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Abstract  
Criminologists have long recognized that some groups govern criminal markets. 
Strategists and political scientists, however, downplay the role organized crime 
plays in domestic and international politics – though the United Nations Security 
Council, World Bank and White House have warned that role may be growing. The 
assumption has been that states and insurgents exist in a political ‘upperworld’ 
while organized crime exists in a separate, profit-driven ‘underworld’. We 
consequently lack a framework for understanding the strategic logic of organized 
crime: how it uses force, and other means, to compete, cooperate and collaborate 
with states and other political organizations for governmental power.  
This dissertation develops such a framework, drawing on strategic theory, 
criminology, and economic and management theory. It applies the framework to the 
emergence, development and movement of mafias in Sicily, New York, and the 
Caribbean between 1859 and 1968. Using unpublished judicial, intelligence and 
diplomatic material, mafia memoires, and published secondary sources, the 
dissertation reveals mafias becoming autonomous strategic actors in both domestic 
and international politics. They deliberately influenced elections, organized 
domestic insurgency and transnational armed attacks, attemped regime change, and 
formed governmental joint ventures with ruling groups. Mafias played important 
and unappreciated military and political roles during the Second World War, the 
Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
Based on this historical analysis, the dissertation identifies six ways criminal 
groups position themselves in the ‘market for government’. These positioning 
strategies help explain the emergence and behaviours of mafias, warlords and gang 
rulers; political-criminal alliances; acts of terrorism by criminal groups; and 
criminal sponsorship of new political structures (‘blue ocean’ strategy). The final 
section applies these concepts to two contemporary cases – Mexico and the Sahel – 
and considers the overall implications for strategic theory, efforts to combat 
organized crime and the management of criminal spoilers in peace processes.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 ‘We have become a mafiya power on a world scale.’  
Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, 19932  
 
In 1999 a former CIA Director, Jim Woolsey, appeared before the Committee on 
Banking of the United States House of Representatives. ‘If you should chance’, 
explained Woolsey, 
to strike up a conversation with an articulate, English-speaking Russian in, 
say, the restaurant of one of the luxury hotels along Lake Geneva, and he is 
wearing a $3,000 suit and a pair of Gucci loafers, and he tells you that he is 
an executive of a Russian trading company and wants to talk to you about a 
joint venture, then there are four possibilities. He may be what he says he is. 
He may be a Russian intelligence officer working under commercial cover. 
He may be part of a Russian organized crime group. But the really 
interesting possibility is that he may be all three – and that none of those 
three institutions have any problem with the arrangement.3 
 Woolsey was warning that mafias, business and states were becoming 
difficult to tell apart.  
According to Spanish prosecutors, over the ensuing decade several other 
former Soviet regimes likewise evolved into ‘mafia states’ in which organized 
crime groups worked ‘as a complement to state structures’, doing ‘whatever the 
government… cannot acceptably do as a government’, including trafficking arms, 
carrying out domestic assassinations, extortion, money laundering, drug trafficking, 
and controlling off-shore investments in strategic industries (including aluminium 
and energy).4 By 2012, a leading observer of transnational organized crime, Moisés 
Naím, was warning of the risk of ‘mafia states’ emerging worldwide.5 Other leading 
analysts including Misha Glenny, Douglas Farah and John T. Picarelli all raised 
similar concerns, highlighting the convergence of criminal, political and business 
                                                
2 Quoted in Stephen Handelmann, Comrade Criminal: The Theft of the Second Russian Revolution 
(London: Joseph, 1994), p. 25. 
3 Quoted in Misha Glenny, McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld (London: 
The Bodley Head, 2008), pp. 110-111.  
4 ‘US embassy cables: Russia is virtual “mafia state”, says Spanish investigator’, The Guardian 
(UK), 2 December 2010. 
5 Moisés Naím, ‘Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 91, no. 3 (2012).  
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power in Latin America, Africa and Asia.6  
Worldwide, we see signs of an apparent ‘convergence’ of organized 
criminal activity and instability. The North Korean government stands accused of 
participation in global counterfeiting and drug-running activities.7 In the Middle 
East, organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Daesh (a.k.a. ‘ISIS’) in Syria 
and Iraq combine militancy, social service provision, localized governance and 
participation in a range of off-shore illicit activities with militant activity.8 Armed 
groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mali and Myanmar have engaged in drug 
trafficking, sometimes with the connivance or even participation of state actors. In 
central Africa, the traffic in minerals and wildlife seems to fuel conflict.9 In Somalia, 
organized piracy emerged a decade ago as a central factor in the country’s political 
economy – and its complex politics and long-running civil war.10 In the Sahel and 
North Africa, militant, terrorist and militia fortunes have been tied to dynamics in 
organized hostage markets and in drug, oil and cigarette smuggling.11 In the 
Balkans, cigarette smuggling, organ trafficking, human trafficking and the trade in 
stolen cars have all been factors in the sub-region’s recent bloody past and post-war 
politics.12 And in Central America, skyrocketing homicide rates, the result of local 
actors’ struggles to control the drug trade, human trafficking and extortion markets, 
have topped those of active war zones such as Afghanistan, Syria and South Sudan.  
Global governance institutions such as the World Bank and UN Security 
                                                
6 Glenny; Douglas Farah, Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in 
Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority (Carlisle PA: U.S. Army War 
College, April 2012); Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, eds., Convergence: Illicit Networks 
and National Security in the Age of Globalization (Washington DC: National Defense University 
Press, 2013); John T. Picarelli, ‘Osama bin Corleone? Vito the Jackal? Framing Threat Convergence 
Through an Examination of Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism’, Terrorism 
& Political Violence, vol. 24 (2012), pp. 180-198. See also Naím, ‘Mafia States’, pp. 100-111.  
7  Sheena Chestnut, ‘Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks’, 
International Security, vol. 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007), pp. 80-111. 
8 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (London: Hurst, 
2013). 
9 Katherine Lawson and Alex Vines, Global Impacts of the Illegal Wildlife Trade: The Costs of 
Crime, Insecurity and Institutional Erosion (London: Chatham House, February 2014).  
10 See David M. Anderson, ‘The New Piracy: The Local Context’, Survival, vol. 52, no. 1 (February-
March 2010), pp. 44-51.  
11 Wolfram Lacher, ‘Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region’ (Washington DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2012); Global Initiative Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, ‘Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Past, Present and Future’ 
(Geneva: GITOC, 2014); Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: 
Profits and Losses, Peaceworks No. 96 (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 2014). 
12 UNODC, Crime and its Impact on the Balkans (Vienna: UNODC, March 2008).  
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Council have in turn recognized that organized crime and political instability have 
become entwined.13 This ‘convergence’ is now perceived as affecting the core 
interests of major powers such as the United States. The 2011 White House Strategy 
to Combat Transnational Organized Crime asserted that criminal networks   
threaten U.S. interests by forging alliances with corrupt elements of 
national governments and using the power and influence of those elements 
to further their criminal activities… to the detriment of the United States.14 
What are the strategic implications of this apparent ‘convergence’ of 
political, military, business and criminal power? Some authors such as Naím and 
Farah argue that criminal power is now so ubiquitous and significant in the 
international system that it threatens to disrupt states’ established ways of doing 
business. We may be entering, they imply, a dangerous ‘era’ of mafia states. How 
are strategic decision-makers to tell if the executive in his $3,000 suit and his Gucci 
loafers is a government spy, a businessman, a crook – or all three? And if we cannot 
tell them apart, how are we to prevent mafias, or other criminal groups, from 
abusing the privileges and powers of statehood, and to stop states from working 
with, or acting like, mafias? How will states trust each other? And how can they 
deal strategically with groups whose whole strategic approach is intended to keep 
their power – over governments, markets and civil society – hidden? 
 
A ‘strategic vacuum’ 
One simple and effective definition of ‘criminal organizations’ and ‘criminal groups’ 
is provided by sociologists Alan Block and Mary McIntosh: associations made up 
of individuals whose ‘major occupational role is a criminal one, though they may 
have another nominal occupation as well’.15 Political scientists and strategists have 
downplayed the possibility that criminals’ other ‘nominal occupations’ might 
include those they study: politicians, governmental officials and strategic decision-
                                                
13 World Bank, Conflict, Security and Development: 2011 World Development Report (Washington 
DC: World Bank, 2011); UN Security Council, Resolution 2195 (2014), 19 December 2014.  
14  President Barack Obama, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing 
Converging Threats to National Security, (Washington DC: The White House, 19 July 2011).  
15 Alan Block, East Side, West Side: Organizing Crime in New York 1930-1950 (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1983), p. 10; Mary McIntosh, ‘New Directions in the Study of Criminal 
Organizations’, in Herman Bianchi, Mario Simondi and Ian Taylor, eds., Deviance and Control in 
Europe: Papers from the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control (London: 
Wiley, 1975), p. 147.  
  14 
makers (including military commanders). Popular jokes about ‘crooked politicians’ 
aside, we tend to think of ‘criminals’ and ‘government officials’ as having distinct 
roles. Indeed, the humour in the jokes derives from upending that normal distinction.  
The result, however, is no joke, but rather something of a blindspot – both 
theoretical and in terms of practical policy-making. Because criminal activity is 
studied by criminologists and political activity by political scientists, the close 
relationship between these activities – and what happens when individuals take on 
both criminal and political roles – has not been deeply or systematically studied. 
This is surprising, given that criminologists have long recognized that, like some 
legal businesses, some criminal organizations maximize their profits through 
regulatory capture.16 Roy Godson, long-time editor of Trends in Organized Crime, 
goes further, suggesting that regulatory capture may be critical to criminal success: 
in most cases where a crime group has endured and prospered – whether in 
a democracy or an authoritarian regime – the criminals have reached some 
type of accommodation with political authorities.17  
Another scholar, Michael Kenney, likewise concludes that ‘[t]he ability of 
criminals to survive hostile law enforcement often depends on their access to 
political power.’18 But the strategic implications of this criminal access to and 
accommodation with political actors, both for the criminal actors themselves, and 
especially for states and other political organizations, have received limited 
attention. A rich literature explores how criminal groups match means (especially 
violence and corruption) in specific ways to dominate other criminal groups. But 
the possibility that criminal groups might also act strategically (matching means, 
including violence, into ways to achieve defined strategic ends) in order to 
maximize governmental power – the power to set norms, resolve disputes and 
allocate resources – has been comparatively neglected.  
                                                
16 On regulatory capture see Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, 
the Railroads, and the Public Interest’, Yale Law Journal, vol. 614 (1952), pp. 467-509; for extension 
of the concept to transition processes, see Joel S. Hellman and Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Confronting the 
Challenge of State Capture in Transition Economies’, Finance & Development, vol. 38, no. 3 (2001), 
pp. 31-35.   
17 Roy Godson, ‘The Political-Criminal Nexus and Global Security’, in Roy Godson, ed., Menace to 
society: political-criminal collaboration around the world (New Brunswick/London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2003), p. 4.  
18 Michael Kenney, ‘Turning to the “Dark Side”: Coordination, Exchange, and Learning in Criminal 
Networks’, in Miles Kahler, ed., Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance (Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 82.  
  15 
Recent attempts to describe the penetration of national government by 
organized crime at times have struggled to illuminate the dynamics of this 
interaction. Bunker and Bunker, for example, define ‘criminal-states’ to include 
such diverse phenomena as ‘jihadi insurgency’, state failure, criminal takeover of 
the state, and oligarchic regimes.19 The notion of ‘criminal sovereignty’ in the so-
called ‘parapolitics’ literature treats economically motivated crime and other types 
of ‘subversion of the formal political process’ all together.20 Michael Miklaucic and 
Moisés Naím more helpfully describe a spectrum of criminal influence ranging 
from ‘criminal penetration’ to ‘criminal infiltration’ to ‘criminal capture’ and 
ultimately the ‘criminal sovereign’, in which ‘the apparatus of the state itself [is] 
engaged directly in criminal activity as a matter of policy’.21 But this taxonomy 
describes the results of the interaction between criminal organizations and political 
actors, rather than the dynamics of that interaction. Doug Farah perhaps comes 
closest to offering such a dynamic model with his concept of ‘criminalized states,’ 
which he defines as those where the senior leadership is involved in organized 
crime, ‘levers of state power’ are ‘incorporated into the operational structure’ of 
organized crime, and organized crime is ‘used as an instrument of statecraft’.22 
 But even this framework begs the question: what drives the development of 
such an arrangement in the first place? The danger is, as the thoughtful American 
scholar-practitioner Robert J. Bunker has put it, that ‘[t]he creation of governmental 
policy [on organized crime] … exists in a “strategic vacuum”’. 23  We lack 
understanding of what drives the strategic interaction between governments and 
criminal groups – especially on the international level. If there is a ‘strategic logic’ 
to organized crime, as there is to suicide terrorism, it has to date largely been 
                                                
19 Robert J. Bunker and Pamela L. Bunker, ‘Defining Criminal-states’, in Robert J. Bunker, ed., 
Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 37-50. 
20 Robert Cribb, ‘Introduction: Parapolitics, Shadow Governance and Criminal Sovereignty’, in Eric 
Wilson, ed., Government of the Shadows: Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty (London/New 
York: Pluto Press, 2009), p. 8. 
21 Michael Miklaucic and Moisés Naím, ‘The Criminal State’ in Miklaucic and Brewer, p. 149.  
22 Farah, Transnational Organized Crime, p. 6.  
23 Robert J. Bunker, ‘Criminal (Cartel & Gang) Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas: What you 
need to know, not what you want to hear’, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 13 September 
2011, at http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/bun091311.pdf, accessed 14 March 
2015.  
  16 
overlooked.24 Or even denied: in a recent Canadian-government funded study, Carlo 
Morselli and colleagues argue that criminal organizations are not strategic actors 
that deliberately seek out and exploit markets in foreign locations.25 The evidence 
presented in this dissertation challenges that conclusion.  
 
About this dissertation 
This dissertation aims to begin filling this gap in evidence and knowledge by 
considering the strategic logic by which criminal groups – especially the Sicilian 
and American mafias – have competed, cooperated and collaborated with sovereign 
states and other political organizations, and moved from one state to another. Two 
startling conclusions emerge from the evidence. First, some organized criminal 
groups – and not only states – make war. Recognition of this fact will have major 
implications for how we understand and seek to manage conflict worldwide. Second, 
the ‘convergence’ that we see around us may not be so new as we think – but rather 
an acceleration or intensification of long-standing patterns of interaction between 
states and organized crime. Although we may have forgotten it, this dissertation 
reveals that states have a long, complex history of competition – and collaboration – 
with strategic criminal actors. Rememberging that history may better equip us to 
deal with the inter-mingling of politics, war and crime that we see around the world 
today.  
Part One considers whether and how organized crime might be brought 
within the framework of strategic theory. Chapter 2 considers the threshold question 
of whether it makes sense to treat any criminal groups as acting according to a 
‘strategic’ logic. The orthodox view among strategic theorists and political 
scientists has been that criminal activity does not follow a strategic logic. First, 
because it is not ‘logical’ but rather irrational; or, if it is rational, it is disorganized. 
And second, because criminal logic is not a ‘strategic’ one in the sense relevant to 
politics, war and international affairs, since organized crime pursues profit, not 
power. Chapter 2 argues that this traditional approach fails to appreciate how the 
                                                
24 See Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random 
House, 2006).  
25 Carlo Morselli, Mathilde Turcotte and Valentina Tenti, ‘The Mobility of Criminal Groups’, Report 
No. 004, 2010, Public Safety Canada, Ottawa, 2010, p. 6. 
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pursuit of governmental power shapes some criminal choice, organization, culture, 
and impact. Drawing on criminology, strategic theory, economic analysis and the 
business management literature, Chapter 2 develops a framework for understanding 
how some criminal groups develop governmental power in pursuit of the goal of 
maximizing criminal rents. ‘Criminal rents’ are the value beyond the costs of 
production that can be extracted from a good or service the supply of which has 
been criminalized by one or more states, or that can be extracted from legal goods 
and services by criminal means.26  Chapter 2 describes the capabilities that a 
criminal organization must develop to succeed in a competitive strategic 
environment – coercion, corruption and communications – and explores how these 
are effectively organized to extract these rents. Different criminal rents require the 
organization of different capabilities. Taxing trafficking passing through a territory, 
for example, may require a different combination of coercion, corruption and 
communications capabilities than does extortion of legitimate and illegitimate 
business operating within that territory. As a result, criminal groups adopt a variety 
of approaches to governmental power in order to maximize different criminal rents. 
What distinguishes all criminal strategy, however, is that it seeks to maximize 
governmental power without taking on the formal responsibilities of political rule. 
Criminal power is a hidden power.  
Part Two of the thesis tests this analytical framework against historical 
evidence relating to the Sicilian and American mafias. As Phil Williams has noted, 
a strategic perspective needs to understand the longer-term evolution of criminal 
markets and groups, and look beyond the short-term impact of law enforcement 
activities.27 This, in turn, requires understanding the strategic choices open to and 
made by the actors in question. As Raymond Aron observed, strategic thought 
‘draws its inspiration… at each moment of history from the problems which events 
                                                
26 See Thomas Schelling, ‘What is the Business of Organized Crime?’, J. Pub. Law, vol. 20, no. 1 
(1970), pp. 71-84; Jean Cartier-Bresson, ‘État, Marchés, Réseaux et Organisations Criminelles 
Entrepreneuriales’, Paper presented at the Colloquium on ‘Criminalité Organisée et Ordre dans la 
Societé’, Aix-en-Provence, 5-7 June 1996 (Aix-en-Provence: Aix-Marseille University Press, 1997); 
Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman, ‘Introduction’, in Fiorentini and Peltzman, eds., The 
Economics of Organized Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995/1997), pp. 1-30; and 
R.T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2004, revd ed.), p. 15.   
27 Phil Williams, ‘Organizing Transnational Crime: Networks, Markets and Hierarchies’, in Phil 
Williams and Dimitri Vlassis, eds., Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and 
Responses (London/Portland OR: Frank Cass),  p. 84. 
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themselves pose’; it is only through a study of specific historical episodes that we 
can understand how strategic actors have understood what they were doing and 
sought to shape their environments, and how a specific strategic approach or culture 
has shaped an organization’s conduct.28 Chapters 3 to 8 therefore test the analytical 
framework developed in Part One against a series of inter-linked historical episodes 
involving interaction between criminal groups and political actors over more than a 
century (1859-1968) and in three separate, but linked, operational environments – 
Sicily, New York City and the Caribbean.  
While many of these episodes have previously been studied by mafia 
historians this dissertation breaks new ground in three ways. First, in many of the 
episodes, it draws on primary material – declassified government files and rare 
insider accounts by criminal and political actors – that has to date been entirely or 
largely overlooked by scholars. Second, rather than just recounting the history of 
each episode, the analysis focuses on understanding and tracking the strategic 
thinking of actors involved in organized crime. And third, by looking at these 
episodes in juxtaposition, it is able to identify long-term development in the 
strategic thinking of the Sicilian and American mafias.  
The long time-scope of the episodes studied allows the application of the 
analytical framework developed in Part One in a wide array of political and 
economic contexts: agrarian, developing and industrialized economies; rural and 
urban social settings; during and after Prohibition; and against the backdrop of 
several wars. The episodes reveal organizations shifting both from criminal to 
political strategy and in the opposite direction; periods of mafia ‘war’, peacemaking 
and constitutional reform; shifts from accommodation to confrontation with a state; 
resort to domestic insurgency and transnational terrorism; and mafia ‘migration’ 
both through diasporization and cultural transplantation and through more 
deliberate relocation to new foreign markets.29 We see political organizations 
allying with mafias in Sicily, New York, Cuba and The Bahamas, and ‘joint venture’ 
government at both the municipal and national level. We see mafias backing regime 
change and constitutional reform both by force (in Sicily, Cuba and Haiti), and 
                                                
28 Raymond Aron, ‘The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought’, Adelphi Papers, vol. 9, issue 4, 
Special Issue: Problems of Modern Strategy: Part I (1969), p. 7.  
29 Compare Federico Varese, Mafias on the move: how organized crime conquers new territories 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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through the ballot box (in the Bahamas). Perhaps most astonishingly, given the US 
government’s recent warnings about the dangers posed by political-criminal 
collaboration, the study also reveals multiple episodes of extended collaboration 
between the American Mob and the US government, for the purposes of domestic 
espionage, management of the labour movement, foreign assassination, invasion, 
occupation, transnational ‘terror’ attacks and attempted regime change. 
Part Three of the dissertation draws on the evidence presented in Part Two 
to consider the resulting theoretical and policy implications. As Alexander George 
and Andrew Bennett note, one of the benefits of a case study approach is that it 
serves ‘the heuristic purpose of inductively identifying additional variables and 
generating hypotheses’.30 Drawing on the episodes in Part Two, Chapter 9 identifies 
six ideal-type strategies by which groups seeking to maximize criminal rents 
‘position’ themselves in a ‘market for government’. In this market for government, 
individuals and communities consume governmental services and the normative 
order attached to them (‘governmentality’); states, insurgents, criminal groups and 
others are the providers.  
The first three ideal-types of criminal positioning involve the kinds of 
accommodation between state and criminal groups that might be covered by a 
catch-all term like ‘mafia state’, but this analysis provides a more nuanced 
framework for understanding the different strategic configurations between criminal 
actors, state authorities and other political organizations. The first – intermediation 
strategy – involves brokering between the state and enclave markets or communities 
in which the criminal group enjoys governmental power. This is the classical mafia 
strategy, based on jurisdictional sharing of the market for government with the state. 
The second, involving adopting a posture of criminal autonomy, requires limited 
territorial separation sustained by military force, and offering local control of 
criminal markets. This is classically the strategy of warlords and local gang rulers. 
The third, the merger strategy, sees criminal and political actors collaborating to 
develop and use governmental power, through vertical integration of capabilities. It 
generates ‘joint ventures’. 
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Sciences (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 45.  
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Three other positioning strategies arise in the context of confrontation 
between states (or other political organizations) and criminal rivals in the market for 
government. The fourth involves strategic political-criminal alliances against third 
parties. The fifth involves the criminal group coercing another kind of ‘third party’, 
the public, in order indirectly to induce a change in state policy. This is terrorism as 
criminal strategy. And finally, a criminal group may seek to relocate within the 
market for government by changing the market’s formal political structure – 
altering a state’s constitution, or sponsoring state secession – in order to maximize 
its own governmental power. Because this involves moving from a part of the 
market that is crowded with rivals and running red with their blood to a new 
arrangement with less formal governmental competition, following business 
management literature this is described as criminal blue ocean strategy.  
Chapter 10 briefly considers how these positioning strategies may be 
playing out in two contemporary, highly violent ‘markets for government’: Mexico 
and the Sahel. This leads to the conclusion that entrepreneurial armed groups are 
using illicit transnational flows to innovate new business-models in the market for 
government, and in the process disrupting the dominance of sovereignty as a 
business model for government. In turn, hybrid approaches to government are 
emerging, including some combining elements of criminal governmentality with 
terrorist methods, and others combining statecraft with methods similar to those of 
organized crime. The dissertation closes with reflections on what an improved 
understanding of the strategic logic of organized crime and its emerging role in the 
market for government may mean for strategic and international relations theory, 
practical efforts to combat organized crime, and spoiler management in peace and 
transition processes.  
 
Entering a gallery of mirrors 
The investigation of organized criminal activity is notoriously difficult.31 Criminals 
are a secretive bunch, and it can be somewhat risky to stick your nose in their 
business. Rumour abounds, making much existing data unreliable and corroboration 
                                                
31 Robert Mandel, Dark Logic: Transnational Criminal Tactics and Global Security (Stanford CA: 
Stanford Security Studies, 2011), pp. 7-9.  
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challenging. Government sources have reasons to distort criminal activity, whether 
to demonize it or to hide corruption and complicity.32 One noted mafia historian 
describes over-reliance on state sources as entering a ‘gallery of mirrors’.33 Reliance 
on criminal sources poses its own problems. Leading mafia historian John Dickie 
calls ‘[c]ommunications within the mafia… whispers in a labyrinth’.34 As the mafia 
pentito (literally, ‘repentant’ – i.e. state’s witness) Tommaso Buscetta put it, 
criminal groups deliberately ‘fragment’ information, discouraging ‘anyone from 
knowing the full facts’, creating ‘obstacles to the circulation of information’.35 As 
the reporter Hickman Powell noted in 1939, when researching organized crime, ‘the 
partial facts come to the surface only now and then, like brief glimpses of a sea 
monster too fabulous for belief’.36 And sometimes disbelief is entirely warranted. 
The stories told by criminals are often self-serving.37 Robert Lacey, the preeminent 
biographer of the Mob leader Meyer Lansky, points out that many criminals ‘are 
fantasists... It is the character flaw that first drew them to that world.’38 Moreover, 
the mystery, violence and power of organized crime makes it a subject that tends – 
as the late British historian Eric Hobsbawm noted – to attract ‘sensational gossip, as 
pears attract wasps’.39  
Yet the challenges facing the organized crime historian differ more in 
degree than kind from those facing ‘regular’ historians.  Which historical source is 
not, in some way, partial and self-serving? This dissertation seeks to address the 
serious investigative challenges posed by the subject-matter by using multiple 
independent sources to develop an understanding of actors’ strategic choices to 
resort to criminal methods and activity. This requires understanding how these 
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actors defined their goals, the resources available to them, and the constraints they 
faced in mobilizing and deploying those resources to achieve their goals. It requires 
attention to the dialectic process of adjustment between means and ends undertaken 
by the actors studied, and their responses to shifting strategic circumstances. The 
aim of the episodic case-study approach, as neatly summarized by Lawrence 
Freedman, is not the development of a ‘general theory’ per se, but rather to: a) add 
to our understanding of the cases in question; and b) add to our understanding of 
how strategic choices present themselves to policy makers (in this case criminal and 
political leaders) and why and how strategic choices are made.40 
 Insider accounts provide unique insights into these choices and 
understandings, and English and to a lesser degree Italian-language insider accounts 
provide a major source for the analysis in both Parts One and Two.41 A full list of 
the sources relied upon is provided in the Bibliography. The chapters in Part Two 
also begin with brief notes on the provenance, strengths and limitations of major 
sources used. The most important insider accounts dealt with include memoires by 
mafia leaders such as Joseph Bonanno and the rarely-used memoire of Nicola 
Gentile, both particularly useful in understanding the relationship between the 
Sicilian mafia and the New York Mob, and the Castellammarese War within the 
New York underworld studied in Chapter 4.42 Other significant insider accounts are 
found in reported interviews with leadership figures such as Lucky Luciano,43 
Meyer Lansky,44 the gangster lawyer Dixie Davis,45 and the Mob soldier Joe 
Valachi.46  
These insider accounts are corroborated through a variety of police, judicial 
                                                
40 Freedman, Deterrence, p. 45.  
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and parliamentary proceedings (again, in both English and Italian). Some of this 
archival material reveals additional insider testimony; wherever possible, transcripts 
of actual testimony – rather than official summaries – have been consulted. 
Examples of such sources used in Part Two include US State and Federal 
investigations into governmental corruption,47 organized crime,48 the waterfront,49 
racketeering,50 and the assassination of John F. Kennedy.51 One unique source 
underpinning Chapter 5, the examination of collaboration between the Mob and the 
US Navy during World War Two, is the material contained in the Thomas E. 
Dewey archive at the University of Rochester Library in up-state New York, 
relating to a 1954 judicial investigation led by William B. Herlands, some of which 
has never previously been publicly referenced.52  
Declassified intelligence analysis and diplomatic correspondence has also 
proven invaluable. One such source is the FBI’s ‘Mafia Monograph’, written in 
1958 after J. Edgar Hoover was forced – by the arrest of over 60 Mob figures at 
once in Apalachin, New York – to acknowledge the existence of the Mob. This 
unique monograph draws not only on extensive US government sources but also 
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detailed Italian government sources (now believed lost) and US informant 
testimony. 53  Other key governmental sources drawn on in Part Two include 
unpublished US, British and Italian government correspondence relating to Sicily 
and Cuba, much of it found in the British National Archives in Kew and the US 
National Archives and Records Administration (primarily in College Park, 
Maryland). 
 
Why does criminal strategy matter? 
The central, compelling reason for understanding the strategic logic of organized 
crime is simply that it may strengthen efforts to combat it.  
Even those contemporary state strategies for combating organized crime that 
do contemplate the possibility that criminal groups may work with and within 
political institutions, such as the recent White House National Strategy, are vague in 
their treatment of criminal groups’ strategies.54 The same is true of much academic 
analysis: as Southerland and Potter have recognized, most studies of organized 
crime focus on ‘the structural dimensions and their determinants without attending 
to theory of organizational behavior’.55 If we take seriously the call by the eminent 
strategist Hew Strachan for ‘strategy’ to be something more than ‘policy’, for it to 
anticipate spoiling behaviour and be capable of adjustment to deal with changing 
circumstances, then we must take seriously the possibility that our adversaries – 
whether we label them ‘criminal’ or ‘political’ – are themselves strategic, and not 
just the playthings of structural forces.56 Yet much contemporary analysis treats 
organized crime just that way. For example recent analysis by Morselli, Turcotte 
and Tenti on the mobility of criminal groups treats criminal actors as passive 
objects subject to ‘push and pull’ factors, rather than recognizing their capacity also 
to shape those forces. ‘Setting’, they state explicitly, ‘matters more than the group 
itself.’57 
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The label ‘organized crime’ itself also works at times against strategic 
thinking on the part of states, creating a knee-jerk preference for coercive responses. 
As Lawrence Freedman says of ‘terrorism’, the presentation of organized crime  
as inherently illicit and immoral conduct ensures that it is put in a separate 
category to other forms of action and so is subject to different 
considerations to those that normally govern political affairs or even most 
types of military operations. This encourages an a-strategic view.58 
As the leading scholar on warlordism and organized crime in contemporary 
Afghan politics Antonio Giustozzi notes, it is counter-productive simply to write off 
some actors as ‘criminal’, irrational or atavistic. A more effective approach would 
require policy-makers to develop an improved understanding of these actors’ 
political and economic strategies.59 The Sicilian anti-mafia magistrate, Giovanni 
Falcone, recognized this during his struggle with the mafia in the early 1990s. 
Falcone argued that ‘different strategies’ were needed ‘according to the type of 
Mafia one is dealing with’, and that to determine that, we must not demonize the 
mafia, but rather understand it. Mafiosi, he argued,  
are not … the Devil… They are men like us… if we want to fight the 
Mafia organisation efficiently, we must not transform it into a monster… 
We must recognize that it resembles us.60 
 The Sicilian mafia, however, did not wish to be understood, because to be 
understood meant to be demystified, and to have the sources of their power revealed. 
They preferred to stay hidden, mounting a sustained campaign of terrorist bombings, 
targeting politicians, judges, a Roman church and even the Uffizi Gallery in 
Florence to try to terrorize the population and the state back into silent 
accommodation of mafia power. On 23 May 1992, Falcone himself died when the 
mafia exploded a huge bomb under his convoy outside Palermo.   
 Episodes such as this generated an increasingly loud post-Cold War 
drumbeat of warnings from security scholars that criminal actors were gaining 
power and influence within the international system.61 Roy Godson, Phil Williams 
                                                
58 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy’, Government & Opposition, vol. 42 (2007), p. 315.  
59 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Debate on Warlordism: The Importance of Military Legitimacy’, Crisis 
States Discussion Paper 13 (London: Crisis States Research Centre, October 2005), p. 7.  
60 Giovanni Falcone, Men of Honour: The Truth about the Mafia (London: Warner Books, 1992), pp. 
70, 100.  
61 See Phil Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security’, Survival, 
vol. 36, no. 1 (1994), pp. 96-113; Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano, ‘Introduction’, in Mats Berdal 
  26 
and Susan Strange all warned that organized crime may be corroding state capacity 
and the state system.62 Martin van Creveld forecast that ‘the state will lose its 
monopoly over … organized violence’, with security becoming a ‘capitalist 
enterprise’, a private good sold in a global market, rather than a public good 
supplied by states.63 Some have linked this notionally increased criminal power to 
globalization and market liberalization. 64  Others suggest, however, that 
transnational organized crime and terrorism are convenient bogeymen conjured by 
the West to replace the communist threat.65 As the eminent strategist Lawrence 
Freedman has noted, transnational non-state armed groups have loomed large for a 
‘hyper-power without a military peer among states’ that has nonetheless ‘turned out 
to be unexpectedly vulnerable to a murky underworld of gangsters and terrorists.’66 
But Freedman himself points out the need to accommodate a wide range of strategic 
actors within our frameworks for analysing contemporary affairs. As Freedman 
notes,   
theory need[s] to consider the employment of strategic threats by any 
politically conscious collectivity for a great variety of potential purposes, 
and not just by states...67 
 Should this include some organized crime groups? Strategic competition 
between criminal groups that have taken on governmental roles – setting norms, 
resolving disputes, and allocating resources – can become just as totalizing as 
Clausewitz explained war can be. 68  As Roberto Saviano, an Italian public 
intellectual who grew up amongst the Camorra, the dominant organized crime 
group in Naples, put it: 
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When the armies take to the streets, it is impossible to move according to 
any other dynamic than their strategy; it is they who decide meaning, 
motives, causes.69 
Here is a Sicilian pentito, a repentant former mafioso turned state’s witness: 
It was as if I was a soldier for a state, my state Cosa Nostra… I was only 
interested in the opinion of my people, the people of Cosa Nostra, I wasn’t 
interested in anybody else’s opinion, just as an Italian soldier wouldn’t be 
interested in the opinion of [enemies such as] the Yugoslavs or Germans.70 
War within the mafia may feel, to the combatants, like war between states – 
but simply conflating war and crime seems unlikely to get us very far in 
understanding the strategic significance for states – if any – of organized crime. 
When, a decade ago, economist Paul Collier argued explicitly that all civil war 
could be understood as organized crime,71 critics quickly emphasized that the 
diversity of motivations and organizational forms amongst contemporary armed 
groups defies such a generalized analysis.72 The resulting debate helped to reveal, 
however, that even as some contemporary organized violence functions as ‘the 
continuation of economics by other means’ it does not lack political motives and 
effects.73 As Mary Kaldor, David Keen and other ‘New Wars’ scholars have 
clarified, even profit-oriented activity during civil war generates competition for 
control over normative order, dispute resolution and resource allocation – in other 
words over governmental power.74  
A more careful parsing may be needed of the distinctions between criminal, 
insurgent and political groups – distinctions that the Brookings Institution scholar 
Vanda Felbab-Brown cautions are ‘frequently exaggerated in policy discussions.’75 
Felbab-Brown herself made illuminating contributions in her 2009 monograph, 
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Shooting Up, which explored the relationship between states and insurgent groups 
engaged in illicit drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan, Colombia, Burma, 
Northern Ireland and India.76 Her study highlights how insurgent organizations use 
drug trafficking to generate and harness not only economic but political effects: 
popular support or ‘political capital’, freedom of action, and material gains. In 
subsequent work Felbab-Brown has also developed these insights to address urban 
governance and low-intensity conflict and even suggested that criminal groups 
compete with political actors in ‘state-making’, an idea explored further in Chapter 
9.77 
A parallel debate has considered the role of criminal activity in the changing 
nature of insurgency, stimulated in particular by the work of Steven Metz.78 R. 
Thomas Naylor added much to our understanding of the role of criminal activity 
during insurgency through his analysis of the ‘insurgent economy’.79 Phil Williams 
and John Picarelli have illuminated how criminal activity can serve political groups’ 
interests and even underpin strategic alliances between criminal and insurgent 
organizations. 80  Nils Gilman, Jesse Goldhammer and Steven Weber explicitly 
recognize that ‘deviant entrepreneurs wield political power’ in the form of money, 
violence and through the provision of public goods and services.81 Recently, there 
has also been considerable debate over whether drug violence in Mexico can 
usefully be understood through the hybrid conceptual lens of ‘criminal 
insurgency’.82 Adam Elkus and John Sullivan have applied Clausewitzian strategic 
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concepts to understand Mexican cartel military operations, but stop short of 
considering the political dimension of cartel strategy.83 One analyst who has come 
close to such an approach (outside Mexico) is General Sir Rupert Smith, in his 
seminal work The Utility of Force. Drawing on his extensive command experience, 
especially in the Balkans, Smith highlights the importance of clandestine social 
networks and criminal activity as a source of logistical and social resources for 
contemporary armed groups competing with the state for control of the ‘protection’ 
of populations in a ‘war amongst the people’.84  
Yet none of these authors considers how criminal groups mix and match 
their criminal capabilities to achieve specific political goals. If anything, these 
various debates have thrown into relief the analytical weakness of hybrid concepts 
such as ‘mafia states’, ‘threat convergence’, ‘criminal insurgency’ and ‘crime-
terrorism nexus’. Simply combining the concepts of war, crime and terrorism may 
obscure, rather than reveal, underlying patterns of interaction. While it may be true 
that groups engaged in armed conflict, terrorism or organized crime interact, or 
even that a particular organization, such as Hezbollah, engages simultaneously in all 
three activities, this does not mean that it is helpful to treat the activities themselves 
as converging. A better approach may be to identify when and why armed groups 
will engage in each activity.  
This is, fundamentally, a question of strategy. In the case of criminal 
strategy, the central question is why and how some groups develop governmental 
power to maximize criminal rents. It is to that question that we now turn.  
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2. The Strategic Organization of Crime 
  
‘The logic of the Mafia… is nothing more than the logic of power...’ 
Giovanni Falcone85  
 
What is ‘organized crime’? Argument over how to understand the concept is both 
semantic and empirical.86 The respected criminologist Klaus von Lampe argues 
there is no single phenomenon of ‘organized crime’.87 Others argue that organized 
crime is simply whatever powerful states say it is.88 A term originally coined during 
Prohibition in the US,89 ‘organized crime’ has been explained through a variety of 
analytical frameworks – political, economic, social and cultural.90 Yet to date there 
has been limited consideration of whether crime is organized ‘strategically’.   
Strategy is about how actors relate means to ends. As Lawrence Freedman 
succinctly explains, ‘strategy is the art of creating power’, where power is 
understood as the ‘capacity to produce effects that are more advantageous than 
would otherwise have been the case’.91 To understand an actor’s strategy, we must 
understand both the sources of its power, its advantage in relationships; and the 
choices it makes to realize that power.92 This Chapter provides an analytical 
framework for considering whether crime is ever organized strategically. Drawing 
on existing scholarship, the Chapter considers four questions: First, do criminal 
groups have strategic goals? Second, is crime rationally organized to achieve them? 
Third, where does strategic decision-making occur?  And fourth, how are the means 
to achieve these ends organized? 
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Criminal strategy and governmental power 
The field of strategic studies has traditionally ruled out criminal groups being 
considered strategic actors, because it treats strategy as a question of pursuing 
power – and especially political power. War is seen as the paradigmatic form of 
strategic competition for power. As the eminent strategic theorist Colin Gray has 
put it, taking his cues from Clausewitz, ‘War is about politics, and politics is about 
relative power.’93 Violent competition between criminal groups, on the other hand, 
‘is not war’, argues Gray, because criminal groups pursue economic, not political, 
goals.94 Security scholars such as Mats Berdal and Mónica Serrano take a similar 
position: crime, they argue, is over-ridingly organized according to ‘the logic of 
profitability and economic gain’, rather than a political or strategic logic.95 
 Part of the problem arises from the fact that, as noted by Robert J. Kelly, a 
former President of the International Association for the Study of Organized Crime, 
there is a ‘lack of strong coherent explanatory scientific traditions that make sense 
of’ the political power that organized crime does wield.96 The most important 
attempts have taken the form of case studies. Alan Block’s study of the collusion 
between criminal organizations and political figures in New York between 1930 
and 1950, for example, provides rich insights into the social function of these 
dealings, though less insight into internal decision-making processes.97 There is a 
particularly rich literature exploring political-criminal collusion in Italy, some of 
which is explored in Part Two. More recently, case studies have emerged around 
the role of criminal groups in specific states such as Russia – for example Solnick’s 
Stealing the State and Handelmann’s Comrade Criminal; and Kenya, as in the 
journalist Michela Wrong’s It’s Our Turn to Eat.98 Area studies specialists have 
also explored the role of criminal groups and organization in national political 
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orders in Latin America,99 Africa,100 and Central Asia.101 
These case studies rarely explore the role of criminal groups in international 
politics. A volume on the ‘political-criminal nexus’ edited by Roy Godson at 
Georgetown University points in places to the role of foreign governmental actors 
such as the US Central Intelligence Agency in influencing some domestic political 
dynamics.102 A related genre of academic inquiry into ‘parapolitics’ and the ‘deep 
state’ aims to study ‘criminals behaving as sovereigns and sovereigns behaving as 
criminals’, focusing on relationships between intelligence services, clandestine far-
right or conservative groupings (so-called ‘occult powers’) and transnational 
organized crime.103 But the literature is largely descriptive, focuses on individual 
state settings and comparative analysis, rather than exploring inter-state dynamics, 
and risks – as the leading survey of the subgenre acknowledges – tipping over into 
‘grand conspiracy theory’.104  
Other idiosyncratic efforts provide useful though limited building blocks for 
deeper analysis. Robert Mandel’s Dark Logic: Transnational Criminal Tactics and 
Global Security considers the relationship between violence, corruption and 
security.105 But the volume offers no real explanation of how different criminal 
groups choose, dynamically, to apply what he calls the ‘tactics’ of corruption and 
violence in different settings – in other words how they develop and execute 
strategy. Alfredo Schulte-Bockholt’s 2006 monograph The Politics of Organized 
Crime and the Organized Crime of Politics comes closer to such an explanation, 
developing a neo-Marxist hypothesis that organized crime groups reflect dominant 
political elites’ ideological preferences. Like the English Marxist historian Eric 
                                                
99 Enrique Desmond Arias, ‘Understanding Criminal Networks, Political Order, and Politics in Latin 
America’, in Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to 
State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty (Stanford CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), pp. 
115-135.  
100 Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in 
Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).  
101 See for example Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanström, ‘The Eurasian Drug Trade: A 
Challenge to Regional Security’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 53, no. 4 (July-August 2006), 
pp. 10-28. 
102 Godson, ‘The Political-Criminal Nexus’, op. cit. The role of the CIA was explored by Alfred 
McCoy in his seminal The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 
1973).  
103  See Wilson, Government of the Shadows – especially Cribb, op. cit., and Eric Wilson, 
‘Deconstructing the Shadows’, pp. 13-55.   
104 Cribb, p. 3.  
105 Mandel.  
  33 
Hobsbawm before him, Schulte-Bockholt sees organized crime as fundamentally 
capitalist, nested within the institutions of private property and commerce.106 
Adapting Antonio Gramsci’s concept of trasformismo, Schulte-Bockholt argues that 
political elites admit criminal actors to power in order to maintain elite hegemony 
and protect private property.107 In some contemporary settings this explanation 
appears plausible. But Schulte-Bockholt’s rigid approach struggles to explain the 
shifting patterns of accommodation, confrontation and relocation in relations 
between political and criminal organizations that we will see in the episodes in Part 
Two. Nor do these frameworks explain why political and criminal groups may 
collaborate in ways that deliberately generate limited disorder and breakdowns in 
the institutions of private property as a basis for rule, as Chabal and Daloz, Bayart, 
Ellis and Hibou, and Reno, have all suggested has been the case in Africa in recent 
decades.108  
A large portion of existing criminological and sociological scholarship 
simply brackets off the political aspect of organized crime, treating it instead as 
business or ‘enterprise’ operating under the special conditions of illegality.109 This 
economic analysis of organized crime has offered powerful insights,110 particularly 
into internal organization of criminal groups and the strategies of criminal groups 
towards each other.111 But it has proven less adept in explaining criminal groups’ 
relations with political and governmental entities.  
This is in some ways surprising, given that one of the central insights of 
economic analysis of organized crime is that some criminal organizations take on 
governance roles within criminal markets – and under certain conditions can even 
tend towards a governmental monopoly, as do states. Illicit market actors face many 
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challenges that those in legal markets do not, as a result of the absence of the state: 
uncertainties in property and possession; higher capital investment and borrowing 
costs; limited remedies for poor quality goods and services; limited information 
about counterparties; unclear rules; short business planning horizons; and limited 
asset disposal opportunities.112 This creates a demand for protection from violent 
rivals, generating a market for protection services.113 Diego Gambetta’s seminal 
1993 work The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection showed how 
features of the Sicilian mafia sometimes ascribed to culture or norms may in fact 
serve organizational, branding or marketing logics.114 Federico Varese has also 
successfully extended the model to post-Soviet Russia.115 The absence of the state 
also, however, creates a demand for governance functions within criminal markets – 
setting market and social norms, allocating resources, and resolving disputes.116 As 
the sociologist Charles Tilly recognized, organized crime and statehood thus have 
much in common, providing complex protection and regulatory systems.117 It is in 
this sense that, in the phrase made famous by the American analyst Donald Cressey, 
some organized criminal groups are ‘both a business and a government’.118 Those 
who can enforce the rules of the underworld accrue the power to set them. In 
different contexts, criminal organizations have thus variously been described as 
operating as ‘governance structures’,119 ‘de facto’ or ‘private governments’,120 
‘primitive states’121 or competitors in state-making.122  
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Even when this criminal governmental power has been recognized, however, 
it has largely been assumed that this power operates in an underworld sphere 
entirely separated from that of formal or state politics, the upperworld. Eric 
Hobsbawm, for example, described criminal groups as pre-political or apolitical.123 
Criminal organizations, it seems true, usually do not seek to replace the state, as do 
insurgent and rebel groups. Rather, groups adopting criminal strategies seem largely 
to eschew the ‘responsibilities of rule like a state’.124 A preference for dodging 
formal political authority in the upperworld does not however necessarily signify a 
lack of desire for political power over that upperworld. That is precisely the genius 
of criminal strategy: it involves the development of clandestine advantage in 
political relations with and in the upperworld, even if the rents and power accrued 
lie primarily in the underworld. Criminal strategy thus requires leaving the state in 
power – at least formally.125 Supplant the state, or some other higher political 
authority capable of declaring the market you operate in ‘criminal’, and you remove 
the criminal tariff (the rent you can charge because a good or service is illegal). A 
criminal strategy cannot seek to replace or eliminate the state entirely, but only to 
manipulate and exploit it.  
Criminal power is consequently hidden and informal, and criminal strategy 
clandestine. But it is nonetheless political, in the sense that it involves an effort to 
shape the ‘general arrangements’ (Oakeshott)126 or the ‘normative order’ (Weber)127 
of a defined community – not only the underworld itself, but the whole community, 
both upperworld and underworld understood together. After all, without the 
upperworld defining itself as an upperworld, rather than just ‘the world’, the 
underworld does not exist. As Mittelman and Johnston note,  
criminal elements do not seek to take over the state; they are … not 
revolutionary movements seeking to take over its apparatus… [But they] 
are alternative social organizations that … challenge the power and 
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authority of the state to impose its standards, codified as law.128  
They can come to operate, in other words, as covert political organizations, 
or, as some analysts put it, parapolitical associations.129 Power operates within these 
criminal settings not only through the impersonal market forces that Gambetta and 
the economists within the ‘protection’ literature have described so well, but also 
through choices made by individuals, regulating their own conduct in accordance 
with both formal and informal norms.  
Criminal power operates not simply or even primarily through overt 
governmental ‘institutions’, but as a specific, hidden form of what Michel Foucault 
called ‘governmentality’: a normative system by which subjects regulate 
themselves. 130  Foucault described the state as just one specific ‘episode in 
governmentality’.131 This ‘governmentality’ is not just a governmental apparatus 
that disciplines and controls passive objects, but a normative system, within which 
subjects take on a political identity and regulate themselves, self-governing 
mentally.132 Foucault recognized that, until government became associated with 
states, all sorts of other actors were ‘governed’: children (hence, ‘governess’); 
souls; families; the sick. ‘Government’ 
did not only cover the legitimately constituted forms of political or 
economic subjection, but also modes of action… which were destined to 
act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, 
is to structure the possible field of action of others.133 
A ‘governmentality’ is a specific mode of government, a normative and 
practical system for structuring ‘the possible field of action of others’. ‘Government’ 
is thus a strategic concept since, as we saw earlier, ‘strategy is the art of creating 
power’, where power is understood as the ‘capacity to produce effects that are more 
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advantageous than would otherwise have been the case’.134 A ‘governmentality’ 
provides the language through which actors engage with the world, conditioning 
their understanding and expression of their own identities, interests, choices and 
preferences. It provides the mental framework or operating system through which 
they understand their world and seek to create advantage within it. Each specific 
governmentality thus provides, as Foucault neatly formulated it, a system for ‘the 
conduct of conduct’.135  
Some criminal organizations come to operate according to their own 
common, hidden operating systems – their own specific governmentalities. This is 
why we speak not just of a criminal ‘under-sector’, but a criminal ‘under-world’. 
That this criminal ‘governmentality’ is real and powerful in the life of organized 
criminals, and not merely a theoretical postulate, is made clear in an anecdote told 
by Nicola Gentile, a Sicilian-American mafia leader. We will meet Gentile again in 
Part Two, having been called in to attempt to mediate a peace deal during a civil 
war within the New York Mob in the early 1930s. In 1949, after returning to Italy 
where he became involved in the strategic reorganization of the Sicilian mafia 
(discussed in Chapter 6), Gentile spent an afternoon talking to a young researcher. 
He explained the ‘governmental’ nature of a true mafioso’s power: 
Duttureddu [‘little professor’], if I come in here unarmed, and you pick up 
a pistol, point it at me and say: ‘Cola Gentile, down on your knees’, what 
do I do? I kneel. That does not mean that you are a mafioso because you 
have forced Cola Gentile to get down on his knees. It means you are a 
cretin with a pistol in your hand. 
Now if I, Nicola Gentile, come in unarmed, and you are unarmed too, and I 
say to you: ‘Duttureddu, look, I’m in a bit of a situation. I have to ask you 
to get on your knees.’ You ask me: ‘Why?’ I say: ‘Duttureddu, let me 
explain.’ And I manage to convince you that you have to get on your knees. 
When you kneel down, that makes me a mafioso.  
If you refuse to get on your knees, then I have to shoot you. But that 
doesn’t mean I have won: I have lost, Duttureddu.136  
The true, hidden power of organized crime - Gentile was explaining, lies in 
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its normativity, its governmentality. What distinguishes effective criminal power 
from mere coercion is that it makes its victims complicit in the criminal system. 
They view their choices to cooperate as at least partly voluntary. Even without the 
formal trappings of government institutions, criminal power comes to govern 
human actions, through the power it exercises over human minds.  
A targeted carrot-and-stick ‘threat-offer’ or ‘throffer’ usually lies at the heart 
of criminal strategy.137 It is reflected in the famous phrase ¿O plata, o plomo? – 
‘Silver, or lead?’ In popular crime literature, this is known as the offer you cannot 
refuse. Such offers go beyond mere extortion by offering a genuine payoff for the 
target, and not only a threat. Repeated a sufficient number of times, transactions 
structured in this way create an expectation of complicity, a clandestine relationship 
between the person making the threat-offer, and the victim. This relationship is the 
foundation of the protection racket, whose legitimacy and authority may eventually 
be internalized by those within it. This is why criminal organizations frequently 
speak of those in their networks of influence not as their business associates or 
clients, but as their ‘friends’. The exchange relationship is not merely transactional, 
but also associative. 
The hidden web of organized criminal influence operates below, alongside 
and even within the formal state and other political structures. The covert, criminal 
order is sustained not simply through criminal coercion, but through the complicity 
of actors – including government officials – who act in line with what they believe 
are its demands, norms and discipline. It is this covert governmentality that 
underpins criminal organizations’ generation and control of criminal rents.138   
The competition between organized crime groups and the state is thus 
totalizing, and political, in a way that business competition in the legitimate market 
is not. Businesses compete for an individual’s customer loyalty vis-à-vis other 
providers of their goods and services, but rely on the state to govern the market and 
do not compete with it for that power. Strategic criminal organizations and the state 
compete not just to be the individual’s protector, but to be the source of the rules 
and discretion by which that individual is ultimately governed. As for legal 
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businesses, the key to long-term profit maximization for criminal groups is reducing 
competition, whether through collusion or the creation of a monopoly.139 But for 
criminal groups the state is one source of competition. Conversely, criminal groups 
use certain means to compete – violence and corruption – which are ruled out for 
legitimate firms. At least in theory; in fact, legitimate businesses often turn to 
organized crime groups to provide just these capabilities in order to achieve 
strategic advantage through corruption and regulatory capture, or to enforce cartel, 
racketeering and other illegal market arrangements.140  
It should be no surprise, therefore, that some criminal organizations 
deliberately develop collusive and even collaborative arrangements with 
upperworld political actors, maximizing each organization’s governmental power 
within their own territorial, social or commercial sphere of influence. A 1967 Task 
Force on organized crime established by US President Lyndon Johnson found that 
‘organized crime flourishes only where it has corrupted local officials’.141 A 1976 
Task Force on Organized Crime established by US Congress drew similar 
conclusions.142 Respected Italian mafia scholar Letizia Paoli has explicitly argued 
that ‘the most durable and powerful Italian mafia associations… are those that have 
been able to infiltrate state institutions most deeply’.143 Other leading mafia scholars 
such as Sciarrone, Allum and Siebert have all similarly concluded that organized 
crime success relies heavily on the development of political capital.144 Likewise, 
recent analysis of violence in Mexico suggests a direct correlation between the 
disruption of criminal access to political channels (through which to enforce 
corruption arrangements) and upticks in violence.145   
The unorthodox hypothesis that follows is that some criminal organizations 
do indeed seek political power, and should be treated as legitimate objects of 
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strategic analysis. Such a hypothesis is not entirely unprecedented. The sociologist 
Alan Block found that ‘pursuit of power in one guise or another was the cement 
holding together under- and upperworlds’ in New York in the mid-20th century.146 
Adam Elkus, an expert on Mexican drug cartels, describes their goal as ‘power over 
people’.147 Roberto Saviano describes the maxim of the Neapolitan Camorra as 
‘Power before all else.’148 And Francisco Marino Mannoia, a pentito, brings such 
conclusions to life: 
It is often believed that people work with the Cosa Nostra for the money. 
But that is only partly true. Do you know why I became a uomo d’onore 
[man of honour, mafioso]? Because before I had been a nobody in Palermo 
and then afterwards, where I went, heads bowed. You can’t value that in 
money.149  
 The next question, however, is whether this pursuit of power is a collective 
and organizational activity, or simply one pursued individually. 
 
Individual, network or organizational strategy?  
To say that some crime is strategically organized is not to succumb to the populist 
fantasy of criminal masterminds operating according to some ‘master plan’. For a 
criminal group to be ‘strategic’ does not require total control, but only the attempt 
to deliberately shape its environment, rather than simply reacting to it.150 The 
argument here is that organizational choices matter: that the historical development 
and trajectory of some criminal activities is the result not just of underlying 
structural factors or opportunity structures, but also specific choices by human 
agents. The suggestion is that some such choices are ‘strategic’: they involve an 
effort to use available resources to shape the environment in which the actor 
operates, to achieve defined ends. Necessarily, such ‘strategic’ choices are dynamic 
and iterative, emerging out of experience and experimentation. This is just what 
researchers have begun to identify in the organization of rebellion.151 Here, we 
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extend the analysis to criminal organization. 
Understanding strategic choice requires, as Thomas Schelling argued, 
understanding how actors perceive opportunities and incentives.152 This generates 
two related threshold questions that must precede identification of strategically 
organized crime. First, does organized criminal behaviour involve planned, rational 
efforts to shape the strategic environment? Or is crime in fact better considered the 
disorganized response of individual actors reacting to recurring opportunity 
structures? And second, if crime is strategically organized rather than just a 
structural epiphenomenon, where is the strategic decision-making capacity located? 
Is it decentralized across criminal networks, or more centrally organized?  
The first question concerns criminal motivations. As with terrorism, the 
label ‘organized crime’ can be a pejorative one applied by states to delegitimize 
conduct and demonize actors, hampering objective analysis. The application of the 
label can trigger a presumption that the conduct in question is irrational, anarchic or 
even atavistic. This tendency crops up repeatedly in more popular accounts of the 
convergence of war and crime, with terms such ‘anarchic’ and ‘irrational’ being 
used interchangeably with ‘criminal’.153 Much criminal violence is indeed reactive 
– a product of brutalization, anomie and emotional impulse. 154  Indeed, gang 
violence prevention efforts have found great success in recent years through a 
model that empowers cool-headed, locally-legitimate ‘interruptors’ to intervene in 
spiralling gang disputes, talking at-risk youth off emotional cliffs and walking them 
back from violent angry impulses.155 But this does not mean that all violence 
associated with crime is unplanned or non-instrumental. Just as it is for military 
commanders, the challenge for criminal organizers is to channel and harness these 
violent impulses effectively. As Adam Elkus notes of Mexico,  
Much of the violence associated with the drug war is … vicious gang 
                                                                                                                                   
Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 33 (2010), 
pp. 836-853. 
152 Schelling, Choice and Consequence, pp. 198-199.   
153 See for example Hans M. Enzensberger, Civil Wars: From L.A. to Bosnia (New York: The New 
Press, 1994), p. 103 - describing civil wars as frequently being ‘about nothing at all’.  
154 See Phil Williams, ‘The Terrorism Debate over Mexican Drug Trafficking Violence’, Terrorism 
& Political Violence, vol. 24, no. 2 (2012), pp. 259-278. 
155 Charles Ransford, Candice Kane and Gary Slutkin, ‘Cure Violence: A disease control approach to 
reduce violence and change behavior’, in Eve Waltermaurer and Timothy Akers, eds., 
Epidemiological Criminology: Theory to Practice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 232-242. 
  42 
warfare, mutilation and beheadings, and bizarre pseudo-religious sects 
known as narcocultos. Such behaviors were once common in Europe — 
the Thirty Years’ War being the most prominent example — and do not 
change the fact that deliberate policy and strategy guides the violence, not 
mass brutality. We would do well to pay heed to Clausewitz and note the 
constant tension between passion, chance, and reason.156 
A recent review of available evidence concluded that most ‘violence in 
illicit markets is typically selective and instrumental rather than random and 
gratuitous’.157 Still, it is one thing to say that crime – and associated violence – is 
rationally planned by individuals, and another to say that it is systematically, 
collectively organized. This brings us to the second question. To adapt the 
distinction offered by the criminologist A.K. Cohen: is violence an aspect of 
criminal activity, or of criminal association?158  
Beginning in the 1960s economic analysts argued that organized crime is 
often centralized and hierarchical, like a business firm.159 Subsequent empirical 
investigation called this orthodoxy into question, revealing illegal markets 
populated by small entrepreneurs, fluid ‘action sets’ and crews, and complex family 
and commercial networks. This resulted in a shift away from firm-level to industry-
level analysis.160 Some scholars also began suggesting that much crime is in fact un-
organized, and better thought of as opportunist. 161  This has in turn fuelled 
suggestions that even organized crime is better thought of not as a closed, directed 
enterprise, but as an open activity or method, culture, system or form of power into 
which a range of actors can tap. Henner Hess, a leading mafia scholar with 
extensive field experience, famously argued for many years that the Sicilian mafia 
did not exist as an organization, but was rather just a conceptual shorthand by which 
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we sought to reify and explain illicit market forces. 162  Anton Blok, an 
anthropologist whose longitudinal study of mafia activity in a western Sicilian 
village is seen as something of a watershed,163 argued that ‘[p]resenting mafia as a 
single unified structure neglects its structural flexibility and fluidity manifest in 
open-ended networks and action sets’.164  
A particular vogue has emerged in recent years, perhaps amplified by the 
dominance of counter-terrorism discourse and research funding, to treat organized 
criminal activity as the product of network interactions, rather than atomized market 
transactions or hierarchical enterprise behaviour. 165  Yet network analysis and 
organizational analysis are not mutually exclusive.166 As Scott Helfstein of the US 
Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center has noted, clandestine networks 
are ‘subject to the same institutional and bureaucratic forces that influence any other 
purposeful organization’. 167  Karl Von Lampe’s recognition that criminal 
organizations are ‘the results of action, being continuously shaped and re-shaped in 
exchanges between various stakeholders’168 recalls the recognition in management 
theory in the 1980s that organizational behaviour is in part a product of contractual 
negotiation ‘among self-interested individuals with divergent interests’.169 Criminal 
enterprises emerge as institutionalized patterns of exchange within networks, just as 
networks emerge from recurring patterns of exchange within a market.170 As 
Southerland and Potter note,  
viewed from a distance, criminal enterprises might give the impression of 
producing a very high volume of illicit activity, which because of its 
prevalence seems highly organized, and … appears to be a single 
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organization or several very large organizations. But … the same structure 
viewed from the inside would look like a series of partnerships organized 
around specific criminal projects.171 
This all suggests that actors within criminal networks can exercise different 
kinds of influence and power, depending on their position within the network.172 As 
different actors are exposed to different risks, they develop different strategic 
perspectives and preferences.173 The strategy of a criminal organization is thus best 
understood as the result of complex interplay between strategic choices made by 
individuals, operating in a variety of network and hierarchical forms. Depending on 
the shifting distribution of power and activity within these forms, the resulting 
strategy may be deliberate or ‘directed’ from the top down, or ‘emergent’ from 
internal transactions.174 Criminal groups can be understood as providing a ‘context 
of action’, a governmental system of shared resources and common rules that 
constrain participating actors – who may have very diverging objectives and 
strategies, and may compete internally for power even as the group competes with 
external rivals.175 Understanding the strategic behaviour of criminal networks thus 
requires looking inside those networks to understand shifts in internal power and 
influence, and their complex interaction with shifts in the strategic environment in 
which the network operates. 
 
Social bandits and primitive criminal strategy 
The difference between a-strategic and strategic criminal organization is illuminated 
by the special case of social bandits such as Robin Hood, Rob Roy, Jesse James and 
Pancho Villa. These are, as Eric Hobsbawm explained: 
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outlaws whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but who remain 
within … society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as 
champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, 
and in any case as men to be admired, helped and supported.176 
Bandits are of course organized criminals, in the sense that their bands use 
violence to extract criminal rents, through robbery and plunder. Mancur Olson has 
famously suggested that bandits choose whether to rove, or, if it looks like it offers 
better returns, to become stationary autocrats, turning theft into ‘taxation’.177 But 
are these choices strategic? 
As defined by Hobsbawm, social bandits are typically unmarried male 
youths who emerge as peasant rebels after some brush with the state or ruling class 
for an infraction considered socially legitimate but formally illegal. 178  Their 
‘ambitions are modest: a traditional world in which men are justly dealt with, not a 
new and perfect world.’179 The term remains germane, with contemporary criminal 
leaders such as Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán Loera, the former head of the Sinaloa 
Cartel in Mexico, still being described and regarded by some rural poor as a social 
bandit, despite appearing on the Forbes Rich List.180 Hobsbawm explained that the 
poor would  
protect the bandit, regard him as their champion, idealize him and turn him 
into a myth… In return, the bandit himself tries to live up to his role even 
when he is not himself a conscious social rebel.181  
The social bandit is the product of emergent social protest, rather than the 
agent of strategic change, emerging in conditions of rural pauperization and 
economic crisis or, in some cases, slower-moving politico-economic 
transformation.182 Social bandits usually struggle to establish a coherent social 
programme and typically do not emerge as governmental rivals to states, remaining 
vehicles for social protest. They are, in Hobsbawm’s terms, ‘primitive rebels’. As 
we shall see in the brief study in Chapter 6 of Salvatore Giuliano, the famous 
Sicilian bandit with ties to the mafia, bandit strategy is also rather primitive. As 
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Hobsbawm has decisively shown, bandits tend to be men of action, not deep 
thinkers. They are ‘activists and not ideologists or prophets from whom novel 
visions or plans of social and political organization are to be expected’, tough 
leaders who ‘hack out the way’ rather than ‘discover it’. Their social role is not one 
they choose, but one they are typically thrust into by popular acclaim: ‘Bandits, 
except for their willingness or capacity to refuse individual submission, have no 
ideas other than those of the peasantry… of which they form part.’183 Indeed, once 
bandits start to select attack targets not because they are ‘organic’, well-known local 
sources of oppression, but rather on the basis of sophisticated ‘political calculations’, 
they are removed ‘far from the sphere in which social banditry … operates’.184 In 
the figure of Salvatore Giuliano in Chapter 6 we see just how hard the transition 
from social bandit to strategic organized criminal can be. 
 
Criminal capabilities 
Existing scholarship has examined the resources – the means – used by specific 
criminal groups, and the operational tactics used to harness those resources.185 
Southerland and Potter demonstrated that criminal groups can develop competitive 
advantage within illicit markets through innovation to develop new capabilities.186 
Scholars have also explored how criminal groups compete to develop new, lower-
cost methods for manufacturing, delivery, logistics, weaponry, marketing and 
money-laundering. 187  But to date no analytical framework has emerged that 
explains how criminal groups combine these resources (their means) into strategic 
capabilities (organizational processes or ways).188 This section introduce such a 
framework, exploring how strategically organized crime develops three capabilities 
– coercion, corruption, and communications – and combines them through a control 
system. This provides a framework for understanding the strategic organization of 
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criminal capabilities, which is then applied in Part Two to decipher the strategic 
choices of real criminal organizations in the historical record. 
Coercion 
The absence of state enforcement power from criminal markets makes strategic 
coercion – the use of overt threats or actual force to influence another’s choices189  
– central to criminal organization. As Paoli neatly summarizes, ‘[u]ltimately 
violence constitutes the backbone of [criminal] power.’190 The simplest use of 
coercion is to capture the resources – the means – needed to extract criminal rents. 
This is simple predation and robbery – whether of the highway variety, or, as in the 
Somali piracy case, the high seas variety. Coercion is used to control both material 
and intangible resources, such as supply routes. In Mexico, for example, cartel 
violence is often focused on control of the plazas, strategic nodes in trafficking 
route networks.191 Coercion is also used to enforce criminal deals and employment 
contracts.192 The normalization of coercion as a sanction turns a criminal network 
into a more institutionalized organization, separating it from the broader 
environment. As the great anti-mafia magistrate Giovanni Falcone stressed, the 
mafia 
is a society, an organisation which to all intents and purposes has its own 
legal system.… Given that within the Mafia structure there are no courts 
and no police force either, it is essential that each of its “citizens” knows 
that punishment is inevitable and that the sentence will be carried out 
immediately. Whoever breaks the rules knows he will pay with his life.193 
 This internal violence is legitimized through the logic of protection.194 
Protection from what? The criminal groups’ rivals – both other criminal groups, and 
other governmental actors such as the state. Coercion is also used to directly attack 
those rivals, setting up the potential for arms races and security dilemmas. World 
Bank economist Stergios Skaperdas describes the resulting market structure in 
terms that sound very similar to descriptions of the inter-state system:   
a curious sort of monopolistic competition, whereby each gang has the 
local monopoly of protection within a certain area and this local monopoly 
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is maintained by the gang’s capability of mobilizing and using force 
against other gangs.195 
 Just as it is for states, for criminal groups coercion is closely tied to a 
strategy of deterrence. Building a reputation for violence can be as important as 
building the actual capacity for violence.196 Criminal groups frequently engage in 
atrocity to deter potential rivals and reduce their own enforcement costs.197 Saviano, 
the Camorra-watcher, explains that ‘[i]n Naples cruelty is the most complete and 
affordable strategy for becoming a successful businessman.’198 Conversely, signs of 
weakness can be self-fulfilling. Alan Block notes that in the underworld,  
Displays of personal power are constantly necessary for both personal and 
financial security… Weakness undermines not only an individual’s 
position but reverberates through the entire associational network...199 
Strategic criminal coercion is consequently intimately tied to strategic 
communications. In Mexico, for example, the posting of videos of beheadings and 
torture has become normalized. Drug cartels routinely dump bodies with long and 
complex public messages – narcomantas – attached. A typical narcomanta from 
Monterrey in March 2007 read:  
Prosecutor: don’t be an idiot, this will continue until you stop protecting 
Hector Huerta’s people, ‘Shorty’ Guzman, and that queer ‘La Barby.’ 
Especially you, Rogelio Cerda [a local official], until all your children are 
dead... P.S. This is only the beginning.200 
As with many arms races, it can be hard to prevent a race to the bottom, with 
increasing levels of barbarity becoming normalized.201 The flipside of this use of 
coercion for external deterrence is what Michael Howard described as the 
generation of ‘reassurance’ to those within one’s protection.202 Displays of violence 
help to remind participants in the criminal network of the potential harm they face 
from rivals, and the importance of the organization in protecting them from it.  
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Notwithstanding this tendency towards brutality when violence is deployed, 
organized crime groups tend to be selective about when to deploy it. Wide-scale 
confrontation between criminal groups, and between those groups and the state, is 
exceptional – just as war is exceptional, while deterrence and coercion are quite 
common on the international plane. As John Bailey and Matthew Taylor have 
explained, this is because a campaign of violence requires capabilities – such as 
intelligence gathering, secrecy, coordination, and weaponry – that depend on 
substantial organizational sophistication; and also because the costs of wide-scale 
confrontation are high, ranging from personal insecurity, internal defection and 
decreased business, to increased government repression.203 
 Criminal organizations are therefore more likely to resort to wide-spread 
violence when the predicted costs are low – because the military or enforcement 
capacity of the state or criminal rival is weakened. Once such a calculation becomes 
ubiquitous, a chain reaction may set in, as we have seen in Mexico in recent years. 
When one cartel is wounded, others move in to prey on its resources, absorbing its 
personnel, taking over its trafficking routes, capturing its weapons, stepping into its 
relationships with businesses and government. 204  The competition for these 
resources hurts some actors, and the chain continues. This is why Mexico (and 
arguably Syria) at times seems to resemble the meltdown of the Thirty Years War. 
They are brutal melées fuelled by a dangerous domino effect.  
Corruption 
Corruption is the single most distinctive strategic capability of criminal 
organizations. Its importance is made clear by a recent analysis of the business 
model of the Sinaloa cartel, one of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations 
in the world, which found that corruption payments constituted the single largest 
line-item expenditure in its budget.205 So what is corruption? 
‘Corruption’ is frequently defined as ‘the abuse of a public position of trust 
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for private gain’.206 But this description overlooks the transactional nature of 
corruption, which exchanges an illegal or illicit exercise of governmental discretion 
(whether in a position of public office or private authority) for a criminal rent. 
Corruption subverts the exercise of governmental power through threats and/or 
payments, giving privileged access to public contracts, protecting criminals from 
law enforcement, or targeting a criminal group’s rivals. In some cases, criminal 
groups use corruption to influence the way that the state defines and regulates 
criminal activity, to their advantage.  
As we shall see in Part Two, at this ‘highest’ level corruption often involves 
political campaign finance and support. This is intended to create broad systemic 
leverage, through what Frank Madsen aptly terms a ‘futures market’.207 A US 
Senate Committee in 1951 used the popular term ‘the fix’:  
The fix may… come about through the acquisition of political power by 
contributions to political organizations or otherwise, by creating economic 
ties with apparently respectable and reputable businessmen and lawyers, 
and by buying public good will through charitable contributions and press 
relations.208 
Strategic corruption thus involves the deliberate ‘acquisition’ of future 
‘political power’ through investments in candidates, causes and parties. In some 
cases, there is even evidence of such investments leading to criminal organizations 
vetting shortlists of candidates put forward by politicians (Italy, Mexico), dictating 
party programs (Colombia), or even presenting their own candidates for office.209  
The real utility of strategic corruption is not, however, its instrumental value 
in delivering material resources, or even human resources in the form of 
government officials. It is its creation of legitimacy. The corrupted bystander or 
rival suddenly becomes a ‘friend’. This is what makes corruption unique from a 
strategic theory perspective: it presents as a voluntary exchange of governmental 
discretion in return for a reward or the non-execution of a threat.210 It rests on the 
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target’s fear of future punishment being outweighed by the promise of current 
rewards. As early as 1901 an observer of the Sicilian mafia noted the way in which 
corrupt mafia exchanges allowed the mafioso’s ‘friend’ to ‘flatter himself’ that his 
‘tribute’ was ‘actually a gracious gift or the price paid for a service rendered’.211 
Almost a century later, the mafia pentito Tommaso Buscetta stressed to Italian 
prosecutors that the Sicilian mafia’s influence  
cannot be explained [solely] as the result of coercion. Those who cooperate 
expect certain advantages. True, one cannot expect these relationships to be 
on an equal footing, as it is always clear that one of the parties is [a 
mafioso]; yet the other party makes himself available.212 
Strategic corruption is thus distinct from strategic coercion. As Lawrence 
Freedman has explained, the latter seeks to create a situation of  
force majeure, a choice dictated by overwhelming circumstances. The 
target has a choice, but one that is skewed if he accepts that the 
consequences of non-compliance will be a denial of future choice.213 
In contrast, strategic corruption aims not simply at one-off control, but at 
retaining the structure of on-going bargaining and even amicable association. It 
creates a pretense of equality and reciprocity, disguising the power relations within 
a transactional relationship. 
Why do criminal groups bother to keep up this fiction? Why not just 
threaten officials into submission? The traditional answer, drawn from economic 
analysis, is that corruption is cheaper over the long term. As the economic historian 
of Venice, Frederic Lane, explained, commercial enterprises are likely to pay tribute 
(bribes) to a higher political authority, rather than pay for their own armed 
protection, where the cost of tribute is lower than the rent they accrue from the 
resulting protection thus afforded. (That rent can be measured in terms of the 
change in production and distribution costs as a result of prevented violence.214) 
Structuring the exchange as a voluntary one helps to reduce the criminal actor’s 
enforcement costs, which would otherwise depend on on-going monitoring and 
retention of a credible threat, until the target exercised her discretion in the 
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preferred manner. Seen from an industrial perspective, corruption thus represents an 
attempt to purchase the loyalty of upstream suppliers of protection, bringing them 
within the criminal group’s supply chain and lowering its overall business costs.215  
But corrupt exchanges have political effects that other commercial 
exchanges do not. They make the parties rely on each other to keep the exchange 
hidden. The result is a special kind of clandestine allegiance.216 Robert and Pamela 
Bunker have astutely described this as a Faustian bargain, from which there is no 
turning back.217 As the Kefauver Committee put it in 1951, ‘It is axiomatic in the 
underworld that once a public official’ has corruptly exercised his discretion on one 
occasion, ‘thereafter the underworld owns him’.218 As Joe Valachi, the first major 
mafia informant in the US said, ‘once you are in, you can’t get out’.219 As one 
Italian convicted of corruption put it, ‘I found myself in a mechanism that had a life 
of its own’. 220  Corruption does not generate control of territory, but rather 
complicity, the basis of criminal loyalty.221 It is a kind of subversion.222 As a 
strategic capability, corruption is thus neither ‘hard power’ (coercion) nor what Joe 
Nye calls ‘soft power’, which relies on affinity and persuasion. 223 It is better 
thought of as a source of ‘hidden power’, creating clandestine norms and 
expectations against which the subject self-regulates. It is, in other words, the 
foundation of criminal governmentality, through which individuals secretly 
‘conduct their own conduct’, to recall Foucault’s term.   
Corruption works by aligning the victim’s own incentives with the criminal 
organization’s success; by remaking the individual as a subject within the hidden 
criminal system, a participant in an ‘underworld’. This is not just a question of 
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psychological and ideational incentives, but also extends to a variety of behavioural 
techniques and practices intended to bind the target into the criminal system. 
Criminal organizations have, for example, developed a surprising array of financial 
mechanisms binding supporters and collaborators together. Both the Neapolitan 
Camorra and Afghan drug traffickers have developed sophisticated pricing and 
subsidy mechanisms designed to force legal producers to become suppliers to 
criminal supply chains.224 Michael Ross describes the use of what he calls  ‘booty 
futures’ – i.e. a stake in the control of future criminal rents looted through war – as 
a capital-raising technique to attract illicit investment in aggressive resource capture 
schemes in Africa.225 Somali pirates ‘offer’ coastal communities the opportunity to 
crowd-fund piracy operations, receiving a share of the pirate booty in return.226 The 
Nuvoletta clan created a retail shareholder scheme for distributors in the cocaine 
market around Naples; and the Di Lauro clan adopted an Amway style ‘circle’ 
distribution arrangement, giving distributors (and not just suppliers) a commercial 
stake in promoting the criminal order.227  
Communications 
A review of the existing literature also hints that effective criminal organizations 
will develop processes for communicating with target audiences in ways that 
change the circumstances of other strategic actors (including the state), and give the 
criminal group competitive advantage over them. 228  Strategic communications 
frequently involve shaping the normative order, through efforts designed to 
legitimize and normalize criminal conduct and criminal influence within the 
upperworld. They aim, in other words, at enlarging the sphere of criminal 
governmentality. 
To date this aspect of criminal organization has received limited attention. 
Many authors treat criminal groups’ interest in public relations and self-promotion 
as a response to a psychological, rather than a strategic, need. Robert Lacey, the 
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biographer of the Mobster Meyer Lansky, suggested for example that ‘Gangsters 
revel in the folklore that popular culture has constructed around them’ because it 
‘provides glamour and importance all too often lacking in their personal lives’.229 
Some analysts have explored the role that strategic communications plays in 
positioning criminal actors against their commercial rivals.230 Vanda Felbab-Brown, 
Steven Metz, Adam Elkus and Phil Williams have all also considered the role of 
criminal communications during insurgency.231 But there has been limited attention 
to the role of criminal communications in developing political influence or 
governmental power in other contexts.  
The strategic function of a communications capability is the same in a 
criminal organization as in other power-maximizing entities. As Lawrence 
Freedman put it: ‘The trick of the powerful is to rule by encouraging the ruled to 
internalize the ruler’s own values and interests.’232 A communications capability is 
thus critical for a criminal organization to develop what Colin Gray has called the 
‘social dimension of strategy’.233  Effective strategic criminal organizations go 
beyond a mere strategy of social influence and public relations, to one of 
governmentality. Criminal leaders often become legitimized as all-knowing father-
figures dispensing unknowable, yet forceful justice.234 They create alternative – 
though secret – social narratives, framed around justice claims, operationalized in 
specific behavioural codes such as the Sicilian mafia’s code of omertà (silent non-
cooperation with the state) which govern their members and supporters’ behaviour.  
As Falcone put it, through these narratives and codes, these groups function as 
hidden ‘societies’.235  
In many cases, criminal organizations seem to achieve this goal by 
becoming socially ‘embedded’, adapting and manipulating existing social narratives 
and structures.236 In Italy and Russia, for example, mafias have co-opted Christian 
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authority symbols.237 Criminal narratives and media outreach also help to normalize 
illegality and violence. Saviano offers an account of the Camorra’s deliberate use of 
the media during the ‘Secondigliano War’ in Naples to normalize the ongoing 
violence.238 And as we explore further in Chapter 10, Mexican drug cartels, 
likewise devote considerable attention to promoting a social culture of death and 
criminal power, in particular through the popularization of ‘narcoballads’, and 
through targeted attacks on traditional and social media outlets that dare to question 
cartel conduct or power.239  
By stoking fear, strategic communications can also prime demand for 
protection. Criminal groups seek to generate legitimacy by providing livelihoods, 
social mobility, physical security and protection of property, or even social services 
such as disaster relief (the yakuza), welfare payments (criminal groups in Colombia), 
or medical services (Haitian gangs). Once criminal groups are seen as providers of 
livelihoods and public goods and services, the state is confronting a true rival for its 
population’s allegiance.240 And once that rival is seen as an alternative source of 
norms, the state is in deep trouble: when a government loses its power to secure 
support for the norms it promotes, then it is ‘on the road to having to rely on brute 
force’.241 
Strategic communications may also be shaped by the nature of the rents 
sought. Rents that require broad-based labour inputs – such as agricultural drug 
production, or illicit alluvial mining – may require a criminal group to wield broad-
based social control over the labour-force.242 Broader, public communications 
capabilities may be required. In contrast, rents that require control only of limited 
trafficking sites, or decision-making by a small number of highly-placed state 
officials – for example to prevent law enforcement interference with trafficking 
activities – may not require such broad communications capabilities, but rather ones 
more narrowly targeted towards high-level state officials. These may focus on 
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campaign support and efforts to create private influence and hidden social capital.243 
It may be that different criminal groups operating in the same space develop 
different approaches to communications, since they focus on different rents. And as 
different criminal rents become available, the same criminal group may need to 
alter its communications strategy. Dennis Rodgers describes, for example, a shift in 
mara strategic communications in Nicaragua, as gangs have shifted away from 
taxing local protection rackets, towards taxing transnational drug flows.244  
Command and control 
Effective strategy requires not only the development of capabilities, but also their 
combination and control. The inherently risky and clandestine nature of criminal 
organization poses special challenges for command and control.245 In the absence of 
the dispute-resolution functions of the state, and the strong corrosive presence of 
greed, criminal organizations are constantly susceptible to betrayal, defection and 
fragmentation.246 They face an uphill battle recruiting members and maintaining 
loyalty. 247  The profit motive can radically undermine discipline and internal 
cohesion. Even ideologically-inspired political insurgencies seem to have a 
tendency to devolve into criminal organizations over time, as financial incentives 
displace political goals. 248  As Samuel Huntington noted 40 years ago: ‘The 
criminalization of political violence is more prevalent than the politicization of 
criminal violence.’249  
Many criminal organizations accordingly develop highly personalized 
command and control systems, closely tied to their leaders.250 Yet the need for 
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secrecy can also encourage the dispersal of risk away from the leadership. Flatter, 
cellular network structures may be less easily disrupted by competitors (including 
law enforcement) – but they may also facilitate defection. The tension between 
these two imperatives – towards centralization for control, and towards 
decentralization for resilience – seems to give rise to a recurring strategic solution 
amongst criminal organizations: decentralized decision-making guided by a 
common culture – or governmentality – and centralized sanctioning power.251 
Strategic criminal groups often adopt two-tier network structures, with an insulated 
‘core’ providing general guidance and sanctioning misconduct, while a much larger 
network engages in semi-autonomous business.252 In periods of stability, lower-
level commercial and military activity may be conducted throughout the network, 
with the ‘core’ engaged in more consequential strategic direction setting – such as 
internal governance and handling external relations with higher-level state actors. 
When the organization is under attack, temporary centralization and creation of a 
more responsive command-and-control chain may however be necessary.253 In 
Central America, for example, gang warfare between MS-13 and the Eighteenth 
Street Gang, and the adoption of mano dura (heavy hand) policies by state actors 
forced the diffuse mara networks to develop more cohesive command and control 
systems. 254 Similarly, in Naples, competitive pressures forced the centralization of 
the Di Lauro clan, moving from a liberal management system of autonomous cells 
to a wage-based hierarchy.255  
When not operating in this more centralized mode, however, criminal 
networks often depend on their shared governmentality, sometimes codified into 
explicit but secret norms, to guide their members’ decentralized decision-making. 
This clandestine governmentality depends on trust – the scarcest of commodities in 
the underworld.256 Trust supplements violence as the basis for criminal command 
and control.257 The sinews of criminal organizations typically follow the contours of 
                                                
251 Southerland and Potter, p. 262; Fiorentini and Peltzman, ‘Introduction’, pp. 12-13.  
252 Williams, ‘The Nature’, p. 154.  
253 Southerland and Potter, pp. 258, 260.  
254 José Miguel Cruz, ‘Central American maras: from youth street gangs to transnational protection 
rackets’, Global Crime, vol. 11, no. 4 (2010), pp. 389-393. 
255 Saviano, pp. 74-78. 
256 Gambetta, p. 17.  
257 Paoli, ‘Paradoxes’, pp. 78-81; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, pp. 75-76. 
  58 
trust networks born in common family, clan, childhood or prison experiences.258 For 
example, Sicilian mafia slang for prison is ‘cunvittu’ – convent, or boarding school 
– reflecting the perception that time served in prison works not only to isolate its 
boarders from broader society, but to provide a common socialization or education.  
Criminal organizations institutionalize trust through initiation rituals 
designed to inculcate a sense of in-group and out-group identity, and create an 
‘imagined community’ beyond the state.259 To express the resulting obligations of 
loyalty, these initiation processes are often framed in terms of kinship rituals – for 
example induction into a mafia ‘brotherhood’ and adoption by a ‘godfather’. In the 
Japanese yakuza, each criminal group is called a family (ikka) and hierarchical 
relationships are expressed in familial terms of protection and obedience.260  
In most cases, these families – and criminal power – are utterly patriarchal. 
Many criminal structures idealize women as embodiments of traditional ideals such 
as family, honour, purity and respect; but this typically serves to objectify and 
subjugate women, denying them agency within criminal power structures, instead 
treating them as passive bystanders to men’s choices.  Women are routinely and 
ritually instrumentalized in men’s often violent pursuit of criminal power. Some 
criminal organizations even use inter-marriage to build bonds of trust in conditions 
of anarchy – just as do tribes, royal families and terrorist networks such as Al 
Qaeda.261 Marrying women off to other criminal actors serves as a hedge against 
distrust, by increasing the time horizon over which potential rivals will assess 
returns. It follows a similar logic to free market actors’ decision to join a firm: as 
Ronald Coase explained, firms institutionalize and reduce transaction costs and free 
up resources that can then be used for external action. So do marriage alliances.  
But this logic can also work in reverse: as Williams has shown in Mexico, 
strategic competition between drug cartels is overlaid at times by ‘blood feud’ logic, 
like the two decade-long feud between Chapo Guzman and the Arellano Felix 
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organization.262 The creation of in- and out-groups can develop an irreversible 
momentum, reducing criminal organizations’ flexibility in positioning themselves 
relative to the external environment. And the treatment of women as passive 
bystanders also carries significant risks, because it overlooks the power that women 
do in fact enjoy, both in their own right, and as shapers of male choices through 
their embodiment of governmental values such as family loyalty. In Chapter 5 we 
will see how costly this can be, when a male criminal leader – Lucky Luciano – 
fails to account for the possibility that female sex workers might betray him to the 
state. Interestingly, male criminals’ obliviousness to female agency within their own 
lives also seems to open up the possibility of women helping to change their 
strategic outlooks, helping to woo them away from a life of violence – as has been 
used successfully in counter-terrorism efforts. We explore this possibility briefly in 
Chapter 10.  
The framing of criminal organization in terms of fictive kinship also, sadly, 
facilitates the integration of children. Children cost less to feed, do not necessarily 
expect payment, and are generally more impressionable and less demanding on 
organizational monitoring and disciplinary systems.263 And the incorporation of 
children also strengthens a group’s ties to the broader community, through their 
(biological) families.264  
The transformation of an individual’s identity through entry into a criminal 
organization also resembles entry into a new family in other ways. Whereas 
legitimate business firms are built on ‘purposive contracts’ of limited effect, 
organized crime enterprises are built on ‘status contracts’ which, in Max Weber’s 
terms, ‘involve a change in what may be called the total legal situation (the 
universal position) and the social status of the persons involved’.265 As Letizia Paoli 
puts it,  
with the entrance into the [criminal] group, the novice is required to 
assume a new identity permanently and to subordinate all his previous 
allegiances to the [criminal group] membership. It is a life-long pact. 
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Initiation magically transforms the individual, changing them from being 
subjects of one governmental system into subjects of another. It is in a sense a 
‘religious conversion’ in Giovanni Falcone’s terms, a permanent Faustian bargain, a 
permanent submission to the governmentality of the criminal group. As the pentito 
Antonino Calderone was told when he was initiated,  
One cannot leave, one cannot resign from the Cosa Nostra. You’ll see for 
yourselves, in a little while, how one enters with blood [i.e. a ritual 
pricking of the finger]. And if you leave, you’ll leave with blood because 
you’ll be killed. One cannot abandon, cannot betray, the Cosa Nostra, 
because it’s above everything.266 
The indelible nature of the transformation is sometimes represented through 
external marking: Russian and Japanese organized crime, outlaw motorcycle gangs, 
and the maras all use tattoos to this effect. They publically (and thus undeniably) 
brand the individual as the permanent subject of an alternative governmental (even 
cosmic) order. Of course, this also impedes operational secrecy; for that reason, 
some Central American maras now appear to be dispensing with the use of publicly 
visible tattoos. 
Criminal corporate cultures are governmental, in the sense that they rely 
heavily on the subject’s self-regulation to ensure their behaviour accords with 
shared norms. The obligations of a member of the group are frequently informal and 
learned through participation and osmosis. But they may also be made explicit, 
through codes and constitutions.267 Criminal governmentality provides a common 
operating system that can sustain even quite decentralized operational activity.268 
As R.T. Naylor has explained, financial ties within criminal groups are frequently 
the loose ties of an association or society, rather than the tighter ties of a firm – 
more Rotary Club than Standard Oil.269 Once the subject has bought into the 
criminal system, they may in fact enjoy quite a large degree of autonomy, with the 
core leadership operating more like a clan head or market regulator than the 
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commander of an army.270 
Recognizing the strategic function of governmentality in criminal 
organization may also suggest certain limits to criminal power. Off-shore ventures 
may be constrained by the group’s ability to transnationalize a trust network or 
export a specific governmentality. Diaspora and immigrant networks are, for this 
reason, a recurring path of criminal internationalization; the development of 
criminal off-shoots in entirely foreign environments from overseas appear to be less 
common – though as we shall see in Part Two, not entirely unfeasible.271 
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has developed a framework for understanding the development and 
decision-making of criminal groups in strategic terms. Based on an extensive 
review of existing scholarship, it suggests that some criminal groups may pursue 
governmental power through the strategic development and combination of the 
capabilities of coercion, corruption and communications. Strategic decisions may 
emerge through the complex interaction of individuals within criminal networks, 
coalescing in some circumstances into more hierarchical criminal organizations.  
The question is whether this analytical framework can help to explain the 
decision-making and development of specific groups found in the historical record. 
Part Two seeks to answer this question through a careful analysis of a series of 
episodes in the activities of the Sicilian and American mafias, in New York, Sicily 
and the Caribbean in the 19th and 20th centuries. Part Three returns to the question 
of how these mafias positioned themselves in relation to other governmental rivals, 
such as states, and what this may imply for how theorists and practitioners approach 
strategy, efforts to combat organized crime, and the management of spoilers in 
peace and transition processes.  
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3. Mafia origins, 1859-1929 
 
‘The King of Italy might rule the island but men of my tradition govern it.’ 
Sicilian mafia saying272 
 
Gangi, a Sicilian village on a steep hilltop half way between Palermo and Mount 
Etna, is largely unremarkable. In January 1926, however, it was the venue for a 
remarkable scene: the Italian state besieging its own citizens. Fascist paramilitary 
units surrounded the village, cut off its water supplies and took women and children 
hostage, refusing to release them until their male relatives, hiding in the town, 
surrendered. Within two weeks, 450 arrests had been made. 149 people were 
detained for trial. Two committed suicide. The rest were held for two years before 
trial. Seven men received life sentences with hard labour; eight received 30 years’ 
imprisonment. Two women received 25-year sentences, and most of the rest five to 
ten years’ imprisonment. International reaction was swift – and approving. This was, 
The New York Times proclaimed, ‘one of Premier Mussolini’s great achievements’ 
– an apparently decisive blow against the ‘mafia’.273 What was this ‘mafia’, and 
why was it perceived as such a grave threat?  
In late 1925, the Italian state was undergoing a constitutional transformation. 
Benito Mussolini’s evolution from Italy’s Prime Minister to fascist dictator was 
well advanced. A law adopted on Christmas Eve 1925 made him responsible only to 
the King, not to Parliament, and replaced locally elected mayors with podestàs 
appointed by the Senate, which he controlled. By late 1926 political parties had 
been banned. It seemed that little impeded Il Duce’s drive for total power. 
 Except in the south, in the poor, agrarian Mezzogiorno provinces of 
Campania, Apulia, Calabria – and above all in Sicily. A 1924 visit to Palermo had 
convinced Mussolini that Sicilians, in particular, did not adequately respect the state, 
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and instead offered allegiance to a shadowy, alternative local power: the clandestine 
fraternal organization known as the ‘mafia’. Such a concentrated source of power 
outside the state was anathema to the fascist vision of totalitarian governmental 
power. It could not be tolerated. ‘Your Excellency has carte blanche’, Benito 
Mussolini telegraphed to Cesare Mori, his new Prefect in Palermo, on his 
appointment in October 1925: 
The authority of the State must absolutely, repeat absolutely, be re-
established in Sicily. If the laws still in force hinder you, this will be no 
problem, as we will draw up new laws.274 
This was the go signal for Mori’s iron-fisted crackdown. Over four years, 
some 11,000 people were imprisoned on suspicion of mafia ties.275 Twenty major 
trials were held. One sentenced 244 people to a total of 1,200 years in prison. Mori 
came to be known as the ‘Iron Prefect’, making liberal use of torture and the confine, 
exile without charge on islands off Sicily.276  
The siege of Gangi seems all the more remarkable, now that we know from 
first hand accounts that a notable landowner had, a month earlier, negotiated a mass 
surrender of the local mafia leadership. 277  The siege of Gangi was not an 
operational necessity: it was an exercise in strategic communication. As the Sicilian 
mafia historian Salvatore Lupo has explained, Mussolini and Mori considered that  
In order to win on the terrain of folk values, the state had to gain itself a 
degree of ‘respect’ by behaving in a more mafioso fashion than the mafiosi 
themselves.278  
Mori had understood that the mafia’s power stemmed from its social 
influence and the normalization of ‘mafioso’ culture. If the state wanted to beat the 
mafia in the market for government, it had to win back the hearts and minds of the 
Sicilian people. It had to win in the terrain of governmentality.  
This chapter explores the origins of the Sicilian mafia’s governmental power 
in Italy’s post-unification political and economic transitions, and explains how 
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mafia emigration reproduced mafia governmentality, organization and power in 
New York. The chapter draws on a mixture of secondary sources, Italian and US 
governmental inquiries – and the first-hand accounts of mafiosi in both Sicily and 
New York, notably those of mafia leaders Joseph Bonanno and Nicola Gentile, the 
reliability of which has previously been tested and demonstrated.279 Both accounts 
are particularly useful to our inquiry, because both men were initiated into the 
Sicilian mafia before moving to the US and taking on leadership roles there. They 
both later moved back to Sicily to warm mafia welcomes. Both represented, in other 
words, authoritative voices within the mainstream mafia tradition on both sides of 
the Atlantic. As mafiologist John Dickie has pointed out, Gentile’s often overlooked 
autobiography in particular offers an unparalleled understanding of ‘the laws of 
motion of the mafia … because his survival and success depended on that 
understanding’.280  
Accounts provided by the lower-level mafia soldier Joe Valachi are also 
used in this chapter, but treated more cautiously.281 As a soldato rather than a capo, 
Valachi was not privy to higher strategic decision-making processes within the 
mafia – only their results. Yet Valachi’s account, the accounts of Sicilian pentiti 
such as Antonino Calderone and Francisco Marino Mannoia, and those of American 
mafia informants such as Mikey Franzese and Joe Cantalupo all provide rich, highly 
corroborative, detail on matters of organization, culture and outlook.282 Finally, 
there is the special case of The Last Testament of Lucky Luciano, purportedly based 
on unrecorded interviews the New York mafia leader Salvatore Lucania (a.k.a. 
Charles ‘Lucky’ Luciano) allegedly gave the screenwriter Martin Gosch shortly 
before both died.283 The book represents the interpretation of Gosch’s interview 
notes by Richard Hammer, a journalist Gosch had brought in on the project.284 
While the main timelines established by the book seem sound, Richard Warner has 
established that numerous small details and several longer passages in The Last 
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Testament do not stack up against independent evidence.285 Accordingly, this 
dissertation does not rely solely on The Last Testament, or indeed on other sources 
based only upon The Last Testament, for any point of analytical significance.  
 
Origins 
Profiting from transition 
On 11 May 1860 a former resident of New York’s Staten Island landed on the 
western-most tip of Sicily with a thousand red-shirted revolutionaries. Giuseppe 
Garibaldi had come to assist an uprising against the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 
As his rebel army marched across Sicily, it was joined by several Squadri della 
Mafia – squads of mafia, a term which, at the time, meant something like ‘braves’. 
By September 1860 Garibaldi’s army had conquered Sicily and southern Italy, 
including Naples. In October, Garibaldi turned it all over to the Sardinian King 
Vittorio Emmanuele II who, in March 1861, became the King of Italy. It was the 
first time in 13 centuries that Italy had been politically unified. 
 Unification upended both the political and social orders of southern Italy. 
Though legislative initiatives over the preceding half-century had aimed to unwind 
the feudal structure of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies’ economy, wealth and 
markets remained tied to huge rural landholdings, the latifundias, owned by 
absentee aristocratic landlords. Post-unification governments, dominated by forces 
from Italy’s industrializing north, quickly set about the liberalization of 
landholdings and markets in the south. But legislative decrees from Rome were not 
matched by state power or presence on the ground in the south. The reform 
initiatives ran up against the realities of how Sicily and the other Mezzogiorno 
provinces were governed. As Sicilian mafiosi still say today, ‘La presenza è 
potenza’: Presence is power.286 
Absentee landlords, including the Church, had long relied on local 
strongmen to manage their estates and to protect them from others’ violence. These 
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strongmen were organized first as local guardiani (guard militias) and after the 
formal abolition of feudalism in 1812 as tenants (gabellotti – i.e. ‘rentpayers’) and 
stewards.287 These leaseholders had relatively free rein to use violence against local 
peasants, and an incentive to maximize their own rents. This they did by driving 
down the rent their formal overlords demanded of them – through threatening 
reduced output, or outright revolt – and by maximizing the rent they could extract 
from their own subtenants, often small land-holding peasants.288 Much of the 
countryside was consequently ruled by protection rackets, in which violent 
entrepreneurs aspiring to be appointed as gabellotti (or already colluding with them) 
manufactured threats through vandalism, robbery or kidnapping, and then, having 
hidden their involvement, encouraged the absent landlord to pay them for 
protection.289 The pattern became ritualized. 
The result was the emergence of a class of local strongmen brokers: men 
whose control of coercion turned them into problem-solvers, dispensers of 
patronage, informal local political authorities. The mafia pentito Nino Calderone 
recounted, a century later, how he and his brother, a local mafia boss, would joke 
about setting up a sign outside their office, where they received streams of visitors 
seeking their support and backing, labelled ‘Welfare Office’.290 Despite post-
unification efforts to establish public institutions in Sicily’s interior, these mafiosi, 
as they had become known, maintained their role as informal local governors, 
extracting tribute in return for the provision of rough justice and access to the state 
and its services.  
Disputes between local mafiosi could resemble low-level armed conflict. A 
feud between two mafia groups in Monreale and Bagheria lasted from 1872 to 1878, 
killing dozens and displacing hundreds.291 Post-unification governments adopted a 
strategy that presages the approach we now see adopted in contemporary conflict-
affected contexts such as Kosovo and Afghanistan: they commissioned some of 
these groups to take on formal policing functions, enlisting the most violent bands 
as paramilitary auxiliaries of the state. Yet this proved as counterproductive in 
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Sicily as it arguably has in Kosovo and Afghanistan. As the nineteenth century 
Tuscan researcher Leopoldo Franchetti concluded after a visit to southern Italy, by 
failing effectively to monopolize violence, the state had allowed others into the 
market – and allowed violence to enter the broader political economy.292 What 
emerged in response was not, initially, a hierarchical organization, but rather myriad 
entrepreneurial groups who slowly coalesced around a common mafia strategy and 
repertoire.293  
The mafioso’s power lay not, as is sometimes suggested, in isolated 
territorial control of latifundia separated off from state power, but rather in the 
control of a territory and population that was connected to external markets. Some 
post-unification bandits and brigands did control and tax local economies like 
warlords. What differentiated those that survived as mafia was their adaptation of 
coercion from this focus on local autonomy to a role more focused on brokering the 
flow of goods from those rural landholdings to consumption markets in the littoral 
cities and overseas. Mafia power emerged in the established wheat and olive 
supply-chains that, with new capital investments by northern industrialists, were 
being repurposed to sell citrus and sulphur – crucial in the galvanization of rubber – 
into export markets. Mafia networks also developed hidden inside the family-based 
commercial networks connecting rural gabellotti to urban fruit-sellers and bankers 
and lawyers.294 Middle and upper class actors were drawn into mafia webs both 
through direct coercion and extortion, and through the weakness of their control 
over their estates, which gave mafia actors space to make them complicit in 
criminal activity such as trading in stolen goods.295 As the British historian Eric 
Hobsbawm has explained, the mafia emerged out of a ‘modus vivendi with northern 
capitalism’. It was a product of Sicily’s integration into a modernizing Italian 
political economy dominated by northern Italian capital.296  
This economic transformation – and the mafia’s brokering role – was, from 
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the outset, nested within the newly unified political structures of the Italian state. As 
James Fentress has shown, early mafiosi used political patronage strategies, 
clandestine organizational techniques and social networks acquired during 
cooperation with Garibaldi and other clandestine revolutionary forces between 1848 
and the early 1860s. Indeed, in Fentress’ account, many of the early mafiosi were 
revolutionaries who, after unification, turned away from politics to organize 
crime.297 By the 1870s, Fentress has shown, an established pattern of corrupt 
exchange between mafiosi, politicians and officials, especially police, had emerged. 
Politicians ensured that officials did favours for mafiosi and their economic allies; 
the mafiosi, in turn used their coercive power to deliver electoral outcomes. Michele 
Pantaleone, a noted anti-mafia activist, remembered that in the first part of the 
twentieth century,  
election campaigns were ushered in with threatening letters, robberies, 
cattle-killing, crop, hay-loft and rick firing, the felling of trees, the cutting 
down of vines, and the pollution of water in wells and cisterns.298 
Democratic politicians in unified Italy quickly became dependent on these 
mafia intermediaries for access to local votes. Mafia gangs’ operational areas soon 
coincided with electoral districts, as the mafia-backed gabellotto became the ‘chief 
elector’ for his political ‘friends’.299 One hundred years later, the mafia pentito Nino 
Calderone explained that a similar electoral logic was still in place, using Palermo 
as an example: with 1,500 to 2,000 operational mafiosi in the city, and each 
mustering 40 to 50 votes through family and friends, the mafia controlled a package 
of 75,000 to 100,000 votes, even before intimidation of the broader public was 
considered.300 Of course, in the nineteenth century, when suffrage was limited to 
propertied men, the social network needed to develop political capital was even 
smaller. Failure to cooperate with the mafias could spell electoral suicide.  
 Post-unification politicians generally did not become members of the violent 
organizations they were patronizing, but rather their ‘friends’ and ‘associates’, 
partners in a system of corrupt exchanges.301 So unassailable was the mafioso’s 
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legitimacy that he could be quite open about his political contribution. This 
brashness ensnared the mafia’s friends in a web of complicity, encouraging them to 
buy-in to the silence around the mafia’s criminal conduct. It was not the power of 
the criminal actor, but his criminality, which had to be hidden. The politician ‘had 
good reasons for’ being silent, explains Pantaleone:  
he was not only defending his votes but also safeguarding himself against 
the scandal which would result if the man known to be his ‘chief elector’ 
had to be tried in a court of law.302 
Criminal power hid in plain sight, becoming embedded within an informal 
clientelist protection system inside the new Italian state, protected by a culture of 
silence - omertà.303 The director of the district police for Palermo, writing in the 
early 20th century, stated simply that the mafia were  
under the protection of senators, members of parliament, and other 
influential figures who protect them and defend them, only to be protected 
and defended by them in return.304  
This system gave a ‘virtual license’ to the mafia.305 For northern Italian 
politicians, concluded the British historian Eric Hobsbawm, the south  
could provide safe majorities for whatever government gave sufficient 
bribes or concessions to the local bosses who could guarantee electoral 
victory. This was child’s play for Mafia… But the concessions and bribes 
which were small, from the point of northerners (for the south was poor) 
made all the difference to local power… Politics made the power of the 
local boss; politics increased it, and turned it into big business.306 
The mafia did not so much move into politics as emerge out of it. ‘The 
history of the Mafia is essentially one of political collusion’.307 It was embedded in 
the electoral and administrative systems of the unified state, serving as an 
instrument of political and social control -– a partner in the governmental 
marketplace, operating not on the basis of a territorial but rather a jurisdictional 
segmentation. Even peasant rebellions in the 1890s did not dislodge it. ‘The tacit 
partnership between Rome with its troops and martial law and mafia was too much 
                                                
302 Pantaleone, p. 32.  
303 Giuseppe Alongi, La mafia: fattori, manifestazioni, rimedi (Palermo: Sellerio, 1886/1977), p. 50. 
304  Ermanno Sangiorgi, Chief of Police, to Vincenzo Consenza, Public Prosecutor, Palermo, 
‘Rapporto’, quoted in Lupo, History, p. 17.  
305 Dickie, Cosa Nostra, pp. 69-77; Raab, p. 16; Pantaleone, pp. 31-32; Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, 
pp. 42-43; Catanzaro, pp. 84-91. 
306 Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, p. 43. 
307 Pantaleone, p. 195.  
  71 
for them’, concluded Hobsbawm.  
The true ‘kingdom of Mafia’ had been established. It was now a great 
power. Its members sat as deputies in Rome and their spoons reached into 
the thickest part of the gravy of government: large banks, national 
scandals.308 
Writing in December 1899 under the pseudonym ‘Rastignac’ in La Tribuna, 
a Milanese broadsheet, an anonymous political commentator described recent 
events in Sicily:  
Here was a mysterious and subtle poison… under the façade of the Mafia 
the power of politics was at work, and under the façade of politics the 
power of the Mafia was at work.309 
 
Organizing the Sicilian mafia 
As Franchetti explained, the democratization of violence that resulted in southern 
Italy from unification spawned an entire ‘industry of violence’. The mafioso was an 
entrepreneur in that industry, an entrant into a market for illicit government with 
few barriers to entry. The mafioso  
acts as capitalist, impresario and manager. He unifies the management of 
the crimes committed … he regulates the division of functions and labour, 
and he controls discipline amongst the workers.… To him falls the 
judgement from circumstances as to whether violence should be suspended 
for a while, or multiplied and made more ferocious. He has to adjust to 
market conditions to choose which operations to carry out, which people to 
exploit, which form of violence to use best to achieve the desired 
objective.310  
Mafiosi were, in other words, strategic organizers of crime. They were 
building governmental power out of crime, developing internal norms, resolving 
disputes, allocating resources. Steadily, a specific governmentality emerged in 
which autonomous mafia groups organized using common forms, ranks, codes, 
rituals and tactics.311 Each mafia unit was known as a cosca, or ‘tuft’, pointing to 
the fact that, like tufts of grass connected by subterranean rhizomatic roots, they 
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were both autonomous and connected to a deeper, hidden network, a ‘fractional 
form’ of a larger whole, as the FBI later put it.312  
The roots of the cosca being in violence, its structure was quasi-military. 
The leader was the capo (head or chief), usually above several sottocapi 
(underbosses or deputy chiefs). Each sottocapo oversaw several regimi (regiments 
or units, also called decina), each of which was led by a caporegime (lieutenant), 
and was made up of soldati (soldiers, also picciotti). Additionally, the capo was also 
usually advised by a senior consigliere (counsellor), a staff officer adjacent to the 
formal, linear command structure.313 This militaristic terminology has misled many 
observers to misunderstand the system as highly centralized, hierarchical and 
bureaucratic – like an army. Because the system’s organization was clandestine, it 
in fact operated more as a network or ‘context of action’. Mafia ‘ranks’ are best 
understood not as fixed steps within a homogenous command structure, but rather 
as indicators of power differentials in a network. As an official Quebec 
investigation into the mafia explained in the 1970s, ‘not all members of the same 
ranks are necessarily equal’.314 Even within a given cosca, authority could be fluid 
and contested. 
The clandestine nature of mafia criminal activities such as extortion and 
election rigging placed a premium on trust. Unsurprisingly, mafia cosche emerged 
out of established kinship networks. Because these groups were often found in one 
town or village, cosche were sometimes known as borgati (townships or 
burroughs).315 Joseph Bonanno, who rose ultimately to be a senior capo in the New 
York mafia, stated simply that  
it is impossible to understand events – whether they are marriages, political 
alliances, or killings – unless there is some understanding – literally – of 
just who was related to whom.316 
As the Sicilian economy integrated first with that of northern Italy, and then 
with European and trans-Atlantic markets, family networks steadily became 
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dispersed. Recruitment morphed from actual to fictive kinship arrangements, giving 
rise to the compare or padrino (godfather) system in which an initiated mafioso 
would sponsor the membership of an outsider (often a talented prospect who had 
been observed for some time), under his surrogate fatherly patronage and 
guidance.317 Kinship structures were also central to the secret initiation ceremony 
and internal disciplinary code. The initiation process appears to have been 
reasonably uniform across the mafia and over time – a good indicator that cosche 
arrived at their common organizational approach not by accident but as a result of 
organizational choice and mimicking. Initiation involved the symbolic spilling of 
blood through the pricking of a finger, and the swearing of a ritual oath to abide by 
the mafia’s code – which emphasized loyalty to the group, including through 
silence, on pain of death and, by many accounts, a commitment not to interfere with 
female members of other mafiosi’s families.318As in many criminal organizations, 
women were never admitted into the mafia. They were treated as passive vehicles 
for traditionalist values rather than seen as social agents in their own right. Even as 
the mafias urbanized and became more commercialized, the territorial and familial 
roots of the mafias’ origins remained as referents of a shared heritage and identity, 
useful in the mobilization of loyalty and internal organization.319 In America, 
cosche later became formally known as ‘Families’. By the 1950s, through 
interaction between deported American Mobsters and Sicilian mafiosi (discussed in 
Chapter 6), that term (famiglia) had gained currency back in Sicily. 
Mafia cosche, though separately run, shared a common strategic alignment 
vis-à-vis the state. The capo acquired his position through the development of a 
reputation for effectively resolving disputes – whether through violence or 
arbitration. 320  This required the acquisition of a group of followers, through 
personal charisma, family loyalty (including marriage), or wealth.321 And it required 
a reputation for toughness and independence, an unwillingness to kowtow to the 
state. The esteem in which such individuals were held was demonstrated by the 
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connotation uomo di rispetto (‘man of respect’), or uomo d’onore (‘man of 
honour’).322 Yet there was a paradox here: the more effective a mafioso’s capacity 
to organize and threaten violence became, the more invisible was that violence. A 
reputation for being capable of effective violence became socially institutionalized 
as ‘respect’ or ‘honour’.323 The mafioso’s power was hidden – but its source well 
understood. As the pentito Calderone put it bluntly, ‘Every mafioso knows perfectly 
well, when all is said and done, where his power comes from.’324 Nicola Gentile put 
it even more bluntly: ‘Se non si è feroci non si diventa capi.’ Those who are not 
ferocious do not become mafia leaders.325 
Mafia culture justified violence as the way to remain independent of an 
untrustworthy and unjust state, even as Sicilian politicians frequently tried to co-opt 
mafia values and social legitimacy. Campaigning in Palermo in 1925, former Prime 
Minister Vittorio Emmanuele Orlando, who had led the Italian delegation to the 
Versailles Peace Conference, could with a straight face proclaim: 
If by ‘Mafia’ we mean an exaggerated sense of honour, a passionate refusal 
to succumb to the overbearing and arrogant, a nobility of spirit that stands 
up to the strong and indulges the weak, a loyalty to friends that is more 
steadfast and enduring even than death – if these characteristics, albeit with 
their excesses, are what we mean by ‘Mafia’, we are dealing with 
ineradicable traits of the Sicilian character, and I declare myself to be 
Mafioso, and I am happy to be such.326 
Mafiosi cloaked themselves in the trappings of conservative resistance to 
imposed, foreign and unjust change, giving them the ‘romantic aura of popular 
heroes’.327 Mafiosi were, in a sense, descendants of social bandits, though where the 
social bandit rebelled openly against the established order, the mafioso covertly 
colluded with it.328 The mafioso played a double game. The mafia mentality stood 
for Sicilian parochialism and rejection of foreign rule. But the mafioso also profited 
from keeping order as the agents of absent foreign rulers and as intermediaries in 
economic and political exchange between Sicily and outside markets.329  
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Raab describes mafia cosche as constituting a ‘substitute, extra-legal 
government’.330 But it is more accurate to say that the mafia supplemented, rather 
than substituted for, the state.331 The mafia’s governmental power differed from that 
of the state in two crucial ways. First, in its invisibility. Mafia power was, from the 
outset, a hidden power, organized to be not just private but secret. Its social 
effectiveness depended in part on society being enlisted into keeping the fact of 
mafia organization and influence secret, even as mafioso culture was celebrated. 
From the outset, the practice of omertà – the mafia’s ‘code of silence’, notionally 
enforced on pain of death – was critical to its success.332 Formally, omertà applied 
only to ‘made’ or initiated members. But in practice, its shadow lay heavily across 
those communities within which cosche operated. It encouraged communal 
complicity with the mafia and a secret subversion of communal allegiance to the 
state, ‘insubordination to the rules of the state’.333 State power, by contrast, is 
intrinsically public. But so long as that division of labour – between the state as the 
public face of power, and the mafia as its hidden intermediary in society – could be 
sustained, there was an apparent complementarity between these two forms of 
power. It was only when the state sought to displace the mafia as even a private 
form of governmentality on the island, as Mussolini’s totalitarian project aimed to; 
or when the mafia seemed to seek to substitute its own decisions for public 
governmental discretion, as it did with its bombing campaigns in the 1980s and 
1990s, that the two powers were bound to collide. 
The second key difference between the mafia and the state’s governmental 
power lay in its structure. Within Sicily, the Italian state purported to monopolize 
coercion and legal authority. The same could not be said of the mafia, even within 
its underworld. The mafia was not a governmental monopoly, but more of an 
oligopoly: a system of criminal power organized via multiple cosche. In that sense, 
the organizational structure within the mafia was similar to the inter-state arena, 
with individual organizations monopolizing control over certain territories and, in 
some places, intermingling and competing for influence. Without a system of public 
justice, the cosche relied on clandestine violence – often through vendetta – and 
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negotiation to maintain orderly relations across cosche lines.334 At times, diplomatic 
relations between capi were even institutionalized through temporary commissions 
or a ‘general assembly’.335 In some cases, this ‘general assembly’ even took on the 
role of a ritual tribunal, collectively ratifying death sentences proposed by the 
capi.336 But until the creation of a permanent Commission in the American mafia 
(Chapter 4) and a ‘Cupola’ system in Sicily (Chapter 6), these structures remained 




When Salvatore Lucania arrived on the Lower East Side of Manhattan from central 
Sicily at the age of nine in the spring of 1907, the conditions he encountered were in 
some ways more like those we would today expect to find in a refugee camp or a 
‘fragile state’ than a thriving, modern city. Lucania’s family lived on East 13th 
Street near Second Avenue. Such over-crowded tenements typically had twelve 
rooms housing four immigrant families, with one toilet per floor. Most apartments 
doubled as garment piecework factories. The streets were cobbled or sometimes 
unpaved, and filthy. And the neighbourhood was extremely crowded. 20,000 new 
inhabitants arrived on Manhattan in May 1907 – in just one day. 237,000 Italians 
had immigrated to America the previous year.337  
Italian unification had not brought prosperity to southern Italy. The New 
World promised a new life. 2.1 million Italians moved to the US between 1900 and 
1910 alone, 80 per cent from the Mezzogiorno or Sicily.338 In the first fifteen years 
of the 20th century roughly a quarter of Sicily’s population migrated to America, 
usually entering through, and often staying in, New York.339 The city was home to 
more Italians than Florence, Venice and Genoa combined.340 The East Village 
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tenements around ‘Mulberry Bend’ (Mulberry, Mott, Hester, Prince and Elizabeth 
Streets) where many Italian immigrants pitched up were the stronghold of 
Tammany Hall, the local Democratic political organization that served as an 
intermediary between the city’s municipal institutions and the city’s immigrant 
communities, providing access to governmental services in return for votes. Other 
notable Italian immigrant clusters were found in East Harlem and Williamsburg. 
Yet in addition to massive Italian immigration, between 1870 and 1900 New York’s 
Jewish population also grew from 60,000 to 300,000.341 At the same time, the Irish-
born population was dropping steadily, and moving to outer boroughs. Tammany’s 
power within these neighbourhoods was loosening, and its traditional role in 
governing lower Manhattan’s vice markets was also weakening. 
When Lucania arrived in 1907, the Lower East Side was threatening to 
become ungovernable. In the months after his arrival, a series of strikes paralyzed 
large parts of lower Manhattan. One was led by Italian street cleaners, with rotting 
garbage piling up in the streets, and the risks of epidemic spiralling. Police 
escorting strike-breakers were pelted with refuse and bricks. Soon after, the 
meatpackers went on strike, with butcher shops closing down across the city. Given 
the very limited access to fresh produce and refrigeration, riots and disease 
threatened. Again, the police were called in.  
In some ways this political economy resembled the one in Sicily that 
Lucania and his fellow immigrants had left.342 ‘Access to the labor market’ in both 
places, argues John Dickie, was ‘similarly controlled by tough-guys and local 
bosses’. Sicilians fully appreciated, Dickie argues,  
how important it could be, in terms of their livelihoods, to be loyal to the 
right faction in town…. Many had no illusions about what it took to get on 
in politics and business…. Like Sicily, the world of the new immigrant in 
North America was one where power was invested not in institutions, but 
in tough, well-networked individuals.343 
 It was an environment potentially ripe for the reproduction of mafia-type 
power. Yet there is a longstanding dispute within the research literature about how 
the Italian America mafia emerged in New York and other US cities. The economist 
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Donald Cressey and various US government investigations in the mid-twentieth 
century treated the American Mafia as a ‘branch’ or ‘offshoot’ of its Sicilian 
forebear, the result of a kind of criminal colonization or off-shore strategy. A 
critical perspective has suggested, on the contrary, that the American mafia is better 
understood as the result of local responses to local conditions, modelled on but not 
directly established by their Italian cousins. Diego Gambetta has argued, for 
example that 
Mafia families were not exported to America but emerged spontaneously, 
as it were, when the supply of protection and the demand for protection 
met: when, in other words, a sufficient number of emigrants moved there 
for independent reasons, some bringing along the necessary skills for 
organizing a protection market, and when certain events, notably the Great 
Depression and Prohibition, opened up a vast and lucrative market for this 
commodity.344  
This structuralist analysis, which treats the mafia as vehicles for impersonal 
market forces, is somewhat ahistorical. And, as it turns out, a little inaccurate. The 
reality is that the protection market in New York already existed, well before the 
Depression and Prohibition – but was effectively governed by the Tammany 
organization, which operated primarily as a patronage organization, describing its 
style of politics as based on ‘honest graft’.345 Italian immigrants to New York, and 
other cities such as New Orleans, began developing their own schemes in the 
shadow of these established protection providers.346 
The Black Hand 
As Lucania arrived, however, Tammany grip on local-level criminal activity was 
weakening, both as the result of its Irish clientele moving off Manhattan, and as a 
result of Tammany reforms in response to the emergence of another rival for the 
role of political intermediary in the political marketplace – the labour movement.347 
As a result, space for violent and criminal entrepreneurialism in New York’s 
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immigrant neighbourhoods was beginning to open up. Local youth gangs controlled 
the pickpocket and illegal craps rackets.348 Lucania fell in with this crowd, before 
being packed off to a ‘secure school’ in Brooklyn – where he mingled with other 
similarly delinquent youth, gaining a valuable education in petty crime at the state’s 
expense.349 Some of these gangs also began to take the place of earlier Irish gangs 
as election day enforcers for the Tammany organization, forging exploitable ties 
that would later provide invaluable political protection.350  
From August 1903, an epidemic of extortion gripped the Italian-American 
community across the country. Victims would usually receive several letters 
making extortionate demands, signed by the ‘Mano Nera’ (Black Hand). If the 
victim did not comply, a ‘friend’ of the victim would often step forward as a 
‘conciliator’. But payment could often lead to further demands. Non-payment, 
however, frequently led to bombing. Seventy such attacks were recorded in 1911 in 
New York city alone.351 A 1909 report by Giuseppe (‘Joe’) Petrosino – a pioneering 
New York police officer who was assassinated by the Sicilian mafia in Palermo just 
a couple of months later – identified structural factors in New York that facilitated 
Black Hand extortion. They could be lifted straight from a contemporary United 
Nations report considering the possibilities for criminal activity in a ‘fragile state’: 
Here there is practically no police surveillance. Here it is easy to buy arms 
and dynamite. Here there is no penalty for using a fake name. Here it is 
easy to hide, thanks to our enormous territory and overcrowded cities.352 
 With such low costs and risks, anyone could get involved in Black Hand 
extortion. Such tactics – though not the Black Hand symbol, specifically – were 
well known in southern Italy,353 especially amongst the Neapolitan Camorra.354 
Insider accounts suggest there was no centralized ‘Black Hand Society’, as the 
contemporary press theorized. Indeed, Italian mafiosi that had emigrated to the US 
were not, apparently, major Black Hand proponents. 355  Instead, Black Hand 
extortion was an open-source criminal methodology that spread through mimicry 
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not only by thugs but also by businessmen seeking an edge over their rivals.  
This was disorganized, not organized, crime. There was a collective 
incentive for all Black Hand copy-catters to have their activities perceived as the 
product of a vast, powerful conspiracy, since this raised the perceived risks of non-
compliance.356 Some small extortion rings did emerge, but they tended to endure 
not on the basis of their income from extortion, but through developing other 
criminal rents, notably from counterfeiting and narcotics. The terrorizing nature of 
Black Hand extortion offered no basis for such rings to develop sustainable support 
within the Italian-American community, nor to develop political protection. 
Tammany could not protect those involved in terrorist bombings, and as early as 
1904 backed the formation of a special ‘Italian squad’ in the New York Police 
Department to deal with Black Hand bombings.357  
Modern Family 
Black Hand extortion thus created a new opportunity for mafiosi in the US: to 
provide protection. Early American mafiosi presented themselves precisely as 
protectors of the Italian-American community, stepping in to settle Black Hand 
disputes, as well as to protect Italian-American interests from police brutality and 
extortion. But with Black Hand activities conducted so furtively and in such a 
disorganized way, the only way to prevent and control them was not through direct 
physical pressure, but through social influence.  
Sicilian mafia capi and leaders of other southern Italian criminal 
organizations such as the Neapolitan Camorra and the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta who 
had emigrated from Italy brought their reputations, and their wealth of respect, with 
them.358 They were well positioned to play a local public order role. As the leading 
historian of the early Italian-American mafia David Critchley concludes, the 
‘[o]riginal American Mafia chieftains were frequently pillars of the Italian 
community, involving themselves in politics, and earning a living from self-
employment.’359 Their power stemmed particularly from their ability to govern 
these kinds of illicit markets and transactions. As Joe Bonanno put it: ‘By 
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performing such favors [i.e. resolving extortion disputes], large and small, the “man 
of honor” made himself indispensable’. 360  As in Sicily, the new American 
mafioso’s power rested in what one Mob leader’s son described as ‘a thousand 
friendships’ – the power of his social network.361 Mafia leaders’ dispute resolution 
efforts placed people in their debt, both figuratively and often literally: mafia 
mediators would often take a cut of the settlement negotiated with Black Hand 
extorters, and also lend the victim the money needed to pay the settlement (often at 
extortionate rates).362 
These pioneers were not envoys of Italian criminal organizations, sent 
strategically to build new branches in New York, but rather unintended vessels for 
the transplantation of mafia strategy and techniques. The initiation rituals for these 
early American mafia cosche, for example, seem to have been directly copied from 
those in southern Italy.363 The connections they developed back to Italian criminal 
groups were not hierarchical, but fraternal. There was no unified command 
structure; there was a shared operational culture and system of governmentality. In 
these early days, mafiosi emigrating to the US could hold dual membership of both 
the Italian and US organizations. American organizations would accept a ‘letter of 
consent’ from a Sicilian capo as a basis for admission to an American cosca, and 
‘made’ members moved back and forth between the organizations.364  
The most important leader to emerge in this way was Giuseppe Morello, 
whose cosca wielded influence from New York to Chicago to Louisiana in the 
1910s. The Morello cosca is sometimes described as the ‘First Family’ of the 
American Mafia. Morello was born in Corleone in western Sicily in 1867. By the 
time he migrated to New York in 1894 to escape imprisonment for counterfeiting, 
he was a powerful member of the Corleone cosca. By 1900, he had become a leader 
in the manufacture and distribution of counterfeit notes in New York, and his 
seniority in the mafia in Sicily gave him high standing in the US, with some insider 
accounts describing him as the first ‘capo di tutti capi’ (boss of bosses).365 Dickie 
                                                
360 Bonanno, p. 40.  
361 Bill Bonanno, Bound by Honour (New York: St. Martin’s Paperbacks, 1999), p. 6.  
362 Francis A. Ianni and Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni, A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in 
Organized Crime (New York: Russel Sage, 1972), p. 52; Critchley, p. 32.  
363 Gambetta, pp. 262-270; Critchley, pp. 63-64, 119. 
364 Critchley, pp. 62-63; Gentile, pp. 53-61.  
365 Critchley, pp. 36-48.  
  82 
describes Morello’s gang as an early transplant of the Sicilian mafioso culture to 
New York, using the same techniques of protection, patronage and police 
corruption.366  
Morello’s operation, however, demonstrated several strategic vulnerabilities. 
First, it lacked strategic depth. Critchley’s research into primary records suggests 
that it was organized like a rural Sicilian cosca, with only 10 or 20 members, 
leaving Morello without ‘buffers’ between him and the rank and file, ‘creating an 
obvious risk of exposure of the leadership to prosecution’.367 In Sicily, the Corleone 
cosca could rely on the powerful normative hold of omertà over the broader 
population to provide cover. In New York, the influence of omertà was notably less 
extensive. Second, Morello built his organization around a core Corleonesi kinship 
network involving overlapping marriages between the Morello and Terranova 
families. As his operation grew and required more personnel, he relied on members 
of this group to vouch for new members from outside the network, expanding into a 
broader Sicilian network, but with only very limited reach into the Calabrian and 
Neapolitan communities.368 This fostered operational security, but again at the 
expense of social reach. No charismatic communicator, Morello lacked the social 
connections in New York (or beyond) that would have allowed him to broker 
resolutions to larger disputes. He was not, in other words, able to develop broader 
governmental power within the emerging Italian-American underworld, or political 
power beyond it.369 Morello consequently failed to develop effective protection 
from the state. While he did corrupt numerous judges and police officers, it proved 
inadequate.370 Counterfeiting was a federal crime, and federal officials lived in 
places, both literal and figurative, that Morello could not reach. Later, for exactly 
this reason, the American mafia would formalize a ban on engagement in 
counterfeiting, and mafia members were specifically warned not to harm federal 
agents.371 In 1910, he was jailed for twenty-five years on counterfeiting charges.  
Around the same time, however, two other distinct mafia-style groups began 
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to consolidate in Brooklyn, both descendants of the Neapolitan Camorra. One was 
based around the Brooklyn Navy Yard and one around Coney Island. For a period 
they were bloody competitors, but eventually banded together to wipe out the 
(Sicilian) Morellos.372 Yet they also suffered from a lack of strategic depth due to 
their failure to move beyond their own specific immigrant communities, and their 
long bloodletting significantly diminished their own coercive capabilities.373  
The question of whether these criminal groups should replicate the 
provincialism of their Italian forebears or move beyond it, overlooking ethnic 
identity, became a central political and strategic question within the organizations. 
It was a question of trust. Sicilians were not used to trusting Calabrians or 
Neapolitans. Joe Bonanno, a ‘traditionalist’, argued throughout his life that non-
Sicilians could not fully understand the Sicilian ‘Tradition’.374 FBI records from as 
late as the 1960s point to formal vertical and horizontal separations between mafiosi 
of different (Italian) geographic heredity in the St Louis, Philadelphia and 
Cleveland mafia cosche.375 Yet by the late 1910s, Neapolitans and Calabrians were 
increasingly being recruited into the more cosmopolitan, Sicilian-led mafia cosche 
that were emerging on the Lower East Side and in East Harlem. Some Sicilians 
were also beginning to collaborate with Irish, Jewish or other gangs. On the Lower 
East Side, Salvatore Lucania was beginning to make a name for himself (as Lucky 
Luciano) through collaboration with a Neapolitan kid, Vito Genovese, a Calabrian 
immigrant, Francesco Castiglia (Frank Costello) and even a Russian Jewish 
immigrant, Maier Suchowljansky (Meyer Lansky). Luciano was adapting the 
Sicilian tradition, with its emphasis on real or fictive kinship, to create a ‘modern 
family’, stretching beyond traditional cosche lines. ‘I used to tell Lansky’, he would 
later say, ‘that he may have been Jewish, but someplace he must have been wet 
nursed by a Sicilian mother.’376  
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Illicit government 
The cosche or ‘Families’ that were emerging in America were, just like their 
Sicilian cosche forebears, governmental.377 Members became embedded in a secret 
normative order. The  
family embraced an individual’s whole life and demanded his total loyalty. 
Within its confines family members learned a common set of roles, norms, 
and values, which not only regulated their behavior within the family but 
structured their relationships with the outside world as well. In his relations 
with outsiders, a man never acts simply as an individual, but rather as a 
representative of his clan.378 
 This was the sense in which even mafiosi from different American cosche 
would refer to their shared world as ‘Our Thing’, Cosa Nostra. It conveyed the 
impression of a shared, secret outlook, a shared way of being or way of life; this 
secret order gave them more in common with each other than they shared with 
others.379 It set them secretly apart.  
The cosca had immense power over its members’ lives. Nothing 
controversial, not even a marriage, could be undertaken without considering its 
impact on other mafiosi, and in many cases seeking approval from mafia 
superiors.380 Initiates specifically swore loyalty to the cosca ‘family’ over their own 
biological families.381 And the word of a mafia’s superior was law, even in matters 
of life and death, as Joe Valachi, an American mafioso who famously turned state’s 
witness in the early 1960s explained to a US Congressional committee: 
Mr. VALACHI. …If he wants to get rid of anybody, he has such a way that 
he finds a way of legalizing it. In other words, for instance, he will make 
up stories and there is no one there to dispute him. 
The CHAIRMAN.  You mean legalize – 
Mr. VALACHI.  Legalize it amongst ourselves. 
The CHAIRMAN.  You mean your own crowd?  In other words, his word 
becomes law, that makes it legal? 
Mr. VALACHI.  Right. 
The CHAIRMAN.  Can he and does he pass out death sentences? 
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Mr. VALACHI.  He passes them out. They tell you he was a rat, he is this.  
They tell you anything they want to.382 
Secrecy was crucial. Members did not all know each other. More junior 
members relied on coded introductions to get to know the network. A member was 
introduced as ‘a friend of ours’, a non-member as ‘a friend of mine’.383 Yet 
membership of an American cosca (later, ‘Family’) was not like becoming a 
salaried bureaucrat. In return for participation in mafia violence, soldati and other 
members received a license to pursue their own criminal rents, including through 
the use of violence, within a system regulated by the mafia hierarchy. Michael 
Franzese, a made member of the Colombo Family, explained ‘we weren’t given a 
salary or put on somebody’s payroll. It was up to each man to make his way.’384 
Another Colombo Family member, Joe Cantalupo, similarly recalled that ‘the rules 
of the game were simple. Make money any way you can.’385 As Edelhertz and 
Overcast, two criminologists, put it, ‘To be “made” one has to be a producer, not a 
mouth to feed.’386 Again, Valachi explained: 
Senator MUNDT. … I am trying to determine what your income was as a 
soldier working for Genovese. 
Mr. VALACHI.  You don’t get any salary, Senator. 
Senator MUNDT.  Well, you get a cut, then. 
Mr. VALACHI.  You get nothing, only what you earn yourself. … 
Senator MUNDT.  In other words… all you got out of your membership of 
this family was protection from somebody cutting in on your racket? 
Mr. VALACHI.  That would be a good way to put it.387 
That ‘protection’ included from the state. In his testimony, Valachi also 
clarified that the Family would provide a range of support services to members and 
their families, including legal assistance – providing bail, a lawyer, and often 
pulling strings in the judiciary. A member’s biological family would also be looked 
after while he was serving time in prison, drawing on a centralized welfare fund 
financed through the dues and tributes paid by lower-ranking members. Other 
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evidence makes clear the same system pertained in Sicily.388  
The then-Director of the New York State Organized Crime Task Force 
explained the resulting pattern of innovation and control in an interview with New 
York Magazine in 1992. The mafia, he explained, has  
always been looked at as a corporation… But it’s not… In a corporation, 
people at the bottom carry out the policies and perform the tasks assigned 
to them by executives at the top. In the Mob, the people at the bottom are 
the entrepreneurs. They pass a percentage of their income upward as taxes 
in return for governmental-type services: resolution of disputes, allocation 
of territories, enforcement and corruption services.389 
The distinction between a corporate and governmental model is also borne 
out in the different allocations of authority within the system. To become a ‘made’ 
or initiated member in the mafia was less about ascending in the bureaucracy than 
entering the aristocracy. Joe Pistone, who spent six years undercover in the mafia as 
an FBI informant using the name ‘Donnie Brasco’, explained: 
A made guy has protection and respect … You are elevated to a status 
above the outside world of ‘citizens’. You are like royalty… A made guy 
may not be liked, may even be hated, but he is always respected.390 
Nick Caramandi, a former capo in the Philadelphia-based Scarfo Family, 
saw the distinction in even more extreme terms. Once made, he said ‘You become 
like a god. Your whole life changes. You have powers that are unlimited.’391  
The mafia’s governmental power depended, however, on keeping the state at 
bay. As Henry Hill, a famous mafia informer, explained, what the mafia itself 
provided to its members to achieve this was protection and connections. 392 
Connections stood for trust, and reduced transaction costs – protection from 
interference, cheating, prison.\ An individual’s power in the mafia was thus linked 
both to his ability to mobilize and deploy coercion but – above all – to his ability, 
through corruption and communications, to make and keep connections. As 
Pantaleone explained, ‘Above all’, a mafioso  
must have connections in all levels of society. If he is isolated he cannot be 
                                                
388 Ibid., pp. 240, 323; Raab, pp. 5, 8; Arlacchi, Men of Dishonor, pp. 143-144. 
389 Michael Stone, ‘After Gotti’, New York Magazine, 3 February 1992, pp. 22-31, at p. 29. 
390 Pistone and Woodley, p. 77. 
391 George Anastasia, Blood and Honor: Inside the Scarfo Mob – The Mafia’s Most Violent Family 
(Philadelphia PA: Camino Books, 1991), p. 223. 
392 See Nicholas Pileggi, Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family (New York, Simon & Schuster: 1985), pp. 
56-57. See also Bonanno, p. 152.  
  87 
strong; even if he is the most feared and violent man in the ‘family’ or the 
‘cosca’, and the most experienced ‘killer’ amongst them, he will never 
become a chief.393 
 Politics, it seemed, were at the root of mafia power from the outset. 
The Iron Prefect 
Back in Sicily, by the late 1910s the mafia was playing an important role as a 
broker within the island’s political order, particularly by controlling the communal 
violence that might otherwise have arisen from Sicily’s slow-motion economic 
modernization.  
Don Calogero Vizzini, a leading mafia capo from Villalba in central Sicily 
provides an example of how this worked. In the wake of the First World War, 
socialists, labourers, peasants and activists from the Popular Party (the ideological 
precursor to the Christian Democrats) agitated for land reform. In 1920 they 
occupied the holdings of a major latifundia around Villalba, where Don Calò was 
based. Twelve years earlier he had brokered a solution to a similar dispute between 
a Paris-based absentee landlord, a Palermo-based administrator, local peasants and 
the Catholic Rural Fund, which granted him a lease with a local cooperative as 
tenants. Now he repeated the scheme, with variations. In 1921 he brokered the sale 
of the land by its owner, Cavaliere Matteo Guccione to a Cooperative of War 
Veterans of Villalba, put together by Vizzini, presided over by Vizzini’s brother, 
and financed by an agricultural bank Vizzini had founded. The sale provided for the 
distribution of the land to small landowners – but only after 6 years, during which 
they had to continue to pay rent to Vizzini, and surrender the proceeds of the 
harvest to him. After the arrangement ended in 1926, both Vizzini and his sister had 
somehow acquired titles over significant tracts of the land.394 Both the landowner 
and the local land-workers had avoided their least-preferred outcomes – violence 
for the landowner, the status quo for the workers – but Vizzini proved to be the real 
winner. 
Through such manoeuvring the mafia had emerged as a conservative force 
in the political economic transition, slowing down the process of land reform and 
wealth redistribution that might otherwise have led to the emergence of a middle 
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class.395 This served the interests of conservative political forces, as did the role that 
the mafia played as strike-breakers and labour market brokers in Sicily’s 
agricultural sector, unhampered by the unionization that had arisen in more 
urbanized economies. As Mussolini rose to power in the mid-1920s, it was this very 
mediating power of the mafia that seemed to represent an obstacle to realization of 
the Fascist programme in Sicily. This became clear in the 1924 general election. 
While the Fascists won a landslide victory nationally, in Sicily mafia mobilizers 
secured victories for the opposition Popular Party and Liberal Party. Mussolini 
toured the island, hoping to drum up support, but received a cold reception in mafia 
areas. His response was the appointment of Mori and his anti-mafia campaign. 
Mori’s attack on the mafia was both an effort to break its power and a cover 
for the Fascists to ‘destroy the freedom of political organization’ more broadly on 
the island, asserting their totalizing vision of unitary power.396 It was an effort to 
remove the mafia as an alternative source of governmental or political power, all of 
which, under the Fascist ideology, was to run through the Fascist party. In 1925 the 
Fascists abolished parliamentary elections, depriving the mafia of ‘its main 
currency for purchasing concessions from Rome’.397 Mori himself characterized the 
campaign as not simply ‘a police campaign on a more or less grand scale, but 
instead an insurrection of the conscience, a revolt of the spirit, the action of a 
people.’398 He recognized that the mafia ‘obtains exceptional strength from a logic 
which is all its own’, and that omertà, based in fear, was key to this logic.399 His 
response was an explicitly moral appeal to Sicilians’ sense of self and identity: 
[W]e must turn… to pride as an instrument with which to react to 
arrogance and bullying; courage to react to violence; strength to react to 
strength; and rifles to react to rifles.400 
The siege of Gangi in 1926 was thus intended to show that he could be more 
mafioso than the mafiosi. It was an attempt to show that the Fascists, not the mafia, 
were the viable brokers between the state and the population, the embodiment of 
cherished values of fortitude and self-reliance, and the most powerful governmental 
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actors. These were themes Mori would emphasize in speeches in the towns and 
villages where his crackdown took place, and in interviews with the press. 
Yet Mori recognized that his battle with the mafia required attacks along a 
material front as well as a conceptual front. He took several steps to undermine the 
rackets on which the mafia thrived, creating a tighter registration and branding 
system to undermine cattle-rustling and investing state resources in more regularly 
assessing land rents against yields, to prevent the mafia from forcing landowners to 
rent land to them at unrealistic prices.401 Yet under his rule, agricultural wages fell 
by 28 per cent. The Fascists had ‘not so much … eliminated the mafiosi’, as the 
historian Alexander Stille later put it, but rather ‘replaced them by acting as the new 
enforcers for the Sicilian landowning class’.402 With his campaign of intimidation, 
the abolition of party politics, and the state’s increased role in the economy, the 
mafia’s brokering power was steadily corroded, and increasingly higher-level mafia 
actors moved into the Fascist Party.403 
Mori’s apparent success against the mafia appears to have come by splitting 
the ‘upper’ mafia – the parts of the mafia network that connected into the 
landowning classes, the urban professionals, the politicians – from the ‘lower’ 
mafia. As Lupo explains, most of those punished by Mori’s campaign were 
campieri (field guards on the large estates) and gabellotti (estate managers, often 
foisted on landowners by the mafia). The campaign specifically left the traditional 
landowners themselves – many of whom had collaborated with, if not joined the 
mafia – untouched. The few landowners that were entangled in the campaign 
escaped punishment by successfully pleading ‘necessity’ at trial. And when Mori 
seemed set to begin to go after this ‘upper’ mafia, including some with open ties to 
the Fascist party, he was suddenly recalled to Rome.404 The Fascists declared 
victory over the mafia. It was premature. The preservation of the latifundist system 
left in place the bottlenecks in the Sicilian economy that the mafia was able to 
exploit, and much of the mafia network remained in place. Unsurprisingly, once 
Mussolini had moved on, the mafia quietly clawed back its power, laying the seeds 
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of its resurgence after the Second World War, described in Chapter 6.405 
The Iron Prefect’s crackdown did, however, have one other profound impact. 
Scores of young mafiosi fled to the US, including future leaders in the American 
mafia such as Joseph Bonanno, Carmine Galante and Joe Profaci.406 The exodus 
helped to accelerate the transplantation of mafia expertise and techniques to the 
New World. This was particularly the case when those leaving were more senior 
mafiosi, at the sottocapo or capo level. Of these, one in particular stands out, a capo 
from the cosca in Castellammarese del Golfo, a seaside town west of Palermo. His 
name was Salvatore Maranzano, and his arrival in New York would soon lead to 
upheaval in the American mafia. 
 
Conclusion 
The Sicilian mafia was born out of the limited governmental power in Sicily of the 
unified Italian state. Mafiosi emerged as entrepreneurial brokers during the Sicilian 
politico-economic transition, using their control of local coercion to develop 
governmental power. These entrepreneurs shared a common positioning strategy, 
interposing themselves between local communities and supply-chains, and the state. 
Over time, this loose group came to share an operational culture and organizational 
techniques, likely stimulated by interaction with the clandestine revolutionary 
networks of the 1850s and early 1860s. What emerged was not just a clandestine 
association, but a secret society, a private normative order with its own values, rules 
and repertoire structuring the possible actions of its members and associates. The 
Sicilian mafia represented, in other words, a specific, criminal governmentality.  
 The mafia’s emergence in the United States followed a similar pattern: not 
through a deliberate colonization by Sicilian cosche, the Neapolitan Camorra or 
Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, but through the use of imported mafia techniques and 
strategies to govern an unruly underworld. The American mafia cosche coalesced 
among Italian immigrant communities who turned to the mafia system to govern the 
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Black Hand extortion epidemic and petty crime more generally.407 As Varese and 
Gambetta have argued, the American mafia families were the ‘lineal descendants’ 
of the Mezzogiorno mafias, rather than their colonial outposts.408  
 In Sicily, the mafia’s governmental power was from almost the outset nested 
inside the formal political structure of the state. Mafia cosche were a powerful 
brokering force in keeping order and delivering votes. Mussolini’s vision of a 
unified party-state left no room for the mafia to continue to play such a brokering 
role in Sicilian government. The campaign led by Cesare Mori to eradicate the 
mafia took place not only in the military or coercive domain through a sustained, 
large-scale show of force, but also in a political and normative, or as Mori saw it, 
moral dimension, through strategic communication. Through speeches, the press, 
military operations and trials designed for their signalling power as much as their 
operational necessity, Mori sought to portray himself and the Fascist Party, rather 
than the mafia, as the true protectors of traditional community values. He sought to 
position the Fascist Party as the monopoly provider of governmentality, driving the 
mafia out of the market.  
In New York, the governmental brokering role that the mafia played in 
Sicily was instead played by gangs and the Tammany political organization. With 
an American mafia system emerging as a potential governmental actor, could these 
two brokering organizations, Tammany and the mafia, co-exist?  
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4. War and Peace in the American mafia, 1920-1941 
 
‘He wanted something more terrible than money: he wanted power.’  
Mafia capo Nicola Gentile409 
 
‘The real problem is to remove the influence of the racketeer from politics.’ 
Thomas E. Dewey410 
 
 
On 10 September 1931 Salvatore Maranzano, the newly confirmed capo di tutti 
capi (‘boss of all bosses’) of the American mafia was sitting in his office in the 
newly opened Helmsley Building that towered above Grand Central Station. He was 
waiting for a visit by the federal Internal Revenue Service. Upon arrival the IRS 
agents flashed their identity cards and asked Maranzano to follow them into his 
interior office. One stayed outside in the waiting room, where, producing a gun, he 
bailed up the bystanders and forced them to face the wall. Inside Maranzano’s 
office, the agents’ guns jammed. So they stabbed Maranzano to death instead.  
These were not IRS agents, but Jewish mobsters working for another mafia 
boss – Lucky Luciano. It was the second time in five months that Luciano had 
worked with non-Sicilians to assassinate a superior in the mafia. With these 
manoeuvres, and the organizational reforms he instituted after Maranzano’s death, 
Luciano rose to pre-eminence within the American mafia, and a coalition of mafia 
Families and Jewish gangsters that came to be known as ‘the Mob’ emerged as the 
dominant power within the American underworld. By 1935 this coalition had not 
only gained control of rackets in most of New York’s legitimate and illegitimate 
industries, but also developed innovative new gambling markets country-wide and – 
through ties between gambling and politics – leverage within New York and 
national-level Democratic politics. Yet in 1936 Luciano was convicted at trial and 
sentenced to fifty years’ imprisonment in an upstate prison nicknamed ‘Little 
Siberia’. What went wrong?  
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 In this chapter we explore the rise and apparent fall of Lucky Luciano. 
Diego Gambetta has famously described the Sicilian mafia as a product of the 
business of private protection.411 Here, we explore how Luciano’s fate – and that of 
the American mafia – was shaped not just by the business of private protection but 
also the politics of public protection. The first section considers the role of 
Prohibition as an accelerator of strategic competition in the American underworld, 
leading to civil war in the mafia between 1929 and 1931. After a period in which 
rival mafia leaders attempted to reach a mediated settlement, the conflict was finally 
concluded by Luciano’s assassination of his mafia capo and Maranzano’s rival, 
Giuseppe Masseria, at lunch in a restaurant in Coney Island. The second section 
considers the underworld political settlement that emerged from the civil war, the 
events at Maranzano’s office, and Luciano’s subsequent constitutional reforms. A 
third section explores the political and economic effects of strategic reorganization 
within the underworld. The economies of scale opened up to the Mob allowed it to 
expand its governmental power, but also fostered rivalries. The fourth section 
considers how these rivalries for governmental power – including both underworld 
and upperworld actors –  brought Luciano down.  
Like other periods of violent strategic crisis and change, the history of the 
events treated in this chapter has been clouded through exaggeration and 
dramatization in popular journalism. This chapter relies not only on secondary 
sources but also a balanced array of primary accounts of these events. In the case of 
the ‘Castellammarese War’ within the American mafia, treated in the first and 
second sections, this includes the accounts of strategic decision-makers such as Joe 
Bonanno, chief of staff to Maranzano, and Nicola Gentile, a mafia capo brought in 
to mediate a settlement. Largely because his account remains difficult to come by, 
and perhaps because it is in Italian, many English-language researchers have to date 
overlooked this important source.412 One important exception is David Critchley. 
His detailed history of this period receives special attention.413  
For the ‘post-War’ period, the 1939 series of Collier’s magazine articles by 
Richard ‘Dixie’ Davis, formerly Dutch Schultz’s lawyer, helps to provide insight 
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and context relating to Schultz.414 Tom Dewey’s Twenty Against the Underworld 
affords a window into the approach of the Prosecutor that brought down Luciano, 
but, as this chapter emphasizes, needs to be understood as an artefact of careful 
strategic communication by a very effective politician.415 In some ways more useful 
is the popular journalist Hickman Powell’s Lucky Luciano.416 Powell’s reporting of 
the speech of Mob figures, his own explanation of how he wrote the book, and 
triangulation against case files in New York municipal archives indicate that it is 
based on access to Dewey’s case-files during the Luciano trial, including transcripts 
of pre-trial testimony by over seventy Mob-linked witnesses. That makes it a 
uniquely valuable source of insight into the trial, and the Mob activities it explored. 
 
War 
Prohibition as a driver of innovation 
When the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution came into effect 
on 16 January 1920, criminalizing the manufacture and sale of all alcoholic 
beverages, new rents were created, attached to a huge unmet demand. Strategic 
competition for control of these rents would transform the American underworld. 
Prohibition resulted in part from a social backlash to the immigrant waves of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. White, Protestant middle America 
mobilized to defend their pastoral, family-oriented values against the perceived 
decadence, dissolution and corruption of America’s booming cities, with their huge 
new alien populations.417 Exactly for that reason, from the outset Prohibition did not 
take hold in New York city, the immigrant metropolis. By 1923 the New York State 
Legislature had terminated police cooperation with federal enforcement authorities. 
By 1925 the World League Against Alcoholism was reporting that ‘To all intents 
and purposes anyone can now engage in the liquor traffic unmolested in the City of 
New York.’418  
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With barriers to entry low, the new market spurred innovation. Huge profits 
were available. The mark-up on locally produced beer was around 700 per cent, and 
on a case of imported scotch whiskey around 4,000 per cent – comparable to 
cocaine today.419 Illicit stills sprang up in urban basements and country barns. Local 
street gangs that had focused on theft and extortion and illegal gambling quickly 
moved into production and distribution. Within a couple of years, Lucky Luciano’s 
street gang on the Lower East Side had an annual payroll of about $1 million – 
about $14 million in current terms. Revenues, however, were roughly 12 times this 
size.420 
 Prohibition changed the strategic environment for criminal activity in New 
York in two fundamental ways. First, it created a huge new pool of resources which 
criminal groups not only had an incentive to capture, but also needed to prevent 
their rivals from capturing. Second, it provided social complicity offering the 
strategic depth that the Sicilian mafia had enjoyed in Sicily, but which Morello’s 
cosca had not been able to that point to generate. Overnight, Prohibition weakened 
the bonds of allegiance of the average citizen to the state, turning ‘thousands of law-
abiding Sicilians into bootleggers, alcohol cookers and vassals of warring mobs’.421 
To be enjoyed, alcohol needed to be consumed socially, in bars and clubs, with 
entertainment. That required a diverse labour-force, space and a clandestine supply-
chain. The result was a whole criminal ecosystem, a huge new market for illicit 
government, ‘in which there were no courts to fix, no penalties to evade. The 
statutes were six-shooters, the constitution a machine-gun.’422  
 The result was a surge in organized crime. Established Irish and Jewish 
mobs with links to gambling syndicates were particularly well placed at the outset 
to dominate high seas importation, since it required significant capital 
investment. 423  In contrast, moonshine and bootlegging operations – domestic 
production and overland distribution – offered higher risks and lower rewards, but 
also lower barriers to entry. As a result, the market remained fragmented. Some 
groups built distribution networks and production cooperatives. The Jewish 
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syndicate led by Waxey Gordon, for example, soon controlled thirteen breweries in 
Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey.424 But most enterprises remained highly 
localized, opening up space for the Italian-American street gangs and the mafia to 
provide protection.425  
The illicit alcohol market seemed to breed a particularly violent gangster 
because of the ease with which the bulky cargo could be hijacked during transit.426 
As a result, coercion became a key strategic capability for operators in the 
bootlegging market. The need to scale up their coercive capabilities forced the 
emerging Italian-American mafia cosche to expand and innovate, bringing in 
immigrants and street toughs who had grown up in America, such as Luciano.427 
Some even began to cooperate with non-Italians. It also encouraged the formation 
of cartel structures. In the larger urban centres the only way to achieve scale was 
through cooperation with other mobs.428 Luciano cooperated from early on with a 
gang led by a young Russian Jewish immigrant, Meyer Lansky, by their own telling 
driven by the brute logic of economies of scale: ‘We were in business like the Ford 
Motor Company’, Lansky would later explain. ‘Shooting and killing was an 
inefficient way of doing business. Ford salesmen didn’t shoot Chevrolet salesmen. 
They tried to outbid them.’429  
One way to win on cost was to reduce the cost from violence and state 
interdiction – to buy protection. From the outset, the bootleggers’ business model 
depended heavily on police corruption. The most important kerbside liquor 
exchange in downtown New York was at the junction of Kenmare and Mulberry 
streets – just two blocks from the local police precinct house and a stone’s throw 
from the State and Federal courts. As crime writer Tim Newark has succinctly put it, 
Prohibition unwittingly ‘introduced a level of corruption into public affairs that 
enabled criminal gangs to get a firm grip on the American metropolis’.430 In the 
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process, the mafia moved out of the Italian neighbourhoods, into the broader city – 
and then beyond.431  The emergence of a national liquor market created ‘the 
opportunity to organize on a national scale, and to gain internal discipline on a 
national scale’.432 Smuggling and distribution networks emerged, with their leaders 
meeting frequently to sort out operational and organizational problems in leisure 
spots where demand for alcohol was high and protection from law enforcement 
could be assured: Miami, Havana, Hot Springs, Arkansas, or, most famously, 
Atlantic City in May 1929.433  
The organization that emerged was not unitary or hierarchical; it was more 
like a world or ecosystem, in which certain groups and networks dominated. These 
were predominantly based in New York, because New York was the key node in 
the production and distribution networks, what is today in Mexico called a plaza. 
New York was the busiest port in the country, the starting point for rail distribution 
networks thoughout the country, a chokepoint in the smuggling network, and a 
relatively safe operating environment. It was one of the biggest consumption 
markets, a major source of finance – and of political protection that transferred well 
to other parts of the country.   
Civil war in the American mafia 
For much of the first half of the 1920s, the landscape of bootleggers and enforcers 
was highly fluid, with alliances and rivalries shifting kaleidoscopically. These 
entrepreneurial criminal networks were not consolidated into regular organizations, 
but tended to operate as highly flexible ‘crews’ (known to criminologists as ‘action 
sets’), coming together for a particular job, disassembling, and then forming new 
patterns for another job.434 The central strategic challenge for these mobs was one 
of internal organization. 435  
The southern Italians had one crucial competitive advantage over other local 
mobs and crews: their access to the codes and repertories of pre-existing secret 
criminal societies, the mafia, Camorra, and ‘Ndrangheta. These provided the 
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scarcest of resources in the underworld – trust – and offered ready-made criminal 
organizations with normative and social reach into immigrant communities. Jewish 
Mobsters such as Meyer Lansky, Bugsy Siegel and Louis ‘Lepke’ Buchalter could 
and did develop power through violence, but they had no such ready-made 
governmental systems on which to draw. It was to prove a decisive difference.  
By the second half of the 1920s, two rival mafia networks had emerged as 
major players in the US liquor markets, one led by Joseph Masseria, and the other 
by Salvatore Maranzano. Maranzano was born on 31 July 1886 in Castellammare 
del Golfo in Sicily, and married into a powerful Castellammarese family with deep 
mafia ties. He quickly rose to influence in the Trapani region, developing close ties 
to leading politicians. 436  In the 1920s, fleeing Mori’s crackdown, Maranzano 
migrated to the US, pitching up in Williamsburg, bringing a small fortune with 
him.437 His familial ties to the Schiro cosca, dominant in western New York state, 
provided a route into the New York mafia. Within just a couple of years, he had 
become a major moonshiner and bootlegger, with several large distilleries up-state 
in Dutchess County. He had charisma and a gift for oratory. Joe Bonanno, who 
became his chief of staff, said that ‘When Maranzano used his voice assertively, to 
give a command, he was the bell-knocker and you were the bell.’438 By the late 
1920s, Maranzano was consigliere of the Schiro cosca, operating primarily in 
Williamsburg. A second cosca, led by Salvatore D’Aquila, was active primarily in 
Harlem; and a third, including the remnants of the Morello cosca, continued to 
operate in lower Manhattan and Harlem, under the leadership of Giuseppe Masseria.  
Masseria was a year younger than Maranzano, born in 1887 outside Marsala, 
Sicily – not a known mafia stronghold. He moved much earlier than Maranzano to 
New York, and while Maranzano was rising through the mafia ranks in Sicily, 
Masseria was involved in Black Hand activities, kidnapping and robbery on the 
Lower East Side of Manhattan.439 He was close to Giuseppe Morello.440 His 
fortunes were transformed by Prohibition, since his gang was based in the 
neighbourhood that hosted the most important wholesale curb exchange at Kenmare 
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Street. Masseria had a particularly bloody reputation, having killed more than thirty 
rival bootleggers and gambling organizers.441 Unlike the Schiro and D’Aquila 
cosche, however, Masseria’s outfit was not built on a biological kinship network.442 
By the mid-1920s he had taken another young Sicilian street tough, Luciano, under 
his wing. Like Masseria, Luciano was born (as Salvatore Lucania) in a Sicilian 
town (Lercara Friddi) that was not a noted mafia base. Luciano’s gang reflected his 
upbringing in cosmopolitan New York, incorporating individuals from outside the 
Sicilian tradition such as Vito Genovese and Joe Adonis (Neapolitan), Frank 
Costello and Albert Anastasia (Calabrian) and, later, close relations with Meyer 
Lansky (Jewish).443  
As Masseria’s power over moonshine and bootleg operations expanded in 
lower Manhattan, he confronted hostility from the D’Aquila cosca based in 
Harlem.444 After a series of hits on each other’s criminal networks, Masseria began 
sponsoring challenges to mafia leaders backed by D’Aquila around the country, 
most successfully in Cleveland in 1927.445 In October 1928, D’Aquila himself was 
gunned down on Avenue A in the East Village. Insider sources suggested Masseria 
was responsible.446 This left Maranzano as Masseria’s major rival within the 
American mafia.  
Maranzano’s network was more narrowly ‘Sicilian’. His sottocapi and 
capiregime included Joe Bonanno (from Castellammarese, Sicily) and Joe Profaci 
(from Palermo), and Maranzano had placed ‘traditionalist’ protégés in key locations 
throughout New York state.447 When a Castellammarese capo in Detroit, Gaspar 
Milazzo, was gunned down on 31 May 1930, Maranzano blamed Masseria, and 
called on other Castellammarese across the country to revolt against Masseria’s 
increasingly overbearing power.448 A later interview with Nicola Gentile, a mafia 
elder statesman called in to negotiate an end to the violence that resulted from the 
Maranzano-Masseria rivalry, threw light on what had been at stake: 
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Chilanti [the interviewer]: I don’t understand what Maranzano wanted. 
Was it a question of money, of whiskey…? 
Gentile: Not at all. In that period money was not needed. There were 
mountains of dollars available to everyone…  
Chilanti: But then what was Maranzano after? 
Gentile: He wanted something more terrible than money: he wanted 
power.449  
The violence within the mafia was intensely political. Masseria’s 
ascendancy in the late 1920s had generated resentment and resistance. He 
antagonized Sicilian traditionalists through his willingness to empower non-
Sicilians.450 Going over the heads of local Sicilian capi he initiated Al Capone (a 
Neapolitan) into the mafia and appointed him as his deputy in Chicago.451 The 
assassination in Detroit suggested Masseria would not stop until he controlled 
American cosche nationwide.452 His adversaries, such as Joe Bonanno in Brooklyn, 
saw Masseria pursuing power ‘through a combination of intimidation, strong-arm 
tactics, bullying and tenacity’.453 Gentile concluded that  
The actions of the Masseria government were imposed through a 
dictatorship, through exasperating commands which did not allow reply… 
They ruled by force of terror.454 
Maranzano mobilized a coalition to contest Masseria’s centralization of 
power.455 Active resistance appears to have begun in late 1929. The Masseria capo 
installed to run the cosca in Cleveland was assassinated. 456 In the Bronx, a 
sottocapo, Tommaso Gagliano, prepared a revolt against another Masseria-installed 
capo, and reached out to Maranzano for support.457 Maranzano used the killing in 
Detroit as a pretext to stoke dissent, describing it as ‘tantamount to a declaration of 
war against all Castellammarese’. 458 
 The violence that followed, now known as the ‘Castellammarese War’ was 
not a pitched battle between the established regime and a united opposition. It was, 
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like many civil wars, a series of opportunistic engagements between shifting 
alliances organized around two poles of power. Both poles were based in New York, 
and this was the primary operational theatre of the war. Recalling Stathis Kalyvas’ 
explanation of the relationship between local disputes and civil war violence,459 
Critchley explains that during the Castellammarese War 
murders outside of New York were the outcome of chiefly localized 
dynamics exploding or simmering just below the surface before the War 
began, while being influenced by personalities and events as they emerged 
in New York.460 
 Concerned for his safety, Schiro, still the nominal capo in the Brooklyn-
based cosca despite Maranzano’s growing personal influence, went into hiding. In 
July 1930, after a major financial backer for the Schiro cosca was assassinated, 
Maranzano was formally designated ‘war commander’.461 Soldati sent their families 
away for safety. A centralized chain of command was created stretching across both 
the Schiro and Bronx-based Gagliano cosche, with Joe Bonanno as chief of staff to 
Maranzano. Centralized intelligence and communications apparatus were created, 
and the group began importing guns. Similar arrangements were also put in place on 
Masseria’s side.462  
Both sides began raising substantial funds. The mafia leaders Magaddino 
and Aiello provided perhaps as much as $5,000 per week to the Castellammarese. 
Gagliano put up $150,000, and Maranzano made a similar contribution.463 These 
funds were used both for materiel, and to pay the frontline soldiers, many of whom 
were holed up in safe-houses awaiting orders, or undertaking surveillance – and 
thus unable to run their normal rackets.464 Human smuggling from Europe also 
appears to have played an important financing role for Maranzano.465 Masseria (and 
Luciano) may have turned to drug trafficking from Europe.466 These financing and 
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logistical networks quickly generated an arms race. Both Masseria and Maranzano 
took to riding in armour-plated cars, and Maranzano had a swivel-mounted 
machinegun installed in the back seat.467  
Maranzano went on the offensive, hitting several targets before Masseria 
could retaliate. On 15 August 1930 Maranzano’s forces killed Masseria’s mentor, 
Morello, and two others at 352 East 116th Street. On 5 September 1930 Gagliano’s 
men killed a Masseria-allied capo in the Bronx, with that cosca then formally 
defecting to Maranzano’s cause.468 This was a major strategic development. The 
new capo in the Bronx, Gagliano, was not a Castellammarese: he was born in 
Corleone. Masseria now found himself confronted not just by a Castellammarese 
kinship network, but by a broader alliance of Sicilians claiming to be protecting the 
Sicilian ‘tradition’. In November 1930, a joint operation by Maranzano and 
Gagliano soldati penetrated a secret Masseria conclave in the Alhambra apartments 
at 760 Pelham Parkway in the Bronx, killing two and almost killing Masseria 
himself.469 Masseria’s vulnerability was now obvious to all.  
Mediation and betrayal 
Maranzano sought to press home his advantage. Despite his gains, he was running 
out of time. For much of 1930, the police had stood by.470 Gentile claims that the 
Police Commissioner told the mafia capi that ‘so long as they killed amongst 
themselves, it did not concern him’. But as press alarm grew (magnified by leaks 
from the belligerents, using the press as a bullhorn to stoke fear and intimidate their 
rivals) he indicated to the capi that they must either resolve the matter themselves – 
without resort to gunfire – or they could expect a police crackdown.471  
 Maranzano switched from a military to a political track. Demonizing 
Masseria as a despot, he sold himself to the mafia rank and file as a bridge-building 
alternative leader.472 Drawing on Sicilian practice, he instigated the convening of 
the first ‘General Assembly’ of the American mafia in Boston on 1 December 1930. 
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The Assembly elected a neutral Boston capo, Gaspare Messina, as provisional capo 
di tutti capi and created an impartial five-man commission (including Nicola 
Gentile) charged with negotiating a peace settlement.473 The commissioners met 
with Maranzano for four days and offered to organize new elections for a 
permanent capo di capi. But Maranzano insisted Masseria must go, and tried to 
convince the commissioners to approve his replacement by his sottocapo, Vincent 
Mangano. Desperate, Masseria disappeared from view while telling his supporters 
to unilaterally disarm and offering himself to become a ‘plain soldier’.474 Once they 
felt they had amassed adequate political support, Maranzano’s supporters circulated 
a letter calling a new General Assembly, this time in Maranzano-supporting New 
York.475 There, in front of some 300 mafiosi, Maranzano offered a rousing speech 
that increased pressure for Masseria’s assassination. 476  The commissioners 
proposed a two-month truce, but Maranzano rejected the idea, and soon after, 
another key Masseria financier, Joseph Catania, was assassinated.477  
Critchley’s description of the role of this General Assembly paints a picture 
of peacemaking between mafia Families that could easily describe a contemporary 
civil war peace process overseen by the United Nations: 
Parties in dispute were ‘encouraged’ to discuss solutions to problems, but it 
was ultimately left to Family heads to accept or to reject them. The system 
left the general assembly during the War in the difficult position of aiming 
to restore peace but without the means to enforce it.478 
Just as successful international conflict resolution often depends on 
underlying military factors, so Maranzano’s political ascendancy in the American 
mafia flowed from his forging of an unassailable military coalition. Yet he had not 
delivered the coup de grâce. Masseria, though humiliated, lived. Maranzano turned 
to Masseria’s own war commander, Lucky Luciano.479 On 15 April 1931 Luciano, 
Vito Genovese and Joe Adonis met Masseria at the Nuovo Villa Tammaro 
                                                
473 Gentile, pp. 102-103 
474 Gentile, p. 98; Critchley, p. 185; McClellan Hearings, Part 1, p. 198.  
475 Gentile, p. 107.  
476 Ibid., pp. 108-109; Bonanno, pp. 121-122. 
477 Gentile, pp. 110-111.  
478 Critchley, p. 185.  
479 Bonanno, pp. 121-122; Newark, Lucky Luciano, pp. 57-58. 
  104 
restaurant in Coney Island, and assassinated him at the lunch table.480  
Luciano’s decision to betray Masseria and throw his weight behind 
Maranzano decided matters in Maranzano’s favour. But this begs a question. Why 
did the other capi, many of whom were older and of higher standing than Luciano, 
go along with this move? Luciano was not, after all, capo of his own cosca at this 
point; ordinarily, his assassination of his own capo would risk harsh punishment by 
other capi. Luciano’s move was justified by his peers in classic realpolitik terms, as 
a necessary evil to protect the integrity of the mafia from the twin threat of internal 
collapse and external invasion (by the state). Gentile summarized this thinking 
neatly: ‘It was a just decision because the Masseria government was already in 




Maranzano quickly instituted a series of organizational reforms designed to 
entrench his power. A third General Assembly was held in May 1931 in Chicago, 
reorganizing New York’s cosche into the ‘Five Families’.482 These later came to be 
known by the names of the capi that succeeded the leaders in place at this point. 
Maranzano’s Castellammarese-based group ultimately became the Bonanno Family, 
after Joe Bonanno. Luciano’s group went on to become known as the Genovese 
Family, after Vito Genovese. Tommy Gagliano’s Bronx-based group was known as 
the Lucchese Family, and the remnants of the Aquila cosca became the Gambino 
Family. Joe Profaci, who had managed to stay largely neutral through the War, led 
the fifth group, later known as the Colombo Family.483  
The creation of these ‘Five Families’ was about more than leadership 
appointments and names, however. It was a post-war political settlement within the 
American mafia. It provides the constitutional foundation for the American mafia to 
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this day. Because of the political and economic dominance of the New York cosche 
within the Italian-American underworld, their reorganization triggered realignment 
across the country. The way in which this settlement was carefully hammered out 
and publicized suggests a deliberate and strategic organization of the American 
mafia, belying the contention of sociologist Francis Ianni that American mafia 
Families were ‘not consciously constructed formal organizations’.484  
Joe Bonanno, Maranzano’s right hand man, records a series of conclaves 
between Maranzano and other mafia leaders in Chicago and up-state New York that 
allowed each leader to ‘identify and place himself within the new political 
constellation’.485 The settlement was then publicized to New York soldati at a 
meeting in the Bronx. Maranzano was to be capo di tutti capi.486 New, clearer, rules 
were introduced to deal with disputes between the Families.487 The old rules 
forbidding mafiosi from using force against each other were also emphasized.488 
While the war had forced changes in command and control structures to respond to 
operational tempo, the Bronx meeting made clear that old command hierarchies 
were reinstated.489 The new settlement was not a wholesale change: it represented a 
codification and formalization of old approaches, adapting them to new realities. 
The governmentality was old, but the governmental institutions were new.490  
Coup d’état 
In early August 1931 a three-day testimonial ‘banquet’ was held to mark the end of 
the War and to ratify Maranzano’s new regime. $115,000 in tributes was raised 
through $6 tickets and contributions in cash envelopes. Maranzano’s supporters 
were dancing, almost literally, on Masseria’s grave: the banquet was held at the 
Coney Island restaurant where he had been murdered.491  
Such an ostentatious show of power suggested a tin ear on the part of a 
leader who had earlier promoted rebellion precisely on the basis that his predecessor 
                                                
484 Ianni, ‘Formal and Social Organization’, p. 33.  
485 Raab, p. 29; Bonanno, pp. 125-129. 
486 Raab, p. 29. 
487 Mass, p. 84; McClellan Hearings, Part 1, p. 215; Gosch and Hammer, pp. 134-135. 
488 Maas, pp. 85, 179-180; McClellan Hearings, Part 1, pp. 184-185. 
489 Maas, p. 85; McClellan Hearings, Part 1, pp. 80-81, 195, 216-217; Gosch and Hammer, p. 134. 
490 Compare Critchley, p. 188.  
491 McClellan Hearings, Part 1, pp. 217-218; Messick, Syndicate Abroad, p. 20; Bonanno, p. 124; 
Gentile, p. 115. 
  106 
had grown too big for his boots. In short order, Maranzano’s political coalition 
began to fray. While he was a natural military commander, even his chief of staff, 
Bonanno, conceded that Maranzano ‘became somewhat of a misfit’ in the 
peacetime environment.492 He seemed to be stuck in war mode, unable to make the 
transition to the diplomacy required for peacetime coalition government. Instead of 
distributing the Coney Island funds as a peace dividend, he pocketed them, arguing 
that he needed them to maintain his regime’s security.493 He warned Magaddino and 
Capone that he sensed ‘very strongly the possibility of the outbreak of a [new] 
war’.494 Outwardly conciliatory, he secretly prepared a target-list of 60 underworld 
opponents to be purged.495 These were senior and mid-level leaders ‘he could not 
get along with’ – all originally in opposition during the War, or slow to join 
Maranzano’s winning team.496 Lucky Luciano was at the top of the list. He had 
recent form, when it came to double-crossing a capo di tutti capi.497 Maranzano 
hired an Irish hitman, Vincent ‘Mad Dog’ Coll, to kill Luciano.498 But one of 
Maranzano’s supporters spilled the beans to Luciano, Capone and Mangano.499 
Luciano went to ground and turned to his Jewish gangster friends for help.  
In the middle of 1931, Maranzano had taken a protection contract – which 
Luciano had already turned down – in the garment industry, setting the mafia at 
odds with Louis ‘Lepke’ Buchalter, a Jewish gangster that Luciano had worked 
with during Prohibition. Buchalter was working for the other side in the garment 
dispute.500 Maranzano’s intervention worked against Luciano’s interests, both at a 
financial level (he had interests in Buchalter’s racketeering venture) and politically 
(by signalling to the Jewish gangsters that he could not protect them from Italian-
American interference). But it also gave him an advantage: an interest amongst the 
Jewish gangsters to get rid of Maranzano. Luciano and his consigliere Costello 
appear to have met with Lepke Buchalter, Meyer Lansky and Ben ‘Bugsy’ Siegel 
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and hatched the plan to assassinate Maranzano.501 
Maranzano had over-reached, creating a whole new set of enemies. Luciano 
and his supporters carefully consulted with a range of Italian and Jewish supporters 
around the country.502 The hit was carried out in Maranzano’s office not by 
Luciano’s own men but by Jewish gangsters under Meyer Lansky’s control, 
masquerading as federal tax officials. Maranzano’s men would likely have 
recognized Luciano’s men; they did not recognize Lansky’s.503 In the days that 
followed, several other Maranzano supporters were also killed.504 In return for their 
help, Luciano and Gagliano in turn appear to have helped Lansky and his associates 
in their 1933 ‘Jewish War’ against Irving ‘Waxey Gordon’ Wexler, scoping, 
planning and carrying out the assassination of Murray Marks.505 
A new governmental approach 
Luciano’s coup against Maranzano left him in a strong position to assume 
individual leadership of the American mafia. But he recognized that both Masseria 
and Maranzano had become vulnerable precisely because they had sought to install 
themselves as capi dei tutti capi. Luciano took a different tack, creating a new 
governmental approach within the mafia. Under his leadership, a coordinated, 
national, multi-ethnic ‘Mob’ emerged for the first time. 
 Luciano’s signature institutional reform was the creation of a permanent 
‘Committee of Peace’, later called ‘The Commission’. This brought together the 
heads of the Five Families, Capone from Chicago, and Ciccio Milano of 
Cleveland.506 (This was later expanded to ten to twelve capi.) The Commission 
would exercise key aspects of the Families’ governmental power collectively, to 
resolve disputes and maintain peace.507 Unsurprisingly, this was welcomed by the 
other Family capi. ‘He was not trying to impose himself … as had’ his forebears, 
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concluded Bonanno.508 Still, the Commission, like any committee, was not a level 
playing field. Though all members were formally equal, there were subtle informal 
power factors in play, including tenure and proximity to New York’s Five 
Families.509 Luciano served as de facto ‘chairman’ from its establishment until his 
imprisonment in 1936. 
The Commission idea seems to have been put to, but rejected by, 
Maranzano.510 Luciano made it a priority. It was this body, not he acting alone, that 
would now have the power to ‘decide policy, establish jurisdiction, and make 
agreements’511 – in other words, to govern mafia affairs. Dixie Davis, lawyer to the 
Jewish gangster Dutch Schultz, described the impacts of Luciano’s regime:  
the organization was no longer a loose, fraternal order of Sicilian black-
handers [mano nero] and alcohol cookers, but rather the framework for a 
system of alliances which were to govern the underworld.512 
Members looked to the Commission as ‘the ultimate authority on 
organizational disputes’.513 When in the 1960s Joe Bonanno pushed to take over 
territory in California and Canada without prior Commission authorization, two 
capi from the Genovese Family were caught discussing it on tape. One opined: 
If one member can dispute a Commission order you can say good-bye to 
Cosa Nostra, because the Commission is the backbone of Cosa Nostra. It 
will be like the Irish mobs who fight among themselves and they [the 
mafia] will be having gang wars like they had years ago.514 
 The Commission system was seen, in other words, as the foundation of 
effective collective government within the American mafia. The Commission could 
even place a Family under temporary collective trusteeship.515 ‘The organization 
would be supreme; its parts, replaceable’, as Raab put it.516  
 The Commission’s collective control of mafia capabilities was reflected in 
several further organizational innovations. First, though in practice it rarely 
happened, soldati were in theory allowed to appeal to the Commission not through 
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their capo but through their Family’s consigliere. This gave the sense that the 
system was more of a ‘constitutional government’ than the previous feudal 
arrangement, since the soldato’s rights seemed no longer to depend, at least 
formally, entirely on the discretion of his capo. As Gentile recognized, ‘The 
government, so composed, gave assurance of trust, because everyone could turn to 
it without being coerced in their ideas.’517  
Second, during the 1930s, the Commission established a collective coercive 
capability (‘Murder, Inc.’), a squad of a dozen specialist assassins, disconnected 
from any particular Family, which it used as a collective enforcement arm.518 This 
squad was notable both for the sheer number of contract murders it appears to have 
carried out – at least 60, but perhaps as high as 400 – and because it had a mixed 
membership, including significant numbers of Jewish gangsters, helping to bind 
them into the ‘Mob’ orbit of the Commission. Murder, Inc. was, in fact, initially led 
by Louis ‘Lepke’ Buchalter, who had assassinated Maranzano.519  
Third, the Commission established collective corruption capabilities, 
including a consolidated ‘Buy-Money Bank’ – a strategic fund used for bribing 
politicians and bureaucrats.520 And fourth, under the leadership of the Commission, 
the mafia began developing joint business ventures, with Families taking equity 
positions in syndicates bringing together not only mafia Families but also non-mafia 
criminal groups (notably Jewish gangsters, such as Meyer Lansky and Bugsy 
Siegel) to develop and manage new operations.  
Just as important as these formal institutional changes, however, was the 
shift in the mafia’s broader concept of itself and the rules that governed mafia 
conduct – its governmentality. All Five Family capi approved by Maranzano had 
been born in Sicily. Luciano, however, appointed a Neapolitan, Vito Genovese, as 
his sottocapo, and a Calabrian, Frank Costello, as consigliere. What was more, he 
made clear his intent to continue to collaborate closely with Jewish mobsters, even 
inviting Lansky to sit in on some Commission meetings as an observer.521 The 
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Commission formally governed only the mafia Families, but in practice it set the 
course for the broader Mob, including Lansky, Siegel and their criminal associates.  
Because these reforms made the mafia ‘more businesslike’ (as Joe Bonanno 
and Joe Valachi separately put it),522 they are sometimes styled a ‘managerial 
revolution’.523  The reforms were indeed revolutionary, in the sense that they 
escaped the path-dependency of the Sicilian mafia tradition. As Gutiérrez Sanín and 
Giustozzi have noted, ‘organizational solutions’ adopted by clandestine militant 
leaders ‘weight heavily over the solutions that will be adopted tomorrow, because 
they create know-how and social interactions that are organization-specific’.524 
Luciano’s genius was in finding a way to adapt the mafia’s approach without any 
apparent normative revolution. He did this by developing a strategic approach that 
repositioned mafia governmentality in the context of American capitalist culture.  
Luciano himself described his approach in business terms. He encouraged 
managerial reforms within Families’ operations, fostering specialization of 
labour.525 He referred to the Commission as the ‘board of directors’.526 ‘The Mafia’s 
like any other organization except we don’t go in for advertising’, he told an 
undercover cop. ‘We’re big business, is all.’527 Luciano saw himself and other 
leaders as strategic managers, breaking down situations into solvable problems: 
‘We was like analysers; we didn’t hustle ourselves into a decision before we had a 
chance to think it out.’528 His respect for Lansky was based on his recognition of 
Lansky’s strategic nous: he ‘was a guy who could always look around corners’, he 
reportedly told Martin Gosch.529 Luciano and Lansky were, in their own perception, 
different from the mafia traditionalists: ‘We was tryin’ to build a business that’d 
move with the times and they was still livin’ a hundred years ago.’530 
As Eric Hobsbawm observed, under Luciano the mafia ‘embodied… the 
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values of “Americanism”’. What ‘could be more American than the success stories 
of penniless immigrant boys clawing their way to wealth and respectability by 
private enterprise?’531 Luciano’s success lay in connecting the Sicilian tradition and 
the American mentality. He was seen by his peers as a man of ‘two worlds’: ‘He 
lived among us, the men of the old Tradition’, said Joe Bonanno, the 
Castellammarese traditionalist; ‘but he also lived in a world apart from us’, in a 
‘coterie whose views of life and of moneymaking were alien to ours’.532  
Perhaps the most significant impact of Luciano’s adoption of a more 
‘managerial’ strategy has, however, been overlooked: the external impact. Both the 
other heads of the Five Families and criminal actors outside the mafia saw that 
Maranzano’s rule spelled on-going violence within the mafia, threatening 
intervention by the state across the underworld. Luciano, in contrast, knew how to 
do business across Family and ethnic lines. Throughout Prohibition he had worked 
closely with Jewish – and even Irish – criminal organizations. As Dickie has 
recognised, these contacts were a ‘key resource that he brought to bear within the 
mafia.’533 The internal and external strategic environments were intertwined.  
His emergence as a consensus candidate to replace Maranzano, and the 
resulting Jewish participation in the coup, were based on the prospect of a period of 
stability and potential growth for all. His reforms sought to make good on that 
promise. Success would depend not only on maintaining political stability within 
the mafia – the purpose of the Commission – but also on effective dealings with 
non-Italian groups, and, ultimately, political organizations and state officials. 
Maranzano was defeated by a strategic adversary who had understood that the 
dispute within the mafia was not just over who would rule the mafia and how it 
should be internally organized, but also over how the mafia should relate to its 
broader strategic environment, including how it should position itself relative to 
broader social norms and other sources of governmental power. Both Masseria and 
Maranzano proved incapable of the kind of ‘influence peddling’ necessary for 
effective coalition government.534 Luciano proved much more adept.  
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Consolidating power 
Racketeering and union power 
The creation of the Commission opened up new economies of scale for its members. 
By forming investment and management ‘syndicates’ or ‘combinations’ 
Commission members could mobilize large volumes of capital and expertise to sink 
into new markets, dwarfing their strategic rivals. This was to prove of particular 
importance as the imminent repeal of Prohibition became obvious in 1932 and 
criminal groups jockeyed for control of alternative revenue streams from illegal 
gambling, prostitution and racketeering.  
Mobsters moved heavily in the early 1930s into racketeering – collusion, 
often forced, between employers and/or labour, to artificially control demand and 
supply and extract oligopoly prices.535 Racketeering often emerges where certain 
structural conditions pertain: where inelastic demand or consumers’ inability to 
differentiate products facilitates over-pricing, or where barriers to a firm’s entry or 
exit are high.536 Under such circumstances, suppliers have an incentive to collude to 
fix prices. Coercion and corruption can become important, though secret, 
commercial capabilities. The Mob stood ready to supply those capabilities – and to 
force legitimate businesses that were not colluding to do so. One commentator 
noted ‘open declarations… by some of the country’s most notorious criminals’ that 
they were getting out of bootlegging, and into racketeering.537 The Mob could draw 
on a formidable pool of coercive capabilities experienced in extortion,538 and it also 
enjoyed access to capital and other scarce resources such as liquor. As Luciano 
explained, the spread of Mob influence was steady and insidious:    
We gave the companies that worked with us the money to help them buyin’ 
goods and all the stuff they needed to operate with. Then, if one of our 
manufacturers got into us for dough that he could not pay back, and the guy 
had what looked like a good business, then we would become his 
partner.539 
Whether, that is, he wanted a Mob partner or not. As Gambetta summarizes, 
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‘protectors, once enlisted, invariably overstay their welcome’.540 Just as it had for 
the Sicilian mafia, dominance in the market for private coercion was turning the 
Mob into a dominant provider of private protection. Unlike the Sicilian mafia, 
however, the Mob was a multi-ethnic system operating within a mafia culture. The 
Families collaborated with Lansky, Siegel and Buchalter on a range of initiatives, 
notably Murder, Inc., racketeering in the garment industry, and Lansky’s struggle 
with Irving Wexler.541  
Truckers (‘teamsters’) and stevedores were also major targets for Mob 
racketeering.542 Both handled bottlenecks in supply-chains where employers were 
vulnerable to extortion, especially in an era when refrigeration remained limited and 
the loss of perishable goods during transit could inflict severe commercial damage. 
A 1932 New York state investigation led by Samuel Seabury found racketeering in 
a staggering list of industries from floristry to the fish market, from millinery to 
window cleaners.543 Mob Families quickly penetrated the fish, poultry, green-
grocery and dairy distribution chains. Working together with allied Jewish gangs, 
Mob Families took over the $50-million-a-year kosher chicken racket – extracting 
rents from producers, wholesalers and retailers.544 Sanitation disposal followed.545  
Union power was the next target. The Mob used its street muscle to funnel 
recruits and dues to allied unions, then graduated to strikebreaking and enforcement 
of union discipline. It was a short step for the Mob to stack a local union chapter 
with Mob affiliates. In time, specific union locals came to be considered the 
‘property’ of particular Families. A prominent example was Local 1814 of the 
International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), operating in the Brooklyn 
waterfront neighbourhoods. The ILA controlled the assembly of stevedoring crews, 
giving it significant power to create bottlenecks in the waterfront economy and to 
extort both employers and employees, as famously represented in Elia Kazan’s On 
the Waterfront. The local mafia capo, Vincent Mangano, stacked Local 1814 with 
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Mangano Family associates, with the brother of sottocapo Albert ‘The Executioner’ 
Anastasia, a key figure in Murder, Inc., installed as leader of Local 1814.546 
Through the Local, the Anastasias developed significant waterfront loan-sharking, 
illegal gambling and marine hijacking activities. The Mangano (later Gambino) 
Family emerged as the broker of the corrupt exchanges that kept Brooklyn 
waterfront traffic flowing. 547  It was exactly this control that would make it 
necessary for the US Navy to turn to the Mob during World War Two, as we 
explore in the next chapter.  
The power that the Mob was accruing through union infiltration was not 
limited to the underworld. It stretched into upperworld politics and institutions.548 
The Anastasias stacked other union branches with their own supporters and began 
placing them into formal governmental roles. 549  In the mid-1930s Albert 
Anastasia’s son-in-law Anthony Scotto controlled the appointment of the 
commissioner of the city’s Department of Ports and Terminals, giving him 
influence over maritime traffic, waterfront contracts and real estate. Scotto’s 
personal attorney sat on a government commission appointed to investigate 
corruption on the waterfront. At a later trial, two former New York mayors, a New 
York state senator and the President of the AFL-CIO (the peak union body in the 
US) all testified as character witnesses for Scotto – a sign of how far the Anastasias’ 
influence reached.550  
One important ‘friend’ of the Anastasias was Brooklyn District Attorney 
William O’Dwyer.551 O’Dwyer was famous for convicting members of Murder, Inc. 
It was only later, when he was New York Mayor that evidence surfaced suggesting 
he may have protected the Anastasias during that case, possibly through the death of 
                                                
546 Block, East Side, pp. 183-191; see ‘Interim Report of Evidence Adduced by the State Crime 
Commission Relating to Six Brooklyn Locals of the International Longshoremen’s Association: 
Confidential’, September 1952, in CURBML.  
547 See New York State Crime Commission, ‘Fourth Report, Port of New York Waterfront’, 
Legislative Document no. 70, 1953, in CURBML, p. 12; Raab, FF, p. 68 
548 Block, East Side, p. 194. 
549 Compare ibid., pp. 193-194 
550 U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
‘Statement of Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Former US Attorney, Southern District of New York and Alan 
Levine, Former Assistant US Attorney, Southern District of New York’, in Waterfront Corruption, 
 Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st session, 25 February 1981 (Washington DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1981).  
551 See esp. Block, East Side, pp. 95-125, 189-190. 
  115 
a star witness.552 A US Congressional investigation found that ‘[n]o matter what the 
motivation of his choice, action or inaction, it often seemed to result favorably for 
men suspected of being high up in the rackets’.553 
Gambling innovation and political finance  
As Prohibition ended, the gambling sector was one of the few that seemed to offer 
revenues approaching those from bootlegging. The onset of the Great Depression 
had increased desperation and participation in gambling. The sector quickly became 
a Mob ‘mainstay’, with the Commission increasingly asserting its power over 
everything from local ‘numbers’ and ‘policy’ games (informal lotteries), to 
backroom craps games and casinos.554  
As in other industries, the Mob’s route to control lay not through direct 
confrontation, but through iterative development of leverage over established 
operators: rendering coercive services and offering (or often, imposing) protection; 
leveraging that into equity investments and debt; and then steadily taking over 
beneficial ownership, and sometimes also management.555 ‘By 1936’, claimed Dixie 
Davis, ‘nobody could run a gambling joint… unless he stood in with the Italian 
mob.’556 In cities where the Mob had not previously been dominant, it would take a 
coordinated syndicate approach and ‘split up the gambling rights among the mob 
barons from various cities’. This was the approach taken in Miami, Las Vegas and – 
later – Havana.557  
The gambling expansion owed much to the innovative leadership of two 
non-Sicilians close to Luciano. The first was Meyer Lansky. Lansky learned from 
Arnold Rothstein, the entrepreneurial criminal financier who backed many of the 
Jewish bootlegging outfits during Prohibition, probably rigged baseball’s 1919 
World Series, and was close to Tammany bosses such as ‘Big Tim’ Sullivan and 
Mayor Jimmy Walker.558 Under Lansky’s supervision, the Mob adapted the ‘wire’ 
then being used to allow nationwide betting on horse-races into a sophisticated risk-
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hedging system for ‘lay-offs’ amongst local ‘policy’ and ‘numbers’ games 
(lotteries). The Mob forced local lottery operators to pool risk; if one of them 
suffered large losses, they were insured and protected, and would not collapse.559 
This helped to maintain stability, a steady flow of rents – and minimize violence. 
The Mob was acting as a prudential regulator for the American underworld, and in 
the process keeping the state off its back.  
The second innovator was Frank Costello. Beginning in 1931 he led a Mob 
takeover and expansion of the slot machine industry. The Mob created a national 
distribution network, forcing the machines on small business owners operating 
under Families’ ‘protection’ all over the north-east, using a candy-vending outfit 
(True Mint Novelty Co.) as a front.560 In 1933 the Mob had 25,000 one-armed-
bandits grossing about $500,000 per day. By 1940, there were 140,000 slot 
machines operating nationwide, generating $540 million annual revenues. 561 
Strategic coordination amongst the Families and their close non-Italian allies was 
crucial to this explosive growth. So, too, was political protection. Costello hired 
politicians as distribution agents and partners, buying off local law enforcement and 
opening up new markets.562 During the 1932 Democratic National Convention in 
Chicago, for example, Costello negotiated a deal with Senator Huey Long of 
Louisiana, who was desperate for campaign finance.563 New Orleans was soon 
flooded with slot machines, with Long taking 10 per cent of the proceeds.564  
Such rapid growth risked fostering violent competition within the Mob and 
undoing the political settlement that Luciano had cobbled together with such 
success after the Castellammarese War. Yet Luciano and Lansky proved 
spectacularly successful in managing political coalitions within the Mob, using the 
syndication model to carefully distribute the benefits of growth. When necessary, 
however, they would also resort to violence. A good example was provided by the 
Las Vegas venture in the 1940s. Las Vegas already served as a kind of on-shore 
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‘off-shore’ centre for the US, a normative enclave that provided a range of services 
such as boxing and divorce that had been prohibited elsewhere.565 Its growth into a 
gambling powerhouse in the 1940s was financed by a Mob consortium initially 
managed by Bugsy Siegel. Siegel had grown up with Lansky and Luciano on the 
Lower East Side, and worked successfully for the Mob on the West Coast running 
gambling operations in Los Angeles and infiltrating the stagehands’ union in 
Hollywood. But his management of the Mob’s venture in Las Vegas, notably the 
Flamingo hotel and casino, was disastrous. At a meeting in Havana at Christmas 
1946 (discussed in Chapter 7), the Commission, together with Lansky, ruthlessly 
agreed to jettison him. He was murdered in June 1947. The Flamingo – and the Las 
Vegas venture – rolled on without him.  
Effective management of internal and external politics were, however, 
intertwined. In the 1950s, when Miami emerged as an important gambling market 
under Meyer Lansky’s leadership a Chicago mafia Family muscled in by 
underwriting (with over $300,000 in donations) the Democratic gubernatorial 
campaign of Fuller Warren. Once elected, Warren appointed Special Investigators 
to look into the Mob syndicate that controlled gambling in Miami, forcing Lansky 
and others to give the Chicago Family a larger cut in order to buy protection from 
Warren.566 The investigation came to nought.  
The connection between gambling and political fund-raising was highly 
significant. ‘Losing’ a hand at cards or dice is an age-old way to pass a bribe. And 
the Depression had made gambling an even more important source of political 
finance than it had been in the past as other sources dried up. The intertwining of 
gambling and political fundraising could be found in a wide range of American 
cities controlled by political ‘machines’ of both Democratic and Republican 
stripes.567 Because it required both careful internal coalition management and 
protection by external governmental actors, the Mob’s expansion into gambling 
both increased risk for the circle immediately around Luciano, notably Frank 
Costello and Meyer Lansky, and also made them more powerful nodes in the Mob 
network. In time Costello came to be known as the ‘Prime Minister’ of the 
                                                
565 Haller, ‘Bootleggers and American Gambling’, pp. 129-130.  
566 Messick, Lansky, p. 48.  
567 Kefauver Committee, Report on Organized Crime.  
  118 
underworld, reflecting his emergence as the first amongst equals in the pseudo-
parliamentary Commission and for his growing influence over the political 
networks within Tammany Hall. (Lansky, in turn, was nicknamed the ‘Henry 
Kissinger’ of the underworld, referring to his central role in the Mob’s overseas 
operations (discussed further below).568)  
Costello was born ‘Castiglia’ in Calabria, but changed his name after falling 
in with the Irish gangster William Dwyer in East Harlem during Prohibition.569 
Through Dwyer he forged strong ties with Tammany’s then largely Irish power 
networks.570 When Costello aligned with Luciano and Lansky during Prohibition, 
they used the ‘Buy-Money Bank’ – a joint corruption fund used to purchase 
political and police protection – to spread influence through corruption of these 
networks.571 Politicians still needed the same things they always had – a way to 
discipline voters on election day and money to campaign.572 An article in The 
Forum in 1931 noted that gangs still played a ‘considerable part in elections… the 
tricks of colonizing districts, of repeating, of stuffing ballot boxes, and of 
terrorizing voters often require the assistance of gangs’.573 Control of vice and 
gambling served for the Mob as a doorway to the corridors of upperworld power. 
As Tammany Mayor O’Dwyer (no relation to Dwyer, but the same O’Dwyer tied to 
the Anastasias in Brooklyn), who was elected mayor with Costello’s help, told the 
Kefauver Committee: ‘It doesn’t matter whether it is a banker, a businessman, or a 
gangster, his pocketbook is always attractive.’574   
Tammany links proved vital in extending Mob power.575 By 1942 Costello 
had ‘major influence’ within Tammany, determining the succession at the top of 
Tammany Hall, and proving able to summon Tammany leaders at will.576 Tammany 
links into the judiciary also proved important. A 1930 New York Supreme Court 
inquiry found that court officers at every level were beholden to Tammany, 
                                                
568 See N.Y. Post, 16 April 1940; Kefauver Committee, Report, pp. 102-103; Miami News, 18 
December 1975.  
569 Gosch and Hammer, pp. 25, 29. 
570 Kefauver Committee, Report, pp. 96, 102. 
571 Gosch and Hammer, pp. 29, 51, 74, 79-81; FBI, Mafia Monograph, II, pp. 18-21, 97; Raab, p. 45. 
572 Kefauver Committee, Report, pp. 164-167.  
573 Walter Lippmann, ‘The Underworld - A Stultified Conscience’, The Forum, LXXXV:2 (1931), p. 
67.  
574 Ibid., p. 99; Raab, p. 64. 
575 Gosch and Hammer, p. 34. 
576 Kefauver Committee, Report, pp. 92, 103, 125; Raab, p. 62. 
  119 
routinely exercising their powers not with reference to their legal or administrative 
duties, but in an ‘entrepreneurial’ fashion. 577  Police would routinely set up 
vulnerable innocents – especially poor women who would be charged with 
prostitution – in order to extort legal fees, bribes and other rents.578 And this 
influence also extended into the upper judicial echelons. In 1943 a wire-tap picked 
up Thomas Aurelio, Tammany’s new nominee for a position on the state Supreme 
Court, thanking Costello for pulling the strings to get him nominated, and assuring 
him of his ‘undying loyalty’.579 
Costello insisted to the Kefauver Committee that he was ‘not a politician, 
only a friend of politicians’.580 It was an unconvincing distinction: by 1934 the Mob 
controlled the District Attorneys of both Manhattan and Brooklyn, the major 
contracting and financial offices of municipal institutions, police officials and major 
port controllers.581 Paradoxically, when the reform-minded Republican, Fiorello 
LaGuardia captured City Hall that year, it increased the Mob’s sway over 
Tammany. The loss of access to revenues from state patronage and public 
procurement made Tammany more dependent on private financing. The Mob, with 
its growing control of racketeering, gambling and other criminal markets, offered it. 
  
Fall of a Czar 
Playing kingmaker 
For Mob leaders, influence over upperworld politicians and government officials 
was not just instrumentally desirable to protect profits, but also intrinsically 
desirable in itself. It made them feel powerful. Luciano later recalled a night in 1923 
when he had distributed a huge block of tickets to a heavyweight world title fight 
gratis to the police commissioner, Tammany politicians, the press and celebrities.582 
That was, he said, the night he first ‘had the feelin’ of real power’.583 By 1932 
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Luciano was setting his sights even higher: influence over the White House.  
The 1932 Democratic presidential nomination had come down to a contest 
between two New York politicians: Al Smith, a reform-minded Tammany former 
governor; and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the sitting governor, not aligned with 
Tammany. If he was to win the nomination at the Chicago Democratic Convention, 
Roosevelt needed to neutralize the Tammany threat. As a growing power in 
Tammany affairs, the Mob leadership saw a huge strategic opportunity. Luciano, 
Costello and Lansky all accompanied the Tammany Hall delegation to the 
Convention in Chicago, where Al Capone provided much of the (still illegal) 
alcohol and entertainment. Costello shared a hotel suite with Jimmy Hines, the 
Tammany Grand Sachem, who announced Tammany support for Roosevelt.584 But 
another Tammany politician, Albert Marinelli, announced that he and a small block 
were defecting and would not support Roosevelt.  
Marinelli was Tammany’s leader in the Second Assembly District, its 
heartland below Manhattan’s 14th Street. During Prohibition, he had owned a 
trucking company, run by Lucky Luciano.585 Luciano had helped him to become the 
first Italian-American district leader in Tammany, and in 1931 forced the 
resignation of the city clerk, who was replaced by Marinelli, giving Luciano and 
Marinelli control over selection of grand jurors and the tabulation of votes during 
city elections.586 Now, he was sharing Marinelli’s Chicago hotel suite. The Mob and 
Tammany appear to have been playing both sides, looking either to hedge their bets 
or, more likely, to place themselves as brokers in the Democratic nomination 
process in order to extract maximum influence over the winner.587  
Roosevelt needed his state delegation’s full support – and thus Tammany’s – 
if he was going to win the floor vote at the Convention. But he also needed to avoid 
being tainted by the whiff of scandal that hung stubbornly around Tammany. 
Roosevelt responded to the split in Tammany by issuing a statement denouncing 
civic corruption, while carefully noting that he had not seen adequate evidence to 
date to warrant prosecution of sitting Tammany leaders, despite an on-going 
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investigation run by an independent-minded prosecutor, Sam Seabury. Marinelli, in 
turn, dropped his opposition, giving Roosevelt Tammany’s full support and the 
momentum needed to claim the two-thirds majority required for nomination. 
Tammany’s role was not determinative; Roosevelt’s nomination had numerous 
fathers, not least John Garner, a rival candidate to whom Roosevelt offered the 
Vice-Presidency in return for the votes of the Texas and California delegations.588 
But it was a factor. If the Mob leaders were not quite kingmakers as they had hoped, 
they were certainly players. As Luciano reportedly put it, ‘I don’t say we elected 
Roosevelt, but we gave him a pretty good push.’589  
Luciano was a newcomer to upperworld politics, however, and seems to 
have been quickly outsmarted by FDR. Having secured the Presidential nomination, 
FDR loosened the reins on Seabury’s investigation of corruption in New York, 
making clear that if it developed new evidence, he might be prepared to back 
prosecutions after all. Seabury quickly exposed significant Tammany graft in the 
New York administration. The city Sheriff had amassed $400,000 in savings from a 
job that paid $12,000 a year. The Mayor had awarded a bus contract to a company 
that owned no buses but was happy to give him a personal line of credit. A judge 
with half a million dollars in savings had been granted a loan to support thirty-four 
‘relatives’ found to be in his care. Against the backdrop of Depression New York, 
with a collapsing private sector, 25 per cent unemployment and imploding tax 
revenues, this was shocking profligacy and nepotism. By September 1932 the 
Mayor had resigned and fled to Paris with his showgirl girlfriend.590 
In early 1933 FDR moved into the White House, and broke off the formal 
connection between Tammany Hall and the national Democratic Party for the first 
time in 105 years. He even tacitly supported the election of the reformist 
Republican LaGuardia as New York Mayor. Luciano was pragmatic:  
he done exactly what I would’ve done in the same position, and he was no 
different than me… we was both shitass doublecrossers, no matter how you 
look at it.591  
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Mobbing up 
Luciano’s pragmatism suggests a failure to understand the danger that FDR’s 
ascendancy posed to Tammany and thus to his own political protection. Luciano 
presumed that Tammany would still protect him in New York, whoever was in 
power in the White House. Luciano did not understand that the Mob’s ability to 
penetrate Tammany in the early 1930s was a sign not only of his and the Mob’s 
increasing power, but also Tammany’s decline as a broker of governmental services 
for under-serviced populations in New York such the African-American and West 
Indian populations in Harlem, and women.592 The arrival of the radio (and later 
television) presented a further problem for Tammany, as it allowed politicians to 
communicate directly with voters without the aid of an intermediary organization. 
And finally the movement of social welfare from the city and state level to the 
federal level under the New Deal would also corrode Tammany’s brokering 
power.593  
 Tammany leaders recognized by the early 1930s that they were in deep 
trouble, and that they needed to find new income and sources of power. Jimmy 
Hines recognized that Al Marinelli’s alliance with the Mob offered Marinelli new 
revenue sources and muscle, and thus posed a powerful threat to his own position 
within Tammany. Looking for a counter-weight, he set up a meeting with one of the 
few major gangsters that had remained independent of the Mob: Dutch Schultz.   
Schultz was a Harlem-based gangster who had risen to power through a 
violent takeover of Irish beer distribution organizations during Prohibition.594 By 
1932 he had control of the city’s restaurant rackets and was a major player in the 
city courts’ ‘bonding’ racket, particularly around Harlem.595 The bonding racket 
turned law enforcement into a money making exercise for both the cops and the 
robbers: police officers could be bribed to present evidence in a manner that would 
tilt towards or against warranting bail, and gangsters used their control over this 
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discretion to extract fees from those charged with crimes.596  Schultz’s outfit 
remained ‘one of the last strong independent organizations to stand up against a 
consolidation of underworld power [in] a nationwide fabric of interlocking mobs’, 
as his lawyer, Dixie Davis, later put it.597 He was ‘one of the last independent 
barons’ as the Mob coalesced around Luciano.598 And his strategic approach was 
quite different: Luciano was a coalition-builder; Schultz focused on coercion. He 
deliberately adopted a divide and conquer approach to internal discipline, telling 
Davis: ‘That’s the way Napoleon did, kept his generals fighting among themselves. 
Then none of ‘em got too big.’599 He had delusions of grandeur, telling his lawyer 
that the Bolshevik Revolutionaries in Russia were ‘just like me… They’re just a 
mob. If I’d been there with my mob, I could have taken over, just like they did.’600 
He was personally violent and deliberately unpredictable. Davis describes life with 
Schultz as ‘palace politics around a dictator’.601  
In 1932 Schultz was attempting to expand his power even further, through a 
violent takeover of the informal ‘policy’ lottery in Harlem – so named because of its 
similarity to the sale of penny insurance policies. For as low as a nickel or dime a 
consumer could place a bet on a three-digit number. If his number came up – as 
determined by some random event, such as the last three digits of the New York 
Stock Exchange at closing, for example – he was paid off at odds of around 600:1. 
With the odds of a win at 998:1, even with a ‘fair’ system the house almost always 
won. The Harlem policy market was the most lucrative in the city, taking in as 
much as $80,000 per week.602 Schultz began a violent attempt to take it over. But 
his stand-over tactics made him vulnerable to law enforcement. He needed police 
protection. As Schultz’s lawyer and counsellor, Dixie Davis, later put it, he realized 
that ‘to run an organized mob you’ve got to have a politician’.603 
Jimmy Hines, who needed campaign finance, had large influence over 
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police appointments and assignments, and the District Attorney’s office.604 He, in 
turn, recognized that ‘In politics, the thing to do is to build yourself an army’.605 
And he had already showed his willingness to amass an army through crooked deals 
and corrupt dealings.606 An alliance between Hines and Schultz made sense to them 
both. They quickly reached agreement. Schultz would provide $500 (later raised to 
$1,000) per week, plus separate election campaign contributions in the tens of 
thousands of dollars, physical protection and support during elections. Hines would 
use Tammany connections to protect Schultz from law enforcement. Both sides 
made good on their promises, Hines ensuring that cases against Schultz were 
allocated to Tammany-linked magistrates who threw them out. In return, he 
received both finance and votes, using Schultz’s gangsters as repeat voters.607  
As time passed, Hines and Schultz appear to have become increasingly close, 
moving from a transactional relationship to something closer to a genuine 
partnership. Davis describes sitting with Hines and Schultz  
as we plotted ways by which, with the Dutchman’s mob and money, Hines 
might extend his power over still other districts and seize … control of 
Tammany.608  
They had become strategic allies in a conflict being fought in two different 
worlds: Schultz was using Tammany’s protection to control the Harlem policy 
rackets and maintain his independence within the underworld from the Mob, while 
Hines was using Schultz’s muscle and finance to enlarge his power within 
Tammany and upperworld politics.  
The Boy Scout 
For a year or so the scheme paid off. But then the strategic environment began to 
shift. In 1933, an ambitious young federal prosecutor, Thomas Dewey, had Schultz 
indicted on tax evasion charges. For the best part of two years, Schultz operated 
from hiding, relying on his ‘minister of foreign affairs’, Abraham ‘Bo’ Weinberg to 
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represent him. Hines’ reach did not extend into the federal office where Dewey 
worked, so the investigation could not be terminated. But once the case came to trial, 
Hines’ influence told. A Tammany-linked judge agreed to move the case to the tiny 
town of Malone near the Canadian border. Schultz used some canny spending and 
strategic communications (including showering a local children’s hospital with 
flowers and cards) to win local sympathy with the jury. He was quickly acquitted.609 
The acquittal went to his head. ‘Any guy who can lick the government can lick 
anybody’, he told Davis.610 Emerging from hiding, he became concerned that 
Weinberg had been plotting with the Mob to double-cross him. In early September 
1935 Weinberg’s feet were set in concrete and he was dumped in the Hudson 
River.611 Now, without consulting Luciano, the Commission or other Mob leaders, 
Schultz signalled his intent to assassinate Dewey.612  
Luciano was alarmed by Schultz’s recklessness. The Commission ‘decided 
we wouldn’t hit newspaper guys or cops and D.A.’s.’, he reportedly said. ‘We don’t 
want the kind of trouble everybody’d get if we hit Dewey.’613 He wanted to avoid 
direct confrontation with the state and was prepared to kill Schultz if that was 
necessary. Yet this was also an important strategic test for Luciano’s organizational 
reforms: under the Commission’s collective security system, it was not just his 
views that mattered. This was the first time the Commission had been asked to take 
a collective decision of such consequence – to kill someone not just outside the 
mafia, but clearly outside the broader Mob.614 The Commission was being asked to 
take on a role governing the broader relationship between the underworld and the 
upperworld. As Luciano supposedly put it, the Commission ‘was either gonna work 
or the whole thing could fall apart right then and there.’615 The Commission agreed 
to have Murder, Inc. kill Schultz.616 The hit took place at the Palace Chop House on 
23 October 1935, killing five others in the process.617  
With Schultz out of the way, the Mob’s wealth and power seemed even less 
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vulnerable, and Luciano even more to have the air of a ‘czar’. That was the term 
used for him when, within just a year, he was on trial, facing off directly with Tom 
Dewey.618 Though only thirty-three Dewey had already made a mark through his 
earlier pursuit of Dutch Shultz (and Waxey Gordon). But Luciano and the Mob 
were not too concerned. ‘What do they think of me?’, Dewey asked a 
knowledgeable journalist. ‘They regard you as a Boy Scout’, came the reply, 
‘hopelessly mismatched against their terrorist tactics and political connections.’619  
It was to prove a dangerous underestimation of this highly effective 
politician. When Schultz was killed, Dewey set his sights instead on Luciano after 
stumbling across evidence of Mob control of New York’s prostitution industry.620 
The Mob had moved into the prostitution market during the autumn of 1933, filling 
the protect-and-tax role that Tammany had once occupied.621 The Mob syndicated 
the industry, with the revenues from specific brothels providing dividends to 
different groups of Families and other Mob players.622  This was good Mob politics. 
But it did not leave everyone a winner. The Mob had followed its playbook from its 
imposition of rackets on other industries, muscling in first on the madams who 
controlled the brothels, and then imposing taxes also on the male ‘bookers’ who 
operated like ‘theatrical agents’, booking sex-workers into brothels ‘after the 
manner of vaudeville circuits, with a change of entertainers every week’.623 Over 
time, the fees imposed by the Mobs were raised. The madams complained that the 
tax burden was too high and would make the brothels commercially unviable. The 
Mob did not seem particularly to care: a heavily indebted brothel was an easy target 
for Mob loan-sharks and, ultimately, hostile takeover.624 Luciano’s stated objective, 
as a witness during his trial would famously claim, was to turn the system into a 
modern business: ‘We can take the joints away from madams, put them on salary or 
commission, and run them like a syndicate, like large A&P stores’, he reportedly 
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said, referring to a new Canadian supermarket chain.625 But in this industry, the 
strategy generated ‘widespread tax dodging’ by madams and bookers.626 The Mob’s 
coercive response helped to create a pool of resentful underworld players, not used 
to Mob rule, not deeply socialized in mafia governmentality, and not governed by 
values of omertà. Luciano seemed oblivious to the danger: after all, in the highly 
violent, male-dominated underworld that he ruled over, what did he have to fear 
from a group of women? 
When Dewey’s investigation gathered steam, first madams, then female sex-
workers, then male booking agents began to roll over, turning state’s witness in 
return not just for immunity from state prosecution, but also protection from the 
Mob.627 The testimonies of the sex industry labour-force – especially the women – 
ultimately proved crucial at Luciano’s trial. None of the witnesses against him, 
notably, were Italian-American. Their prior silence was the result of fear, not a 
positive affinity with the Mob. 628  For them, the Mob was frightening, even 
terrifying; but not ultimately a source of binding governmentality. If the state could 
credibly promise protection, they would defect.  
By mid-1936 Luciano had been tried and convicted, on a sentence of thirty 
to fifty years, after coming off second best in a courtroom face-off with Dewey. 
Dewey used the female sex-workers who testified against Luciano as props in 
stoking a moral panic: he portrayed them as powerless victims of a terrifying 
criminal organization, bent on corrupting them and threatening all New York’s 
traditional family values. It was a story the middle class, and the jury, were happy to 
hear, notwithstanding New York’s long traditions of vice and prostitution.  
Luciano and his henchmen struggled to make sense of their adversary’s 
approach. Unable to fathom that they had been rendered vulnerable by women they 
claimed that the conviction must have been stitched up. Luciano, they pointed out, 
had never been directly involved in the prostitution racket. But this was something 
Dewey conceded. That was not his case. His case was that Luciano governed the 
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prostitution industry, as his opening statement at trial made clear: 
Luciano will be proved not to have placed any women in any house, not to 
have directly taken any money from any women, but [rather] to have sat 
way up at the top in his apartment at the Waldorf as the Czar of organized 
crime in this city where his word, and his word alone, was sufficient to 
terminate all competitive enterprises of any kind.629 
Once they realized the threat posed by the female witnesses, the mafia 
turned to their normal approach: threats of violence. Several witness recanted their 
testimony after the trial. But it was too late. Luciano’s appeal was unsuccessful.630 It 
seemed he would die in prison.  
For Dewey, though, this was just the beginning. Over the next decade, he 
wrapped himself in the mantle of the community’s chief protector against 
(immigrant-born) corruption and crime and the champion of civic virtue and 
traditional (i.e. white, Protestant) morality. He rocketed to fame. Newsreel coverage 
of the Luciano trial nationalized his image. After Luciano’s conviction national 
polling showed Dewey, almost unknown outside New York a year earlier, with a 
huge lead over even FDR as preferred president.631 In August 1937 he accepted the 
Republican nomination for Manhattan District Attorney, and cruised to victory after 
a radio campaign ‘blasting away at Tammany Hall by telling true detective stories 
on the radio, hair-raisers about the power of the underworld’, as Dixie Davis put 
it.632 Dewey found a politically astute formula linking his anti-mafia efforts with 
Republican values of small government and protection of the family: 
There is today scarcely a business in New York which does not somehow 
pay its tribute to the underworld, a tribute levied by force and collected by 
fear. There is certainly not a family in the City of New York which does 
not pay its share of tribute to the underworld every day it lives, and with 
every meal it eats.633 
It was a breath-taking piece of rhetorical jiu-jitsu. In Sicily, the mafia had 
presented itself as the protector of the community and its traditional values from an 
overbearing governmental force, the state. Here, Dewey, the state official, was 
using the same argument to claim the role of community protector, with the mafia 
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itself treated as the overbearing governmental force.  
Half a year after being elected Manhattan District Attorney Dewey secured 
the Republican nomination for Governor of New York. Though he narrowly lost the 
election, 8 months later he declared for the Presidency, riding a further wave of 
popularity resulting from his successful prosecution of Jimmy Hines.634 By 1941, at 
39, he was Governor of New York, and in 1944 and 1948 he was the Republican 
nominee for the Presidency. While he never quite made it to the White House, the 
springboard that his attacks on the Mob had provided, shooting an unknown 
prosecutor to national political prominence, did not go unnoticed by other 
politicians. Fighting organized crime, it was clear, was a great way to build a brand 
in the political marketplace.   
 
Conclusion  
The story of Luciano’s rise and fall is, at its heart, a story about the development 
and management of governmental power, and the politics of protection. The 
Commission system instituted by Luciano in 1931 provided a platform for Mob 
collaboration that saw its governmental power rapidly spread across a range of 
rackets and industries. The system offered an underworld social contract, 
institutionalizing trust and releasing mobsters from their nasty, brutal and short 
Hobbesian existences during Prohibition. It released them from having always to 
rely on coercion as the way to resolve disputes. Absent that governmental system, it 
is entirely conceivable that competition for new revenue streams after Prohibition 
would have led to further underworld violence. Through the Commission the mafia 
became, as the Kefauver Committee would later put it, the ‘cement’ that 
increasingly bound a nationwide underworld together.635 By creating a flexible and 
enduring system of pseudo-parliamentary governance for the mafia, the 
Commission reduced transaction and capital acquisition costs and provided Mob 
actors access to economies of scale. The Mob exploited these opportunities smartly 
through the development of shared strategic capabilities such as Murder, Inc. and 
the Buy-Money Bank, through joint investments and innovation, and through 
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collective external positioning, particularly in relation to upperworld political actors.  
But the Commission system did not turn the American underworld into a 
unitary firm or single organization. The Commission itself was a purely Italian-
American mafia structure, not formally encompassing Jewish gangs. Some orbited 
it in informal alliances, and the resulting coalition acted increasingly coherently as a 
collective Mob, through strategic coordination at the leadership level. But 
independent criminal organizations could and did continue to exist outside the 
Mob’s orbit, as Dutch Schultz’s operations made clear. And the Commission 
system always left individual criminal groups, even mafia Families, room to 
develop their own political connections and power networks in the upperworld. This 
was made clear by the Mangano Family’s ties into Brooklyn Democratic Party and 
union politics, which did not run through Luciano’s clique, nor Tammany. 
Upperworld and underworld power networks could, and did, connect through 
multiple nodes. The Mob was not an armada with a single commander-in-chief; it 
was a flotilla, with multiple capi sailing their own vessels, their moral compasses 
responding to a shared criminal governmentality. 
 Luciano proved at first highly effective at leading this network. What 
brought him down was not a mismanagement of coalitions amongst mafia capi, but 
rather an over-extension of the Mob’s reach into groups not sufficiently disciplined 
by its governmentality. He failed to understand the political risks the Mob faced 
from an alliance between underworld (largely female) dissidents and a crusading 
prosecutor looking to portray himself as a community protector. The clash between 
Luciano and Dewey was a competition between two normative systems vying to 
impose their own governmentality over a community. It was a competition to 
govern. The political nature of this competition is, for obvious reasons, written out 
of most official analyses: the official ‘big-man’ or ‘kingpin’ theory of organized 
crime treats it all as a personal enterprise, downplaying the broader normative 
power of organized crime. Dewey spun political capital by peddling the narrative 
that his convictions of the kingpins Luciano and later Hines had ‘smashed whole 
mobs’.636  
It was this kind of approach that misled the FBI to conclude that American 
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mafia strategy was highly centralized and hierarchically directed, with a narrow 
group of leaders who ‘define the criminal objectives, give the orders, and provide 
the means for reaching the objectives’.637 The historical record shows a more 
complex, negotiated and collective decision-making process, the kind of mixture of 
directed and emergent strategy that often results from complex coalition 
arrangements. Luciano’s gaoling did not lead to a sudden, violent battle for power 
in the underworld. As Raab has noted, a mafia Family ‘did not disintegrate at the 
sudden absence of its head man’.638 On the contrary, the Commission structure 
functioned effectively for sixty more years. Such nuances tend to spoil a good 
political narrative. More electoral credit can be reaped from portraying the fight 
against organized crime in Manichean and highly personalized terms, claiming the 
mantle of community protector.  
The astonishing speed with which Dewey’s political star rose points 
however to an important change in the market for government: the incredible 
amplifying power of film, radio and television. These media offered a way to 
bypass traditional intermediary and brokering political organizations such as 
Tammany and speak directly to electors. The 1951 television broadcasts of 
congressional hearings on organized crime led by Senator Kefauver had a similar 
effect, paving the way for his Vice-Presidential nomination.639 This was one of the 
first modern major television ‘events’, drawing unprecedented audiences of 30 
million viewers.640 Attacks on corruption and organized crime have ever since 
remained an important route into American politics: Republican New York Mayor 
Rudy Giuliani and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie both started out as 
crusading prosecutors in the Dewey mould. Democrat Senator, later Secretary of 
State, John Kerry even wrote a book on the topic.641 
Some Mob figures recognized upperworld actors’ political interest in 
developing governmental power through occasional public attacks, notwithstanding 
hidden cooperation. In notes for a memoire, Meyer Lansky argued that Kefauver 
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and Dewey both used attacks on organized crime ‘as a political hammer’.642 But 
others were slower to this realization, to their detriment. Frank Costello, for 
example, chose to appear before the Kefauver Committee, on one condition: that his 
face remained hidden. Perhaps he felt this would somehow keep his power hidden, 
too. It did not. The cameras focused instead on his hands, which, with his gravelly 
disembodied voice, became ‘the symbol of an otherwise unseen criminal empire’.643 
Costello spent fifteen months in prison for contempt of Congress for his evasive 
answers to the Kefauver Committee, and when he returned, he was forced out of 
power by the younger Vito Genovese. Lansky, who had avoided the glare of the TV 
spotlight, remained comparatively untroubled. 
Luciano allegedly concluded near the end of his life that, ‘It was my 
publicity that really cost me the best ten years of my life.’644 ‘You gotta stay out of 
the papers’, he said. ‘You gotta pay people good to stick their necks out while you 
stay in the background… all the smart ones stayed out of the papers.’645 Once 
organized crime was in the public eye, its mere existence represented a disruption of 
the state’s narrative of providing order and justice, its claim to a monopoly in the 
market for government. Confrontation became inevitable. Only by remaining in the 
shadows could the gangster expect to retain unmolested, and retain his hidden 
power over people’s private behaviour.  
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5. The Underworld Project, 1941-1942 
 
‘I’ll talk to anybody, a priest, a bank manager, a gangster, the devil himself. This is a war.’ 
Lt Commander Charles Haffenden646 
 
It was chilly by President Grant’s Tomb in Riverside Park at midnight on 26 March 
1942. Joe ‘Socks’ Lanza could probably recall that detail, twelve years later, 
because of what an unusual night it turned out to be. Lanza, 41, was the brother-in-
law of a Tammany leader, elected head of United Seafood Workers Local 16975 
and boss of the Fulton Fish Market – the primary seafood market for New York and 
the American north-east, and one of the largest in the world at the time. Lanza was 
also a former federal prisoner, a mafia caporegime and a close associate of Lucky 
Luciano. Frank Costello was best man at his wedding in 1941.  
In March 1942 Lanza was under indictment by the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s office – until a few months earlier still run by Tom Dewey – for 
racketeering. He had negotiated pay rises for his union members while taking 
payoffs from employers to keep those rises within secretly agreed limits. So why, at 
midnight on 26 March, could he be found sitting on a bench on Manhattan’s Upper 
West Side – far from his usual stomping ground on the Lower East Side – with 
Murray Gurfein, the head of the Rackets Division of the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s office?647 What were Lanza, so close to Luciano, and Gurfein, a Dewey 
protégé, doing there together? The venue had been carefully chosen to shield them 
both from prying eyes and suspicions that they were collaborating. It was as well, 
because that was exactly what Gurfein was now proposing: collaboration. Not, 
however, to help the DA’s office prosecute the Mob. No: a collaboration to ‘assist 
the war effort’.648  
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Thus began what would come to be known in the US Navy as the 
‘underworld project’: secret wartime collaboration between the US Navy, the 
Manhattan District Attorney’s office, and the Mob.649 Today the US government 
may express concern about the convergence of foreign state and criminal actors 
threatening US interests; but during World War II, it actively engineered such a 
convergence. Over several years, the Mob helped the US government police the 
New York waterfront and defend America’s littoral approaches from U-boat attacks. 
Mob help allowed US authorities to quickly track down four Nazi saboteurs that 
landed by U-boat in The Hamptons at the eastern end of Long Island. And the 
collaboration also drew the Mob into a range of domestic security roles of highly 
questionable legality: attacking union activists, infiltrating alleged Falangist 
organizations in Harlem, and breaking into foreign consulates. In 1942 and 1943, 
the collaboration took a new turn, with mafia Families providing detailed 
operational intelligence that helped the Allies plan and execute the amphibious 
invasion of Sicily. As a reward for facilitating all of this collaboration in 1946 
Lucky Luciano was released from gaol and deported to Italy. 
Luciano’s release caused great controversy and criticism for the Governor 
who ordered it: Thomas E. Dewey. Why would the very same man who had sent 
him to prison in the first place, ten years before, now order his release? With the US 
military unwilling to reveal the Underworld Project to the public, speculation filled 
the void. The entire Underworld Project had been, by agreement between the Navy 
and the Mob, ‘off the record’. At the end of the war, the records that did exist were 
destroyed.650 In 1953, Governor Dewey – by then a national figure, having picked 
up the Republican Presidential nomination in 1944 and again in 1948 – was forced 
to counter rumours that he had been bribed by the Mob to release Luciano. He 
tasked the New York State Commissioner of Investigation, the unimpeachable 
William B. Herlands, to conduct a secret judicial inquiry. He hoped that the 
resulting analysis, once published, would put the controversy to bed.  
Herlands’ investigation obtained sworn testimony from 57 witnesses – 
mobsters such as Joe Lanza and Meyer Lansky, Navy and other intelligence 
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officials, and law officers – stretching to 2,883 pages. The resulting 101-page report, 
sent to Dewey in 1954, was never published. Though its findings did indeed clear 
Dewey entirely, the underlying facts were too potentially damaging to the Navy for 
it to be released. The Navy convinced Dewey to put the Report in a drawer and 
leave it there.  
At the end of his life, the contents of Dewey’s files – including the Herlands 
investigation materials – were archived in the Library of the University of 
Rochester in upstate New York. Only two prior publications, Rodney Campbell’s 
1977 The Luciano Project, and Tim Newark’s Mafia Allies have previously drawn 
on these materials. Campbell’s 1977 book does not place the episode in the broader 
context of the Mob’s development – our understanding of which has developed 
significantly in the intervening four decades. Newark’s volume is much more 
successful in this regard, but his coverage of the Herlands investigation materials is 
far from comprehensive. 
This chapter pieces together the story of the Underworld Project from the 
original Herlands investigation materials, other original FBI records, and relevant 
secondary sources. The Mob’s war-time alliance with the US government helps to 
explain how the Mob’s strategic horizons enlarged from the national to the 
international level, and lays the groundwork for the events in occupied Italy 
explored in the next chapter. The first section of this chapter explores how and why 
the US government enlisted the Mob in its war effort, and the evolution of the 
Mob’s role from an intelligence focus to a domestic auxiliary enforcement role. The 
second section considers the Mob’s provision of local knowledge and access to its 
Sicilian mafia cousins during the Allied invasion of Italy, and explains how this led 
to Luciano’s release. The chapter concludes with some reflections on what this 
episode tells us about the evolution of the Mob’s power and strategy, and the 
dangers of seeing the crime-politics ‘convergence’ as an entirely novel phenomenon. 
  
‘This is a war.’ 
Enlisting the underworld 
Lanza and Gurfein’s cloak-and-dagger meeting in March 1942 was the result of a 
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significant but shocking realization by US authorities: the Mob might offer strategic 
capabilities that the US government lacked and was now desperate to acquire, 
specifically governmental reach into New York’s docks and the fishing-fleet that 
operated in the Atlantic approaches to the eastern seaboard. 
The US was reeling from several strategic setbacks. On 7 December 1941, 
Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor, killing over 2,000 US personnel and gravely 
damaging its Pacific fleet. Germany and Italy declared war on the US a few days 
later. The Combined Chiefs of Staff of the Allied nations agreed that the basic war 
strategy would be ‘Victory First in Europe’. But in March 1942 that was looking 
like an increasingly tall order, as control of the North Atlantic also seemed to be 
slipping away, and with it, Britain’s prospects of holding out against the Nazis. 
Britain needed more than 1 million tonnes of supplies per week. Between December 
1941 and March 1942 German U-boats wreaked havoc on Allied shipping in the 
North Atlantic, with 71 vessels lost.651 In January, a Norwegian oil tanker was sunk 
just 60 miles off Montauk (Long Island, NY), and Latvian and US vessels were 
sunk off North Carolina.652 The outcome of the war seemed, as Commissioner 
Herlands would recall, to ‘hang in the balance… extremely grave’.653 
How could the German submarines be operating so far from home? After 
survivors of U-boat attacks who had been taken aboard those U-boats reported 
observing American supplies on board, commercial fishing fleets came under 
suspicion as a possible source of refuelling and re-supply.654 Suspicion fell on the 
Italian-American and German-American communities, both deeply involved in 
commercial fishing – in particular ‘criminal elements’ within those communities. 
By early February 1942, US Naval Intelligence was hypothesizing that  
(a) information as to convoy movements and (b) assistance in refuelling of 
submarines might be traced to criminal elements of Italian or German 
origin on the waterfront in the metropolitan area. The theory was that such 
persons might sell information, or give information to the enemy out of 
alien sympathies; or even that some among them who had been rum-
runners during the days of Prohibition might be finding a new source of 
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revenue from running oil supplies to enemy submarine fleet.655 
 The true source of logistical support was quite different: the Germans were 
running new, long-range U-boats, supported by Milchkühe (‘milk-cow’) refuelling 
U-boats. If this was known from decoded German signals intelligence, it was not 
knowledge that had reached the operational level of the Third Naval District, 
charged with controlling New York Harbour and its approaches.656 There, U-boat 
refuelling was not the only concern. Sabotage was also feared. In late 1941, New 
York had witnessed a high-profile trial and conviction of thirty-three German 
sympathisers, twenty-five of them American citizens, on espionage and sabotage 
charges. Now, concerns about a potential ‘fifth column’ amongst the German and 
Italian-American communities began to reach fever pitch.657  
On 9 January 1942 fire destroyed a pier and several buildings on the west 
side of Manhattan. A month later, the largest and one of the fastest luxury liners in 
the world, the SS Normandie, burned and capsized as she sat at Pier 88 at 48th Street 
on Manhattan’s west side, wounding 128 servicemen and killing one. The largest 
vessel destroyed in the war to that date, she had been seized by the US Government 
after France fell to German forces, and was being retrofitted as a troop carrier, the 
Lafayette. Worth $56 million, she was to be the US Navy’s largest troop transport, 
expected to carry 10,000 personnel. She was due to set sail to Europe three weeks 
later.658 Had she been sabotaged?  
History suggests not. Mob sources would later try to claim responsibility for 
the fire, suggesting they had set it in order to push the Navy into their waiting 
arms.659 But there are no corroborating sources. The fire appears to have been 
caused by sparks from welding and poor safety controls caused by a rush to get her 
finished.660 At the time, however, the sinking of the Normandie fanned concerns 
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that enemy agents might be operating in and around New York Harbour. US Office 
of Naval Intelligence (ONI) personnel swarmed the docks, looking for spies and 
saboteurs. They were quickly rebuffed by the Mob-controlled labour-force, resistant 
to all government penetration and control. No-one was talking.661 
The head of ONI in the Third Naval District was Lieutenant Commander 
Charles Haffenden, a World War I veteran, former private investigator, and hotel 
association executive. His previous work appears to have brought him into contact 
with the Mob, and he now  
conceived and sponsored a plan to use, among others, persons with 
underworld associations, their underworld associates and their contacts as 
instrumentalities of Naval Intelligence.662 
‘I’ll talk to anybody, a priest, a bank manager, a gangster, the devil himself’, 
Haffenden would later recall himself thinking. As he saw it, 
This is a war. American lives are at stake. It’s not a college game where we 
have to look up the rule book every minute, and we’re not running a 
headquarters office where regulations must be followed to the letter. I have 
a job to do.663 
‘He did not care from what source we got information as long as it was for 
the war effort’, explained one of his underlings later.664 Haffenden told his team that 
they had ‘several sore spots that we could not get to unless [with] the assistance of 
the underworld’.665 He concluded that effective counter-intelligence might require 
‘enlisting the “underworld”’.666 He decided to ‘set up a flow of information from 
the underworld to combat the possibility’ of enemy operations.667 His plan was 
known at the highest level of Naval intelligence in Washington D.C., with no 
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opposition being voiced.668 
Mob cooperation was now deemed crucial to securing effective US 
surveillance of its own waterfront in its richest port. But Haffenden also saw the 
effort as a necessary defensive manoeuvre in a balancing game. If the US 
government did not form a tactical alliance with the Mob, he told his team, there 
was a danger that the Fascist powers would – and use it to attack New York directly. 
By working with the Mob, ONI would both augment its own human intelligence 
capabilities, and ‘neutralize the possible use of the underworld by the enemy’.669 It 
was a clear recognition of the strategic significance the Mob now possessed – not 
just in the underworld, but in broader geostrategic terms.   
Regular guys 
On 7 March 1942 ONI approached the District Attorney, Frank Hogan, who had 
been the main interrogator of sex industry workers during Dewey’s prosecution of 
Lucky Luciano, and who was also deeply involved in the prosecution of Jimmy 
Hines. Hogan threw his weight behind the plan for intelligence cooperation with the 
Mob, telling his office to open their files to the Navy and help them identify 
waterfront informants.670  
Why? Why would the newly-elected Manhattan District Attorney, who had 
made his name battling organized crime, put his reputation, political future (and 
livelihood) at risk by working directly with these same adversaries? Why would he 
increase the Mob’s leverage over current and future prosecutions? To date, this has 
been put down to simple patriotism or expediency. Another possible explanation 
presents itself: politics. Though Dewey had become a major Republican figure, 
Hogan, his aide, was elected to succeed him with Tammany (i.e. Democratic) 
support.671 Hogan’s willingness and ability to connect ONI to the Mob may have 
had something to do with his electoral debt to Tammany, which by this point was 
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firmly under Costello’s Mob influence. 
Whatever the motivation, ONI and Hogan’s office realized that if 
intelligence was to flow from the docks and fishing fleets, they would first need the 
Mob leadership’s cooperation. Hogan suggested working through Lanza, the head 
of the United Seafood Workers’ Union that controlled the Fulton Fish Market – 
whose brother was the local district leader for Tammany. Lanza’s indictment, they 
argued, would give the District Attorney leverage.672 With Hogan’s approval, 
Gurfein and Lanza met on 26 March near Grant’s Tomb.  
A week later, Lanza met again with Gurfein, Haffenden and Dominick Saco 
– a former private investigator, now working as an undercover naval intelligence 
agent. The venue this time was Haffenden’s inconspicuous civilian office in the 
Executive Members’ Association suite on the mezzanine floor of the Astor Hotel, in 
New York’s Times Square. Lanza agreed to cooperate ‘one hundred percent’, and 
Saco was appointed as a go-between. Within days, Lanza was helping ONI to place 
naval intelligence agents in the fishing industry along the whole length of the 
eastern seaboard. Lanza agreed to ‘get union books and put them in as regular guys’, 
and did so, inserting naval agents into the union books of the Building Service 
Employees’ International Union (Local 32B), and the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers (Local 202).673  
Liaising frequently with Haffenden, over the following weeks Lanza and 
Ben Espy – a former rum-runner – worked their contacts on the docks. They 
encouraged suppliers to inform them if there were unexpectedly large purchases of 
fuel or other supplies by fishing smacks heading out to sea. Crews were instructed 
to report anything suspicious they saw on the docks or at sea. Lanza and Espy 
checked up on specific boats and personnel who had attracted ONI’s suspicion, 
such as Edward Fiedler, a fishing captain of German descent who operated out of 
Easthampton, and Lanza’s associates began passing on names of possible ‘fifth 
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columnists’ to ONI.674  
Naval intelligence agents were soon installed in the ports of Long Island, in 
fishing industry trucks, and on fishing boats operating out of ports up and down the 
coast, from Maine down to North Carolina.675 ONI also installed short-wave radio 
communications equipment on Mob-controlled fishing boats to create an offshore 
submarine lookout network. This reported relevant sightings, such as wreckage, 
aeroplane parts, and even human remains.676 Soon, the major oil and gasoline 
suppliers to the fishing fleet were brought in on the project. This not only allowed 
monitoring of gasoline purchases but also, since most gasoline was sold on spec, 
close monitoring of the financial situation of much of the fleet – which could 
facilitate detection of a sudden improvement of operators’ position, perhaps due to 
sales to enemy boats.677 
The stream of intelligence opened to the US government flowed from both 
Lanza’s union authority and his Mob ties. When an attempt to get the naval agent 
Dominick Saco a job on one of the local trucks ‘created a little bit of controversy’, 
it was Lanza’s union contacts who produced a union card for Saco that smoothed 
things over.678 Lanza also drew on his Mob connections, introducing some agents 
into Mob networks as ‘our friend’, a mafia code word that allowed them to ‘conduct 
their operations or surveillance’ without interference.679 
Lucky’s break 
What was in this collaboration for Lanza? The DA’s office repeatedly insisted that 
his cooperation would have no bearing on his prosecution, that it would not buy him 
any immunity or reduction of sentence. But since he was already under indictment, 
what did Lanza have to lose? Potentially quite a lot: if he were seen by his Mob 
superiors to have committed infamità, breaking omertà, his life would be in 
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danger.680 Lanza’s enthusiastic and rather unhesitating cooperation with ONI and 
the DA’s office thus leads to the strong suspicion that he must have sought and won 
approval from Mob superiors from the outset.  
That meant getting Lucky Luciano involved. Despite having been in prison 
for 5 years, Luciano remained an active and highly influential Mob leader, 
operating remotely through Frank Costello and Meyer Lansky. For Lanza to have 
cooperated with Frank Hogan, who helped to put Luciano away, without Luciano’s 
approval would have been highly risky, to say the least. The US government’s 
approach offered Luciano a huge break. But if Luciano knew about Lanza’s 
cooperation from the outset – as seems highly likely – he was careful not to rush. 
Had the Mob immediately pushed the DA’s office and ONI to get Luciano involved, 
they might have balked. At the outset, Luciano’s power was best kept hidden. 
Within six weeks, however, ONI was discovering the limits of Lanza’s 
underworld authority. Though he could get naval agents on boats in North Carolina 
and Maine he professed impotence in securing access to the West Side or Brooklyn 
waterfronts, controlled by different mafia groups. And his influence seemed ‘largely 
confined to the fishing industry’.681 Meanwhile, the strategic situation in the North 
Atlantic continued to deteriorate. Between March and May, 47 Allied ships were 
sunk by U-boats. This made 272 since the start of the war – the most serious threat 
to US naval strength in the Atlantic since the War of 1812.682  
In late April 1942 Lanza told Haffenden that in order to be of further 
assistance he ‘needed contacts that he could not make himself and for which he 
required the “O.K.” of Charles “Lucky” Luciano’. Other witnesses recalled that 
Luciano had to give ‘clearance’ as he had ‘overall control’, and his ‘illegal 
operations along the waterfront had as much influence with conditions on the docks 
as the shipping people themselves, and in many cases, more’. A ‘higher echelon of 
the underworld’ needed to be engaged, ONI concluded, if the ‘field for possible 
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help [was to] be greatly enlarged’.683 Luciano’s involvement was, they quickly 
concluded, unavoidable. He was the one player who ‘could snap the whip in the 
underworld in the entire USA’.684 He was the ally they needed to exert true power 
within that underworld.  
With the DA office’s support, ONI approached one of Luciano’s defence 
lawyers, Moses Polakoff. He had previously been head of the Criminal Division of 
the District Attorney’s office and oversaw the administration of elections in New 
York – before becoming Luciano’s attorney.685 Polakoff recommended working 
through another of his clients: Meyer Lansky. He was ‘the man who could serve 
most effectively as the chief intermediary between Luciano in prison and his outside 
contacts and associates’. As Polakoff explained, ‘if Lansky said he was acting for 
Luciano, that statement would not be questioned’.686  
The bargaining began. Haffenden and Gurfein met with Lansky to sound out 
the prospects of approaching Luciano, making clear that nothing was being offered 
in return.687 Wary that Luciano, who had never been naturalized, might end up 
helping the Italians, Gurfein asked Lansky if Luciano could be trusted. Lansky’s 
reply was affirmative: ‘His whole family was here, his mother and father and two 
brothers and sister with children.’ But it was not clear whether, in Lansky’s mind, 
this was a sign of where Luciano’s allegiance lay – or whether he was simply 
pointing out that the US government had leverage over Luciano.688 Lansky asked 
for a sign of the government’s good faith to help convince Luciano of the 
seriousness of the approach. ONI and the DA’s office leaned on the State 
Commissioner of Corrections, John A. Lyons, and convinced him to move Luciano 
on 12 May 1942 from a prison near the Canadian border to Great Meadow Prison 
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just north of Albany.689 
The first of almost two years of secret, government-sponsored meetings 
between Luciano and his Mob associates occurred in early June 1942. Lanza, 
Lansky and Polakoff travelled upstate to visit Luciano in prison and he approved 
the collaboration subject to it remaining secret from the broader public. Ostensibly, 
he was concerned that if he fell into the hands of Fascist powers – either because 
they won the war, or because he was released but deported to Italy (as in fact later 
occurred) – ‘he might get lynched’ for supporting the Allied war effort. But he 
recognized that if his name was behind the project, ‘everything will go 
smoother’.690 Haffenden agreed. It was not in his interest, either, for the Underworld 
Project to become public. Henceforth all the top mobsters involved were referred to 
in government intelligence documents by codename. The whole project was to be 
kept hidden.691 
Soon, all the leading Mob figures were involved. Lansky was the main go-
between, ferrying instructions to and from Luciano. Costello and Adonis supported. 
Other Mobsters from outside Luciano’s Family who were known enforcers on the 
docks, including Johnny Dunn and the Camarda brothers, were roped in. Bugsy 
Siegel and Willie Moretti went to visit Luciano in prison to obtain ‘instructions with 
respect to the use of his name in certain quarters and reporting back to him’. More 
than 20 visits took place, sometimes with seven or eight Mobsters together at 
once.692 Alive to the possibility that these meetings – most of which lasted several 
hours – might provide cover for Luciano to reinsert himself into Mob life, Hogan 
ordered wiretaps on Joe Lanza’s phone. These failed however to reveal anything 
which would require termination of the project. 693  And the authorities 
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conspicuously refrained from bugging the meetings themselves, held in a room next 
to the prison warden’s office.  
With Luciano’s name now being openly invoked on the docks and 
throughout Mob networks, the collaboration took off. As Lansky put it, the visits to 
Luciano allowed him ‘to instruct’ Mobsters that Luciano ‘was personally interested’, 
that ‘it was also their duty and to stress to go allout [sic] to give this assistance’. 
Instead of the Mob brokering access, but then largely standing passively by as US 
agents operated on their territory, Mob members now went out of their way to 
support the achievement of US government strategic objectives. Lt Commander 
Kelly – one of the ONI team, with twenty-five years of experience as a police 
investigator in civilian life – summed up the change: prior to getting Luciano 
involved, ONI ‘ran into great difficulty in obtaining reliable informants along the 
waterfront … they just refused to talk to anybody, war effort or no war effort.’ Once 
Luciano was brought in, there was no longer any ‘hedging’, but rather ‘full and 
whole-hearted cooperation’, ‘a decided and definite cooperative approach’. 
Investigations proceeded far faster, and the information gathered was more reliable. 
The Mob became an active source of operational advice to the Navy, suggesting 
ways that ships could be packed and unpacked more safely and quickly, speeding 
the sending of wartime aid to Europe and the Soviet Union. And interventions by 
Lansky, Costello, Adonis, Mangano and Willie McCabe soon extended the 
collaboration to the West Side, Brooklyn, Harlem, Jersey and beyond – even other 
eastern seaboard cities. McCabe, a Mob leader in Harlem, stated simply ‘Anything 
the boss wants; we’ll do anything for him.’694 In these places it was Luciano, not the 
US, whose edicts governed. The US was piggybacking on Mob authority, ‘starting 
with Lanza and Luciano’, as Commissioner Herlands put it, and ‘fanning out 
through known intermediaries and informants’ into the Mob’s trust network.695 
From watchdog to attack dog 
That network quickly generated spectacular results: the spotting and capture of four 
Nazi saboteurs. On 13 June 1942 four Germans familiar with the US came ashore 
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under cover of darkness at Amagansett Beach on Long Island, carrying four trunks 
of explosive equipment and $80,000 cash. They had been trained in Nazi Germany 
as saboteurs and were under instructions from the German High Command to target 
military and industrial sites. The operation was named ‘Pastorius’, after the leader 
of the first group of German colonists to move to America in 1683. It was a 
spectacular failure. Coming ashore, the saboteurs encountered a US Coast Guard 
patrolman. They were able to talk their way past him, but not before his suspicions 
had been raised and the alarm raised. Rattled, the novices’ operational discipline 
quickly evaporated. They were all captured within two weeks, tried by a military 
commission, and most were executed.696  
The process by which the saboteurs were spotted and captured has long been 
opaque, with the FBI publicly taking the credit. But overlooked testimony before 
the Herlands investigation by ONI agents who worked closely with the Mob – one 
of whom was awarded an official commendation for helping to catch the saboteurs 
– strongly suggests that the Mob was integral to the counter-intelligence efforts. It 
appears to have been a boat in the Mob-backed coastal surveillance network that 
spotted the saboteurs landing, and reported it to the US Coast Guard, who then 
investigated. Once the saboteurs had been spotted, Haffenden’s agents appear to 
have worked directly with Lanza’s Mob contacts on Long Island to track down the 
first saboteurs, who then led authorities to the others.697 The role of the Mob was 
rapidly airbrushed out of the official story. 
 With this demonstration of their strategic utility, Mob figures appear to have 
begun ratcheting up the scope of their collaboration in ways that reinforced their 
own power. Past accounts have characterized the Underworld Project in terms of 
the intelligence role played by the Mob for the government. But a close reading of 
overlooked material in the original Herlands investigation file reveals the Mob 
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playing a larger role from mid-1942, working as an auxiliary coercive asset for 
Haffenden – not just a watchdog, but a domestic attack dog. Much of this activity 
seems to have been illegal. As we saw earlier, Haffenden did not feel constrained to 
follow regulations ‘to the letter’, nor did his superiors complain.698 
The first area of enlarged collaboration related to controlling union activity. 
Lanza specifically assured Haffenden that there would ‘not be any trouble on the 
waterfront during the crucial time’ and that the unions would not be allowed to 
jeopardize the war effort through strikes or wage demands. The Mob worked 
actively to ensure that incipient workplace disruptions were ‘rectified’ in order ‘that 
there be a free and uninterrupted flow of supplies out of this Port of New York to 
the war theatre – and to England’. After ONI raised concerns about the impending 
visit to New York by an Australian-born labour activist, Harry Bridges, Lanza 
himself beat up Bridges to prevent him headlining a rally at Webster Hall.699 Mob 
lawyer Moses Polakoff reported Haffenden to be very appreciative.700 
The site of collaboration was moving away from the waterfront to other 
targets around the city. Using his power as a union official, Lanza organized for 
undercover government agents to be installed in buildings and business of particular 
strategic concern, including factories supplying the Navy, and hotels, bars, 
restaurants and nightclubs on Manhattan. One even appears to have been installed 
in a Mob operation overseeing the ‘Italian lottery’.701 Soon ONI agents and Mob 
figures were collaborating on some 50 ‘surreptitious entries’ into buildings for 
broader espionage purposes, including inside (notionally immune) foreign 
consulates. The Mob surveilled the buildings, helped ONI agents gain access 
through placement in Mob-controlled unionized janitorial and cleaning crews – and 
even trained ONI agents in specialized burglary skills such as lock-picking.702 Some 
of these agents later used these skills for the Office of Strategic Services, the 
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precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency that was established in June 1942 to 
unite the intelligence arms of the different military services.703 One ONI agent told 
Herlands that this ‘surreptitious entry’ operation provided ‘conclusive evidence of a 
German espionage ring using a dozen agents in six large American cities’, which 
was consequently broken up within a month.704  
Nor was it only foreign states that were targeted. The ONI-Mob 
collaboration also led to actions to disrupt local political and press activity that were 
arguably protected by the US Constitution. First, the Mob helped ONI to infiltrate 
and disrupt foreign subversive organizations in Harlem. Willie McCabe, who had 
taken over the Harlem policy racket after Dutch Schultz’s death, used his lottery 
‘runners’ – who couriered instructions and revenues between the retail outlets and 
headquarters – as surveillance assets. At the Mob’s suggestion, the same role was 
extended to the Mob’s installers and servicemen handling ‘vending machines’ (i.e. 
slot machines) in Harlem.705 This collaboration led to the identification of alleged 
Spanish falangist and Japanese propagandist groups operating in Harlem and 
Greenwich Village, which were soon broken up.706 Next, when a US Senator and 
former Governor of Massachusetts, David I. Walsh, was caught in a homosexual 
brothel in Brooklyn with ties to both the Navy Yard and alleged Nazi sympathizers, 
ONI turned to the Mob to help suppress the story, ‘encouraging’ the press to accept 
that it was a case of mistaken identity.707  
It was a short step to Mob personnel taking orders directly from ONI. Meyer 
Lansky organized ‘contracts’ under which waterfront enforcers, such as cross-eyed 
Johnny ‘Cockeye’ Dunn (executed in 1949 for first degree murder), worked directly 
under the ‘specific instructions’ of Haffenden. 708 Dunn was, at the time, on bail on 
racketeering and extortion charges.709 His job, as Lansky later explained, was not 
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just to be a Navy ‘watchdog’, but to instil ‘discipline’ on the waterfront.710 Dunn 
seems to have taken his new duties seriously – perhaps too seriously. After two 
characters ONI suspected of being German agents disappeared, ONI asked the Mob 
in future to clear any such hits with them.711 It became routine for ONI to directly 
task Mob enforcers with jobs. ‘Usually’, Meyer Lansky later testified, ‘I would 




In early 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed 
to create a second front in Europe by invading Sicily. But the Americans soon 
discovered a problem. As Rear Admiral W.S. Pye, the head of the Naval War 
College would put it just a year later, US naval intelligence had been ‘sadly 
neglected’ before the war, because there had been a failure to recognize ‘the 
importance of the intelligence function in the conduct of war’. The problem was 
acute, ‘especially… in Italy’ where the Navy ‘found that we lacked much 
information required for effective planning’.713 The US Navy’s attention had long 
been focused on the Pacific and Atlantic. Planning for war in the Mediterranean had 
not been a priority. They needed all the help they could get, particularly regarding 
the maritime approaches to Sicily and potential landing spots.  
 Once again, evolutions at the strategic level in the Second World War gifted 
the Mob a source of strategic advantage, which they exploited adroitly. ONI tried 
approaching Sicilian, Neapolitan and Calabrian Americans directly for information 
about geography, highways, water supplies, and power structures, trying to collect 
old photographs, illustrated postcards, school textbooks and private diaries. But 
they met resistance and hostility, just as they had when they tried to gather 
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intelligence in New York’s docks.714 Once again, the Mob seemed to hold the key 
to access. 
 Haffenden’s Underworld Project team was now charged by Navy superiors 
with gathering intelligence for the Allies’ amphibious assault on Sicily. At his 
request, Lanza assembled the ‘bosses of the gangs’ and Haffenden asked them for 
help in gathering intelligence from the Italian-American community.715 Haffenden 
later testified that ‘the greater part of the intelligence developed in the Sicilian 
campaign was directly responsible to the number of Sicilians that emanated from 
the Charles “Lucky” contact’.716 Shepherded by Adonis and other mafia leaders, 
Sicilian and Mezzogiorno immigrants began showing up in large numbers at 
Haffenden’s Manhattan office, providing detailed descriptions of their hometowns 
and villages.717 Some Mob leaders, such as Vincent Mangano, who was heavily 
involved in smuggling from Sicily, proved reluctant, and had to be leaned on 
heavily by Adonis before they would cooperate.718 The information thus solicited 
gave detailed knowledge of beach conditions… details of mountain trails, 
good roads, short cuts and locations of fresh water springs… Photographs, 
snapshots, picture post cards and similar objects dealing with the 
countryside of Sicily and Italy were shown to the informants and when a 
specific area was recognized, a native of that particular place was found 
and sent in to report to the Naval Authorities.719 
All this information was synthesized through a large purpose-built map on 
Commander Haffenden’s wall. It had a cellophane overlay on which intelligence 
information was marked up, summarized and cross-referenced to specific coded 
human sources.720 Luciano and the Mob leadership also passed on the names of 
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‘trustworthy’ contacts in Sicily, which the Navy later found to be  ‘40% correct’.721 
A 1945 inquiry initiated by Governor Dewey before he agreed to release Luciano 
found that through these contacts, ‘much valuable information was obtained relative 
to the position of mine fields, enemy forces and strong points.’722 
Creating a fifth column 
Emboldened, Luciano began to offer operational advice. Was it a sense of historical 
irony, or perhaps revenge, that led Luciano to recommend an amphibious landing 
supported by aerial bombardment in the small Golfo di Castellammare to the west 
of Palermo, whence hailed the Castellammarese?723 He even suggested that he 
himself be ‘dropped in by parachute’ and use his personal clout ‘to win these 
natives over to support the United States’ War Effort’ – leading a fifth column 
against Mussolini from within Italy. Haffenden, remarkably, supported the 
suggestion, and presented the proposal in Washington, where it was refused.724  
Yet the idea of Italian criminal groups serving as a fifth column began to 
find some traction. The British Secret Intelligence Service’s 1943 Handbook on 
Politics and Intelligence Services for Sicily had already identified a figure, Vito La 
Mantia, as a mafia boss and a possible source of ‘valuable information: uneducated 
but influential’.725 But the Americans went further. The Special Military Plan for 
Psychological Warfare in Sicily, issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1943, 
suggested using Sicilian-American mafiosi to establish ‘contact and 
communications with the leaders of separatist nuclei, disaffected workers, and 
clandestine radical groups, e.g. the Mafia, and giving them every possible aid’. 
Allied forces would supply weapons and explosives for use against strategic targets 
including bridges and railroads.726 This plan, though not executed, was approved in 
principle by the operational theatre commander – Dwight D. Eisenhower.727 As we 
shall see in Chapter 8, two decades later, as President, Eisenhower authorized a 
remarkably similar collaboration between the CIA and the Mob to remove Fidel 
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Castro from power in Cuba.  
Members of Haffenden’s intelligence team who had worked closely with 
Mob contacts in New York, including during the search for Nazi saboteurs on Long 
Island, went ashore with the first wave of the Allied invasion of Sicily, Operation 
Husky, on 9-10 July 1943.728 One of the agents, Anthony J. Marsloe, later secretly 
testified that the intelligence gathered via Mob connections in New York helped 
those landing understand the role of the mafia in Sicily: Sicilian ‘customs and 
mores… the political ideology and its mechanics on lower echelons, … the chains 
of command’. All of this ‘enabled us to carry out the findings and purpose of our 
mission’.729  
A story has long circulated suggesting that a golden handkerchief with the 
letter ‘L’ (for Luciano) was dropped from a plane to signal to the Sicilian mafia that 
they should cooperate with the Allies. This, it was said, explained the rapid advance 
of the Allies through Western Sicily.730 Tim Newark has conclusively shown the 
story to be apocryphal.731 But overlooked material in the Herlands file shows that 
the concept underlying the story – that Allied cooperation with the mafia provided 
specific military advantages facilitating the advance – is in fact true. Once ashore, 
operating to a specific plan, Haffenden’s agents actively sought out and contacted 
Mobsters who had been deported from the US, using them as both literal and 
figurative translators, brokering access to local Sicilian mafia capos.732  
Unpublished Herlands investigation testimony and an unpublished 
manuscript by one of the agents, Anthony J. Marsloe explain just how useful this 
access proved. Lt Paul A. Alfieri, who went ashore at Licata, in Sicily’s south-east, 
made contact with a mafioso ‘cousin’ of Luciano, whom Luciano had earlier helped 
to flee the electric chair in New York after he had killed a policeman on the Lower 
East Side. Gunmen from his cosca led Alfieri to the local naval headquarters, which 
they attacked. Alfieri then used lock-picking skills learned from the Mob during the 
‘surreptitious entry’ operations in New York to open a safe, where he discovered 
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priceless operational intelligence: the order of battle and location of Italian and 
German naval forces for the Mediterranean; a radio codebook; and minefield maps. 
These were used both to aid the American advance in Western Sicily and ‘to 
accelerate the Italian surrender’.733 Alfieri, then a mere Lieutenant, Junior Grade, 
was awarded the Legion of Merit.734 Joe Titolo, another member of this team, 
explained how he repeated this approach as he was deployed steadily north in Italy. 
He repeatedly ‘sought out members of the criminal element’ to provide intelligence 
and other forms of cooperation.735 And in Sardinia, Titolo used underworld contacts 
to capture nineteen escaping high-ranking Italian officers, and prevent three 
different sabotage operations.736 
Release and exile 
By 1942 Luciano had been in prison for six years, and would not be eligible for 
parole for another twenty-four. If he did not press his advantage now, it might 
evaporate. While the District Attorney’s office had made clear to Lanza that any 
Mob cooperation with ONI was not going to lead to any deals, it had also told 
Luciano’s lawyer that ‘if Luciano made an honest effort to be of service in the 
future, they would bear that in mind.’737 Luciano’s lawyers moved for a reduction 
of sentence. The motion was considered by the same judge, Supreme Court Justice 
Philip J. McCook, who had sentenced him. He privately interviewed both 
Commander Haffenden and Murray Gurfein, and while denying the motion for 
release indicated opaquely that ‘[i]f the defendant is assisting the authorities and he 
continues to do so, and remains a model prisoner, executive clemency may become 
appropriate at some future time’.738 By mid-1944 the maritime threat to the eastern 
seaboard had largely been seen off, and Italy was under Allied control. The Mob’s 
utility to the US government’s war effort was waning. Haffenden was reassigned to 
active service in the Pacific (where he was badly injured on Iwo Jima), and the 
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Underworld Project came to an end.739 It seemed like Luciano’s chance at release 
had slipped through his fingers. 
On the day the war ended in Europe, 8 May 1945, Lucky tried his luck once 
more. His lawyers wrote to Governor Dewey, seeking clemency. This posed a 
political conundrum for Dewey. If he denied Luciano clemency, he risked the Mob 
and its Tammany allies leaking the fact of the government’s cooperation with the 
Mob during the war, causing him serious political headaches. The government 
seemed unlikely to agree to the release of details of the cooperation. But if he 
released Luciano without explanation, that could also cause public consternation. So 
Dewey kicked the question to the Parole Board, who mounted a limited 
investigation of Luciano’s claim to have assisted the war effort. On 3 December 
1945 the Parole Board recommended that while Luciano’s sentence should be 
commuted, since Luciano had never been formally naturalized, he should be 
deported. It was a neat compromise. The Governor granted the commutation on 3 
January 1946.740 His public statement explained straightforwardly that  
Upon the entry of the United States into the war, Luciano’s aid was sought 
by the armed services in inducing others to provide information concerning 
possible enemy attack. It appears that he cooperated in such effort…  
Dewey further specified that if Luciano ever re-entered the US, he should be 
treated as an escaped convict.741 After a final round of visits with Costello, Lansky 




In 2011 the White House released a Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 
Crime that warned that criminal networks   
threaten U.S. interests by forging alliances with corrupt elements of 
national governments and using the power and influence of those elements 
                                                
739 Polakoff testimony, p. 32.  
740 Materials from the Parole Board’s inquiry and the deportation decision are in URHIM 16:1 and 
17:no number. See also Polakoff testimony, pp. 56-59; Herlands Report, pp. 9-10, 99-100; and 
Campbell, pp. 192-256. 
741 Herlands Report; and see ‘Dewey Commutes Luciano Sentence’, N.Y. Times, 4 January 1946. 
  155 
to further their criminal activities… to the detriment of the United States.742 
Yet seventy years earlier, it was the US Government that was forging 
alliances with criminal networks, in an effort to thwart the perceived designs of its 
own adversaries. The Second World War proved to be a strategic gift for the Mob, 
transforming its positioning options and its field of vision. Before the Second World 
War, the Mob understood its relationship with the US government in domestic, 
binary terms: they competed and collaborated largely within the confines of the 
American political economy. The War transformed the field from a domestic to a 
transatlantic one, bringing in new players: the US’ enemies. This transformed the 
Mob’s positioning options, opening up the possibility of balance-of-power alliance 
strategies. The Mob could exploit the old logic of ‘My enemy’s enemy is my friend’ 
to ally itself with the US government, buying strategic space at home and 
piggybacking on the war effort to extend its reach overseas.  
Both sides explicitly recognized the defensive logic underpinning the 
alliance within the Underworld Project. Meyer Lansky described the state’s 
participation as a ‘great precaution’ against the creation of a fifth column.743 Lt 
Marsloe, a central figure in Haffenden’s team, similarly describe the project as 
intended to provide a ‘system… which will prevent the enemy from securing aid 
and comfort from others… [including] the so-called underworld.’744 The US Navy’s 
defensive logic for allying with the Mob against the Fascist powers was similar to 
the logic that Jimmy Hines had in allying with Dutch Schultz against political rivals 
such as Al Marinelli (in turn backed by the Mob). Both episodes involved strategic 
alliance between upperworld and underworld actors in a larger competition for 
power. The only structural difference was the strategic setting: one played out 
within the confines of New York politics, while the other played out in the 
transatlantic theatre of World War Two. 
The prospect of the Mob actually allying itself with Hitler and Mussolini 
was probably never very high. Meyer Lansky, for example, had been active in 
forcibly breaking up rallies of the German American Bund (a Nazi-aligned 
organization) in New York in the 1930s, so he was probably an unlikely candidate 
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to become a fascist agent. 745  But the prospects of some American mafiosi 
collaborating with the fascists was also not zero. Vito Genovese, one of Luciano’s 
main lieutenants who had fled New York to escape a murder charge in 1937 spent 
the Italian war cooperating closely with senior Fascists in Naples. Some suspect 
him of organizing the assassination of an anti-fascist labour activist in New York, 
Carlo Tresca, for Mussolini. During the war Genovese was, indeed, presented 
Italy’s highest civilian award by the Fascist government.746  
Even if the probability of Mob elements developing into a fifth column was 
low, the fear that it might was very real in intelligence circles in 1941. 
Commissioner Herlands, in his report, argued that the authorities had been forced 
by their sense of ‘grave emergency and national crisis’ to adopt an ‘essentially 
pragmatic’ approach, moving to a form of ‘total mobilization’ that induced them to 
use ‘the entire community and every useful element in it’.747 The state of war, in 
other words, represented a normative rupture: pure strategic considerations forced 
the state to ignore the very norms that, during peacetime, would prevent it 
cooperating with organized crime. The sense of crisis altered the strategic landscape, 
creating fears that the Mob exploited cannily, ratcheting up its role from one of 
waterfront intelligence cooperation, to waterfront enforcement, to broader 
intelligence and enforcement cooperation – and ultimately assisting the US in the 
intercontinental projection of force. It gave the Navy real results: improved access 
to maritime intelligence, assistance tracking down Nazi saboteurs and suspected 
Falangist agitators, access to auxiliary enforcement capabilities including 
specialized break-and-enter skills, and valuable operational intelligence and 
contacts in Italy. Commissioner Herlands concluded that there could ‘be no 
question about the usefulness of the project’.748 
 The problem with such collaboration, whether the Mob took the role of 
watchdog or attack dog, was summed up by one of Haffenden’s agents, Lt Harold 
MacDowell: ‘When you go to sleep with dogs, you get up with fleas.’749 The US 
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government may have gained much from the Mob, but the Mob received at least as 
much in return. The integration of the Mob and ONI’s coercive apparatus – with 
naval agents working in Mob-controlled workplaces, and Mob enforcers taking 
direct orders from naval officers – amplified both parties’ power. It extended the 
Navy’s power in the underworld and zones it could not reach, such as the unionized 
waterfront, fishing fleet and hotels. But it also amplified the Mob’s power by 
making the state complicit in some of its activities. The Mob’s collaboration with 
ONI not only protected it from other state actors, but also sent a signal to potential 
rivals of the Mob – whether underworld rivals or legitimate rivals for its political 
mediation role, such as communist-leaning union factions – that it had enlarged 
room to manoeuvre, possibly even impunity. 
Mob leaders were fully aware what a ‘break’ they had caught from the 
Underworld Project.750  If nothing else, Luciano, sentenced to thirty to fifty years in 
prison, was now out – in less than ten. Four outstanding indictments against him 
had been quietly dropped.751 Yet Lucky had also been exiled to Italy – a poor, 
ruined, post-conflict state. That was a grim prospect. Had their strategic decision to 
cooperate with the Navy backfired?  
If the Mob’s ambitions were limited to the US, then indeed, perhaps the 
permanent exile of their uncontested leader was a steep price to pay. But this exile 
also seems to have encouraged Luciano and the Mob leadership to conceive the 
Mob’s potential in larger geographic terms. The Mob had helped the US 
government project power across the Atlantic, and in the process acquired new, 
transnational strategic options. The first of these lay exactly where Luciano was 
now headed: occupied Italy. 
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6. Governing Sicily, 1942-1968 
 
 ‘The “roaring twenties” in America were nothing compared with Sicily of today.’ 
Brigadier-General George S. Smith, 1945752 
 
‘Politicians, governments and men in power change, while the Mafia stays the same.’  
Don Calògero Vizzini753 
 
At 5 p.m. one day in early January 1944, the British Minister Resident in the 
Mediterranean and future Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, called at an office in 
the centre of Palermo. Macmillan was serving as Churchill’s liaison in the 
Mediterranean theatre. The office in question belonged to the most senior American 
in the Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories (AMG or AMGOT), 
which governed Sicily and southern Italy. This was Colonel Charles Poletti, the first 
Italian-American to become a state governor in the US (of New York), and as 
Macmillan later put it, ‘Tammany personified’. Poletti, Macmillan reported back to 
London, had ‘clearly run Sicily with enthusiasm and gusto’. But he seemed to 
consider himself the ‘”boss” of Sicily’. ‘[T]he shadow of … Tammany Hall’, 
Macmillan concluded, had ‘been thrown … across the Island.’754 
 Macmillan’s analysis was trenchant. For much of his time in Italy, Poletti 
employed an ‘interpreter’: Vito Genovese, the Luciano Family lieutenant, 
collaborator with the Italian Fascists, and later top New York Mob boss. 
Genovese’s job, it appears, was to ‘interpret’ between the upperworld and the 
underworld, organizing and governing the booming, volatile black market that 
seemed to pose a major threat to Allied control. With AMG’s connivance, the 
governmental power of organized crime in southern Italy was being revived. Even 
prior to the invasion, Allied planners recognized that ‘there were two enemies to be 
faced in Sicily’ – the openly hostile Fascist forces, and the hidden power of 
                                                
752 Brigadier-General George S. Smith to Supreme Allied Commander, ‘Report on Conditions in 
Sicily’, 23 November 1945, BNA, WO 204/2449. 
753 Costanzo, p. 39.  
754 Macmillan to Foreign Office, Algiers, 15 January 1944, BNA, FO 371/43918; Harold Macmillan, 
War Diaries: Politics and War in The Mediterranean, January 1943 – May 1945 (London: 
Macmillan, 1984), p. 352. 
  159 
organized crime.755 The Allied invasion and occupation of Sicily defeated the 
Fascists, but arguably left organized crime welded into Italy’s post-war system of 
government.  
 Drawing extensively on unpublished British and American wartime 
correspondence, intelligence analyses and published secondary sources, this chapter 
explores the underappreciated strategic impact of organized crime during the Allied 
Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT or simply AMG), the 
Sicilian separatist movement of 1943-1945, and Sicily’s post-War transition. The 
interactions between the AMG, Italian political organizations, and the American 
and Sicilian mafia hold numerous insights for contemporary military interventions, 
peace operations and post-conflict transition processes, touched on here and further 
explored in Chapter 10.  
The first section explores the hidden history of AMG officials’ handling of 
the mafia during the initial occupation. The second section explores the role of the 
Sicilian mafia in the emergence of a Sicilian separatist movement in the immediate 
post-occupation transition, and the Italian government’s efforts to avoid a separatist 
insurgency through secret accommodation and negotiation efforts. The third section 
explores different approaches to criminal strategy during Sicily’s post-War 
transition, focusing briefly on the unsuccessful efforts of Salvatore Giuliano, the 
notorious ‘Prince of Bandits’, which contrast with the much more successful efforts 
of Salvatore Lima, the mayor of Palermo. The final section briefly reflects on 
lessons from these episodes, particularly for contemporary post-conflict transitions.  
 
‘A bargain has been struck’ 
Black market rents 
Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed that it would serve their strategic interests to 
give the AMG a largely American face, because of the ties between Sicily and 
America built up by immigration over the previous decades. Despite America’s 
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supposed familiarity with Sicily, Allied occupation planning failed to appreciate 
how local criminal actors would exploit the vacuum of political authority and 
absence of effective law enforcement capabilities during the occupation. The US 
War Department’s directive for Allied administration of Sicily proposed a 
dismantling of the Fascist party, removal of all Fascist personnel from authority, 
and the insertion of the Allies’ own nominees. As Tim Newark has pointed out, this 
approach created ‘a rush to fill the political vacuum left behind by the Fascists – a 
process that would attract the Mafia’. 756  In this, the British and American 
occupation of Sicily uncannily foreshadows the course of events in Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Libya six decades later.  
When the occupation forces arrived, southern Italy was a failing state. In 
Sicily, a month after the occupation all railways remained cut, most large towns had 
no bread and less than 24 hours’ food on hand at any time, and large numbers of 
dead were still being buried.757 By late October AMG officials were reporting that 
mafia groups were hoarding wheat, stealing it in attacks on AMG-controlled 
reserves, and selling it at up to four times its true market value.758 By December, 
food shortages were critical and posed ‘[t]he main threat to security... This lack of 
food leads to general unrest and is exploited by criminal and political factions’.759 
By early 1944, food prices were higher even than during the last year of Fascist 
wartime rule.760  
The war reduced the costs of organizing crime. Some gangs looted weapons 
from battlefields and poorly defended state arsenals.761 Others used the proceeds of 
the black market to purchase leftover materiel – machine guns, trench mortars, land 
mines, field radios, even light field artillery – and hid it away in caves and secret 
stores.762 In Naples – which, like Sicily, was under AMG control – Norman Lewis, 
a British intelligence officer and later a celebrated travel writer described seeing 
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‘[e]very single item of Allied equipment’ on open sale.763 By the spring of 1944, the 
US Psychological Warfare Bureau was estimating that one third of Allied supplies 
were disappearing into the black market – which was the source of almost two-
thirds of Neapolitan households’ income.764 Mass prison break-outs as the fascist 
powers fled ahead of advancing Allied forces, abandoning their guard posts, sent 
hardened criminals and desperate men into a labour-market with no jobs.765 Armed 
gangs of bandits and hardened war veterans began to roam the countryside of Sicily 
and parts of southern Italy, pillaging and looting.766  
War and deprivation broke down normative barriers to participation in 
criminal activity, making people increasingly ‘illegality-minded’. ‘An entire 
generation of young people addicted to legal abuses and criminal violence began to 
grow up’, argued Michele Pantaleone, a leftist politician who lived through the 
period.767 The post-conflict black market was playing a similar role to Prohibition in 
New York: breaking down mental barriers to participation in organized crime, and 
stoking a Darwinian competition between criminal groups for control of resources 
that weeded out the weak and consolidated the strong. The US War Department 
directive had promised to manage such problems through price controls and direct 
assault on racketeers. But there were only limited law enforcement assets available 
to undertake that assault. Just 65 British policemen were deployed to AMG 
operations.768 In early September, a joint British-American operation planned by 
Scotland Yard and the New York Police Department arrested two mafia leaders and 
seventeen of their associates. But the operation was apparently based on tips from 
other mafiosi, pointing dangerously towards manipulation of the Allies by mafia 
factions.769 And this operation seemed to be the exception, not the rule.  
AMG officers at the tactical level were forced to innovate. In Corleone, the 
British administrator attempted – with apparently limited success – to simply cut 
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black market racketeers out of the picture, buying the harvest straight from 
producers. No doubt due to mafia pressure, he found the sellers reluctant, and the 
caribinieri uncooperative.770 Other AMG officers took the opposite course, turning 
to local ‘persons of influence’ to ‘act as mediators with the local communities.’771 
AMG officials discovered how helpful the mafia could be. Haffenden’s ONI team, 
now inserted into the civilian administration in Sicily, worked to identify local 
criminal leaders, whom they found to be ‘extremely cooperative’.772 One former 
Underworld Project operator, Lt Paul Alfieri, worked with local mafiosi to use the 
Sicilian fishing fleet as an intelligence apparatus, specifically ‘patterned after the 
fishing fleet project under Commander Haffenden’ in New York.773  
The Office of Strategic Services claimed to have gone even further. 
Precursor to the CIA, OSS’ presence in Sicily was led by Joseph Russo, whose 
father had been born in the Sicilian mafia stronghold of Corleone. Russo sought out 
mafia leaders as collaborators.774 In a secret internal report archived in the US 
National Archives, filed under the OSS codename ‘Experimental Department G-3’, 
Russo made a pragmatic case for engaging the mafia: ‘Only the Mafia is able to 
bring about suppression of black market practices and influence the … majority of 
the population.’ Russo claimed with striking bravado to have turned the Mafia into 
a strategic asset: 
We at the present time can claim … the Mafia. We have had conferences 
with their leaders and a bargain has been struck that they will be doing as 
we direct or suggest. A bargain once made here is not easily broken.…775 
Where would this supposed bargain lead? 
‘Wine and women and champagne’ 
The AMG’s improvisational and apparently uncoordinated approach to dealing with 
the mafia at the tactical level might suggest a lack of awareness of the problem at 
the strategic level. This was not so. As with many contemporary peacekeeping and 
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military operations that grapple with criminal spoilers, the issue was not so much a 
lack of awareness of the problem as an absence of a clear, coordinated strategic 
response.  
The man in charge of AMG’s administration of Sicily was Major-General 
Francis Baron Rennell of Rodd. A former diplomat and banker, Lord Rennell had 
won the Royal Geographic Society’s Founder’s Medal in 1929 for a study of the 
Touareg nomads of the Sahel, suggesting an anthropologist’s eye for social 
complexity. He was not blind to the danger posed by the mafia. In fact, he 
specifically warned his superiors that ‘[t]he aftermath of war and the breakdown of 
central and provincial authority provide a good culture ground for the [mafia] 
virus’,776 and that the ‘Mafia is far from dead’. Only the ‘intimate local knowledge’ 
of local police could combat it.777 The AMG insisted on exercising indirect control 
over the Sicilian population, with ‘the Sicilians doing’ the actual ‘governmental 
work’.778 But after a decade of fascism, there were few alternative authorities 
capable of assisting the Allies to restore order and welfare on the island.779  
Rennell concluded that the interventionist approach favoured by the 
Americans – removing all Fascist institutions – was unwittingly playing into mafia 
hands: 
Unfortunately owing to the zeal which Allied Military Government 
Officers have shown in the removal of Fascist [mayors] they have fallen 
into the trap of appointing the most pushing and obvious person, who in 
certain cases are now suspected as being the local Mafia leaders. In certain 
parts of Sicily there is no doubt that the election of [mayors] will result in 
virtually unanimous voting for local MAFIA leaders.780  
Mafiosi found that the AMG’s door pushed open very easily. Many of the 
AMG’s initial mayoral selections resulted from AMG officers ‘following the advice 
of their self-appointed interpreters who had learned some English in the course of a 
stay in the USA’. Many were American Mobsters who had fled the US or been 
deported back to southern Italy. Under their influence, concluded Rennell, AMG 
officials ‘invariably chose a local Mafia “boss”, or his shadow, who in one or two 
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cases had [themselves] graduated in an American gangster environment.’781 AMG 
officers’ ‘ignorance of local personalities’ led them to appoint ‘a number of mafia 
“bosses”’.782 In Villalba, Don Calògero Vizzini, a major mafia leader in western 
Sicily, was appointed mayor.783 And in Naples, Lewis recorded how Genovese and 
local associates had quickly ‘manoeuvred into a position of unassailable power in 
the military government…. In so far as anyone rules here, it is the Camorra.’784 
American officers seem to have taken longer than their British counterparts 
to accept that the mafia posed a problem. There were deep cultural and 
organizational divisions between the two Allies, and AMG organization was 
frequently chaotic.785 (Again, the parallel with the experience in occupied Iraq sixty 
years later is striking.) American officers denied there was a problem, some arguing 
there was no formal mafia organization in Sicily, just a system of hereditary 
chieftainship.786 British officers kept calling for an AMG-wide policy.787 But the 
basic problem was in identifying who exactly was a mafioso. The British 
government historian later noted that all foreign occupiers face difficulty in 
weighing up ‘the value or danger of local characters’.788 But in Sicily, as Rennell 
pointed out, there was an additional problem: 
Here my difficulty resides in the Sicilian Omerta code of honour. I cannot 
get much information even from the local Caribinieri who in outstations 
inevitably feel that they had better keep their mouths shut and their skins 
whole if the local AMGOT representative chooses to appoint a Mafioso, 
lest they be accused by AMGOT of being Pro-Fascist. The local Mafiosi 
who of course had no love for the [Fascist] regime, which persecuted the 
Mafia, are naturally not slow in levelling accusations of Fascist sympathies 
against their own pet enemies.789 
 The AMG was, in a sense, flying blind. By October 1943 the Americans 
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were forced to admit that there might be a problem, and commissioned a military 
intelligence officer, Captain W.E. Scotten, who had served three years as American 
Vice-Consul in Palermo, to develop ideas to address the ‘grave and urgent’ problem 
of the mafia. After consulting with Allied military and political intelligence officers 
and local Sicilian informants, Scotten produced a remarkable six-page confidential 
memorandum entitled ‘The Problem of Mafia in Sicily’ which was circulated not 
only amongst AMG leaders but also in Allied HQ in Algiers and London.790  
Scotten demonstrated a nuanced appreciation of mafia power. He explained 
the mafia as the product of ‘a system of private safeguards’ that had emerged in the 
absence of effective state capabilities in the centre of Sicily, degenerating from a 
‘feudal system’ of rackets into ‘a criminal system’ aimed at committing ‘extortion 
and theft with impunity’. It was both an ‘association of criminals’, disciplined 
through a code of silence, and, because of the imposition of that code on the public, 
‘more than an association; it is also a social system’.791 It nurtured its own power 
through deliberately cultivating governmental power, showing 
the desire to entangle in its meshes persons in high places who could serve 
to protect its own members when need arose, even to the extent of 
intervention in Rome on their behalf. As a matter of fact, Mafia, before the 
advent of Fascism, had reached the position of holding the balance of 
political power in Sicily. It could control elections, and it was courted by 
political personages and parties…792 
It was wrong, Scotten argued, to think that the Fascists had wiped out the 
mafia. Mori was ordered back to Rome, he explained,  
when it became apparent that a complete housecleaning would involve too 
many high-ranking professional and business people and even influential 
members of the [Fascist] Party…793  
The mafia had, Scotten asserted, quickly regenerated its power in Sicily 
during the brief Allied occupation by using these links and its own social networks 
to assert control over the black market. Now, he argued, the ‘grave implications’ of 
resurgent mafia power not only for Sicily’s political future but also ‘on the 
mainland of Italy’ must be recognized in AMG Headquarters.794 
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Yet AMG’s strategic leadership did not seem too concerned. Though British 
officers on the ground were increasingly worried, their leaders seemed resigned to 
the fact that the mafia would inveigle itself into the post-war political system. 
Macmillan wrote almost flippantly to the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in 
September 1943:  
Whatever Fascism may have been in theory or on the mainland of Italy, in 
Sicily it was obviously just a legalized ‘racket’. It is worth remembering 
that Al Capone was a Sicilian. Of course, in due course AMGOT and 
Control Commissions will pass away, the ‘racket’ will return, ‘democracy 
will then resume its reign/and with it, wine and women and champagne’.795 
Macmillan was adapting a satirical ditty by Hillaire Belloc from 1923, On a 
General Election, which had skewered the British political parties for being more 
similar than different: 
The accursed power which stands on Privilege  
(And goes with Women, and Champagne and Bridge)  
Broke — and Democracy resumed her reign  
(Which goes with Bridge, and Women and Champagne).796 
 
An election that brought a change of government in truth simply changed 
the ordering of priorities, not their underlying content, he was implying. Macmillan 
was picking up this theme, suggesting that the war, and Allied occupation, would 
have a similar effect in Sicily – i.e., not much. Ultimately, he suggested, the mafia 
and the Fascists were not so different.  
‘Our good friends’ 
The Allies did not plan to put the mafia back in power. Nor, however, was it simply, 
as Tim Newark has argued, ‘a mistake’, in which the AMG allowed the mafia to 
‘put themselves back in positions of power’.797 The AMG’s approach lay between 
the two: it was not blindness, but wilful blindness; not ignorance, but acquiescence. 
And in some individual cases, it went even further: connivance and collusion. 
 As early as October 1943 Captain Scotten was reporting ‘numerous cases’ 
of both local Sicilian mafia figures and American Mobsters operating inside AMG 
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ranks.798 The unpublished draft official history of AMG concluded that AMG 
‘interpreters’, many of whom had acquired their knowledge of English ‘while 
members of some of the most unscrupulous racketeering gangs in the United States’, 
used AMGOT armbands, motor-car labels and other official markings to facilitate 
their criminal activities.799 Allied military supplies were imported tax-free; they 
could be diverted and sold into the Italian black market at huge mark-ups, while still 
sold at a steep discount to official prices. Genovese’s system, as one example, drew 
in the Neapolitan Camorra, Neapolitan judges, the mayor of Nola, the president of 
the Bank of Naples, as well as Don Calò and the Sicilian mafia.800  
As a result, Scotten asserted as early as October 1943, the local population 
was beginning to see AMG as ‘the unwitting tools of Mafia’.801 But as evidence of 
active collusion mounted, it became clearer that some AMG officers were the 
witting tools of the mafia. Genovese’s extensive operations clearly benefited from 
some level of protection within AMG. Suspicion fell on Poletti. During the 1930s 
and 1940s, when Frank Costello’s influence over Tammany and judicial 
appointments was clear, Poletti became Counsel to the Democratic National 
Committee, then Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, then Lieutenant-
Governor of New York and then, for just 29 days, Governor of New York. It was 
precisely this experience in the senior levels of government that was seen as 
qualifying him for the post of Senior Civil Affairs Officer in the AMG, the highest 
American post. But the model of government he brought to Sicily, as Macmillan 
had noted, was drawn straight from the Tammany tradition – which, as we have 
seen, had long included friendliness to organized crime. Lucky Luciano described 
Poletti as ‘one of our good friends’, often mafia code for signalling someone was an 
initiated mafioso himself.802 There is a trail of annotations and asides in archived 
British government wartime memoranda noting concern about Poletti. Lewis, a 
military intelligence officer, concluded simply that Poletti provided Genovese 
‘high-placed protection’. Herlands investigation materials also seem to corroborate 
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the idea that Poletti worked with Genovese to ‘operate the black market’.803  
Genovese’s run was ultimately interrupted by a fearless 24-year old military 
investigator, Orange Dickey, who bravely ignored his superiors’ active obstructions 
and single-handedly returned Genovese to face outstanding murder charges in 
Brooklyn – charges he had somehow been evading the whole time he served as the 
official interpreter to a former justice of the New York State Supreme Court and 
Governor, Poletti. During his investigation, Dickey turned up other Tammany 
figures in Italy, notably Bill O’Dwyer, the District Attorney in Brooklyn who 
appears to have deliberately bungled the investigations into Murder, Inc. By the 
time Dickey got Genovese back to New York, the main witness against Genovese 
had been murdered in prison. Genovese walked free. He was now one of the most 
senior mobsters in New York, with a new, lucrative transatlantic network 
connecting the Mob even more directly than before to Italy. And best of all, the 
Allied Military Government seemed disinclined to interfere with his activities.804  
  
Mafia separatism 
Confrontation, accommodation or withdrawal? 
Scotten set out three strategic options open to AMG for dealing with the mafia. The 
first was confrontation: a quick and direct action to bring the mafia under control, 
through the arrest of 500 or 600 top mafia leaders and their detention or deportation 
without trial. But for this option, Scotten noted,  
time … is of the essence. Mafia has not yet regained its old strength… its 
organisation is still to a considerable degree disrupted and localised, and 
the public at large is not yet under the incubus of fear and silence which 
mafia knows how to impose. But this fear is rapidly returning, and once it 
has set in, the problem for the police will be multiplied many times over.805 
Scotten himself favoured this approach, seeing it as ‘the only one consistent 
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with the expressed objectives of military government’. Yet he also recognised what 
a strategic challenge it posed: it ‘requires a careful appraisal of the ways and means 
available at the present juncture’. He was doubtful that AMG could ensure the 
secrecy required for such an operation to be effective, or the political willingness to 
arrest and deport five or six hundred leaders, some of considerable social standing.  
A second option was accommodation: the deliberate negotiation of a truce 
with Mafia leaders, trading an agreement by the mafia to liberalize the trade in 
foodstuffs and staples, and not to interfere with AMG personnel and operations, for 
a commitment by the AMG to not come after the mafia. Scotten considered this 
impracticable, because such an agreement could not be kept secret. And were any 
such agreement to leak, it would irreparably damage the political credibility of the 
AMG in the eyes of the populace.806 
A third option was withdrawal: ‘abandonment of any attempt to control 
Mafia throughout the island’, with AMG withdrawing into enclaves where military 
government could function properly – ceding the rest of the island to the Mafia. 
Scotten described this third option as ‘the course of least resistance’. But it would 
also be interpreted as ‘weakness’  
by the enemy, by the rest of Italy, by other enemy-occupied countries who 
are watching the experiment of AMG, and by the home populations. It may 
well mean the abandonment of the island to criminal rule for a long time to 
come.  
‘On the other hand’, he noted wryly, ‘its chance of success is certain.’807 
Though Scotten’s analysis was circulated throughout the AMG leadership 
and in Allied HQ, there is no evidence that it received much active discussion or 
debate. Instead, AMG’s mafia strategy emerged more by accident than active 
design. Scotten had made clear that the third option – withdrawal in the face of the 
mafia into AMG enclaves – was a political non-starter. The first option – 
confrontation – also seemed unlikely, given the absence of attention to the issue in 
the AMG leadership, and the forces’ limited policing capabilities. Allied military 
and intelligence personnel were likely to be seen as needed elsewhere to fight the 
war, rather than investigating and arresting mafia-linked businessmen and 
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agriculturalists in southern Italy. Nor was local law enforcement up to the task. An 
American field intelligence report from 3 December 1943 described how the 
caribinieri were forced into crime to feed their families because their weekly salary 
could barely cover the cost of three loaves of bread. As the report noted, ‘[n]aturally 
this leads to lack of respect for law and order, and plays in to the hands of the 
political parties which might wish to foster disturbances for their own ends’.808 
That left the second option – accommodation. Scotten had discounted this 
option on the grounds that a negotiation could not be kept secret. But perhaps there 
was some other way to reach accommodation, other than through the AMG 
negotiating directly with the mafia – through more acceptable, notionally political 
intermediaries, such as the emerging Sicilian political parties.  
The logic of mafia separatism 
By the end of 1943 the central question for the Mob, the Sicilian mafia and other 
potential players in Italy’s market for government was what form the new, post-
occupation political settlement in Italy would take. The AMG’s policy on this 
question was difficult to discern. In February 1944 a group of Allied intelligence 
officers concluded in exasperation that ‘Nothing is known about the kind and form 
of civilian government for Sicily that will be supported, or at least encouraged, by 
the Allies’.809 
Captain Scotten argued that the absence of policy was creating a drift 
towards separatism, in part because the mafia had surrounded the AMG with 
‘separatist friends and advisors’. The AMG, he noted, had ‘consistently appointed 
to public office either outright separatists or persons of separatist sympathy’.810 As a 
result, he concluded, ‘the AMG has not only placed itself at a disadvantage to deal 
with Mafia, it has even gone so far as to play into its hands’.811 The mafia’s dealings 
with political parties should not, Scotten argued, be surprising, since it had always 
operated as ‘a system of political racketeering on the higher levels and criminal 
racketeering on the lower levels’.812 While the mafia was dealing with a wide range 
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of parties, including leftists, both Scotten and the Foreign Office predicted that they 
would ally with the emerging clandestine ‘Separatist movement’.813  
An alliance appears in fact to have been agreed in a series of meetings 
around that time.814 The separatists were now, as Monte Finkelstein, the preeminent 
English-language historian of the separatist movement put it, under the mafia’s 
protection.815 There was significant, though hidden, overlap between the leadership 
groups of the two organizations. A noted later pentito, Tommaso Buscetta, would 
later claim that the primary separatist leader, Finocchiaro Aprile, was a member of 
his mafia cosca.816 The British Vice-Consul in Palermo at the time, Manley, felt that 
‘in many cases’ the Mafia and the separatists ‘are the same individuals’.817 More 
broadly, the strategic interests of the two groups seemed to be aligning. The large 
landowners who formed the backbone of the emerging separatist movement had 
traditionally relied on the mafia to coerce the population. Now, lacking a social base 
of their own through which to win governmental power, an alliance with the mafia, 
bandits or some other ‘counterpower to the state’ became necessary.818 A January 
1944 analysis by the US military concluded that the mafia’s control over the 
Sicilian population made it the natural ally of the Separatist Movement.819 
Alliance with the separatists also served mafia interests. When the 
occupation ended and the black market it fuelled disappeared, the mafia’s ability to 
extract criminal rents would depend on its traditional source: economic supply 
chains originating in the countryside areas that remained, despite Fascist efforts, 
under the influence of the landowners at the heart of the separatist movement. The 
breakup of the latifundia had never been truly completed; 1947 figures showed that 
more than a quarter of Sicilian territory was still held in that form.820 This was the 
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economic logic, but it also mapped onto a separatist political logic. The US military 
intelligence apparatus concluded that  
the Maffia members want an autonomous Sicily because in order to 
accomplish their criminal aims, they can easier intimidate the Civil public 
servants, then [sic] they could those residing in far-away Rome.821  
The mafia alliance with the separatists was thus both radical and 
conservative. It was radical because for the first time, ‘instead of inserting itself into 
an existing power structure’ the mafia ‘seemed bent on contributing directly to a 
political hypothesis’ – formal Sicilian separation from the Italian state, the creation 
of a new political entity within which to maximize the mafia’s hidden power.822 But 
it was also conservative, since it aimed at conserving an existing political 
economy.823 Political radicalism – separatism – was necessary in the service of 
economic conservatism. The mafia would, as Pantaleone saw it, pick as a political 
ally whichever party was ‘as “governmental” as possible’ – i.e. whichever party 
offered it the greatest prospect of exercising governmental power in Sicily.824 While 
that appeared to be the separatists, mafia support would continue. Should that 
change, the mafia’s criminal strategy could dictate a change in political alliances. 
The strategy seemed to be working. As the Allies handed formal 
administrative control over Sicily back to the Italian state on 11 February 1944, they 
left behind a native Sicilian as governor. It was Poletti’s pick; he nominated 
Francesco Musotto, a former mafia defence lawyer. OSS reported simply that the 
mafia had ‘won out’.825 
Seeking Great Power protection 
But the game was not over. By early 1944 it was apparent that’s Sicily strategic 
location in the Mediterranean could make it an important theatre in the emerging 
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competition for influence in post-war Europe. The Separatist-mafia alliance moved 
to exploit these shifts in the geostrategic environment by acquiring protection by a 
Great Power.  
The traditional latifundisti and mafia posture had been one of clientelism to 
patrons in Rome. Mafia power had been built on brokering between rural Sicily and 
political and economic power in northern Italy. Replacing Rome and Milan with 
Washington and London was not a giant strategic leap. Separatist leaders began a 
quiet communications campaign, assuring Allied intelligence officers of their 
‘conviction that either American or British domination would result in economic 
benefits’.826 Separatist leaders first floated the idea that Sicily should adopt a 
constitution modelled on Malta’s, placing it not only within the British 
Commonwealth but ceding external relations power to the UK.827 In July 1944 the 
separatist leader Finocchiaro Aprile wrote directly to Prime Minister Churchill to 
appeal to him to back Sicilian independence, 828  telling The Times that an 
independent Sicily ‘would gladly accept British protection’.829 When this did not 
produce results, separatist and mafia leaders switched their attention to the US. Don 
Calò, the preeminent Sicilian mafia capo, emerged as the leader of a separate, pro-
American political party – the Partito Democratico d’Ordine, later rebranded the 
Fronte Democratico d’Ordine Siciliano – which argued not for Sicilian 
independence, but rather for Sicily to join the United States of America as a state or 
overseas territory. Its propaganda material and party branding adopted the stars and 
stripes.830  
The likelihood of either the US or UK supporting Sicilian independence was 
always slim to none. It declined further as the separatist movement became 
increasingly violent. As early as 9 December 1943 the mafia had made clear, in a 
meeting with the separatist leadership, its willingness to use violence to promote the 
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separatist agenda amongst the Sicilian population.831 Mafia-sponsored agitation 
ensured that communist and nationalist politicians received a rough welcome when 
they campaigned in mafia-controlled areas.832 Allied intelligence quickly became 
concerned that the separatist movement might be turning into a ‘revolutionary 
movement’.833 Through the first six months of 1944, this nascent revolutionary 
movement indeed seemed to be gaining considerable traction. In February, the 
movement held its first formal meetings, and established a Youth League. 
Provincial committees were formed, and separatist mouthpieces established in the 
press. By April the movement had become formalized as the Movimento per 
l’Indipendenza della Sicilia (MIS).834  
But between April and June public order deteriorated sharply. In Palermo, 
criminal homicide tripled and robbery more than quadrupled in the first half of 
1944.835 Kidnapping exploded. Rival political rallies turned into running battles 
between gangs supporting different political factions. 836  With the economic 
situation still dire and public safety in free-fall, anomie and lawlessness rose, and 
the intralazzo (racket) took hold. It became impossible to escape corruption. Free 
market norms had been replaced by racketeering. ‘Straightforward commercial 
transactions… are no longer possible’, wrote a US intelligence analyst. And public 
administration had lost its legitimacy: ‘to be an official personage is synonymous 
with having a “racket” on the side…. officials are assumed to be dishonest until 
proven otherwise.’837 Scotten’s prediction – that a failure to confront or otherwise 
address the mafia early on would lead to a resurgence of organized crime – seemed 
to be playing out.  
It was not until mid-1944 that the Allies began to muster the political will to 
tackle the problem – and even then, only through cracking down on the mafia’s 
upperworld avatars, the separatists. In June 1944 dire food shortages provoked civil 
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disorder. The Allies suspected the latifundisti and mafia of stoking the crisis to reap 
windfall black-market profits. Their patience wearing thin, Allied officials 
recommended to the Italian authorities the ‘removal from Sicily (with the help, if 
necessary, of the Security Branch) of the heads of the Separatist Movement’.838 The 
separatist efforts to attract Great Power protection seemed to have failed. 
Negotiating peace with the mafia 
The new Italian government was not yet sufficiently strong, however, to confront 
the mafia and latifundisti by detaining the separatist leadership. In stead it replaced 
Musotto, the separatist-leaning High Commissioner, with Salvatore Aldisio, a more 
moderate Christian Democrat (Democrazia Cristiana, or DC), and charged him 
with pursuing Scotten’s second strategic option: accommodation. Scotten had 
suggested that the AMG could offer the mafia more liberal market policies in return 
for peace. Aldisio recognized that the Sicilian mafia in fact sought something more 
enduring: the preservation of their position as governmental powerbrokers. He 
could neutralize separatism by making clear the DC’s willingness to accommodate 
the mafia’s governmental power on the island.839 Aldisio began secretly wooing the 
mafia away from MIS, convening meetings of mafia leaders and DC party members, 
and working with Don Calò to end the grain crisis.840  
The latifundisti and MIS leadership faced a choice: abandon their support 
for separatism and throw their lot in with the DC; or encourage continued mafia 
support by accelerating the separation process. They chose the latter. Over the 
summer of 1944 MIS leaders began seriously to plan an insurgency, while stepping 
up outreach to foreign powers to prepare the ground for a possible declaration of 
independence later in the year.841 At a congress in August 1944, MIS formally 
adopted a platform contemplating military action. The party’s slogan switched from 
‘Plebiscite and Independence’ (‘Plebiscito e Indipendenza’) to ‘Independence or 
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Death’ (‘Indipendenza o Morte’).842 On 13 September, a large crowd of separatists 
disrupted a meeting between a minister visiting from Rome and the (unitarian) 
Democratic Party of Labour, then marched to MIS headquarters in Palermo. There 
they held a rally without government permission and chanted threats of a ‘new 
Sicilian Vespers’ – the successful but bloody rebellion against French-Capetian rule 
in 1282.843  On 16 September, a leading Sicilian Communist figure, Girolamo Li 
Causi, was shot in the leg, and fourteen of his supporters badly injured, during a 
speech in Villalba, Don Calò’s home turf.844 A separatist congress in Taormina on 
Sicily’s east coast began laying out detailed plans of revolution covering military 
strategy, political coordination, and diplomatic outreach.845  
Rumours of the planned uprising soon leaked. American officials advised 
Aldisio to exercise restraint, arguing that nothing would happen unless there was a 
clear trigger for mass revolt.846 Aldisio, however, prepared to arrest the plotters and 
exile them to the same outlying islands on which Mori had imprisoned mafia 
leaders almost 20 years earlier. The police raided MIS headquarters and confiscated 
membership lists, shutting down the office. Separatist leaders threatened ‘war’.847 
Even as it pressed the MIS leadership, the Italian state continued its efforts 
to peel away mafia support. Aldisio reached out again to Don Calò, encouraging 
him to throw mafia support to the Christian Democrats.848 While Vizzini apparently 
declined a formal alliance, the party that he controlled – the Fronte – altered its 
platform to favour autonomy, not separatism, splitting with the MIS.849 Responding 
to this promising signal from a key mafia leader, Rome sent a senior military 
commander to Sicily to open talks to resolve the separatist question. This envoy, 
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Giuseppe Castellano, was quickly ‘convinced that the strongest political and social 
force to be reckoned with is the Maffia’, and redoubled negotiation efforts.850 
Castellano told the Allies point-blank that a political settlement was possible, if ‘the 
system formerly employed by the old and respected Maffia should return’.851  
Within five weeks he had presented a detailed political reform proposal to 
Rome. It included support for regional autonomy ‘which will deflate the program of 
the separatists’, and ‘extraordinary measures in the administrative-judicial 
department’ to deal with ‘banditry and criminal elements’. What were these 
extraordinary measures? ‘The Maffia in Sicily’, Castellano wrote, ‘is not a 
negligible force. It will be necessary to select the most influential leaders (who are 
also capable) and confer responsible posts upon them.’ Castellano was proposing 
directly enlisting the mafia as an instrument to enforce the legal and political order 
of the state.852 
Castellano called together top MIS, Fronte and mafia leaders. Around 20 
mafia leaders attended. Castellano explicitly framed the talks as an effort to find 
common ground around autonomy proposals, made urgent by rising Sicilian support 
for communism and the increasingly obvious split between the Atlantic powers and 
the Soviets. Out of these talks emerged a specific proposal. Virgilio Nasi, the mafia 
capo in Trapani province, would lead a new mafia-backed movement for autonomy 
(not independence), take over from Aldisio as High Commissioner, and serve as the 
groups’ envoy to the Italian government in Rome. In return, Don Calò promised 
Castellano that he would ensure that the landowners and their conservative allies in 
Palermo would get behind this new arrangement, and that the mafia would work 
against communism. The proposal was put to Nasi by Castellano, Don Calò and 
other Mafiosi at a meeting on 18 November 1944 in Castellammare del Golfo.853  
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Castellano worked to enlarge the momentum of the autonomy proposal 
through bilateral meetings in December 1944 and January 1945 with an expanding 
circle of political party leaders, including Li Causi for the Communists and Aldisio 
for the Christian Democrats. He proposed formal round-table talks to back 
autonomy and choose a representative to negotiate with the Italian government, but 
the factions were unable to agree on the question of the inclusion of the MIS 
leadership in the talks.854 Castellano pushed on, attempting to mediate a solution 
through shuttle diplomacy, without a formal roundtable discussion. Under pressure, 
the MIS leadership contemplated a federal political settlement – but only if Sicily 
became a sovereign republic ‘be it only for a day’ before joining with Italy.855 The 
idea did not take hold. An agreement remained elusive, and the risk of civil war 
loomed. 
A bandit army 
As these secret negotiations proceeded, the state became increasingly alarmed at the 
separatists’ rising popularity. In late 1944 the Italian government estimated that 
MIS could count 400,000 to 500,000 supporters. Other parties could boast less than 
10 per cent as much support.856 A Sicilian revolution seemed a real possibility.  
 In mid-December 1944 a call by the Italian government for recruits to fight 
alongside the Allies met a hostile public response. Sicilians were tired of war and 
reluctant to fight for a far-off Roman power that was in the midst of an island-wide 
crackdown on the black market in grain and flour – the Sicilian staple. Whipped up 
by separatist agitators, violence broke out targeting government buildings, 
telecommunications facilities, banks and food stores in Catania and Palermo. In the 
south, a rebel band in Palma di Montechiaro occupied strategic approaches, cut 
communication, set fire to municipal offices and destroyed documents inside 
(including property registers and tax records), seized stored weapons and held the 
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town for four days. 857  Attacks on government military and police barracks 
continued into January.858 Some sources saw the hand of the mafia.859  
The Allies realized that the weak Italian government now faced a nascent 
‘rebellion’ or ‘insurgency’, and that they might be forced to intervene militarily.860 
But the Italian government’s announcement of support for an autonomy package 
seemed to buy some time. The MIS leadership vacillated. It came close to calling 
for an uprising, but ultimately decided not to – at least not yet.861 For some of their 
supporters, however, Rome’s embrace of autonomy was cause for desperation. At 
Comiso in Ragusa in early January 1945, a breakaway group of former Fascists 
within MIS ranks declared a republic and established a ‘provisional government’. 
Heavy fighting left 15 Italian personnel dead. It took the arrival of an artillery 
regiment with a tank and armoured car escort to bring the situation under control.862 
 Despite significant popular support for Sicilian independence in late 1944, 
by the end of 1945 the MIS was spent as a political force. Finkelstein explains that 
the MIS’ leadership, drawn from the ranks of traditional landowners, urban 
merchants and service professionals, failed to develop an effective organization 
beyond the island’s northern urban centres, in the poorer southern towns and the 
rural interior. In those areas support shifted rapidly through 1945 towards the better 
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organized Partito Comunista Italiana (Communist Party), whose program of socio-
economic reform seemed more attuned to a post-war agenda, and offered more 
concrete deliverables than the abstract, and rather utopian, notion of ‘separatism’.863 
The rapid collapse in separatist support became clear when the security services 
began to outnumber the crowd at MIS rallies. Increasingly desperate and all too late, 
the MIS leadership began to issue shrill calls for revolution and even Allied military 
intervention.864  
As early as late April 1945, the Separatist headquarters in Palermo was 
ransacked by an angry mob, possibly with the connivance of the authorities.865 
Attacks on separatist supporters and offices followed in other cities, and the MIS 
quickly shut down those that remained operational. With the political currency and 
utility of the MIS collapsing, mafia leaders with separatist links began looking for 
other potential conservative allies, including monarchists.866 There is some evidence 
that both Poletti and Nicola Gentile – the mediator in the Castellammarese War – 
may have been involved in these negotiations.867  
As MIS’ political strategy fell apart, it turned in desperation to the military 
option. The MIS leadership had been quietly building a clandestine paramilitary 
wing, the Esercito Volontario per l’Indipendenza Siciliana (EVIS) since 1943, 
under the guise of the separatist Youth League.868 EVIS was led by Antonio Canepa, 
a wartime partisan leader. Canepa managed to build a network of informants within 
Italian state structures, develop a staff structure and detailed military planning, but 
MIS could provide no support base from which to recruit.869 Aldisio told the Allies: 
If I were to say EVIS does not exist I would be guilty of exaggeration, but I 
should not be far from the truth. There is certainly a central headquarters 
and a general staff of EVIS, but it is a general staff whose army is more on 
paper than in the field. 
By late 1945 the movement had ‘six or seven thousand deluded supporters’, 
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but no real fighting force.870 So Canepa was forced to try to co-opt coercive 
capabilities from other sources: mafia bands, former partisans and prisoners of war, 
unemployed rural workers and common criminals.871 By mid-1945 the power 
vacuum in the Sicilian hinterland had led a variety of war veterans, unemployed 
labourers and toughs to form ‘[a]rmed bands, in full “war” equipment, with arms, 
ammunition, supplies, logistic and medical services’ roaming Sicily’s interior, 
staging train robberies and shooting at police.872 Reprising its role from the 1860s, 
the mafia emerged as a mechanism for governing this private violence. EVIS now 
looked to the mafia to help it recruit some of these violent enterprises into its ranks.  
 A typical example was the mafia’s approach to Salvatore Giuliano, a 
charismatic young bandit, born in Montelepre, a hill town between Palermo and 
Castellammare del Golfo. He was twenty-one when the Allies invaded. Despite no 
prior criminal history, the deprivations of the era drew him into the black market as 
a survival strategy. Arrested, he shot a caribiniero, made his escape, then killed 
another to escape a dragnet in Montelepre. After breaking some friends out of 
prison, he formed a bandit gang in the hills above his hometown. Through extortion 
and kidnapping of wealthy landowners, rural companies and urban businessmen, 
Giuliano was able to build a small force of 20-30 committed bandits, supplemented 
by part-timers who would participate in specific operations for a commission. 
Farmers, shepherds and peasants were paid handsomely for information, supplies, 
and transport from the proceeds of robberies outside the area.873 Giuliano had 
became a celebrity, partly out of a reputation for violence – his band killed some 
430 people in seven years – but partly because he had taken on the air of a social 
bandit, directing much of his violence at traditional objects of hostility of the 
peasantry, notably landowners, loan-sharks and, later, urban industrialists.874  
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Sometime in late 1943 or early 1944 the mafia recruited Giuliano.875 Canepa 
also tried to recruit Giuliano into EVIS’ ranks, without luck. However, after Canepa 
was killed in June 1945, his successor, Concerto Gallo was more successful. This 
was perhaps unsurprising: Gallo was not just EVIS’ leader, but also apparently a 
made member of the Catania mafia cosca. In September 1945 Giuliano issued a 
declaration of support for EVIS, apparently in return for promises of future 
immunity from prosecution for his band, the rank of colonel in a future Sicilian 
army, and 1 million lire with which to recruit, train and equip 40 to 60 more men.876  
EVIS’ acquisition of Giuliano’s coercive capabilities seemed promising. 
Giuliano’s band was by then operating almost at will in the areas around Palermo, 
raiding, attacking police and military sites and convoys and kidnapping wealthy 
figures for ransom. But EVIS was dependent on the mafia for its access to these 
capabilities. It was the mafia that was, in Eric Hobsbawm’s words, using bandits as 
the ‘nucleus of effective political rebellion’;877 it was not the rebels that were using 
the mafia to their own ends. The pattern was demonstrated in early 1945 when a 
captured EVIS rebel informed the authorities that he had been personally recruited 
to EVIS by Don Calò. His captors, unaware of the state’s efforts to reach an 
accommodation with the mafia, rashly threatened to arrest Don Calò. US military 
intelligence reported that as a result  
the Maffia has threatened to order active participation by the Sicilian 
Maffia on the side of EVIS and the outlaw bands. Because of their known 
power, this would mean real civil war in Sicily.878 
Alarmed, High Commissioner Aldisio intervened, negotiating a 
‘compromise’ whereby Vizzini left Palermo without being arrested.879 The mafia, it 
seemed, was calling the shots. 
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Settlement and betrayal 
In October 1945 the Christian Democrats came out firmly in favour of Sicilian 
regional autonomy. Confident of mafia support, the Italian authorities now moved 
decisively against MIS, exiling its leaders to administrative detention on an offshore 
island and shutting down the party’s offices across Sicily.880 The MIS had failed to 
find a sustainable source of political support, whether from popular legitimacy, 
protection by a Great Power – or protection by the mafia. When the MIS leadership 
was arrested, the mafia did not intervene.  
Instead, at a meeting in Palermo on 21 November 1945, mafia leaders from 
Palermo, Trapani and Agrigento met to chart a new way forward. Henceforth the 
mafia would aim to influence or control a variety of political parties, most notably 
the Christian Democrats. Having secured Sicilian autonomy within the Italian 
political system, and with influence over the emerging leaders of an autonomous 
Sicily, the mafia was abandoning its strategy of constitutional separatism, and 
returning to its traditional mafia strategy, interposing itself between the state and the 
local population. The decision was ratified a week later by a larger group of 47 
mafia leaders from across the island. The American consul, informed of these 
developments, suggested this new mafia group with its ties to the Christian 
Democrats might provide ‘the foundation of the strongest political force which has 
yet existed in Sicily’.881  
Mafia leaders told OSS that they were abandoning EVIS, and would ‘work 
and cooperate with the authorities to maintain tranquillity throughout the island.’882 
At the same time, however, they lobbied the Italian authorities to ‘allow these 
misdirected EVISsts to disband and return to their homes’. They added a guarantee: 
should remnants of EVIS remain active, however, ‘the Mafia themselves would 
quickly liquidate’ them.883 Soon the police began to find bandit leaders dead, cause 
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unknown; and tip-offs from the population increased dramatically.884  
In late December 1945, EVIS’ leader, Concerto Gallo, was captured. Other 
separatist bands such as the one led by Salvatore Giuliano fought on. Concerned 
about the state’s possible use of air power, Giuliano attacked Bocca di Falco airfield, 
just outside the Palermo city centre, as well as several Carabinieri bases.885 In early 
1946 the Italian government sent nearly 1,000 battle-hardened Garibaldi Regiment 
troops, equipped with armoured cars, to try to finish off the remnants of EVIS. The 
force indeed included reconnaissance aircraft and four bombers, and had the power 
to declare martial law in specified operational theatres, such as around Montelepre, 
Giuliano’s home base. Within two weeks, 600 suspected bandits had been captured, 
along with 2 anti-tank guns, machine guns, rifles, grenades and other battlefield 
weaponry.886  
EVIS had been broken as a military force, and the separatist threat had been 
seen off. In March 1946 the Italian government released the separatist political 
leaders it had detained. In May, it devolved significant additional power to the High 
Commissioner and established a new 24-member regional assembly for Sicily. 
Outmanoeuvred, the separatists fared poorly in the 2 June parliamentary elections, 
collecting just 8.7 per cent of the vote and taking only four of 49 Sicilian seats in 
the new Parliament in Rome.887 They were a spent force. The mafia was not.  
Nor was Salvatore Giuliano. In 1949 the British representative in Rome, Sir 
Victor Mallett, assessed Giuliano as an expert in ‘estimating the amount which he 
can reasonably demand as a ransom and gauging the strength of his terror.’888 He 
was, in other words, tactically astute in the use of force. But he could not marry that 
tactical nous to an effective political strategy. He had cultivated an image of himself 
as protector of the under-dog, carrying a photo of himself inscribed ‘Robin 
Hood’.889 By rebranding his band as a part of EVIS’ apparatus he seemed to be 
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positioning himself in the political marketplace. But this manoeuvring also made 
him dependent on mafia and separatist protection. His failure to develop an 
effective strategy giving himself an independent source of governmental power 
beyond his own immediate theatre of operations left him highly vulnerable, should 
the mafia or EVIS disappear or, worse, betray him.  
Through the course of 1946 and 1947, while continuing his notionally-
separatist guerrilla operations, Giuliano put out feelers to both monarchists and 
Christian Democrats, announcing himself as a potential ally in the looming struggle 
with communism.890 Unsuccessful there, Giuliano turned to foreign state sponsors 
for protection, writing directly to President Truman, indicating his intention to 
‘annihilate’ Communism in Sicily and offering his services as a military asset, even 
suggesting the admission of Sicily as the forty-ninth state of the American Union.891  
Giuliano’s blunder came on May Day 1947, when he attacked a peaceful 
communist rally at Portella della Ginestra. Eleven people died, four of them 
children. Thirty-three others were wounded. And that was just the beginning. 
Attempting to position himself as a political enforcer for the right, over the next two 
months he attacked numerous leftist rallies, peasant unions and collectivist 
headquarters. Several times he tried to assassinate the leader of the Communist 
Party in Sicily, Girolamo Li Causi. A press release on 24 June 1947 made his 
intentions clear, calling on Sicilians to ‘fight’ the ‘Red gangsters’.892  
Giuliano’s sudden turn to terrorism alienated the population beyond his 
home district, destroyed his prospects of building a post-war political career at the 
regional or national level, and undermined his foreign public support. Both the 
British and Americans concluded that Giuliano had been duped by right-wing 
political patrons, probably including the mafia, who had promised him ‘immunity’ 
and perhaps some kind of formal political role.893 He was being used as a vanguard 
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force in a domestic political battle with the Communists.894  
When Giuliano’s patrons did not deliver on their promises, and the 
realization that he was being used dawned upon him, he apparently turned on them, 
renewing his attacks on the state. In 1948, several senior Sicilian Christian 
Democrats were assassinated. In July 1949, Giuliano’s men ambushed a police 
patrol, killing five officers. For some in the mafia, Giuliano was now becoming 
more than a nuisance: he was endangering their own relationship with the DC in 
Palermo and Rome, and the settlement they had brokered. On a tour to Sicily in 
1948, the British Ambassador found the Sicilian elite ‘shamefaced and reticent’ 
about the ‘renewal of brigandage’.895 The mafia decided to deal with the problem.  
Mafiosi began collaborating with a new 1,500-strong paramilitary force 
established by Rome, the Comando Forze Repressione Banditismo (CFRB, 
Command Force for the Repression of Banditry). The CFRB occupied Montelepre, 
imposed a curfew and rounded up anyone suspected of harbouring Giuliano’s men. 
It stayed for almost a year, conducting counter-insurgency style operations against 
Giuliano.896 With the mafia’s help, the CFRB slowly unravelled Giuliano’s network. 
One of his units disappeared; eight charred corpses were found soon after. Giuliano 
supporters across western Sicily turned up dead, reported as killed with clashes in 
police, but with signs they had been killed elsewhere and their bodies dumped. 
Some disappeared completely. 897  Giuliano fled 80 kilometres south into the 
protection of a mafia cosca around Castelvetrano. He may have had hopes of being 
smuggled to Tunis and then on, perhaps to America.898 His body was found in a 
courtyard in Castelvetrano in July 1950, apparently betrayed by his right-hand man, 
Gaspare Pisciotta, on orders from the mafia. Pisciotta himself was murdered by 
strychnine poisoning in a Palermo prison in 1954 – apparently by the mafia.899  
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Negotiating Sicily’s transition 
A Sicilian political machine 
As the open hostilities of the Second World War transitioned in 1947 to the Cold 
War with the Soviet Union, Sicily emerged as an important proxy battleground. An 
October 1947 report from the CIA (successor to the OSS) stated 
It is of vital strategic importance to prevent Italy from falling under 
Communist control… Militarily, the availability to the USSR of bases in 
Sicily and southern Italy would pose a direct threat to the security of 
communications throughout the Mediterranean.900 
In the Italian national elections of April 1948, the Christian Democrats 
emerged as the dominant political force in northern Italy, and garnered 48.5 per cent 
of the vote nation-wide. But the Communists, with their programme of land reform 
and economic transformation, continued to do well in impoverished Sicily. For both 
the mafia and the Christian Democrats, cooperation against the Communists made 
sense.901 The mafia gave the DC instant social reach and electoral power where it 
most needed it. An April 1948 conclave of mafia bosses threw its weight behind the 
DC, and it was in mafia-controlled districts that the DC’s Sicilian vote was highest 
in that month’s national elections.902  
The mafia was not, however, content to cooperate with the DC through an 
arm’s length alliance. Instead, it turned to the same ‘branch-stacking’ techniques 
that the Anastasia brothers had used in Brooklyn.903 Giuseppe Alessi, one of the 
founders of the Christian Democrat Party in Sicily, recalled the leadership’s 
acquiescence in this mafia colonization: 
The Communists use similar kinds of violence against us, preventing us 
from carrying out public rallies. We need the protection of strong men to 
stop the violence of the Communists… [so] the ‘group’ [i.e. the Mafia] 
entered en masse and took over the party.904 
The hyper-local nature of the DC’s political organization, similar to the 
model used by Tammany in New York, worked well for the mafia. As John Dickie 
has explained, DC faction leaders 
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could offer exactly the kind of personal relationships that mafiosi preferred. 
The exchanges between politicians and criminals that had become so 
difficult under Fascism could at last be restored: one hand washes the other, 
as the Sicilian saying goes.905 
The DC’s political networks and structures offered the Sicilian mafia a 
formalized patronage apparatus within which the mafia could hide its informal 
power and system of corrupt exchange, much as the American Mob had hidden 
within Tammany structures in New York. Better still, that apparatus connected 
directly to the corridors of power in Rome. This was crucial, not so much for 
enlarging the mafia’s power over criminal rents as for simply keeping it. The 
Sicilian political economy was changing. Sicily was becoming more than ever 
integrated into the Italian, European and global markets. The DC-dominated 
government in Rome favoured liberal internationalism, and Italy’s post-war 
recovery was to be tied, through exports, to the recovery of broader Western 
consumption. The primary industry supply-chains out of which the mafia’s power 
traditionally grew were being forced to contend with external competition. If the 
mafia wanted to maintain power it needed to control the institutions in Palermo and 
Rome that would regulate these supply-chains, and allocate the new public spending 
directed to Sicily in compensation for the disruption caused by this economic 
transition.906 
The post-War structural transformation of the Sicilian economy generated 
rapid movement of labour from the countryside to the cities, where the state became 
a source of economic subsidy and welfare. At the same time, this labour market 
transformation created significant pressure for the finalization of the century-long 
process of land reform, transforming the agricultural labour-force from the objects 
of patronage to active political subjects. The pre-War system of rule – in which 
Rome had relied on the landowning class to control the rural population, through 
collaboration with the mafia – was no longer viable, and no longer offered the mafia 
a reliable political power-base. Instead, the mafia looked to the mass party 
organization of the DC as a means to control public patronage and continued 
governmental power.907 
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Having penetrated the DC, the mafia targeted Sicily’s land reform process. 
In 1950 a leftist-dominated Sicilian Regional Assembly initiated the sale of 500,000 
hectares of land.908 Oversight of land redistribution was handed to local land 
‘boards’, parastatal organizations that became patronage engines for local DC 
politicians – with mafiosi right behind them.909  The land redistribution scheme 
expanded mafia capital, giving mafiosi formal title and hidden beneficial ownership 
over significant land tracts. But it also amplified the mafia’s power in a range of 
civil society institutions with traditional ties to the land, such as the Coldiretti 
(Farmers’ Association), banks, and the Church.910 Each expansion of the circle of 
mafia influence also helped to move mafia power beyond the DC to other political 
parties; at election time, like many modern corporations, the mafia would provide 
some support to several parties, often of quite different ideological hues, as a 
hedging strategy.911 By the early 1950s, mafia networks fanned out beyond the DC, 
so that ‘direct participation in the mafia’ by the ‘elite corps of postwar Sicilian 
politicians’ was likely ‘widespread’.912 
Structural transformation in Sicily’s economy also changed the geography 
of mafia power, shifting its centre of gravity from the countryside to the urban 
centres, especially Palermo. Mafia power followed the money: the portion of the 
Sicilian workforce involved in agriculture dropped by roughly 20 per cent in the 
1950s, while the portion involved in construction grew by roughly 25 per cent. 
Sicily was becoming increasingly reliant on public spending; it reached 70 per cent 
of Sicilian GDP by the 1990s. The portion of the workforce employed by the state 
grew dramatically, in turn fuelling political patronage – not just in formal municipal 
institutions, but also in those civil society institutions dependent on state funding: 
hospitals, educational institutions, cultural bodies and, increasingly, development 
finance institutions. ‘Mafioso practices’ were spreading throughout the Sicilian 
political economy.913 
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Wisdom of the Mob 
Sicily’s economic transition stimulated innovation. The transformation of 
established markets and the emergence of new ones – particularly in its rapidly-
growing urban centres – provided the opportunity to capture new rents. This quickly 
exposed differences between mafia cosche. One major division that emerged was 
between the more traditionalist, rural cosche, and the port-based cosche who had 
worked more closely with American Mobsters during the AMG occupation to 
control the import-export sector. A surprising number of Mob figures from the 
American east coast were active in southern Italy at the time, including both 
fugitives from justice (such as Genovese and Gentile), and deportees (including 
Luciano and, later, Adonis).914 
The American policy of deporting aliens with US criminal records served to 
export American organizational know-how and social networks to Sicily, just as it 
has in Central America in the last two decades, turning Californian Hispanic prison 
gangs into the transnational criminal systems called maras. The deported Mobsters 
appear to have worked with their host – in many cases, ancestral – cosche in Sicily 
to develop smuggling activities, first in tobacco, and then in heroin. In conflict-
affected southern Italy, cigarettes had become a second currency. Sicilian mafiosi 
and American Mobsters developed an increasingly governmental role in the black 
market in cigarettes, financing inventory purchases, offering security during transit 
and resolving disputes.915 The American Mobsters convinced the Sicilians to adopt 
the syndication system they had developed during Prohibition: instead of organizing 
their own supply lines, the cosche collaborated, allocating equity in co-shipments, 
pooling risk and increasing volume. Steadily these smuggling networks 
consolidated and diversified into Turkish, Syrian and Lebanese heroin. Through the 
                                                                                                                                   
Pantaleone, p. 169; Italian Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the Mafia phenomenon in 
Sicily, Relazione “mafia ed enti locali” (Relazioni Alessi), Legislature VI, Doc. xxxiii, no. 2 (Rome: 
Senate Printing Press, 1976), pp. 1202-1203. 
914 See Pantaleone, p. 169; Gambetta, p. 234; Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, p. 48; Dickie, Mafia 
Republic, p. 139; Italian Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the Mafia phenomenon in Sicily, 
Documentazione allegata alla Relazione conclusiva, VII-IX legislature, (Rome: Senate Printing 
Press, 1985) pp. 74, 78, 622, 999. On Luciano, see CIC, Naples Detachment, ‘Lucania, Salvatore 
(aka Charles “Lucky” Luciano)’, 13 August 1946, FBI, 39-2141-62; and Eduardo Saénz Rovner, The 
Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking, Smuggling, and Gambling in Cuba from the 1920s to the 
Revolution (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), pp. 70-73. On Adonis, 
Catanzaro, p. 194. 
915 Gambetta, pp. 229-231.  
  191 
course of the 1950s, the Sicilian mafia’s ties to the Mob, and the steady stream of 
Sicilian agricultural exports to the US – olive oil, oranges, pasta – gave it a cost 
advantage over the other major global drug smuggling entrepôt, Marseilles.916 The 
risks involved, the potential profit, and the need for organizational unity in order to 
deal with foreign partners (notably the Mob) all slowly pushed the mafia towards 
organizational consolidation.917  
 The growth of the smuggling industry also, however, created tensions 
between the different cosche, which intersected with those arising from the physical 
transformation of Sicily’s urban centres. Two types of sites emerged as key rent-
extraction and governance nodes, or what Mexican cartels call ‘plazas’: urban 
markets and harbour ports. When the Palermo food market was transferred in 1956 
from its established site, controlled by traditionalist hinterland cosche, to a new site 
closer to the harbour – where it would likely be controlled by the export-oriented 
urban cosche – open violence broke out within the mafia.918 
In mid-October 1957, an extraordinary summit was called at the Grand 
Hotel et Des Palmes, an opulent belle époque hotel near the Palermo waterfront. 27 
top American Mob and Sicilian mafia leaders met over several days in the Sala 
Wagner, named because the composer had orchestrated his last opera, Parsifal, 
there.919 The summit, chaired by Lucky Luciano, aimed to sort out the mess created 
by the shifting balance of power within the Sicilian mafia. Whatever else was 
agreed at that meeting, it is clear from the testimony of one of the Sicilian leaders 
present that one major piece of strategic advice was taken on board from Joe 
Bonanno, an American Mob Commission member born in Castellammare del Golfo. 
Many of the Sicilian mafiosi at the Summit also hailed from Castellammare. 
Bonanno advised the Sicilians to copy Luciano’s organizational innovations of a 
quarter-century earlier and adopt a ‘Commission’ structure to govern the Sicilian 
mafia. It was a clear message: if you want to continue to do business with us in 
America, and grow the profits of transatlantic drug trafficking, you need to get your 
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house in order. Soon afterwards, the Sicilian ‘Cupola’ system was born.920 
Like the Commission, the Cupola was not a system of unitary control, but 
rather a system for regulating relations between ‘sovereign’ cosche that had 
previously operated as ‘a mosaic of small republics with topographical borders 
marked by tradition’. 921 Like the Commission, the Cupola was not intended to 
centralize power, but rather to regularize it: the aim ‘was to apply overall rules that 
gave more freedom to individual mafiosi’.922 As one Cosa Nostra pentito involved 
with leadership decisions at the time, Tommaso Buscetta, put it, the Commission 
was ‘an instrument of moderation and internal peace… a good way of reducing the 
fear and risks that all mafiosi run’.923 And like the Commission, the Cupola became 
the central political forum for the Sicilian mafia, with collective enforcement 
powers: it placed several cosche under trusteeship, removed and replaced capi for 
misconduct, and even disbanded troublesome cosche.924 Dickie concludes that it 
was not ‘a board of directors’; it was more ‘a creature of politics … than 
business’.925 
The Sack of Palermo 
As with New York’s mafia Commission, however, the creation of the Sicilian 
Cupola seems also to have served to facilitate coordinated interaction between the 
mafia and upperworld political actors, particularly in Palermo.926 Starting around 
1958, the DC and mafia worked together to organize and deliver a decades-long 
construction boom that obliterated the city’s Conca d’Oro green belt, replaced its 
historical belle époque villas with shoddy and frequently unsafe apartment buildings, 
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and condemned hundreds of thousands to live in poorly planned and serviced 
housing commissions. This was the scempio, or ‘sack’, of Palermo.927 
 The years between 1957 and 1963 were the high-point of the housing boom, 
with the focus in the 1970s and 1980s shifting to infrastructure. The pattern was 
similar to the system used by Boss Tweed at the high-point (or low-point) of 
Tammany rule in New York in the 1860s: a municipal council passing zoning 
regulations and granting development contracts, and compliant legislative and 
executive officials giving mafia figures inside information to allow them to capture 
windfall rents.928 Historic buildings were torn down the night before new zoning 
laws would come into effect. Parks were cemented over. Historic and beautiful 
central Palermo was obliterated. By the 1990s Sicily had the highest per capita 
cement consumption rate in the world.929 
The central DC figures were Salvatore Lima, Mayor of Palermo (1958-1963 
and 1965-1968), and Vito Ciancimino, assessor of public works. Both worked 
closely with mafia construction entrepreneurs such as Francesco Vassallo, Angelo 
La Barbera and Tommaso Buscetta. As Judith Chubb has explained, by centralizing 
licensing authority, Lima changed episodic favouritism 
undertaken without any broader strategic vision and limited to a restricted 
social elite, into a comprehensive strategy of urban expansion and DC 
power, managed directly from key posts of power within the city 
administration.930  
This new system tied together DC operators, legitimate business actors, 
mafia figures (as brokers of capital and labour) and legitimate banks into corporate 
networks designed to hide the beneficial ownership of politicians and the 
involvement of mafia figures.931 In Lima’s first five years in power over 4,000 
building licenses were granted – 60 per cent to three pensioners who had no 
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background in construction but made convenient fronts for hidden beneficiaries. 
Both the mafia and DC, like Tweed and Tammany, were able to use the resulting 
jobs and spending as a source of patronage underwriting continuing popular 
support.932  
This was a strategic departure for the Sicilian mafia. Its traditional 
relationship to political power had been based on arms-length exchange, the essence 
of a mafia strategy. Now, its brokering power was increasingly entwined with a 
political organization – the DC – in the collaborative management of the state to 
extract private rents from public spending. This moved it away from a traditional 
mafia strategy, towards something closer to a joint venture in which state 
capabilities were turned to the maximization of criminal rents, and criminal 
capabilities were used by the state to govern. For decades, Palermitans, Sicilians 
and other Italians endured this system. The state’s economic investment in southern 
Italy helped to create a consumer market for internal exports from the north. The 
outsize and negative influence of the mafia, Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta within the 
DC was clear, but the alternative – ceding electoral ground to the political left – was 
not palatable, either to Italy’s establishment, or her western friends and patrons.933 
Only with the fall of the Soviet Union, and the removal of the communist threat, 
would that strategic logic change.  
 
Conclusion 
The mafia’s return to a governmental role in Sicily after World War Two was not 
inevitable. It was the result of deliberate neglect by the Allies and active 
accommodation by the Italian Christian Democrats. But it was also the result of 
canny strategic manoeuvring by mafia leaders, finding and creating leverage 
through the shifting circumstances of the end-of-war black market, post-war 
political settlement process, and Sicily’s subsequent economic transformation. The 
mafia proved capable of coordinated adjustment both to its internal organization – 
as demonstrated by the adoption of the Cupola system – and to its external 
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positioning relative to governmental rivals – working with the AMG, threatening 
separatism, drawing back to a more traditional brokering role, and then developing 
a joint venture with Lima and the Sicilian DC to use the institutions of Palermo’s 
municipal governance to expand criminal rents.  
 The Sicilian mafia’s strategic trajectory during this period has something in 
common with the evolution of American mafia power during and after Prohibition. 
World War Two and Prohibition both broke down the mental barriers to mass 
participation in criminal activity, enlarging the ranks of an underworld governed by 
local gangs and mafia entrepreneurs. In the 1930s, the American Mob leveraged this 
power into influence over Tammany upperworld power networks; in post-War 
Sicily, the mafia leveraged its governmental power in the black market into 
influence over the AMG and post-War political parties, notably the Christian 
Democrats. These similarities may be more than an accident: the chapter points to 
the involvement of some key American Mob actors in both processes – Genovese, 
Adonis, Profaci, Bonanno, Luciano. 
 But there was also one profound difference in the strategic environments 
involved in these episodes. In New York, the political settlement within the 
upperworld was never in question as the Mob was emergeing (only later, when the 
fascist powers declared war). In Sicily, it was in flux just as the mafia was seeking 
to re-emerge; monarchists, republicans, communists, separatists and unitarians all 
vied to shape the post-War political settlement. The Sicilian mafia proved adept at 
using this uncertainty to augment its own governmental power, first allying with 
separatists, then switching to a more traditional brokering role once Sicilian 
autonomy had been assured. This shift might be mistaken for evidence that the 
Sicilian mafia did not have a political strategy. In fact it did; what it lacked was a 
rigid political ideology. The mafia’s political objective remained constant 
throughout: the maximization of its governmental power in order to control criminal 
rents. What changed, as the strategic environment altered, was its preferred way to 
achieve this goal.   
The mafia’s return to power was also, however, the result of mafia choices – 
and not just its opponents’ failures. This is made clear by the failure of Salvatore 
Giuliano, another leader who tried and failed to develop criminal activity into a 
governmental role. Giuliano met the social bandit’s ‘standard end’ as identified by 
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Hobsbawm: betrayal by more powerful actors, brought on by making ‘too much of 
a nuisance of himself’.934 (Lima ultimately met the same fate, assassinated by the 
mafia in 1992 for his failure to protect the mafia from judicial investigation.) 
Giuliano proved too recklessly violent for mainstream politics, and far too visible 
for his band to take on a hidden role in Sicily’s government. He might have found 
more success as a local politician in Montelepre. But he failed both to develop his 
roving paramilitary band into a stationary governing force, or to renounce violence 
and switch tracks to parliamentary politics. Instead his strategy suggested an 
increasingly desperate search for political relevance and protection, zigzagging 
between seeking alliance with the mafia and EVIS, then seeking foreign 
sponsorship by the US, and finally moving desperately to terrorism.935 By the end 
he was, as Hobsbawm concluded, ‘the plaything of political forces he did not 
understand’.936  
Giuliano learned the hard way what the mafia already knew: that ‘[a]bove 
all’, as Michele Pantaleone reflected, effective criminal strategy depends on 
‘connections in all levels of society’. As Dutch Schultz had learned the hard way in 
New York, if a criminal leader is ‘isolated he cannot be strong’.937 Salvatore Lima’s 
Palermo joint venture with the mafia showed that, on the contrary, by embedding 
itself in the governmental institutions not just of the state, but also the economy – 
and society more broadly – a criminal group could become almost unassailable. But 
that approach required remaining patiently hidden, and fostering a criminal 
governmentality – omertà – to achieve that goal – not appearing in photoshoots in 
international magazines, as did Giuliano. Unlike Giuliano, the Sicilian mafia and 
the DC were meticulous in keeping their violence hidden. When in 1947 the L’Ora 
newspaper ran a series of mafia exposés, two bombs exploded in its printing 
department, terrorist attacks designed to intimidate the press back into silence. 
When, eleven years later, the same newspaper ran another such series, further 
bombings ensued.938 
The silence of the state, under DC influence, was at least as important as the 
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silence of the press in reinforcing the governmentality of omertà. 939  Leftists 
continued to agitate against the mafia in Rome, and, more riskily, in Sicily. But the 
official silence of state authorities spoke loudly. Ultimately, it was this silence, 
acquiesced in and perhaps actively supported by Italy’s NATO partners, that 
institutionalized omertà and re-established the power of the mafia’s criminal 
governmentality on the island.  
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7. The Cuba Joint Venture, 1933-1958 
 
‘There’s no such thing as a lucky gambler. There are just the winners and the losers. The 
winners are those who control the game.’ 
Meyer Lansky, before the Cuban Revolution940 
 
‘I crapped out.’  
Meyer Lansky, after the Cuban Revolution941 
 
The 1957 Palermo summit was not the first such seaside gathering of mafia top 
brass. At Christmas in 1946 a similar get-together of American mafia leaders 
occurred at the Hotel Nacional in Havana, Cuba, famously featuring Frank Sinatra 
as chief entertainer. Like the Palermo summit, the Havana summit was presided 
over by Lucky Luciano. Less than a year after his release and deportation from New 
York to Italy, and following a brief stay in Allied-occupied Palermo, Luciano had 
found his way to Havana, just 90 miles from Florida. He had come to lay claim to 
continuing leadership of the Mob and to receive tribute from the other Mob bosses. 
If he could not rule the Mob from inside the US, Havana offered a good substitute, 
not least because of the strong partnership that the Mob had, by 1946, forged with 
Cuba’s ruling class. The summit was facilitated by Cuba’s governing Auténtico 
party, which provided heightened security and intervened to expeditiously resolve a 
hotel labour dispute that threatened to disrupt proceedings.942 
 The Havana summit did not, however, have the results that Luciano was 
hoping for. Within months the US government had forced his deportation, again to 
Italy. But the Mob stayed on in Havana. Under the leadership of Meyer Lansky and 
a Floridian mafia capo, Santo Trafficante, Jr., its partnership with the Havana 
‘Palace Gang’ led by the military strongman Fulgencio Batista flourished into a 
fully-fledged governmental joint venture. By the mid-1950s Cuba’s economic 
development had, through combined state and Mob action, been reoriented to focus 
on maximizing rents, both licit and illicit, from tourism, gambling and drug 
trafficking.  
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 By 1958 the Mob and Batista thought themselves to be sitting pretty. Both 
had failed to recognise the corrosive impacts their scheme was having within their 
own organizations, and on their social legitimacy in Cuba. By early 1959, the 
Cuban ‘joint venture’ was in tatters: Batista had fled to Florida, and a rebel military 
force was in power in Havana, its attitude to the Mob seemingly hostile. That was 
ironic, given that US intelligence had warned in the 1940s that the man who now 
led the rebels ‘may soon become a fully fledged gangster’. His name was Fidel 
Castro.943 
 This chapter explores the rise and fall of Fulgencio Batista between 1933 
and 1958. This episode reveals the pursuit of criminal strategies by both local and 
foreign actors and provides new insight into both the triggers for and the military 
course of Castro’s Cuban Revolution. Chapter 8 explores the Mob’s reaction to the 
failure of its strategic partnership with Batista in Cuba. As in previous chapters, the 
analysis draws from a mixture of declassified government archival sources (mostly 
in the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland), 
protagonists’ memoires, and relevant secondary sources. While some of this 
material has been discussed by Jack Colhoun’s excellent history, Gangsterismo, 
Colhoun’s monograph focuses on Cuba’s history, rather than the questions of 
criminal strategy explored here.944 Eduardo Saénz Rovner’s unique study of rarely-
accessed Cuban archival material detailing criminal activities during the period, The 
Cuban Connection, has also proved uniquely valuable as a means to triangulate and 
corroborate US government and Mob sources.945 
 
Buying into Cuba 
Rise of a strongman 
The roots of the Mob’s move into Cuba lie in the US invasion of 1898, which 
realigned Cuba’s political economy away from Spain and towards America, while 
leaving it a separate political and legal entity. Cuba might have become a US state, 
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but for American sugar beet farmers’ insistence on maintaining tariff protections 
against Cuban sugar. US Congress nonetheless made its expectation of a free hand 
in Cuba clear by adopting the Platt Amendment in 1901, which authorized the 
executive to intervene unilaterally in Cuban affairs as and when it saw fit. For the 
next three decades, the US used force – and the threat of force – to protect its 
commercial interests in Cuba, staging a series of invasions and propping up a range 
of plutocratic governments. By 1958 Cuba was all but an American economic 
colony. 58 per cent of Cuba’s primary export – sugar – and 67 per cent of all other 
exports were sold into the United States. A full three quarters of Cuba’s imports 
came back the other way.946  
With US capital dominating Cuba’s economy, the free market offered only 
limited upward mobility to Cuban entrepreneurs. As in any imperial or colonial 
system, there were two roads to wealth and power: either through the patronage 
networks backed by the imperial power – in this case dominated by the so-called 
‘sugar barons’ who owned the rural sugar plantations – or otherwise through 
informal and illicit markets not formally governed by the imperial power.947 
Starting in 1920, the United States’ policy of Prohibition offered those who chose 
the second track huge new pay-offs, and new ways to connect with sources of 
power inside America. Havana quickly emerged as an important Caribbean 
gambling, bootlegging and narcotics transportation centre, including for outfits 
linked to the Mob.948 
Cuba nonetheless suffered terribly through the Great Depression. In the 
summer of 1933 protests by the clases populares calling for more inclusive 
governance culminated in a general strike that forced the President, General 
Machado, from power.949 The response of the US government to such disorder in 
Cuba over the previous decades had been military intervention. But in his inaugural 
address on 4 March 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt had set a new tone by 
announcing a non-interventionist ‘Good Neighbor’ policy towards Latin America. 
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Cuba’s formal economy remained closely tied in to America’s, but US political and 
military control was being relaxed. The short-term result in the summer of 1933 was 
a power vacuum in Havana. Two men, one American and one Cuban – both born 
poor outsiders, both charismatic leaders of armed groups, both adroit balancers of 
factional support – seized this opportunity. They would become lifelong friends, 
and their strategic decisions would significantly influence Cuba’s political 
landscape – and the US’ immediate strategic environment – for the next thirty years.  
The first was Meyer Lansky, the young Jewish Mobster whose alliance with 
Lucky Luciano had underpinned the formation of the American ‘Mob’ system. As a 
junior partner in the mafia-dominated Mob, Lansky seems to have avoided relying 
solely on violence to maintain his strategic position. Instead, he made himself 
indispensable as a business operator, and as something of an honest broker between 
different mafia factions. ‘I listened and read about men in all kinds of endeavor’, he 
would later tell an interviewer. ‘The men who mostly went to the top were men with 
integrity.’950 Lansky recognized that his greatest strategic asset was that rarest of 
underworld commodities: trust. Lansky’s casinos were known, ultimately 
worldwide, for their honesty – at least in dealing cards. ‘Everyone who came into 
my casino’, Lansky later claimed, ‘knew that if he lost his money it wouldn’t be 
because he was cheated.’ Nor was this mere self-aggrandizement. A visitor to 
Havana in the 1950s asked the US Ambassador why all the American Mobsters 
were tolerated by the government. ‘It’s strange’, the diplomat responded, ‘But it 
seems to be the only way to get honest casinos.’951  
As we saw in Chapter 4, by 1933, Lansky and Luciano were working 
actively to replace the revenues that would be lost when Prohibition ended by 
expanding into new gambling markets. They set their sights on Havana. Lansky had 
spent time there during Prohibition and got to know some of Cuba’s leading 
political and military figures.952 Perhaps Havana could now be turned into a 
gambling enclave like those controlled by the Mob in Atlantic City, Saratoga 
Springs, Broward County in Miami and, later, Las Vegas. All offered handy and 
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lucrative exceptions to the staid moral codes and legal order of much American life, 
sustained through the ‘fix’: corruption of local law enforcement and political 
figures.953 Equally significant, since gambling was legal in Cuba, it offered a 
potentially unique venue for money-laundering. In the spring of 1933 Lansky 
proposed to Luciano that they ‘approach a contact in the Cuban government’ to 
‘“buy in” with the Cubans so that the Mob could begin to develop its own gambling 
infrastructure on the island’.954  
Lansky and Luciano’s next move was telling, and shows how deft they had 
become in marrying internal strategic organization and external strategic 
positioning. Rather than strike out on their own to exploit this new market and gain 
an edge over their internal Mob rivals, they chose to bring those rivals in on the 
exploitation of Cuba’s gambling potential, spreading risk and costs, and further 
entrenching the collective governance system of the Commission. In the spring of 
1933, Luciano and Lansky called a meeting of Mob bosses at Luciano’s suite in 
New York’s Waldorf Towers and presented a plan for the Mob to invest as a 
syndicate in the Cuban gambling sector. Each capo was asked to sink $500,000 for 
bribes and ‘to buy goodwill’ – i.e. for ‘the fix’. In return, each would get a piece of 
the action, either through control of a particular establishment, or through equity 
(‘points’) in syndicate-run nightclubs and casinos.955 In subsequent years, the Mob 
adopted a similar syndicated approach for joint gambling enterprises in Miami and 
Las Vegas.956 Having secured the group’s approval Lansky flew to Cuba, and spoke 
to his contact in the Cuban military – a young sergeant named Fulgencio Batista y 
Zaldívar. He promised Batista huge sums: allegedly $3 million up front and at least 
as much annually thereafter.957  
Like Lansky (and Luciano), Batista was also born an outsider. Hailing from 
an impoverished family in eastern Cuba, his personal charisma and leadership 
qualities propelled him rapidly to prominence in the Cuban army. On 4 September 
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1933, claiming that on-going civil unrest following the fall of the Machado 
government demanded a more forceful, if sympathetic, response than the military 
leadership was offering, Batista led a rebellion of young non-commissioned officers. 
Between September 1933 and January 1934 a loose coalition of radical activists, 
students, middle-class intellectuals and junior army officers formed a Provisional 
Revolutionary Government, nominally led by a popular intellectual, Dr Ramón 
Grau San Martín. The PRG’s political authority, however, clearly rested on 
Batista’s military support.958  
The PRG steadily began to challenge the existing political settlement. First it 
weakened ties with the US by unilaterally rejecting the Platt Amendment and 
dissolving Cuba’s existing political parties. Next, it decreed a series of socio-
economic and civil rights reforms: an eight-hour workday, female suffrage, 
improved labour regulation, and a minimum wage for cane-cutters. When it 
promised land reform, the established sugar barons and their American patrons 
began to push back. In January 1934, under pressure from these interests, and with 
the backing of the US State Department, Batista pushed Grau San Martín from 
power, and installed a new President. The message was clear: Batista was the real 
power behind the throne in Cuba.959  
The ‘Batista Palace Gang’ 
Batista was not however content to be a puppet through whom the established sugar 
barons could ventriloquize. He wrote his own strategic script, seeing himself not as 
the guardian of an existing strategic environment, but as the developer of a new 
one: 
[M]any want to forget that I am the chief of a constructive social revolution, 
and see me as a mere watchdog of public order. My idea of order is that of 
an architect rather than that of a policeman.960 
Batista’s populist strategy rested on forging a direct relationship with the 
Cuban people – especially its labour force – slowly circumventing the control that 
Cuba’s caudillos and sugar barons wielded at the sugar-mill and plantation level. 
Batista in Cuba recognized what Giuliano in Sicily did not: that industrialization 
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and urbanization were changing the geography of power, transforming labour 
relations from a policing issue to a political issue. This was at the heart of the social 
unrest of 1933. As a British Foreign Office dispatch of the time noted, if he was to 
retain power, Batista had to ‘remove the political grounds for economic 
discontent’. 961  After consolidating his military control, he began quietly to 
reinstitute some of the social protections and market reforms proposed by the PRG 
that he had deposed in 1934. At the same time, he led a campaign to force out tens 
of thousands of foreign workers – mainly Jamaicans and Haitians – on the grounds 
that they were taking Cuban jobs, in the process stoking Cuban nationalism and 
establishing himself as a community protector.962  
In 1937 Batista went further, presenting a Three Year Plan for social reform, 
including the redistribution of state land and more intrusive regulation of the sugar 
industry. This elicited significant resistance from the sugar barons. In response, 
Batista un-banned the Cuban Communist Party and entered a tactical populist 
alliance with it. Having demonstrated to the sugar barons his willingness to work 
directly with labour, he offered them a way out, creating a Sugar Stabilization 
Institute to set policy for the industry in which they would control 50 per cent of the 
vote.963 It was an offer of partnership. At the same time, Batista was consolidating 
coercive power within the national military, working around the sugar barons’ rural 
militias. To do this, however, he had to find new means to control the sugar barons 
and landowners. The solution was a highly personalized patronage system. But that 
required revenue. And this was where criminal rents – and collaboration with the 
Mob – became crucial: not just as a business scheme, but as a basis of patronage-
based government.   
From 1936 Batista set out to expand the role of legalized gambling and 
associated illicit activities in Cuba’s economy. Lansky and the Mob provided the 
expertise and the start-up capital. In 1936, Batista legalized games of chance in 
select casinos and nightclubs, and gave the military control of their oversight. At the 
                                                
961 Rees to Eden, Havana, 20 February 1937, enclosure no, 21, ‘The Labour Situation in Cuba and 
the British West Indies’, BNA, FO, registry no. A/1864/65/14.  
962 Whitney, pp. 442-443.  
963 Ibid.; Jorge I. Domínguez, ‘The Batista Regime in Cuba’, in H.E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, eds., 
Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 112-131 at 
pp. 117-118.  
  205 
same time, he officially hired Lansky as a ‘consultant’ to reform the Cuban 
government-owned Gran Casino Nacional.964 Lansky was soon owner and manager 
of three casinos, including one at the premier local racetrack.965 The national lottery, 
something of an institution since its founding in 1812, was transformed from a 
weekly to a daily event. Favoured politicians and military leaders were given blocks 
of tickets to sell, and were commissioned to collect bets.966 While the lottery was 
formally legal, the normalization of gambling also led to the expansion of illegal 
gambling, such as bolita, a Cuban game of chance very similar to the American 
‘numbers’ rackets. A 1943 special investigation by the US Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics found that gambling-related corruption was ‘one of the largest sources of 
revenue’ in Cuba, much of it disappearing into politicians’ pockets.967  
Large-scale narcotics trafficking and prostitution ventures also contributed 
to the patronage system. A confidential US dispatch explained that ‘the illicit 
narcotic racket in Cuba is “sponsored” and fully protected by the Cuban National 
Police and very high Cuban Government officials comprising the “Palace Gang”’. 
This ‘Palace Gang’ controlled narcotics trafficking through the Cuban Director of 
Sports and the Chief of the National Police, both aides to President Batista.968 
Batista was remaking Cuban government from an agricultural oligarchy operating 
under American protection into a system of criminalized patronage operating in 
collaboration with transnational criminal networks. This was a precursor to the 
criminalized governance and rule through disorder we see more recently in Africa 
and Asia. As in those environments, Batista’s emergence as the preeminent actor 
within that patronage system transformed notionally democratic politics into a 
modern ‘court’ system, with him at its centre.969   
The system rested on three legs: widespread corruption; Batista’s control of 
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Cuba’s coercive apparatus; and careful strategic communication representing 
Batista as the source of order amongst pervasive violence, a ‘strongman’ protector 
of the community. His ‘constructive social revolution’ was a key part of that 
communications strategy, building support from the clases populares independent 
of the established economic interests. Yet located just ninety miles from Florida, 
and with the US increasingly agitated by both fascist and communist ideologies, 
Batista could ill afford to appear either too leftist in his social policies, or too 
militaristic in his ways of achieving them.970 In the late 1930s, Batista therefore 
attempted a subtle shift, casting himself as a constitutional democrat, moving his 
focus from economic reform to civil liberties, dressing in suits rather than military 
uniforms. 
Events overtook him. After winning the Cuban Presidency as a ‘civilian’ in 
1940, he ushered in a liberal democratic constitution that contained numerous social 
protection and welfare provisions. These leftist positions, his inclusion in a cabinet 
of several figures with Communist links, and an apparent leftward drift during 
1943-1944 alarmed the US. With the 1944 Presidential election approaching, the 
US government sent word to him – possibly through Lansky, as an offshoot of the 
Underworld Project – that he would do better by retiring to Florida than by standing 
again for election.971 The US government, it seemed, still held the whip hand over 
Cuban governance, despite Batista’s efforts to develop an independent populist 
power-base. Batista moved into temporary exile in Daytona Beach, Florida, where 
Lansky was a highly influential figure. His Palace Gang had lost its captain.  
Gangsterismo 
Batista’s move from military strongman to populist constitutionalist had been 
presented as placing ‘the people’ at the heart of Cuban government. In practice, 
however, his reforms served to personalize political power, as the protector of a 
range of criminal interests, both local and foreign. When he left for Florida in 1944 
a vacuum of political power opened up behind him. Ten years of life under Batista 
had reconstituted the power of the established sugar barons, moving them away 
from their agricultural bases, incorporating them – and a range of new actors – into 
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factionalized patronage networks running through the military and police and 
converging in the ‘Palace Gang’. With Batista’s removal, these networks began to 
compete – often violently – for governmental power. The Cuban term for the era 
tells the story: it is known as the period of ‘gangsterismo’.  
Gangsterismo was characterized by these political networks and their 
organizational partners – political parties, labour unions, and student groups – 
developing urban militias that competed for informal political and economic power. 
Competition was no longer conducted peacefully in political institutions and 
through jockeying within the presidential palace for patronage: it was conducted 
violently in the street.972 Political factions’ prospects depended on access to a steady 
supply of easily controlled militants, and the resources to arm, feed and reward 
them. In a pattern since replicated in other developing countries, such as Nigeria, 
student groups at universities became a major recruiting ground, and protection and 
other criminal rackets became their income source. The violence on campus was 
significant: assassinations of student leaders were common. Lectures were not 
infrequently interrupted by gun battles.973 Political actors protected young gangsters 
from prosecution, paid for their arms and cars and put gangster thugs on official 
payrolls.974  
Over time these ‘gangsters’ graduated from running local protection rackets 
to serving as enforcers for more lucrative, clandestine politically-sponsored criminal 
activity – trafficking, prostitution and high-stakes gambling. Leading politicians 
such as the Prío Socarras brothers – one, the Prime Minister, later President; another 
a Senator – amassed fortunes from trafficking heroin and cocaine into the US, using 
local gangsters as muscle and labour.975 The Prío Socarras brothers also moved to 
use the state’s assets not only to protect criminal activity, but also as an asset in the 
production of criminal rents. In the mid-1940s, the Prío brothers and the Florida 
Mob boss Santo Trafficante Jr. established Aerovías Q: a commercial airline 
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entitled to use Cuban Air Force gasoline, replacement parts, maintenance staff, 
pilots – and with exclusive rights to operate out of military airports, avoiding 
customs. Aerovías Q quickly became an important cog in the developing pan-
American cocaine network, flying coca paste from Colombia to Camagüey in 
central Cuba where the paste was refined before shipment on to consumers in 
Havana nightclubs and the US.976 
The Príos’ entrepreneurialism made clear that there was untapped potential 
in Cuba. But no strongman emerged to replace Batista. Cuba’s criminal markets 
were fractious and poorly governed, ‘no more regulated than a fairground whose 
operator subcontracted the individual sideshows and stalls’, in the memorable terms 
of Robert Lacey.977 The Mob saw an opportunity. Within six months of his 
deportation to Italy, Luciano had applied for an Italian passport and a Cuban visa. 
With help from Lansky and a Cuban congressman and senator he was in Havana by 
November 1946. 978  US government records indicate that he told the Cuban 
authorities that he had come ‘to buy a piece of the gambling rackets’, but his 
governmental authority within the Mob seemed to suggest something else: that the 
Mob could help the Cuban elite to develop Cuba’s criminal markets.979 Luciano was 
quickly spotted in Havana fraternizing with Cuban leaders, including both Prío 
Socarras brothers. He rented a house from the chief of the Cuban general staff, and 
began laying the groundwork for a range of business projects in partnership with 
Cuban political figures.980  
This was the context in which the summit at the Hotel Nacional described in 
the prologue to this chapter took place. A dozen Mob leaders, including Lansky, 
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Bonanno, Genovese, Adonis, Joe Profaci and Albert Anastasia came to ‘pay 
allegiance’ from 22 to 26 December 1946.981 They handed over cash tributes 
totalling almost $150,000, confirming Luciano’s supremacy and providing him seed 
capital for ventures in Cuba.982 Cuban expansion plans were a central agenda item, 
as was Las Vegas.983 Luciano and Lansky suggested working with local politicians 
to build a new casino resort outside Havana. Aerovías Q would provide a dedicated 
private air bridge to Florida so that high rollers would not have to go through 
immigration and customs in Cuba.984  
It was not to be. Luciano’s presence in Havana was reported in the US press 
– possibly as a result of a leak by Vito Genovese, whose own Mob leadership 
ambitions, stoked by his success working with AMG figures in occupied Italy, were 
threatened by Luciano’s return. The US government, who had been tracking 
Luciano in Havana, felt that it could not be seen as tolerating Luciano sitting on 
America’s doorstep, and promptly pressured the Cuban authorities to deport him 
back to Italy. Cuba’s politicians resisted. The President, Prime Minister and 
Minister of the Interior met and decided to allow Luciano to stay. The Interior 
Minister and the National Secret Police Chief were deputized to tell the US 
Embassy that there was no legal reason to deport Luciano.985 In response, the US 
government withheld all supplies of medical drugs to Cuba. Reluctantly, the Cuban 
government abandoned Luciano, forcing him back to Italy in early 1947.986 A US 
official reported shortly thereafter seeing one of Luciano’s Cuban political allies, 
Senator Chivas, walk up to President Prío on the floor of the Cuban Senate, slap 
him in the face, and say ‘From Luciano to you’.987  
Luciano’s gambit to take control of Cuba’s criminal markets had failed, and 
set his power within the Mob back irreparably. Stuck in Italy, he would remain an 
influential figure in Mob affairs, but never again return to its active leadership. This 
did not mean, however, that the Mob’s ambitions in Havana were at an end. But the 
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continuing political instability and absence of a strong governing force in Havana 
made investment highly risky.  
 In 1948 Lansky seems to have smoothed the way with Cuba’s political 
factions for Batista’s return to Cuba from exile in Florida, and his prompt 
installation in the Senate.988 When Lansky was married for the second time later 
that year in a Senator’s office in Havana, Batista was one of a handful of guests.989 
Over the next four years, while Batista served out a constitutionally mandated 
period outside the presidential office, Lansky patiently laid the groundwork for the 
expansion of Havana’s gambling scene. He coordinated joint investments in 
Havana’s nightclubs and casinos by a range of Cuban politicians and Mob 
figures.990  
In 1952 Batista moved to once again take the reins of formal political power 
in Cuba. He nominated as a presidential candidate for an election scheduled for 
June 1952, but polling suggested he was stuck in third place.991 On 10 March 1952, 
working with army officers, he staged a second bloodless coup d’état. Having 
effectively co-opted the labour movement, there were no populist forces to oppose 
him.992 The strongman was back in the palace, and his collaboration with the Mob 
was set to move to a whole new level. 
 
A joint venture in government 
The Havana Mob 
Batista’s unique, personal authority over the military and internal security agencies 
– not replicated by any of the civilian politicians who had ruled in his absence – 
allowed him to more effectively monopolize force. With his return to power, the 
gangsterismo period of competition between local protection rackets looked set to 
end. Instead, against the ideological schisms of the Cold War, it mutated. The 
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factional fighting between gangster squads of the 1940s morphed into the Cold War 
proxy conflict of the 1950s. Gangsterismo figures from the right, such as Rolando 
Masferrer, Fidel Castro’s student leader rival from the University of Havana, 
became Batista’s enforcers; gangsterismo figures from the left, including Castro 
himself, became Batista’s political opponents.993  
By 1950, declines in the sugar price and shifts in the terms of trade meant 
that Cuba was running a budget deficit.994 Cuba needed to diversify its economy. 
But to do so, it needed capital investment, particularly in infrastructure and human 
resources. Where was Batista to find this capital? Cuba did have oil reserves, but 
these were largely controlled by US commercial interests. Absent other natural 
resource endowments or increased foreign debt, Batista was unlikely to be able to 
develop the more centralized state he had long advocated.995 Batista turned to three 
alternative sources of investment capital: his own people’s savings – using 
gambling to channel them into state coffers, and encouraging union pension funds 
to invest in new capital projects, especially hotels; bringing in foreign private 
investment through tourism; and the proceeds of foreign crime looking for an 
effective money-laundering centre. For several years, the approach appeared highly 
successful, in pure economic terms. Legitimate American private sector investment 
in Cuba in the 1950s grew from $142 million to $952 million.996 
State-controlled growth of the gambling industry was the key to mobilizing 
all three sources of capital. And Mob finance – and expertise – was essential to this 
reorientation of Cuba’s economy. A few months after resuming his role as Cuba’s 
strongman, Batista officially invited Lansky to resume his old position, bringing 
him back as Cuba’s ‘adviser on gambling reform’ for an annual retainer of 
$25,000.997  Soon the American Mob and Batista’s clique had formed a new joint 
venture: a ‘Havana Mob’ which ‘ran a network of untouchable businesses, in which 
semi-legal control merged with gang-style law’. This Havana Mob enjoyed 
governing power over domestic criminal operators. It used it not only to tax them, 
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but also to regulate them: through inspections and raids, state law enforcement 
agencies forced a general improvement in customer service standards across 
Havana’s gaming joints, improving Havana’s positioning and reputation in the 
north American gambling market and attracting new visitors and revenues.998 In the 
US, Lansky had used the Mob’s governmental power to create a prudential 
regulatory system to grow the illicit gambling economy; here, he was using the 
formal governing power of the Cuban state to regulate and grow licit gambling 
markets, and all the ancillary illicit markets that came with gambling. 
The Batistianos (Batista supporters, as the Havana Mob was also known) 
protected Lansky and other members of the American Mob in return for a ‘skim’ 
from the rackets and casinos they ran, the skim then underwriting political 
patronage.999 Frequently, these rackets – from casinos to narcotics trafficking – 
involved joint operations and joint investment by both American mafia members 
and Cuban political and military leaders. One example was described by Mariano 
Faget y Diaz, the head of Batista’s Bureau for the Repression of Communist 
Activities (BRAC) – an internal security agency – after he fled to the US in 1959: 
Prostitution and illegal gambling were taxed by the police, and the 
proceeds went directly to the Chief of Police. Smuggling was protected by 
MANUEL PEREZ BENITOA, administrator of Customs in Havana. The 
illegal traffic in drugs was directed from the Bureau of Investigations and 
controlled by the Assistant Chief, Commander RICARDO MEDINA, 
behind the back of his immediate chief, Colonel ORLANDO PIEDRA.1000 
Batista’s brother in law Roberto Fernandéz y Miranda controlled slot 
machines – which were supplied by the Mob – taking 50 per cent of revenues.1001 
General Cantillo, head of the Cuban army HQ, was tied up with Santo Trafficante in 
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the Sevilla-Biltmore casino.1002 The head of the Secret Police owned a piece of 
Trafficante’s Havana nightclub, the Sans Souci, which was managed by Norman 
Rothman, a New York Mobster. Rothman also appears to have been a player in the 
Cuban narcotics trade in the 1950s, while Trafficante worked with a local politician 
to run the local bolita (numbers, or informal lottery) market. Topping it all off, the 
Mob’s attorney in Cuba was Batista’s son-in-law.1003 
Just as Lansky allowed a variety of Mob actors to enjoy the fruits of this 
collaboration, so Batista ensured a wide range of his cohorts benefited. But Batista 
also recognized that the careful distribution of criminal rents was a way to develop 
and maintain his own social legitimacy. By removing Cuba’s national lottery from 
the national budget, he created a special revenue fund he could use as a means of 
political leverage and corruption. Decree Law 2185 (1954) gave him the right to 
make grants from lottery funds to educational, social welfare and cultural 
organizations. Batista himself has described how he doled out money to journalists 
($1.3 million), the Catholic Church ($1.6 million), unions ($1.3 million) and 
pension funds ($3.6 million). Overall he claims to have officially distributed more 
than $63 million in 6 years, purchasing wide support for his continuing rule.1004  
The masterstroke in the new governmental joint venture between the 
American and Havana Mobs was, however, the creation of the Banco de Desarrollo 
Económico y Social – the Bank for Economic and Social Development or BANDES. 
The American Mob had established close connections to key private Cuban banks, 
controlled by senior political figures, including one established by President Batista 
himself. These were used for general banking, for raising capital, and as money-
laundering channels.1005 The BANDES was something else entirely: a state-backed 
development finance institution. It aimed for nothing less than the strategic 
reorientation of Cuba’s economic growth through centrally-controlled, debt-
financed infrastructural development, particularly around tourism – especially 
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gambling. Roads, an airline, the airport, the main Havana racetrack and especially 
hotels all became major BANDES investments.1006  
BANDES was nested in a policy regime that encouraged and facilitated 
foreign investment in Cuba – whatever its provenance. This included a 10-year tax 
holiday on new corporate investments; the waiver of import duties on construction 
materials (which helped to create a thriving black market in such materials); a 
guaranteed gambling license to each and every approved $1 million hotel project – 
or any $200,000 nightclub casino – without background checks on the proprietors; 
and 2-year work visas for workers with specialized gambling expertise, such as card 
dealers.1007 As T.J. English has put it, BANDES was intended to tie Mob interests 
‘into the economic and social development of Cuba itself, so that the fortunes of the 
Mob in Cuba were one and the same with the fortunes of the Cuban people’.1008 
BANDES also served as a mechanism for consolidating Batista’s power 
within Cuba’s factionalized political system, using rents extracted from foreign 
investors as a means of political patronage. BANDES-backed deals required foreign 
investors to take on local partners – i.e. Batistianos – as minority shareholders. 
Infrastructure project pricing was inflated to allow Cuban political sponsors a 
‘skim’. Allocation of these roles allowed Batista to buy off the private militias that 
lingered from the period of gangsterismo. BANDES subsidized the move of Cuban 
gangsters such as Barletta and Battisti into casinos and nightclubs in Havana. 
Rolando Masferrer received government resources and funds to fight Castro’s 
forces in the Sierra Maestra.1009 Batista himself did not walk away empty-handed: 
he received a $250,000 facilitation fee from each BANDES deal, plus monthly 
kickbacks totalling perhaps $10 million annually. 1010  Moreover, BANDES 
consolidated his power within the domestic economy: Cuba’s private banks were 
‘implicitly forced’ to buy BANDES-issued bonds, giving Batista leverage over 
private capital-raising and consolidating his control over potential internal rivals.1011 
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The result was a debt-financed construction boom and money-laundering 
bonanza. Twenty-eight new hotels were constructed in five years.1012 5 new major 
hotel casinos opened with Mob money and personnel between 1955 and 1958: the 
Capri, the Hilton, the Deauville and the Riviera in Havana, and the Comodoro in 
suburban Miramar. Havana’s hotel rooms increased from 3,000 in 1952 to 5,500 in 
1958.1013 Lansky’s Riviera, the largest casino-hotel outside Las Vegas, cost $14 
million, $6 million of which came from government financing institutions.1014 With 
the Cuban state formally legalizing activities that remained illegal in the US (such 
as gambling) and informally licensing others (prostitution, narcotics, pornography), 
Havana became an offshore vice capital and money-laundering centre.  
The scheme made the Havana and American Mobs partners in a 
governmental joint venture in Cuba. Along with Cuba’s security service leaders, 
they were bound ‘together in defense of a repressive, but for them profitable, 
political status quo on the island.’1015 Yet as Batista’s regime became increasingly 
inequitable Cubans became increasingly resentful. While the boom created jobs, 
Cubans were all too aware of how heavily indebted they were becoming as a result 
– and who ultimately stood to profit. A July 1957 article in the magazine Bohemia 
described Havana’s new hotels as ‘constructed with funds stolen from the 
people.’1016 A story in Life magazine ran: 
Standing outside the Riviera, one Cuban said, ‘That cost us $6 million. It 
cost the owners $8 million. If it makes money, all the profits will be 
siphoned off to the U.S. If it loses money, we Cubans have a $6-million 
white elephant on our hands. What kind of deal is that for Cuba?’1017  
The same article reflected the political risk attached to the American Mob’s 
investments in Cuba: if Batista ‘fell from power, the gambling mob would have to 
make a whole new set of deals with a different bunch of politicians’.1018 But that 
was a day that the American Mob did not see coming, at least not soon. On the 
contrary, they were busy fighting over the joint venture’s spoils. 
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Rebellion in the Mob 
The Cuban gambling boom was a fountainhead of patronage not only for Batista, 
but also for Lansky and the Mob. But it also fuelled jockeying and internal rivalries, 
just as had the bootlegging boom in Prohibition New York (Chapter 4) and the 
cigarette and heroin smuggling boom in Palermo (Chapter 6). It was Lansky – not 
Batista – who first had to stare down a rebellion in his ranks.  
As the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics recognized, the Mob served as the 
‘organizational medium’ through which Batista’s gambling boom was realized.1019 
Yet even after Luciano’s organizational reforms (Chapter 4), the Mob functioned 
more as a coalition or confederation of autonomous Families than as a unitary 
structure. Even on questions of external positioning and offshore activity, the 
Families were free to operate autonomously within strategic parameters coordinated 
by the Commission. In Havana, that translated into a variety of operational 
arrangements. While Lansky was the recognized coordinator of Mob interests, some 
nightclubs and casinos were owned and run by specific actors within the Mob, with 
Trafficante having the largest and most lucrative portfolio after Lansky. Others 
were operated on a syndicated basis, with different Mob figures allocated ‘points’ – 
stock – by the Commission.1020 With 5 major new casino hotels coming online in 
just a few short years, jockeying for control of the rents they would generate was 
inevitable. And as T.J. English has put it, ‘decisions made on the island created a 
ripple effect’ out through the ranks of the Mob.1021 
Rival camps coalesced around Lansky – with a strong base in New York – 
and the Trafficantes, who hailed from Florida. Like the New York Mobsters, the 
Trafficantes had drawn on the southern Italian mafia tradition to amass control of 
Florida’s bootlegging, narcotics and gambling rackets in the 1920s and 1930s. They 
had strong ties to Cuba, through the Cuban immigrant community in Florida and 
through running Cuban rum during Prohibition. Like Luciano, Santo Trafficante Sr. 
literally murdered his competition in these markets, assuming a dominant position, 
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before passing control to his son, Santo Trafficante Jr.1022 Trafficante Jr. himself 
apprenticed for a time in New York with the Gagliano Family.1023 And like the New 
York Families, the Trafficantes’ power in both Florida and Cuba relied on careful 
cultivation of law enforcement officials and political actors.1024 
As a formal member of the Commission, Trafficante wielded significant 
power within the mafia. His Family’s long-standing Cuban connections and Spanish 
language skills further amplified their importance to the Mob’s operations in Cuba. 
In the mid-1950s Trafficante Jr. appears to have begun exploring ways to form 
alliances with some of New York Families, to challenge the network around Lansky 
for a greater share of Havana’s criminal rents.1025 One promising prospect was 
Albert Anastasia, the former leader of Murder, Inc., who by the mid-1950s had 
killed his way to power in the Mangano (later Gambino) Family in Brooklyn. 
Anastasia would normally have been subject to discipline by the mafia Commission 
for his unsanctioned violence. But he had sought protection within the Commission 
from Frank Costello, in turn promising to provide Costello physical protection from 
Vito Genovese, who had attempted to have Costello assassinated in May 1957.   
In mid-1957, at the height of the building boom in Havana, Anastasia, 
perhaps encouraged by Trafficante and emboldened by his apparent protection by 
Costello, appears to have demanded a larger piece of the action in Cuba. Lansky 
offered Anastasia a share in the new Hilton Hotel, due to open in 1958. It would be 
the largest hotel in Havana, and have a large casino. But when Anastasia visited 
Havana in September 1957 to conduct due diligence, he discovered that he would 
be sharing ownership and control with fifteen other investors, ranging from Cuba’s 
hotel workers’ union (a key source of political support for Batista) to the junior US 
Senator from the state of Nevada (where the Mob had Las Vegas gambling interests 
                                                
1022 ‘Santos Trafficante Jr.’, supra, at p. 5; FBI, Mafia Monograph, Part II, pp. 54-56; Deitche, pp. 
21-24, 34-36, 50-63; and see the account of Trafficante’s lawyer, Frank Ragano, in Frank Ragano 
and Selwyn Raab, Mob Lawyer (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994), pp. 9-25, 64-68.  
1023 Raab, p. 94.  
1024 Final Assassination Plots Report, p. 351; ‘Santos Trafficante Jr.’, supra; FBI Legat, Havana, 
‘Santo Trafficante Jr.’, 29 April 1959, JFKARC, FBI Subject Files, Santo Trafficante, Box 3; 
Stephen J. Labadie, ‘Santo Trafficante Jr.’, 22 September 1960, NARA JFKARC, RG 233, HSCA, 
Santo Trafficante, Box 3, file TP 92-1.  
1025 Paul Meskill, ‘Yen for Cuba Cash Doomed Anastasia’, N.Y. World-Telegram & Sun, 9 January 
1958; Lacey, pp. 239-245; English, p. 196. 
  218 
to protect).1026 Lansky, in contrast, controlled the Nacional and Riviera outright; and 
Trafficante controlled three establishments – the Comodoro, Deauville and Capri. 
Anastasia returned to New York and met with Trafficante to discuss his concerns 
about the deal. Trafficante appears to have suggested that he could help Anastasia 
secure a deal with Batista to buy the Hilton concession outright. In effect, 
Trafficante was proposing to cut Lansky out of the process, while hiding his hand 
behind Anastasia.1027  
Lansky had attempted to avoid becoming involved in the power struggle that 
had emerged between Costello and Genovese, and a hit on Anastasia could leave his 
old ally Costello dangerously exposed. But Anastasia’s push to outflank Lansky in 
Cuba threatened his own authority too seriously to remain unanswered. Two days 
after he had met with Trafficante, Anastasia was murdered, gunned down in a 
barber’s chair at the New York Park Sheraton Hotel. The murder was never solved, 
but unpublished analysis by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics housed in the US 
National Archives suggests that Lansky cut a deal with Genovese: Genovese hired 
two Cuban-Americans who assassinated Anastasia; and in return, Lansky okayed 
Genovese taking over from Costello as the leader of Luciano’s own Family, which 
now became known as the ‘Genovese Family’.1028  
Revolution in Cuba 
In mid-1958 the Movimiento 26 de Julio (July 26 Movement) insurgency led by 
Fidel Castro controlled only a few hundred soldiers in mountains in the east of Cuba, 
far from the capital. Yet six months later it had taken power in Havana. Batista’s 
regime collapsed with stunning speed, reminiscent of subsequent regime collapses 
such as the one in Mali in 2013. What happened? In both countries – Cuba in the 
1950s and Mali more recently – corruption was at the heart of the matter. The 
political class’ reliance on criminal rents led not only to the collapse of the regime’s 
popular legitimacy but also the hollowing out of its military effectiveness and the 
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creation of political space into which a rival political and military organization then 
stepped. 
By 1958, corruption had become normalized in Cuba. Questioned about 
graft, Batista would quote back the words of the former US Ambassador to Cuba, 
Spruille Braden: ‘Of course there was always corruption… but also on Manhattan 
… there are similar situations of … criminality.’ 1029  The US Treasury 
Representative in Havana reported back to Washington that amnesties were being 
routinely used to ‘white-wash’ corruption ‘in all branches of the Cuban 
government’, justified on grounds of rehabilitation and ‘a new start in life’.1030  
This gave Castro a significant political opportunity to attack Batista’s social 
base. He made criticism of Batista’s cooperation with foreign corporate and 
criminal actors a central target of his communications strategy. Speaking in his own 
defence at his trial for an attack he led on the Moncado barracks on 26 July 1953, 
Castro argued that Batista’s 1933 ‘revolution’ had been nothing of the sort, but  
merely brought with it a change of hands and a redistribution of the loot 
among a new group of friends, relatives, accomplices and parasitic 
hangers-on that constitute the political retinue of the Dictator.1031  
This recalled Macmillan’s words about ‘wine and women and champagne’.  
By 1958 the July 26 Movement was focused on attacking economic targets 
in eastern Cuba to send a political message. They burned sugar mills and cane fields, 
set fire to jet fuel at an Esso oil refinery, took foreign workers hostage, attacked an 
American-owned mining plant, and threatened Freeport mining interests. They also 
went to work on the morale of the Cuban military, dropping leaflets including 
photographs of Cuban army commanders indulging themselves in Havana’s 
nightclubs and houses of prostitution. A September 1958 FBI report noted that even 
soldiers ‘loyal’ to Batista were ‘disgusted’ with the ‘lack of leadership and graft on 
the part of commanding officers.’1032 
Through the course of 1958, Castro increasingly found his military effort 
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involved pushing at an open door. Since criminal rents were ultimately controlled 
and protected by the military and security apparatus, command appointments had 
increasingly been awarded on the basis of patronage logic, rather than merit.1033 
Over time this contributed considerably to demoralization and the degradation of 
operational effectiveness. Soon the maximization of criminal rents began to 
displace other strategic goals even in operational decision-making. One high-level 
Cuban security official later explained how Batista’s brother-in-law, granted 
command of a regiment, turned it over to organizing 17 gambling houses, staffing 
them with troops taken away from posts in ‘important towns which were later 
occupied by the rebels without any resistance’.1034  
Military campaigning against Castro’s forces became sporadic. Even when 
the armed forces had the insurgents on the back foot, they would fail to finish them 
off. The insurgent’s persistence eroded Batista’s credibility and the morale of his 
own supporters. As defections mounted Batista became legitimately more 
suspicious of rivals within his own ranks. In November 1958 he foiled two coup 
attempts, the first led by the chief of army operations, the second by the chief of the 
naval air corps. In December the chairman of Cuba’s joint chiefs of staff sought US 
support for his own coup. Batista kept his most loyal troops in Havana to protect 
himself. Those he sent east to fight Castro were those with more questionable 
loyalties – and thus less incentive to fight forcefully for him.  
Batista also worried about the sugar barons deserting him. So he assigned 
troops to fixed positions for much of the dry harvest season to deter baronial 
rebellion, allowing Castro to build up his strength. Only when the rains set in and 
plantation workforces (and baronial militias) dispersed could these troops be 
released to move east; and by then it was too wet for effective operational 
manoeuvre. From the middle of 1958, the Cuban army began to withdraw whenever 
Castro’s forces attacked. The result was not so much a series of victories by the July 
26 Movement, but rather a shrivelling back towards Havana of Batista’s coercive 
capabilities. Eventually Batista’s operational commander in the east, charged with 
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prosecuting the campaign against Castro, instead opened direct talks with him.1035 
On New Year’s Eve, recognizing he had a losing hand, Batista folded and 
fled Cuba with perhaps $300 million in looted state assets.1036 As Domínguez notes, 
his military ‘had not been defeated in the battle of Havana – there never was any 
such battle, because Batista surrendered state power’. His coercive capability 
simply collapsed, the victim of cronyism, demoralization resulting from corruption, 
and distrust. His strategy for governing Cuba had failed. Domínguez says simply: 
‘Batista’s manner of rule, and the nature of the regime he designed, explains why 
and how he fell’.1037 
The Mob was largely blindsided. It had taken only minimal steps to mitigate 
the rising popular discontent. In a ham-fisted attempt to buy public support, in 1957 
the Mob backed a mass-market bingo game in Cuba, giving away new model 
American cars far beyond the purchasing power of ordinary Cubans.1038 Lansky 
purchased the services of one of Cuba’s leading columnists and radio personalities, 
Diego González (known as Tendelera), and enlisted him to place pieces supportive 
of Batista and public investment in gambling and tourism.1039 But Lansky was 
largely unconcerned by Castro, telling his colleagues that he was confident he could 
pay off anyone who replaced Batista.1040 Trafficante and some New York financiers 
hatched a plan to offer Castro $1 million for assurances that he would allow 
gambling to continue in Havana. Indeed, bribes and guns were offered to several 
members of Castro’s political support network in the US, including the president-to-
be, Urrutia.1041  
The Mob badly underestimated the risk Castro posed. Trafficante told his 
lawyer that he thought the Mob ‘would never stop making all that money in Cuba’. 
‘Who would have known that crazy guy, Castro, was going to take over and close 
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the casinos?’1042 Even after he took power, the Mob remained in denial. Trafficante 
recalled thinking 
He’s not going to be in office or power for long… Batista will return or 
someone else will replace the guy because there’s no way the economy can 
continue without tourists, and this guy is closing all the hotels and casinos. 
This is a temporary storm. It’ll blow over.1043 
In fact, when Batista fled on New Year’s Eve of 1958, the Mob’s losses 
were significant. Lansky, Trafficante and other Mob figures were in Havana and 
witnessed the upheaval that followed. While Batista’s departure did not lead to 
widespread violence, the casino resorts that BANDES had funded did become a 
target for vandalism and symbolic protest. Seven of the thirteen casinos in Havana 
suffered major damage.1044 The vandalism was an expression of the population’s 
understanding and rejection of the joint venture with the Mob that Batista’s 
governing regime had become.1045  
It was a major strategic defeat for the Mob. As Lansky put it, years later, ‘I 
crapped out.’1046 The episode’s seminal emotional impact on Mob leaders and 
organizational self-perception is made clear by a personal account of a Chicago 
Mob leader’s daughter, Antoinette Giancana. Her father, Sam Giancana – who 
features prominently in the next chapter – would fly into a rage at the mention of 
Castro’s name, once yelling: ‘Don’t ever mention that bastard’s name in this house 
again . . . ever… Do you have any idea of what he’s done to me . . . to our friends?’ 
As she put it, the Havana casinos ‘were the golden lode whence the profits flowed 
into the Chicago mob’s treasury – and into the coffers of other crime families across 
the country.’1047 Castro had deprived the Mob of the goose that laid the golden eggs. 
Now, they wanted revenge. 
 
Conclusion 
Though the close relationship between military action and political power has long 
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been understood within strategic theory, as we saw in Part One there has long been 
an insistence that organized crime is something else entirely. Perhaps more clearly 
than any other single episode studied here, the period of Fulgencio Batista’s 
political ascendancy in Cuba between 1933 and 1958 shows that this is not 
necessarily always so. Governmental power in Cuba in that period derived not just 
from military sources and political action, but also from the strategic organization 
of crime.  
Batista’s path to power did indeed start with the development of influence 
and authority in the Cuban military, but then ran through canny manipulation of 
corruption and patronage, buttressed by a sophisticated approach to communication. 
As Cuba’s strongman he regulated and controlled competition between Cuba’s 
relatively autonomous sugar barons, his Palace emerging as a court in which their 
networks competed for patronage and access to criminal rents. The Mob provided a 
significant, independent source of criminal expertise and capital that helped him 
develop this system in size, sophistication and reach, tying a broad range of 
interests into his governmental project. 
 When the US intervened to remove Batista from the Cuban political scene 
in 1944, the patronage networks that had grown in Batista’s shadow were deprived 
of their protection. A period of strategic competition for governmental power, 
known as gangsterismo, followed. Only with Batista’s reinsertion into Cuba’s 
governmental marketplace in the 1950s was stability re-established, at which point 
Batista reinstated the system he had previously relied upon. This time, however, he 
super-charged it through aggressive pursuit of economic growth in sectors offering 
new and larger criminal rents. This was made possible by the use not only of state 
law enforcement and military institutions, but also the state’s economic regulatory 
institutions, such as BANDES. The governmental joint venture of the 1950s 
between the American and Havana Mobs soon put the collaboration of the 1930s in 
the shade. Criminal capabilities were used to govern, and governmental assets in 
criminal enterprises.  
Here was the prototype for an array of subsequent such ‘joint ventures’ 
between organized crime and states. The demise of the Havana joint venture is, 
consequently, potentially highly instructive for contemporary policy makers 
wrestling with ‘mafia states’ and other forms of criminal-political ‘convergence’. 
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Some commentators argue that structural inequalities in global markets push 
marginalized communities into illicit activity, since this is one of the few areas in 
which they enjoy competitive advantage. The Havana Mob episode makes clear that 
even if turning a blind eye to illicit activity generates substantial short-term 
economic growth, it comes at huge social costs likely to outweigh these short-term 
benefits. BANDES and the gambling economy promoted by Batista and the Mob 
infected Cuba with a hidden version of what economists call ‘Dutch Disease’ – 
skewing the allocation of capital and labour towards the extraction of criminal rents 
and hollowing out productive sectors of the economy. Everyday Cubans suffered 
the consequences: under-investment in the rest of the economy, systematic 
corruption, violence, and inefficient labour and capital pricing. What was worse, 
most of the rents were not recycled in the economy, but rather looted and sent to 
safe off-shore accounts. We arguably see this pattern repeated in many 
contemporary situations where local communities are stuck in a developmental 
‘crime trap’, with kleptocratic ruling elites forming joint ventures with criminal 
organizations to extract wealth from local resources and illicit trafficking, passing 
the environmental, social and economic costs on to the community.  
The Cuban experience helps to explain why these joint ventures prove 
fragile over the long run: they undermine their own social legitimacy. The Cuban 
joint venture between Batista’s cohorts and organized crime ultimately undermined 
the legitimacy of his regime. Once popular confidence failed, the regime was 
vulnerable to collapse, as the population looked for a new source of 
governmentality. In Havana, that came in the form of the July 26 movement, led by 
Castro. In today’s Afghanistan, it may take the shape of the Taliban, or in Mali, the 
shape of Touareg-Islamist insurgency. In the next chapter we consider how the Mob 
reacted to this unexpected strategic failure in Cuba. 
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8. The Blue Caribbean Ocean, 1959-1967  
 
‘We’ve been operating a damned Murder Inc. in the Caribbean.’ 
President Lyndon Johnson1048  
 
September 1960, at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami. A senior US Central 
Intelligence Agency official meets with two men – ‘Sam Gold’ and ‘Joe’ – 
contracted for what the official later calls ‘a sensitive mission requiring gangster-
type action’. The term ‘gangster-style’ was not accidental. The two men were Sam 
Giancana and Santos Trafficante Jr., both members of the mafia Commission, both 
at the time on the FBI’s list of the ten most wanted criminals. Their sensitive 
mission? The assassination of Fidel Castro.1049 
Over the next three years, the CIA equipped the Mob with cash, radios, guns 
and even deadly botulinum pills with which to poison Castro. But the Mob also 
went further. It mounted full-scale transnational armed attacks into Cuba directed at 
both government and civilian targets. And it helped to organize and finance Cuban 
governments in exile with the hope that once they were installed in power they 
would return the Mob to its hidden role in Cuban government. The CIA-Mob 
collaboration to kill Castro and install an alternative government in Cuba ultimately 
failed, but not before seemingly impacting other US counter-revolutionary efforts, 
such as the paramilitary invasion at the Bay of Pigs. And ultimately the costs of 
these failed collaborative schemes may have been even higher: Lyndon Johnson, 
Robert F. Kennedy and a US House of Representatives Select Committee all saw 
signs that the cooperation may have backfired, ultimately killing not the leader of 
Cuba, but rather the leader of the US – President John F. Kennedy.1050 
Why was the CIA cooperating with the Mob to begin with? And why would 
the Mob risk exposing its leadership, networks and organizations to penetration by 
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the US government for such an operation? This chapter offers an explanation, and 
explores the potentially major strategic implications of that cooperation. 
The first section explores the strategies developed by Mob actors between 
1959 and 1963 to wrest back control of Cuba’s criminal rents from Castro’s 
revolutionaries, ranging from corrupting Castro’s regime to the more coercive 
methods just described. The second section considers the unintended consequences 
of the US government’s cooperation with the Mob during this period, looking at its 
relationship to the failed American invasion at the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The third part of the 
chapter considers the Mob’s reaction once its removal from Cuba sank in – 
including an attempt to use force to install itself in Haiti; and a much more effective 
and enduring scheme in The Bahamas.  
Drawing particularly on original archival research in declassified CIA files 
and Congressional testimony in the US National Archives in College Park, 
Maryland, this chapter shows the Mob leadership learning from strategic failure. It 
also suggests the emergence of a new approach by the Mob to position itself in the 
governmental market, based not on jostling with rival organizations for advantage 
in a crowded market, but instead adopting what business management literature 
calls a ‘blue ocean strategy’ to find or create a new, uncrowded market.1051 As W. 
Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, the originators of blue ocean strategy theory 
explain, this involves reconstructing the value chain (and industrial space), rather 
than competing within existing parameters through product differentiation or over 
cost.1052 In this chapter, we see the Mob striking upon just such an approach: rather 
than compete with other criminal organizations or political parties for governmental 
power, it learned that it could create entirely new governmental spaces to dominate. 
It could not only react to strategic opportunities as they arose, but carve them out 
for itself. As Kim and Mauborgne put it, ‘strategy can shape structure’.1053  
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‘A gangland style killing’ 
Accommodation or confrontation? 
When Fulgencio Batista fled Cuba on New Year’s Eve of 1958, the damage they 
had sustained suddenly dawned on Mob leaders. On 5 January 1959, even before 
Castro reached Havana, Lansky desperately began trying to cut a deal. ‘All we 
know now is that there is a new government in power,’ Lansky told the Times of 
Havana. ‘We want to do everything possible to cooperate with it.’1054 Santo 
Trafficante Jr. provided Castro’s officials gifts and free sex at his Sans Souci 
nightclub, even offering to assist Cuban intelligence (G-2) operations in the US. An 
unpublished US intelligence report in the US National Archives suggested it was 
Castro himself who nixed the idea, punning ‘O es demasiado santo, o demasiado 
traficante.’ (He is either too much of a saint, or too much of a trafficker.)1055  
Arriving in Havana, Castro warned that he would ‘clean out all the gamblers 
who used the influence of Dictator Batista’s regime to build an empire here’. Most 
of the casinos in Havana suspended operations.1056 But when casino closings 
generated street demonstrations by laid off workers, Castro proved more pragmatic. 
In mid-February 1959 he allowed casinos to reopen, serving foreigners only, and 
under tightened state controls.1057 By May, short on income, the new regime began 
heavily taxing casinos and seizing private assets.1058 In early June, under pressure 
from the US government, the Cuban authorities detained numerous Mob figures, 
including Meyer Lansky’s brother, Jake, and Trafficante himself.1059 Negotiations 
between Castro and Trafficante continued, with Trafficante leaving immigration 
detention to attend his daughter’s wedding at the Havana Hilton.1060 Several sources 
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appear to corroborate that one visitor to Trafficante was a young hoodlum, Jack 
Ruby (about whom more later), trying to sell jeeps to Castro in return for 
Trafficante’s release.1061 By early 1960, all of the Mobsters had indeed been 
released. Trafficante’s nightclub, the Sans Souci, struggled on, tending to the few 
tourists not scared off by the Revolution. But the heady days of the Mob’s Cuban 
gambling empire were over.1062 While Castro remained in power, Mob leaders 
began to recognize, those golden days could not be revived. If corruption would not 
produce the sought accommodation, perhaps they would have to turn to other 
methods – such as coercion and confrontation. 
Elements of the two Mobs – from America and Havana – began organizing 
a military counter-attack on Castro. The Havana Mob had reassembled in Florida, 
using looted Cuban funds to set up in Miami’s hotel industry. A syndicate 
comprising Batista, his brother-in-law (General Fernández) and the former head of 
the Cuban National Police bought Miami’s Biltmore Terrace Hotel, installing 
Norman Rothman, a Mobster close to both Trafficante and Lansky, as the new hotel 
manager.1063 Lansky – who had lost perhaps more, financially and politically, as a 
result of the Cuban Revolution than any other Mob leader – pushed for a Mob 
counter-attack. It was not entirely new territory for him. He had been intimately 
involved in the Mob’s support to the US invasion of Sicily, and after the UN voted 
in 1948 to partition Palestine, he had quietly helped the Haganah (the Israeli 
paramilitary organization) with fund-raising and arms-brokering in America.1064  
The Biltmore soon became an informal planning headquarters. Rothman and 
other Mobsters brokered access to money, arms and explosives. Mob-hired pilots, 
including Roland Masferrer – Castro’s gangsterismo rival, and later Batista’s 
enforcer – began air raids into Cuba from the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico. They 
burned sugarcane fields and attacked sugar mills in Cuba, hoping to destabilize the 
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Cuban economy and swing public opinion against Castro.1065  
The US government was aware of these transnational military operations – 
and took no steps to stop them. By October 1959, Castro was openly condemning 
the US government for complicity in international ‘terror’ attacks.1066 Yet the 
attacks also failed to draw the hoped for results. There were few signs of disorder or 
rebellion in Cuba. The Mob began to realize that a bigger push might be needed – 
and that this would require more active cooperation with the US government. 
Lansky met secretly with the FBI in Miami to try to motivate government action by 
warning of Castro’s leftward turn. Lansky ‘held himself out as a historian’, the FBI 
agents recalled, showing an ‘excellent grasp of political science, current and past’. 
He warned that ‘the time was ripe for communist factions to entrench themselves’ 
in Castro’s government, and, seeking to make common cause, suggested using Mob 
contacts within Cuba to assist the US government.1067 His entreaties had no 
immediate effect; and if anything the attacks in Cuba seemed to be helping Castro 
rally support for the Revolution. By the summer of 1960, the Mob and exiled Cuban 
leadership decided to take a more direct approach, striking at Castro directly, and 
began engaging in their own assassination plotting.1068 One plot involved using one 
of Castro’s lovers to poison him.1069 Another plot involved using Juan Orta, the 
head of Castro’s executive office, secretly on Trafficante’s payroll, to bomb 
Castro’s office.1070 
Who would replace Castro, if the assassination efforts succeeded? Lansky 
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pushed the leadership credentials of Manuel Antonio de Varona y Laredo (‘Tony 
Varona’), a former Cuban Prime Minister and Senate President under President Prío 
Socarras. Lansky invited Varona to his house in Miami and offered him several 
million dollars to establish a government-in-exile and to pay for a public relations 
campaign. Varona appears to have accepted. Lansky hired the Edward Moss 
Agency, a respected Washington D.C. public relations firm with longstanding 
connections to both organized crime and the CIA. (Moss’ secretary and mistress 
was the sister of the manager of gambling rooms at the Mob-controlled Casino 
Nacional, Tropicana and Sans Souci nightclubs in Havana.) The Moss agency 
became a conduit for between $2 and $4 million to be passed from the Mob to the 
anti-Castro forces over the next couple of years.1071 All Lansky asked in return was 
‘that if Varona or his allies should ever come to power in Cuba, the Mafia would be 
able to re-establish their gambling activities in Cuba.’1072 
Internationalizing Murder, Inc. 
Castro was still, however, firmly in place. The Mob’s attempts to dislodge him – 
first indirect, then more direct – had not succeeded. Nor had they attracted clear 
support from the US government. In fact it took some time for the Eisenhower 
Administration to reach the conclusion that they could not work with Castro. A 
National Security Council briefing on 6 January 1959 noted that ‘Fidel Castro has 
often asserted his desire for friendship with the US’.1073 A consultative committee 
of US business interests recommended that the US government recognize Castro’s 
July 26 government, as the US proceeded to the next day.1074 President Eisenhower, 
personally sceptical of the Castro brothers’ intentions and concerned that the US 
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‘simply could not afford to appear the bully’, at first adopted a studied coolness.1075 
When Castro visited Washington in April 1959, Eisenhower went to play golf at 
Augusta National in Georgia. Yet as American public perceptions of Castro steadily 
darkened through 1959, official US reporting began to suggest growing Communist 
influence in Castro’s regime. In May, agrarian reforms threatened to nationalize 
almost half of the $900 million of US private investment in Cuba. By July the 
American foreign policy establishment in Washington DC was actively considering 
how to overthrow Castro.1076  
On 5 November 1959 Eisenhower secretly authorized efforts to remove 
Castro from power. The ‘Good Neighbour’ era was over. By January 1960 the State 
Department and CIA were working jointly to encourage a change of government in 
Cuba.1077 Although President Eisenhower does not appear to have specifically 
authorized assassination per se, the CIA began to explore it as an option.1078 In late 
1959 the CIA attempted to infiltrate two Cuban exiles with a sniper’s rifle into 
Havana, but they were arrested.1079 Over the next six months, it worked to develop a 
more sophisticated assassination or disruption capability. Some of the options 
considered verged on the bizarre: lacing Castro’s cigars with an LSD-like substance 
so that he would make a public spectacle of himself; using thallium salts to make 
his beard fall out, undermining his macho persona.1080 By mid-March 1960, the 
intelligence community had concluded that it would be difficult to take Castro, his 
brother Raúl and the key adviser Che Guevara out in one ‘package’, as might be 
necessary to achieve regime change. High-level attention turned away from the 
assassination plotting to a broader paramilitary effort to topple the whole regime, 
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authorized in January 1960 by the National Security Council’s Special Group.1081  
On 17 March 1960 President Eisenhower approved a secret $4.4 million 
paramilitary programme on Cuba, expected to be operational later that year. This 
effort would ultimately conclude in disaster at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. The 
basis of the Eisenhower administration’s confidence in the CIA’s ability to sponsor 
a covert paramilitary invasion was the Agency’s earlier success in similar 
enterprises in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 (the failure to displace Sukarno 
in 1958 conveniently forgotten).1082 Copying the Guatemala template, the US aimed 
in Cuba to mount a propaganda campaign via short-wave radio, then land 100-150 
exile commandos who would connect with a clandestine ‘intelligence and action 
organization’ that would be set up inside Cuba. The organization would cut its teeth 
through acts of economic sabotage, which would combine with a US embargo of 
the island to disrupt Cuba’s economy and undermine military and popular support 
for Castro, just as such policies had undermined support for Árbenz in Guatemala. 
Once Castro was knocked out, a US-backed government-in-exile would be 
installed.1083  
By mid-1960, the US government was thus engaged in developing several 
different ways of removing Castro – assassination, sabotage and transnational 
paramilitary attack stoking popular unrest – each of which overlapped with the 
limited efforts already being rolled out by the American and Havana Mobs. Over 
the next few months it proved to be a short step for the CIA from adopting the same 
ways as the Mob to sponsoring the very means being offered by the Mob.   
Having failed to develop an effective in-house assassination capability, the 
CIA began to consider its options to purchase one off the shelf.1084 The Agency 
recognized that it shared a strategic objective with the Mob: Castro’s 
elimination.1085 And the Mob, it considered, might have the means it lacked – 
intelligence assets in Cuba, effective lines of communication into Cuba, and 
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potentially the capability to project force into secure locations within Cuba.1086 As a 
later US Senate Select Committee investigation – the Church Committee – put it, 
‘underworld figures were relied upon because it was believed that they had 
expertise and contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens’.1087  
Of course, this raised sensitive questions of complicity with organized crime 
– sensitivities of which the CIA was well aware. As a CIA official told Congress in 
1975, ‘We weren’t proud of this thing.’1088  Indeed, ever since, the CIA officials 
involved have insisted that ‘only a small group’ within the Agency, perhaps six 
people, was briefed. However, a 1967 internal CIA Inspector-General’s report, not 
shared with Congress until many years later, made clear that the true number of 
CIA officials briefed was probably closer to twenty.1089 This likely included the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Allen Dulles.1090 But not others. Senior 
government decision-makers, including those involved in planning the US’s 
paramilitary efforts against Castro, were never explicitly briefed on the effort.1091  
Close examination of the historical record suggests that collaboration was an 
idea developed by a group of CIA officials who had prior Mob contacts, well before 
the project was cleared by DCI Dulles – but after the Mob efforts were already 
under way.1092 Why would the Mob seek US government involvement? Was there 
not a risk of government penetration or prosecution for this, or other criminal 
activities? The short-term motivation was clearly not pecuniary. The US 
government did ultimately promise the Mobsters involved at least $150,000 if 
Castro was eliminated – but the Mob refused the offer.1093 It was not interested in 
money (and this was, anyway, peanuts, for the Mob). Instead the Mob appears to 
have seen two strategic benefits: access to the political and military resources not 
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just to kill Castro but to install and protect a more favourable Cuban government; 
and CIA protection from US law enforcement for the Mob’s other activities at 
home.1094 Mobsters involved in the plot to kill Castro successfully blackmailed their 
way out of US federal prosecution, deportation proceedings and possibly even 
Congressional subpoena throughout the 1960s by threatening to publicly expose the 
story. The Mob even convinced the CIA to install a bug in a Las Vegas hotel room 
so that Sam Giancana, the Chicago mafia capo at the Fontainebleau Hotel, could 
spy on his girlfriend; in May 1962 Robert Kennedy ordered the Department of 
Justice to secretly drop cases against Giancana and other Mobsters resulting from 
this episode, ‘in the national interest’.1095 
In August 1960, once the idea for cooperation had been approved, the CIA 
Deputy Director for Plans – the CIA’s clandestine service – Richard Bissell tasked 
an employee with determining if the Agency ‘had assets that may assist in a 
sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel 
Castro.’1096 In mid-September 1960, while Castro was visiting New York for the 
UN General Assembly, the CIA met at the Plaza Hotel with Johnny Roselli, a 
Giancana lieutenant.1097 Roselli ‘agreed to connect’ the CIA to ‘Sam Gold’ – Sam 
Giancana, his capo. Giancana, Roselli explained, could connect the CIA’s frontman 
and his ‘Wall Street backers’ to Cuban exiles who would carry out the job.1098 The 
CIA met several times in September and October 1960 in Miami with Roselli, ‘Sam 
Gold’, Cuban exiles and an ‘interpreter’ named ‘Joe’. 1099  This was Santo 
Trafficante, Jr. – like Giancana, one of the US Department of Justice’s Top Ten 
Most Wanted Criminals at the time. Like Genovese in Sicily, his role was not just to 
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interpret between English and Italian, but to connect the state with underworld 
governmental capabilities in the exiled Havana Mob.  
The CIA proposed to the Mobsters that Cuban exiles carry out ‘a gangland 
style killing’, i.e. a fusillade, killing Castro inside Cuba. The Mobsters responded 
that it would be impossible to recruit someone to do the job, given the low chance 
of escape. Instead they proposed poison.1100 The CIA had been experimenting for 
several months with different delivery vehicles to poison Castro – cigars, tea, coffee, 
bouillon – and a variety of toxins.1101 Giancana indicated that if the CIA supplied 
pills, the Mob would pass them to a contact inside Cuba – in fact Juan Orta. As we 
have seen, the Mob was already working independently with Orta to kill Castro, 
even before the CIA became involved – though they did not mention this to the 
CIA.1102 A little-noticed secret 1967 CIA internal review concluded that the CIA  
found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent 
operations that the [mafia] syndicate already had under way… In a sense 
CIA may have been piggy-backing on the [mafia] syndicate … supplying 
an aura of official sanction.1103  
Within weeks of meeting with the CIA, Sam Giancana was boasting to other 
Mobsters that ‘Fidel Castro was to be done away with … in November’, and that he 
‘had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions’ at the Fontainebleau 
Hotel.1104 But technical glitches meant that the CIA did not deliver the poison pills 
to the Mob until February 1961.1105 Unbeknownst to the CIA, Orta meanwhile lost 
his Prime Minister’s office position. This showed just how weak the command and 
control mechanism for this sensitive venture really was: ‘while the Agency thought 
the gangsters had a man in Cuba with easy access to Castro, what they actually had 
was a man disgruntled at having lost access’.1106  
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Seeking protection 
By the time Kennedy took power in early 1961, the prospect of confrontation 
between the US and Cuba had increased considerably, and taken on broader 
geostrategic implications. The Mob was becoming a chess piece – though perhaps 
not simply a passive pawn – in the larger Cold War game.  
Cuban exile commando attacks through 1960, backed in part by Mob money 
and arms, provoked only a closing of ranks in Castro’s regime, with leftists installed 
in important administrative positions and more liberal voices in the media being 
closed down. By mid-1960, the US found itself without allies in Cuban politics. The 
US moved steadily towards coercive policies. In turn, Castro began to seek Soviet 
protection from American belligerence. In February 1960 Cuba and the USSR 
agreed a 5-year trade and investment deal. By May, Soviet crude oil was being 
delivered to Cuba.1107 The Eisenhower Administration leaned on Esso, Texaco and 
Anglo-Dutch Shell not to refine the Soviet oil, and blocked sales of Cuban sugar to 
the US.1108 In response, Cuba started receiving arms shipments from the Soviets. On 
9 July, Soviet leader Khrushchev upped the ante, warning the US that the Soviets 
might provide military support to Cuba in the event of a US invasion. By September, 
with Soviet strategic backing becoming more certain, Castro moved against US 
commercial interests in Cuba, nationalizing cattle ranches, oil refineries, sugar mills 
and banks worth around $1 billion. On 19 October 1960 – around the time the CIA 
was meeting with the Mob in Miami – the Eisenhower Administration retaliated, 
imposing an embargo on US trade with Cuba in anything other than food and 
medicine. The embargo would endure for more than five decades. 
Momentum towards confrontation increased with John F. Kennedy’s 
election to the Presidency in November 1960, taking office in late January 1961. 
Kennedy’s position on Cuba had become more hawkish during the election 
campaign. His initial campaign book, The Strategy of Peace, criticized Eisenhower 
and Nixon for failing to embrace Castro when they had the chance.1109 But by 
October 1960, probably after a briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles 
that highlighted growing ties between Castro and Khrushchev, Kennedy was 
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warning that the Iron Curtain now lay ‘ninety miles off the coast of the United 
States’, and asking of Nixon: ‘If you don’t stand up to Castro, how can you be 
expected to stand up to Khrushchev?’1110  On 21 October he called publicly for US 
government support to Cuban exiles in an effort to overthrow Castro.1111 As 
American attitudes became more confrontational, Moscow and Havana quickly 
drew closer together. Khrushchev and Castro met publicly at the September 1960 
UN General Assembly. Soon after, Che Guevara was fêted in Moscow. A strategic 
partnership that had started as a response to arms-length US paramilitary pressure 
was now taking on the shape of Cold War confrontation, and in the process 
radicalizing the Cuban revolution.1112 The involvement of the Mob, with its own 
designs and stratagems, was about to become either a major asset or a major 
liability for the United States. 
  
Subversion and its unintended consequences 
What went wrong at the Bay of Pigs? 
By the time Kennedy entered office in late January 1961, the CIA’s plans for 
paramilitary intervention in Cuba had evolved considerably. US government 
planning now called for a full-scale amphibious invasion by a US-trained brigade of 
Cuban exiles on the south coast, with US air cover. It was still intended to be 
dressed up as an internal revolt.1113 But against the backdrop of escalating US-
Soviet tensions, the invasion plan now carried greater geopolitical risk. On taking 
office, Kennedy expressed concern at the high risk of Soviet escalation if the US’ 
hand in the operation were clear.1114 At his request, the number of US airstrikes on 
the Cuban air force prior to the landing was reduced. When the invasion began on 
17 April 1961, the Cuban air force, which was supposed to have been disabled by 
airstrikes, was instead quickly able to assert control of the airspace over the Bay of 
Pigs where the landing was taking place, devastating the paramilitary ground forces 
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and their naval supply lines.1115 By 19 April the invasion force had run out of 
ammunition and its remnants surrendered. Kennedy refused requests from the CIA 
and Joint Chiefs of Staff to send in US forces to rescue the brigade, concerned that 
it would lead to all out war.1116 Castro’s victory was decisive. 114 Cuban exile 
commandos died and 1,189 were captured. As both Che Guevara and US 
intelligence would later assess, the Bay of Pigs strengthened, rather than weakened, 
Castro’s hold on power in Cuba.1117  
What went wrong at the Bay of Pigs? Lawrence Freedman has demonstrated 
that the US failure was in no small part the result of the absence of key elements 
present in the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala – US air-cover and local 
military defections.1118 It also seems possible, however, that one contributing factor 
was the failure of the CIA’s assassination plotting with the Mob. Traditionally, the 
two efforts have been seen as entirely distinct and unrelated. But there was, it turns 
out, an overlap in personnel. An unpublished internal CIA analysis located in the 
US National Archives in Maryland concluded that some of these personnel viewed 
the assassination plots ‘as being merely one aspect of the over-all active effort to 
overthrow the regime that culminated in the Bay of Pigs’.1119  
How closely connected were the two plans – and the two failures? There is 
reason to believe that they were, initially, intended to be complementary – but that 
the connection between the two was lost as each plan was developed. The invasion 
planning, in particular, was bent far away from a central initial premise: that the 
military invasion would coincide with a political shock inside Cuba, something 
triggering either an uprising or a failure of the Cuban military. Where would that 
come from? The CIA’s assassination planning seems to provide the answer: as a 
later newspaper article based on CIA sources explained, the original ‘intent was to 
eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island.’1120 
Bissell later told a retired Foreign Service officer that the assassination plan had 
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been ‘intended to parallel’ the exiles’ landing.1121 A secret CIA assessment of the 
mission found that ‘Bissell probably believed that Castro would be dead at the 
hands of a CIA-sponsored assassin before the Brigade ever hit the beach.’1122 This 
helps to explain why the CIA failed to alert President Kennedy to the low likelihood 
that the landing of exiles at the Bay of Pigs would create ‘a critical shift of popular 
opinion away from Castro’, as a December 1960 Special National Intelligence 
Estimate put it.1123 The CIA may have been expecting that strategic effect to come 
through other methods – the Mob’s assassination efforts. They may have suggested 
this to Kennedy: a few weeks before the Bay of Pigs landing, President Kennedy 
commented to his close friend Senator George Smathers that he had been ‘given to 
believe’ by the CIA that Castro would be dead by the time of the invasion.1124  
This also helps to explain the acceleration of the CIA’s cooperation with the 
Mob in early 1961. In March, Roselli, Giancana and CIA officials met again in 
Miami – ostensibly for a world title boxing match, but in reality to hand over 
several botulinum pills.1125 Cuban exiles were to administer the pills via a contact at 
one of Castro’s favourite Havana restaurants.1126 The CIA also provided $18,936.65 
for expenses.1127 Roselli told his CIA handler soon afterwards that the pills had been 
placed in Cuba, but the attempt had failed. Various explanations have been offered 
as to why. One possibility is that the ‘go signal’ was never passed via Tony Varona 
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to the agent in Cuba who would have delivered them, 1128  possibly because 
uninformed US officials had isolated Varona for several days to prepare him to take 
governmental power after the invasion – a central breakdown in Bissell’s 
coordination of the assassination and Bay of Pigs plans.1129 Alternatively, the 
message may have been passed, but the attempt simply failed.  
Learning from the Mob? 
A week after the Bay of Pigs President Kennedy explicitly recognized that Cold 
War confrontation would now move into the covert sphere, relying on ‘infiltration 
instead of invasion, on subversion instead of elections, on intimidation instead of 
free choice, on guerrillas by night instead of armies by day’.1130 Suddenly, the 
methods of the Mob looked all the more important. Rejecting Cuban overtures to set 
up back channel negotiations, President Kennedy tasked his brother Robert, his 
Attorney-General, with supervising the CIA’s Cuba planning, and established an 
internal panel to come up with new policy options, looking not only at military and 
paramilitary options, but also other ‘activities which fall short of outright war’.1131  
Covert activity was the focus of this new subversive effort. A report 
prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered staging fake Cuban attacks on the 
US naval base on Guantánamo or on other Latin American countries, or fake 
Cuban-government terrorist attacks on Cuban exiles in the US, as a trigger for US 
intervention.1132 In November 1961, Kennedy established Operation Mongoose, a 
covert operation intended to stoke a Cuban popular uprising as a pretext for US 
intervention. At its peak in the summer of 1962, the Miami-based operation 
involved 600 CIA staff and some 4,000-5,000 contractors running sabotage, 
infiltration and arms positioning missions into Cuba.1133 Cuban exiles began calling 
the CIA the ‘Cuban Invasion Authority’.1134  
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 Despite the scale of the effort, the CIA concluded that it needed new covert 
capabilities. Richard Bissell and another senior official, Richard Helms, tasked 
William Harvey – also charged with leading Operation Mongoose, and already in 
contact with Roselli – with overseeing a new project codenamed ZR/RIFLE, known 
informally as ‘Executive Action’. This was not to be a specific operation targeted at 
a particular leader, but rather ‘a general stand-by-capability to carry out 
assassinations’ across the Agency’s files.1135 Harvey sought advice from the British 
Security Service, MI-5, on how to carry out arms-length assassination. They 
recommended recruiting hit-men from the Sicilian mafia.1136 Harvey recruited a 
European professional criminal as an assassin and tasked him with spotting other 
suitable ‘individuals with criminal and underworld connections’.1137 One potential 
asset in the Middle East, for example, was ‘the leader of a gambling syndicate’ with 
‘an available pool of assassins’. 1138  ‘Executive Action’ seemed to promise 
something every clandestine operator – whether state or non-state – sought: an on-
call, plausibly deniable, surgical force-projection capability. It was the CIA’s 
answer to Murder, Inc., a ‘magic button’, as Harvey put it, in the CIA’s arsenal: one 
press and the CIA’s enemies would magically drop dead.1139 
Like many magic tricks, though, it turned out to be a dangerous illusion. 
One of the hit-men hired through Executive Action was aptly codenamed 
WI/ROGUE.1140 ‘Rogue’ was unleashed in Congo in late 1960 to assassinate Patrice 
Lumumba, the independence leader who was proving hard to control. But ‘Rogue’ 
turned out to be, in the memorable words of the CIA station chief, ‘an unguided 
missile’ who ‘seemed to act on his own without guidance or authority’.1141 He was 
removed from the project. In November 1961, however, despite this warning sign of 
how hard it would be to control Executive Action assets, Bissell and Helms 
instructed Harvey to apply Executive Action to Cuba.1142 Harvey began reactivating 
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the CIA-Mob collaboration, which had been put on hold earlier in 1961. In April 
1962 Harvey met again with Roselli, passed him 4 more ‘poison pills’ and provided 
explosives, sniper rifles, handguns and a boat radar, encouraging Roselli to work 
with Varona to infiltrate a team of hit men into Cuba.1143 Roselli soon reported back 
that the plans were operational.1144 For the Mob, this may have been a charade. The 
CIA had no way to confirm what Roselli told them, and there are signs that Roselli 
was duping them.1145 By the summer of 1962 the Mob may in fact have lost interest 
in getting rid of Castro, and turned its attention to other ventures elsewhere in the 
Caribbean (discussed below). But the Mob had strong domestic incentives to keep 
stringing the CIA along, namely protection against prosecution, even as 
assassination of Castro ceased to be ‘a viable option’. 1146 
 Many questions have been asked, including by US Congress, about what 
precisely the Kennedys knew about all these efforts. The answers are highly 
revealing, because they highlight the extent to which Mob and CIA methods 
converged – and the affinity between organized crime and covert state action more 
generally. Neither President Eisenhower nor President Kennedy ever gave a 
documented, explicit directive to assassinate Castro. Kennedy, on the contrary, took 
active steps to distance himself from the assassination option. 1147  But both 
Administrations recognized the importance of ‘plausible deniability’ in tackling 
Castro: achieving the result without the US’ role being visible.1148 That was the 
nature of covert action – and hidden power.   
 Indeed, both Kennedys were intimately aware of the steps taken by Mob 
leaders to insulate themselves from knowledge of operational details, once they had 
given a general order for a hit.1149 As a US Senator, John F. Kennedy sat on the 
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McClellan Committee, the Senate Select Committee that investigated the role of the 
Mob in US labour racketeering. Robert Kennedy served as chief counsel to that 
committee, driving its pursuit of Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamsters Union. He worked 
closely in this investigation with Frank Hogan, the Manhattan District Attorney 
involved in the Underworld Project, and wrote a best-seller about the McClellan 
investigation, The Enemy Within.1150 Introducing the first televised Congressional 
statement by a former Mobster, Joe Valachi, Bobby Kennedy demonstrated a 
detailed understanding of how Mob leaders covered their tracks when ordering 
assassinations: 
[B]ecause the members of the [mafia] Commission, the top members, or 
even their chief lieutenants, have insulated themselves from the crime itself, 
if they want to have somebody knocked off, for instance, the top man will 
speak to somebody who will speak to somebody else who will speak to 
somebody else and order it. The man who actually does the gun work… he 
does not know who ordered it. To trace that back is virtually impossible.1151  
The similarity with the ‘inherently ambiguous’ command and control system 
for the CIA’s Executive Action programme is clear. CIA officials might have 
planned assassinations without an explicit authorization; but equally,  
this ambiguity and imprecision leaves open the possibility that there was a 
successful ‘plausible denial’ and that a Presidential authorization was 
issued but is now obscured.1152 
The Kennedy brothers could not have been clearer that the overall strategic 
objective was Castro’s removal from power. After the Bay of Pigs, they both 
‘chewed out’ Bissell in the White House Cabinet Room for ‘sitting on his ass and 
not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime’.1153 Bobby 
made clear at a National Security Council subgroup meeting in January 1962 that ‘a 
solution to the Cuban problem’ was the President’s ‘top priority’.1154 And they also 
seemed to be dropping hints that they would not be averse to assassination as a 
method to achieve this goal. In October 1961 the President expressed interest in 
planning for Castro’s being ‘unexpectedly removed’.1155 In March 1962 Bobby 
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pushed for ‘action’ against Castro when he visited a ‘shrine’ to Ernest Hemingway 
near Havana.1156 By October 1962 the planning group Bobby led had decided ‘to 
develop new and imaginative approaches with the possibility of getting rid of the 
Castro regime’. 1157 At least some in the CIA took such hints to mean that 
assassination was implicitly authorized – even desired.1158 The situation was, one 
Church Committee member suggested, analogous to that in England in 1170 A.D., 
when King Henry II complained of Thomas Becket, ‘Who will rid me of this 
turbulent priest?’1159  
When he assumed office and was briefed about what had been going on, 
President Lyndon Johnson exclaimed simply: ‘We’ve been operating a damned 
Murder Inc. in the Caribbean’.1160 CIA officials did not seek specific clarification of 
the instruction to assassinate Castro because – like mafia soldati – they were 
accustomed to carrying out implicit orders without jeopardizing their superiors’ 
security. Compartmentalization of information was as engrained in the CIA’s 
organizational DNA as it was in the Mob’s. CIA official Richard Helms explained:  
I don’t know whether it was in training, experience, tradition or exactly 
what one points to, but I think to go up to a Cabinet officer and say, am I 
right in assuming you want me to assassinate Castro… is a question it 
wouldn’t have occurred to me to ask.1161  
Helms was just discharging his role, as he understood it within the 
prevailing clandestine operators’ governmentality: ‘I was just doing my best to do 
what I thought I was supposed to do.’1162 
CIA officials also appear to have interpreted their instructions as allowing 
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direct collaboration with the Mob, notwithstanding the absence of explicit 
authorization to that effect.1163 CIA officials later explained to Congress that they 
were not surprised that they had not seen any such explicit authorization, since they 
assumed that in order to ‘protect’ the President, the CIA would inform the White 
House of only the minimum amount of operational detail. ‘[D]ue to its sensitive and 
unsavory character, it was not the type of program one would discuss in front of 
high officials’.1164   
Bobby Kennedy was certainly briefed that Operation Mongoose would 
attempt to work with Cuban gangsters, and the lead military planner, Lansdale, had 
previously cooperated with criminal groups in Vietnam.1165 Kennedy did not protest 
about the criminal aspect of Mongoose, nor when he was apparently informed by 
the FBI, on his first day in office, of the Mob’s direct collaboration with the 
CIA.1166 By May 1961 the Attorney-General also knew that it was Sam Giancana – 
one of his main domestic organized crime targets – that the CIA was working with 
in this ‘dirty business’ against Castro.1167 He did not order the cooperation shut 
down: instead he simply insisted the FBI ‘follow up vigorously’. That they did. But 
this only compounded the mess, since the resulting surveillance revealed that the 
President shared a mistress, Judith Campbell, with Giancana. Campbell had even 
called the President at the White House from Giancana’s house.1168  
It was not until early May 1962 that the CIA told Robert explicitly that their 
cooperation with the Mob had aimed at assassinating Castro; but CIA officials 
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claim that they also indicated (wrongly) that these efforts had been terminated back 
in May 1961.1169 Again, Robert did not tell the CIA that he would resist such 
cooperation with the Mob in future. Rather he simply insisted that he must be ‘the 
first to know’.1170 CIA officials continued to work with the Mob to kill Castro – 
without specifically informing the Attorney-General.1171  
The CIA leadership’s decision-making logic was highlighted in an exchange 
between Richard Helms and a member of the Church Committee. A member asked: 
‘[A]s I understand your position on the assassination of Castro, no one in essence 
told you to do it, no one in essence told you not to do it . . . is that correct?’ ‘Yes, 
sir,’ Helms replied.1172 The culture was, in other words, one of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell’.1173  The ‘Don't Tell’ aspect – with its overtones of the mafia’s omertà – was 
highly significant. It was not just a policy of passive silence, but active silence. It 
helps to explain why CIA officials went out of their way to cover their tracks, lying 
not only to Robert Kennedy but apparently also to the Church Committee about 
their on-going contacts with the Mob after May 1961.1174 They were conducting 
themselves in accordance with an internalized code; they were bound by the covert 
operators’ governmentality. It was a governmentality that Mob actors would 
recognize, and easily integrate with. 
Whether or not the Kennedys specifically set out to copy the Mob, what 
emerges from this episode is a recognition that the strategic organization and 
decision-making of the clandestine intelligence and security services of states may 
be more similar to those of criminal organizations than previously allowed. This is 
not to say that they have the same strategic goals; but rather similar ways and means. 
The similarity of the set-ups almost invites inter-operability. This extends to the role 
of secrecy, compartmentalization of information, and the structure of strategic 
decision-making. In both cases, trust is paramount, and top leaders must be isolated 
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from some risky operational information. This is why family members are perfectly 
placed to serve as the trusted cut-out between political leadership and the covert 
world. In dealing with the CIA, Robert Kennedy seems to have taken on that role. 
Brothers and sons regularly play a similar role: Marko Milošević in Serbia, 
Ousmane Conté in Guinea (Conakry), Uday and Qusay Hussein in Iraq, Wali 
Karzai in Afghanistan.  
Cold War wildcard: the Missile Crisis 
If the extent of senior Kennedy Administration approval for the CIA-Mob 
assassination plots is unclear to us fifty years later with the benefit of hindsight and 
access to declassified government records, it can only have been doubly unclear for 
Fidel Castro at the time. As the Church Committee recognized ‘it is unlikely that 
Castro would have distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from those 
plots not backed by the CIA.’1175 And as the House Select Committee pointed out,  
when Castro erred in his assumptions, it was in the direction of attributing 
more, not less, responsibility for attempts to depose him to U.S. 
Government actions than might have been merited.1176  
The CIA-Mob efforts were, after all, consonant with the US’ traditionally 
meddlesome strategic approach to Cuba. The US had not hesitated in the past to 
escalate arms-length policies of subversion to direct military intervention. Nor, seen 
from Havana, was there necessarily a clear difference between the CIA 
collaborating with the Mob to reinstall American gamblers in Havana, and the CIA 
collaborating with the United Fruit Company to protect American capital in 
Guatemala. Seen from Havana, the boundary between the US government, business 
and criminal groups must have been beginning to blur, just as the distinction 
between Russian business, state and criminal interests blurred for Jim Woolsey 
decades later. Castro indeed began to describe American diplomats and officials as 
‘gangsters’.1177 The CIA’s collaboration with the Mob had raised the risk that 
Castro would mistakenly perceive Mob freelancing as part of a broader US strategy. 
That made the Mob a dangerous wildcard in the geopolitical confrontation now 
playing out in the Caribbean.  
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A major Cold War confrontation seemed increasingly likely as Castro 
moved rapidly towards the Communist camp in the wake of the Bay of Pigs. In 
December 1961 Castro proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist, with the Cuban state 
taking control of 90 per cent of industrial output.1178 With the US rehearsing 
amphibious landings in the spring of 1962, the USSR and Cuba began to explore a 
formal defence treaty. Soviet personnel and arms began to arrive in numbers in July 
1962.  By late August 1962, US intelligence had identified that the Soviets were 
shipping surface to air missiles (SAMs) to Cuba. The Director of Central 
Intelligence, McCone, hypothesized that the Soviet leader Khrushchev was risking 
nuclear war in the belief that if he could secretly put offensive missiles in Cuba that 
could compensate for the Soviet’s huge lag behind the US in production and 
possession of inter-continental ballistic missiles, and potentially provide leverage 
that could be used in other global hotspots, including Berlin. 1179  McCone’s 
hypothesis took time to find support in Washington. Others saw the SAMs simply 
as a deterrent to US military intervention in Cuba, and refused to believe 
Khrushchev would place nuclear warheads in Cuba.1180 In fact, by mid-October 
1962, 42 medium range ballistic missile launchers, 66 nuclear warheads, 40 MiG 
jets, nine bombers and 42,000 Soviet troops had reached Cuba.1181   
The Kennedy Administration continued to search for a covert mechanism to 
dislodge Castro. But events were quickly overtaking the covert option, especially 
once US surveillance overflights discovered the Soviet-assisted development of 
medium-range missile sites in Cuba. 1182  Soviet moves were forcing the 
confrontation into the open – though earlier than Khrushchev had hoped. The 
puzzle for the Kennedy administration – which it argued over furiously for days – 
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was how to win the confrontation without it escalating into nuclear war.1183 Covert 
activity was starting to become not just irrelevant, but possibly dangerous: killing 
Castro was no solution to the larger strategic threat posed by the Soviets, and 
Castro’s death would probably gravely inflame the situation and risk Soviet 
retaliation in Berlin, leading to nuclear war.1184 Freelance Mob-backed paramilitary 
or assassination activities now risked triggering a full-blown nuclear superpower 
confrontation. 
When US intelligence indicated some of the Soviet missiles in Cuba were 
becoming operational, Kennedy opted for a naval ‘quarantine’ of Cuba and called 
on Khrushchev to remove the missiles.1185 The blockade involved 150 vessels, 250 
aircraft and 30,000 mobilized personnel, and the US’ Strategic Air Command 
moved to Defence Condition 2 (DEFCON 2) – one level below nuclear war, the 
first time this level had been reached. The military prepared in case full-scale 
invasion of Cuba became necessary.1186 Amidst this tension, the CIA’s Harvey 
decided to send commando teams to Cuba by submarine, without clearing it with 
the White House. When the Kennedys got wind of it, they realized the wildcard 
danger posed by the on-going covert activities. On 26 October the administration 
formally suspended ‘sabotage or militant operations during negotiations with the 
Soviets’.1187  
On 27 October, Khrushchev publicly proposed a trade: the Soviets would 
remove their missiles in Cuba if the Americans would remove theirs in Turkey – 
and leave Cuba to its own devices.1188 It took several more days – and near misses – 
before a deal was agreed.1189 Kennedy had to resist considerable pressure from his 
military advisers to launch an attack on Cuba, and Khrushchev had to overcome 
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similar belligerence from Castro. 1190  Even after the deal was done, Castro 
complained that while the US might formally guarantee Cuban sovereignty, it could 
continue to attack him through ‘piratical’, mercenary and criminal proxies.1191 In 
order to be seen to honour its promise of non-intervention, the US government 
moved towards a policy of supporting exile groups only where they operated from 
outside the US. Both Operation Mongoose, which had supported exile groups’ 
operations from inside the US, and the cooperation with Mob were finally shut 
down.1192  
 This was not, however, the end of the Mob’s attempts at transnational 
subversion. Instead, the withdrawal of American government sponsorship led some 
American mafiosi and Cuban exiles to create another government-in-exile which 
they would seek to install in Cuba through their own independent use of force.1193 
The main Cuban partner was the Junta de Gobierno de Cuba en el Exilio (Junta for 
the Government of Cuba in Exile – JGCE), an umbrella group that included Prío 
Socarras, veterans of the Bay of Pigs, and a network of Cuban exile groups 
coordinated by Paulino Sierra Martinez. A consortium of Las Vegas-linked 
Mobsters offered Martinez up to $30 million to fund these groups, in return for the 
reestablishment of the mafia’s ‘gambling colony’ in Cuba after Castro was 
removed.1194  
Sierra Martinez’s networks, operating from Central America, made 
considerable operational progress in 1963, emerging as potential spoilers of the 
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fragile truce. In mid-March 1963 the Alpha 66 group, a member of Sierra 
Martinez’s coalition, mounted attacks on Soviet vessels and several Soviet 
installations in Cuba. The Kennedy Administration immediately distanced itself 
from the attacks, but the Soviets protested loudly.1195 In August 1963, members of 
Sierra Martinez’s network organized an aerial bombing of a sugar mill in Camaguey 
in central Cuba.1196 Yet Sierra Martinez proved unable to sustain support for these 
operations within the fractured Cuban exile community, and they slowly folded.  
Santo Trafficante Jr. also returned to the fray, financing operations and 
brokering access to arms. A planned air raid on the Shell Oil refinery near Havana, 
planned by Trafficante associate Michael McLaney, was broken up by US 
authorities. The FBI also seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and twenty bomb casings 
in a farmhouse owned by McLaney’s brother.1197 The CIA was made aware of some 
of these plans – but told the Mob this time around that ‘it would not provide 
assistance’. Once again, no mention was made of preventing the Mob activities, 
however.1198  
This may have represented a deeper recognition within the Kennedy 
Administration concerning the limited strategic utility of subversion. The US naval 
blockade against Cuba that had forced the resolution of the Missile Crisis had 
offered, said General Maxwell Taylor, a ‘classic example of the use of military 
power for political purposes’.1199 As Deborah Shapley writes, ‘The object [of the 
blockade] was not to shoot anybody but to communicate a political message to 
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Khrushchev.’1200 The signal to the Mob that the government would no longer 
cooperate with it on Cuba may have reflected a realization that traditional military 
forces, with their finely honed command and control arrangements, were better 
calibrated for conveying such political messages than covert operations carried out 
through criminal proxies at arms length. Criminal groups, it turned out, had their 
own political and military strategies – and their own, unpredictable strategic effects.  
Did the Magic Button backfire? 
It may be the case that the most unpredictable of these effects was felt not in the 
Caribbean, but at home. Warnings to the US government about the costs of 
collaboration with the Mob were early and frequent. In January 1961, a US 
Assistant Secretary of Defense warned the Eisenhower administration of a ‘serious 
impact upon United States prestige throughout Latin America’ if the Castro 
assassination efforts became known.1201 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover warned 
Bobby Kennedy of domestic political blowback.1202 William Harvey warned his 
CIA superiors of the ‘very real possibility’ that the mafia would blackmail the CIA, 
as indeed it did. 1203  No-one warned, however, about what would happen if 
Frankenstein’s monster turned on its former master.  
In The Enemy Within, Bobby Kennedy had called for a ‘national scale attack’ 
on organized crime.1204 When he became Attorney-General, he mounted that attack. 
Department of Justice indictments rose from 35 in the last year of the Eisenhower 
administration to 121 in Bobby’s first year as Attorney-General, and 615 in 1963 
(his last).1205  His campaign was conclusively establishing the existence, structure 
and activities of the mafia Commission, and the mafia’s ‘deep-rooted and extensive 
record of political activism’. It caused ‘deep frustration’ amongst Mob leaders at the 
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disruption of ‘their long-established connections with the political 
establishment’.1206 Federal investigations and prosecutions had broken through the 
wall of omertà. Six weeks before President Kennedy was killed in November 1963, 
Joe Valachi became the first Mob insider to testify before Congress, live on 
television, introduced by Bobby Kennedy himself. When Mob leaders discovered 
government bugs in their Las Vegas casino counting-houses, further suspicion and 
distrust was sown in Mob ranks.1207 Joe Bonanno was openly flouting mafia 
Commission authority by refusing to meet with other Commission members. 
Several other capi were known to be plotting each other’s assassinations. Sam 
Giancana, known to CIA as ‘Sam Gold’, felt all this pressure acutely, with the FBI 
(under Kennedy’s direction) disrupting his influence over the Chicago City Council, 
police and prosecutor’s office in 1962 and 1963.1208 FBI wiretaps established that 
Giancana and other Mob leaders directly blamed the Kennedys for these disruptions, 
and that they had even off-handedly thrown around the idea of killing the Kennedy 
brothers.1209  
Speculation about the Mob’s involvement began almost as soon as President 
Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on 22 November 1963. Both Bobby Kennedy 
and President Johnson privately voiced suspicion about underworld 
involvement.1210 And a variety of theories have canvassed the possibility of the 
Mob carrying out the killing alone, or in cooperation with Castro. Castro had 
warned that ‘United States leaders should think that if they are aiding in terrorist 
plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe,’ and Kennedy 
had himself acknowledged that if the US should compete with its adversaries in 
‘tactics of terror, assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises … we 
would all be targets’. 1211 If the US government could work together with the Mob 
to kill Castro, what was to stop Cuban officials plotting with disgruntled Mobsters 
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to kill Kennedy?1212 Was not this exactly the kind of ‘fifth column’ risk that the US 
Navy had warned about when justifying the Underworld Project?  
There was a trail of breadcrumbs that seemed to implicate the Mob, 
somehow.1213 Key figures in Kennedy’s assassination – including Lee Harvey 
Oswald and Jack Ruby – had connections to Mob leaders.1214 Ruby may have been 
a cash courier for the Trafficantes, and appears to have been involved in the effort 
to extricate Santo Trafficante Jr. from immigration detention in Havana in 1959.1215 
One witness later claimed that Trafficante had told him that President Kennedy 
would ‘be hit’.1216 Trafficante – and other Mob figures, including Jimmy Hoffa – 
certainly seem to have welcomed the news that the Kennedys would be off their 
backs.1217  
Even if we cannot determine, as a matter of historical fact, whether the Mob 
was involved in President Kennedy’s assassination, the fact is that key figures such 
as his own brother and the succeeding US President – Lyndon Johnson – thought 
that this might have been the case.1218 That mere possibility is significant, since it 
suggests that through its collaboration with the CIA (and perhaps, earlier, with the 
US Navy and the AMG), some Mob actors now saw themselves, in the words of a 
1979 Congressional report, as capable of ‘using the resources at their disposal to 
increase their power … by assassinating the President’.1219 The Mob was not 
content to react to the strategic environment, but was now actively seeking to shape 
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The Bahamas and the birth of casino capitalism 
Invading Haiti 
Even as signs emerged in 1958 that Batista’s grip on power was slipping, Lansky 
was considering duplicating the Cuban joint venture elsewhere in the Caribbean. He 
led a series of exploratory trips by Mob leaders to Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Barbados, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Martinique, and the Dominican Republic.1220 In some cases 
Mob leaders conducted extensive talks with political leaders, notably Johnny Abbes 
Garcia and possibly President Trujillo in Dominican Republic.1221  
Haiti offered interesting possibilities. When an exiled Haitian army captain, 
Alex Pasquet, began selling futures in gambling concessions in a new, proposed 
post-Papa Doc Duvalier Haitian government, he found a willing buyer in Lansky 
and Florida Mobsters. A Florida police official with ties to Lansky’s network flew 
to Port-au-Prince and tried to activate a revolutionary movement. He was deported, 
and his contacts rounded up and executed. Undeterred, the police official and 
Pasquet raised new funds and mounted a small ‘invasion’. In late July 1958 they 
seized the Dessalines Barracks in Port-au-Prince, near the Presidential Palace. 
Eventually they were overrun by Duvalier’s Tontons Macoutes and annihilated.1222  
By 1961, Duvalier had however recognized the attractiveness of Mob 
involvement in gambling. David Iacovetti, a member of the Gambino Family from 
Brooklyn established a state-backed ‘numbers’ game: a ‘Republic of Haiti Welfare 
Fund Sweepstakes’, with tickets distributed and bought by the Haitian diaspora, and 
winners determined by the results of key horse races. In 1965, Duvalier sold a 
casino and slot machine concession to Joe Bonanno. Bonanno spent a year in 
Haiti.1223 Smarting from their failed joint venture with Batista, the Mob this time 
took a more proactive approach to ensuring government protection against popular 
insurrection, actively equipping Duvalier with arms.1224 But whether because of 
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linguistic barriers, because Duvalier was not the reliable partner that Batista had 
been, or because Bonanno was not able to muster a broad coalition of Mob 
investors as Lansky had in Cuba, Port-au-Prince never became the tourist 
destination that Havana had been. The Mob had to look elsewhere. 
Casino capitalism 
The Bahamas was an obvious target: as close to Florida as was Cuba, and its official 
language was English. Better yet, it had long depended on rents generated by 
flouting the rules of international society: first as a base for large-scale piracy; then 
from a maritime racket involving first wrecking, then salvaging, ships; later, from 
busting the Union blockade on Confederate cotton during the American civil war; 
and then, during Prohibition, from bootlegging.1225 The small, white establishment 
clique that ruled The Bahamas – known as the ‘Bay Street Boys’ after their main 
gathering point – were comfortable bending international society’s rules to their 
advantage.   
Lansky had contacts in The Bahamas from rum-running during 
Prohibition.1226 He may have been involved in an effort to develop a gambling 
industry in The Bahamas in 1945-46, after Batista first lost power in Cuba, and 
appears to have returned to the notion around 1958.1227 Lansky travelled to the 
Bahamas and offered $1 million to Sir Stafford Sands, then Minister of Finance, for 
exclusive control of gambling on the islands.1228 The idea dovetailed with Sands’ 
efforts to turn one of The Bahamas’ least promising islands, Grand Bahama into a 
free industrial port. In 1956 Sands negotiated an official government agreement 
with Wallace Groves, a convicted American fraudster who may have had ties to 
Meyer Lansky before he arrived in The Bahamas.1229 The agreement gave Groves, 
in the words of a contemporary account, ‘the authority of a feudal baron’ on the 
island.1230 While the Bahamian government abstained from taxing commercial 
activity in the zone for 99 years, Groves was left free to impose fees, award and 
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remove licenses, and control access to the territory.1231 This made him the perfect 
partner for the Mob in a joint venture. 
In 1960 the Mob and the governing party in The Bahamas, the United 
Bahamian Party (UBP, controlled by the Bay Street Boys) met in Miami – yes, at 
the Fontainebleau Hotel. The UBP leadership agreed to turn over part of the free 
trade zone on Grand Bahama to a hotel and resort complex.1232 Groves’ Port 
Authority formed a partnership with DevCo, a Mob front operated through several 
characters involved in the armed attacks in Cuba, notably Michael McLaney, and 
‘Trigger Mike’ Coppola – a Luciano sottocapo who had driven the getaway car 
when Luciano’s men hit Joe Masseria in Coney Island.1233  
DevCo built a new resort on Grand Bahama, the Lucayan Beach Hotel, 
which had a mysterious, giant 9,000 square foot ‘handball court’ at the centre of its 
plans.1234 In September 1961, with the hotel already under construction, Groves and 
DevCo executives wined and dined the Bahamian Premier, Attorney General, 
Treasurer and Colonial Secretary and their wives at a series of get-togethers in The 
Bahamas and Miami Beach to convince them to legalize gambling at the resort. The 
strategic communications nature of these meetings was explicit: DevCo and Groves 
called it ‘Operation Indoctrination’.1235 As a result of these meetings, DevCo soon 
counted as paid ‘consultants’ the Bahamian Premier and Attorney-General, the 
Premier’s son (the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly) and the editor of the main 
Bahamian newspaper.1236 DevCo also promised to pay the UBP itself $10,000 per 
month, disguised as Sands’ legal retainer.1237 (In 2015, the 21-year Speaker of the 
New York State Assembly, Sheldon Silver, was accused of taking graft in the same 
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form.1238) The most influential independent voice in the Executive Council and 
editor of the Nassau Tribune, Eugene Dupuch, suddenly dropped his editorial 
opposition to the approval of a gambling license.1239 Sands, himself a member of 
the Executive Council, received over $500,000 in fees for managing the process, 
and a continuing consultancy contract that promised $50,000 per year if the venture 
retained its gambling license.1240  
The corruption campaign paid off handsomely, turning Grand Bahama – if 
not The Bahamas as a whole – into a joint venture between the Bay Street Boys and 
Lansky’s faction of the Mob, repeating the pattern from Havana. The ‘handball 
court’ was revealed as a gambling floor. By 1963, Sands was directly in business in 
the casino, through a new company, Bahama Amusements Limited, whose other 
hidden beneficiaries were Groves and Mob actors, notably Lansky.1241 Lansky and 
other Mob partners – probably including Costello and Santo Trafficante Jr. – lent 
the casino a $600,000 float and helped establish it within the north American high 
rollers’ circuit. Their entire debt was paid off within a year.1242  
As Hank Messick has explained, control of the casino bankroll gave the 
Mob the ‘trump cards’ in the entire scheme. While others financed and owned the 
port, the hotel, and surrounding businesses, they were all set up to operate – at a 
loss if necessary – to feed gamblers into the casino.1243  The casino was the central 
plaza in the system, the point at which the most lucrative criminal rents were 
extracted. The UBP provided political and physical protection, with the Police 
Commissioner also on the payroll. 1244 The Mob fed ‘high rollers’ – American 
organized criminals looking for a way to launder profits – into the system. To 
prevent them having to travel to The Bahamas with suitcases of cash, the casino 
advanced credit – making Mob knowledge of American underworld characters, and 
their creditworthiness, indispensable.1245  
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Mob expertise was also crucial to structuring this money-laundering scheme, 
and set precedents for the later era of ‘casino capitalism’.1246 Instead of ‘skimming’ 
the casino take by shovelling cash into suitcases before the authorities could count 
the day’s winnings, the Mobsters introduced a system where nothing was skimmed, 
and everything was counted. Casino managers simply received huge bonuses of 
several hundred thousand dollars at the end of the year, passing on significant 
amounts to their silent backers.1247 This was organized through Bahamian banks – 
and their correspondent banks in Miami – with the Bahamas soon becoming one of 
the leading hubs for offshore banking and the establishment of offshore shell 
companies.1248 Another method developed in Havana, The Bahamas and Las Vegas 
– the ‘junket skim’ – is still in use today, notably for moving cash out of China 
through Macau.1249 Under this system, the Mob would underwrite an apparently 
independent travel agency that would organize high rollers’ travel – and give them a 
‘float’. When those high rollers lost to the casino, they paid not the casino, but the 
travel agent. The ‘winnings’ never ran through the casino books – but still found 
their way back to the Mob, through the travel agency.1250 Some two thirds of The 
Bahamas casinos’ nominal profits derived from these junket tours in their early 
years.1251 
Ballots, not bullets  
By 1966, the Lucayan Beach casino was taking in at least $8 million annually. 
Mobsters spread out from the Lucayan to new Bahamian casinos.1252 Side rackets in 
drugs and prostitution were also flourishing. The Bahamas became a pioneer in the 
use of offshore shell companies, international tax evasion and international 
securities fraud.1253 Steadily, it was also drawn into international narcotics and arms 
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trafficking, and used for the offshore bribes to American judges and officials.1254  
Yet as successful as the Mob’s joint venture with the Bay Street Boys was 
proving, it suffered from the same vulnerability as its joint venture with Batista in 
Cuba: its reliance on an elite minority for political protection. And just as the 
Havana Cuban joint venture reduced Batista’s legitimacy through the stain of 
corruption, so was the Grand Bahama joint venture stoking popular discontent with 
the UBP. But this time the Mob adopted a radically different strategy, to vastly 
superior effect, suggesting it had learned from its Cuban mistakes.  
In the early 1960s the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), a black 
empowerment party led by a Nassau-born lawyer trained at King’s College London, 
Lynden Pindling, was pushing for Bahamian decolonization. Through 
gerrymandering, corruption and economic patronage, the Bay Street Boys’ UBP had 
until the mid-1950s kept a lock on seats in the Legislative Assembly. But in 1956 
the PLP managed to win six of 29 seats; and in 1962 it won nine of 33 seats – but 
65 per cent of the popular vote.1255 Emboldened, Pindling began pushing for 
political reform and even independence from Great Britain. He insisted that he ‘did 
not wish violence… the fate of Cuba… to befall the Bahamas’.1256 But the UBP’s 
responses to PLP gains – such as hiring South African and white Rhodesian 
officials, and playing South African government radio programs – seemed designed 
to engineer confrontation.1257  
The Mob knew from Cuba what that heralded. This time, Lansky decided to 
side with the revolution. Lansky and associates ‘set out to capture Pindling’.1258 
McLaney – involved in the aerial bombing in Cuba and in DevCo – was put in 
charge. He provided the PLP around $60,000 of in-kind campaign support: office 
space, communications support and aerial transportation.1259 He also went into the 
blueberry farming business with Pindling, a somewhat odd venture in the tropical 
Bahamas, given that plant’s preference for chilly winters.1260 In return, backing 
away from earlier anti-gambling rhetoric, the PLP agreed not to abolish gambling if 
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they came to power, but to tax it and use the resulting revenues for social 
programming and public works.1261  
Growing in confidence that they had an alternative partner in Pindling, the 
Mob leaked documentary evidence of UBP corruption, under the watchful eye of a 
New York public relations firm, Hill & Knowlton, to the press.1262 Groves briefed 
the US Saturday Evening Post.1263 Speaking to the Wall Street Journal, Pindling 
railed that under the UBP The Bahamas were ‘being sold out to “gangsterism”’.1264 
Sands responded: ‘As to the idea that I get a good share of the country’s prosperity, 
of course I do… But it’s worth remembering that I’ve been a part of making all the 
islands a lot more prosperous.’1265 Such statements, redolent of Tammany’s ‘honest 
graft’ in New York, only served to underline the white minority’s sense of 
entitlement, greatly bolstering electoral support for the PLP.  
When the election results were returned in January 1967, the PLP squeaked 
into government with the support of 2 independent MPs. The Mob’s hedging 
strategy seemed to have paid off. It had helped to organize, as one British 
newspaperman called it, ‘a peaceful revolution’.1266 Yet the high-risk move of 
leaking details of UBP corruption to the press brought significant scrutiny in the 
form of a Royal Commission. In the wake of the investigation, a few Mobsters were 
deported, but the underlying casino management structure was left largely in 
tact.1267 
The reality was that the PLP picked up where the UBP left off. Seventeen 
years later, another official government investigation  
revealed massive smuggling operations and political corruption. High 
Bahamian officials, and/or intimate associates of the prime minister 
[(Pindling) had become] the quintessential middlemen, selling protection 
and a resting place for contraband, permitting transporters for a fee to 
establish their headquarters on different islands and cays, tipping them off 
about D.E.A. raids and informants, and bringing together American pilots 
and Colombian [cocaine] producers.1268 
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 The criminologist Alan Block concludes: ‘the Commission of Inquiry 
proved that The Bahamas [itself] was a racket’.1269 Between 1977 and 1984, 
Pindling and his wife spent eight times their reported earnings, likely receiving 
significant payoffs from Colombia’s Medellín cartel in return for complete control 
over Norman’s Cay, a Bahamian island that was used as a trans-shipment hub for 
moving cocaine into the United States.1270 All up, by the mid-1980s some fifteen 
islands and cays were either totally or partially controlled by drug runners.1271 
Through this period, The Bahamas evolved into an exemplar of the off-shore 
plaza in a globalizing illicit economy. Narcotics, arms and corruption deals were 
sealed at the Bahamas’ resorts, with illicit merchandise stashed handily nearby, and 
money-laundering services offered via the casino or the local banks. Bahamian 
banks’ provision of eurodollar services – deposits denominated in US dollars, but 
not under US Federal Reserve jurisdiction, and thus not subject to US tax regulation 
– were particularly useful. By the mid-1980s, The Bahamas had become a major 
offshore banking centre, with more than $100 billion in Eurodollar deposits.1272 By 
the 1980s, other mafia groups had recognized the power of this off-shore banking 
model. The Cuntrera-Caruana cosca of the Sicilian mafia, the so-called ‘bankers to 
the mafia’, had developed a similar platform for cocaine trafficking and money-
laundering through a joint venture with state officials on the Dutch island of Aruba, 
near Colombia and Venezuela.1273 The application of the blue ocean model in the 
Caribbean had succeeded.  
 
Conclusion 
Castro’s rise to power in Cuba created many losers, including the Havana Mob, the 
American Mob, and the US government. Within twenty months of his arrival in 
Havana elements of all three groups were cooperating to assassinate him. The 
traditional account has suggested that this was a CIA-run conspiracy, with mafia 
guns and Cuban exiles simply brought in as ‘plausibly deniable’ covert assets. The 
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closer examination of the historical record provided in this chapter suggests 
something quite different: that the American Mob formulated its own plans to kill 
Castro, which the CIA then decided to ‘piggyback’ upon and sponsor. This was 
exactly the kind of ‘convergence’, with criminal elements manufacturing state 
support for their own criminal designs, that the White House would warn about 50 
years later in its Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. 
The episode studied in this chapter suggests that the Mob enjoyed a greater 
level of autonomous agency in international affairs than has previously been 
appreciated. When Cuba became a critical site of superpower confrontation during 
the Cold War, that autonomy turned out to have unexpected consequences for the 
US. The US failure at the Bay of Pigs may have been in part a result of its 
manipulation by the Mob, expecting the Mob to have removed Castro. And Mob 
autonomy also enlarged the risk of Soviet misunderstanding of US actions during 
and after the Cuban Missile Crisis. That the Mob did not accidentally trigger 
nuclear war or spoil the deal negotiated by Kennedy and Khrushchev may be in part 
because the Mob’s interest in Cuba had waned in the early 1960s, as it found 
success with its ‘joint venture’ model of collaborative government elsewhere in the 
Caribbean.  
Mob efforts to relocate their joint venture from Cuba to a new the Caribbean 
location also suggest a role for centrally-directed strategy in criminal relocation that 
many contemporary theorists, such as Carlo Morselli, deny exists.1274 And Mob 
adaptation to changing political circumstances in The Bahamas also suggests 
strategic learning amongst some Mob leaders, notably Meyer Lansky, as a result of 
the strategic failures in Cuba. In Cuba, the Mob had no real Plan B, should Batista 
fall. In The Bahamas, in contrast, when the political winds shifted, the Mob  pro-
actively cultivated a relationship with the political opposition, helped it into power, 
and successfully rode the wave of decolonization. As with its efforts to achieve 
regime change in Cuba, this suggested a Mob that not only responded to political 
developments, but also sought to shape them. It was a group that was not afraid to 
use force, but which had also come to understand the limited strategic utility of 
force.  
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This was in part because of the changing geography of power. The 
globalization of finance and trade was changing the role of territorial control in the 
extraction of rents – both licit and illicit – and thus changing the location at which 
criminal power could most effectively be organized. New transportation and 
communication technologies had rendered both capital and labour mobile. The 
utility of political and juridical sovereignty was changing. Instead of deriving power 
from territorial control and the extraction of rents from fixed assets, rulers were now 
confronted by a regulatory race to the bottom in an effort to attract fickle, private 
transnational flows of capital. A new economic strategy was open to state leaders 
that dared to adopt it: they could now derive wealth and power from arbitrage, 
simply by legalizing or licensing – whether formally or informally – goods, services 
and activities that were illegal nearby, using casinos and financial institutions as 
money-laundering services. In Cuba, much of Havana was rented out to criminal 
interests in this way. In The Bahamas, it was most of Grand Bahama.  
Where the CIA-Mob collaboration in Cuba had suggested a convergence 
between organized crime’s coercive methods and state covert operations, here there 
was a convergence between the strategic logic of organized crime and economic 
stratecraft. Like a mafia’s power, for some state actors power in the international 
system seemed increasingly to lie in using their control of sovereignty and 
governmental institutions to broker between two levels: international markets and 
local jurisdiction.1275 This was the gap into which the off-shore tax and banking 
havens would step in subsequent decades. This new approach to ‘casino capitalism’ 
offered a powerful realization of the Mob’s strategic vision: the creation of venues 
for the private accumulation of capital, without the loss of any of that capital to 
public governmental purposes through redistributive taxation, social welfare or the 
provision of public goods.1276 The strategic logic of organized crime, and the 
economic logic subscribed to by some political actors, seemed to be converging. 
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9. Strategic criminal positioning 
 
To reign is worth ambition, though in Hell: 
Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven. 
Satan, in Milton’s Paradise Lost1277 
 
What can we learn from the historical episodes of criminal strategizing considered 
in Part Two about contemporary interactions between states and organized crime? 
The episodes explored in Part Two reveal criminal organizations using several 
approaches to compete – and cooperate – with states for governmental power. Irish, 
Jewish and Italian neighbourhood gangs in New York sometimes kept to 
themselves avoiding the state, as did some Sicilian hinterland bandits. Other groups, 
such as the Sicilian mafia and New York Mob, emerged as brokers between the 
state and these local communities. And in other cases collaborative joint ventures 
emerged between political actors and organized crime, as we saw in New York, 
Havana, Palermo and The Bahamas. In another set of cases, the same mafia actors 
actively confronted states, mounting domestic insurgency (Sicily) or transnational 
armed attacks (Cuba, Haiti); or relocated, whether as a result of migration (from 
Sicily to the US), deportation (the US to Sicily), or by design (to Cuba, Haiti and 
The Bahamas). Understanding what explains the differences in these historical 
cases may offer insights into contemporary interactions between states and 
organized crime, and into the deeper strategic logic of organized crime. 
 The traditional structuralist approach to explaining these variations 
suggested that criminals organize where the state is ‘failed’ or absent, or in 
‘ungoverned spaces’.1278 World Bank economist Stergios Skaperdas speaks of 
‘power vacuums’.1279 Criminologists such as Vincenzo Ruggiero and Nikos Passas 
write of a ‘paradigm of deficit’1280 and ‘criminogenic asymmetries’.1281 But the 
episodes in Part Two show that criminal organization can develop where the state is 
                                                
1277 John Milton, Paradise Lost (London: Penguin Classics, 1667/2003), Book I, ll. 262-263.  
1278 Clunan and Trinkunas. 
1279 Skaperdas.  
1280 Vincenzo Ruggiero, Organized and Corporate Crime in Europe: Offers that Can’t be Refused 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996), p. 33. 
1281 Nikos Passas, ‘Globalization and Transnational Crime: Effects of Criminogenic Asymmetries’, 
in Williams and Vlassis, pp. 22-56.  
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absent (in post-War Sicily); where it is abstinent (on Grand Bahama); where it is 
present but ineffective (in immigrant slums on Manhattan’s Lower East Side, on 
New York’s wharves during World War II, or in occupied Palermo); and even 
where the state is present and effective but susceptible to corruption or coercion (e.g. 
in Havana, or 1950s Palermo). State presence, absence and abstinence are not the 
golden keys that unlock the riddle of criminal power.  
Part Two suggests that we instead need a more nuanced understanding of 
the dynamic interaction between states, criminal organizations and other actors in 
the competition to control governmental institutions and supply governmentality. 
Business management theorists such as Michael Porter long ago pointed out that 
market structure is not a static artefact, but better understood in terms of its dynamic 
interaction with enterprise strategy; and Phil Williams has suggested such analysis 
can usefully be extended to the dynamics of competition in markets for illicit goods 
and services, such as narcotics.1282 The episodes in Part Two suggest there may be 
utility in extending this kind of analysis to another market in which some criminal 
enterprises compete: the market for government.  
 
The market for government  
The market for government involves competition not only to control formal 
government decision-making and institutions, but also to supply governmentality, 
as that term was described in Part One. This involves competition for the allegiance 
of individuals and groups as consumers and participants in a specific normative 
system by which they can regulate their own conduct – whether we think of that 
system as political, religious, or in some other terms.1283 The market for government 
involves competition not simply to control legislatures, courts and police – 
institutions – but, more fundamentally, to become the source of the normative order 
                                                
1282  See Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and 
competitors (New York: The Free Press, 1980); Phil Williams, ‘The International Drug Trade: An 
Industry Analysis’, in G. H. Turbiville ed., Global Dimensions of High Intensity Crime and Low 
Intensity Conflict (Chicago IL: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1995), pp. 153-183.  
1283 Compare Alex de Waal’s notion of the ‘political marketplace’ in Africa: Alex de Waal, ‘Mission 
without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace’, International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 1 
(2009), pp. 99-113; David Kilcullen’s ‘theory of competitive control’ in Out of the Mountains: The 
Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (Oxford: OUP, 2003), pp. 116-168; and Vanda Felbab-Brown’s 
notion of states and criminal actors as ‘competitors in state-making’: ‘Conceptualizing’, op. cit.. 
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that ‘sets the possible field of action for others’ (see Chapter 2). In the case of 
criminal power, the system – and one’s allegiance to it – is secret and hidden and 
the group peddling this criminal governmentality will deliberately avoid a formal 
governmental role. But, as we have seen, though clandestine, that role is 
governmental nonetheless. 
Understanding the interaction and competition between states, criminal 
actors and other providers of government in these ‘market’ terms encourages us to 
think about how these rivals strategically position themselves in relation to each 
other. It also helps explain the focus to date on state ‘absence’ and ‘failure’. Where 
other governmental rivals are absent or weak, criminal organizations enjoy a 
sustainable pricing advantage, because the costs of supplying governmentality are 
lowered – and, as the sole provider of governmentality, monopoly prices can be 
levied. Roberto Saviano, the astute observer of the Camorra whom we met in Part 
One, describes this organizational logic at play in Naples: ‘Everything that is 
impossible to do elsewhere because of the inflexibility of contracts, laws, and 
copyright is feasible here’.1284 Here, criminal organization becomes both more 
attractive to participants – and more obvious to observers. For that reason, some 
commentators have speculated that there is a natural tendency on the part of 
organized crime towards monopoly and even the development of state-like 
characteristics, one of the reasons that Vanda Felbab-Brown speaks of organized 
crime and the state as ‘competitors’ in ‘state-making’.1285 But in many cases, as we 
have seen in Part Two, criminal groups forego such a monopolistic role within the 
upperworld, eschewing formal political authority in favour of hidden political 
influence. How do we explain these criminal positioning strategies which take place 
not in the absence of the state, but alongside, underneath and even, times, 
apparently from within the state?  
  The episodes in Part Two suggest that the answer depends in part on the 
capabilities available to a group – and the strategy it adopts to exploit those 
                                                
1284 Saviano, p. 38.  
1285 See Felbab-Brown, ‘Conceptualizing’; and see Jonathan Goodhand and David Mansfield, ‘Drugs 
and (Dis)Order: A Study of the opium trade, political settlements and state-making in Afghanistan’, 
Working Paper no. 83, Crisis States Working Paper Series No.2 (London: Crisis States Research 
Centre, 2010). Compare the discussion of roving and stationary bandits in Olson, ‘Dictatorship, 
Democracy and Development’.  
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capabilities. The two strategic aspects – internal capabilities and external 
positioning – were closely intertwined in those cases. The same is true today. Adam 
Elkus suggests, for example, that Mexican drug  
cartels are similar to medieval barons who engaged in constant struggles 
for power and alliance politics. Often times, inter-cartel battles are an 
outgrowth of internal cartel political intercourse, much as external wars are 
expressions of internal state politics. External shocks often have a 
destabilizing influence on internal group politics and dynamics.1286 
Certain patterns recur within this market as criminal organizations seek to 
combine internal capabilities in ways that deliver sustainable market positions. For 
example, criminal groups in the radically different contexts of Prohibition New 
York and post-War Sicily both adopted a ‘syndication’ or ‘cartel’ strategy – as did 
criminal groups in Colombia in the 1980s. The strategic logic was the same in each 
situation: pooling risk, reducing costs, and accessing economies of scale. And in 
each case this had both internal and external political effects. In the New York Mob, 
the Commission became an instrument not only of internal governance but also for 
coordinated positioning in relation to state officials (in the creation of the ‘Buy-
Money Bank’, and the attempt to influence the 1932 US Presidential nomination 
process). In Sicily, syndication led to the Cupola system, facilitating the emergence 
of the Palermo joint venture. And in Colombia, cartelisation was driven by 
economic considerations, but also produced coordinated strategy for dealing with 
the state on extradition and demobilization policy.1287  
What other such patterns can we see, particularly in how groups with 
criminal goals position themselves relative to states? Drawing on the episodes in 
Part Two, this chapter identifies six ideal-type positioning strategies adopted by 
criminal groups in the market for government, providing a new, more nuanced way 
of understanding the apparent ‘convergence’ between states, business and organized 
crime on the global stage. Key features of these strategies, and what they suggest 
about the shape of potentially effective state responses, are captured in Tables 1 and 
2, below. 
                                                
1286 Elkus, ‘Mexican Cartels’. On the resemblance to medieval barons, see also John Rapley, ‘The 
New Middle Ages’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 3 (2006), pp. 95-103. 
1287 Gianluca Fiorentini, ‘Oligopolistic Competition in Illegal Markets’, in Fiorentini and Peltzman, p. 
275; Francisco E. Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia (Boulder CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1995), pp. 93-108. 
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Three of these ideal-type positioning strategies involve accommodation with 
the state: 1) intermediation, as pursued by mafias; 2) criminal autonomy as pursued 
by warlords and local gang leaders; and 3) joint venture strategy, in which criminal 
groups and states vertically integrate capabilities. Three other positioning strategies 
emerge out of situations of confrontation: 4) strategic alliance against third parties; 
5) terrorism as a criminal strategy; and 6) criminal blue ocean strategy, a strategy of 
deliberate, directed relocation.  
This is not the first effort to develop an analytical framework for 
understanding how criminal groups are positioned vis-à-vis states. Peter Lupsha’s 
tripartite typology of predation, parasitism and symbiosis has received considerable 
attention.1288 Third Generation Gang Warfare scholarship offers a related model, 
describing gangs as evolving from ‘aggressive competitor’ to ‘subtle co-opter’ to 
‘criminal state successor’.1289 The problem with these models, however, is that they 
offer no theory of change. They cannot explain when, how or why a criminal 
organization will shift from one position to another. The analytical framework 
offered here may help us address this problem and, as we explore in the final 
chapter, provide a number of useful avenues for further research and practical 
guidance.  
  
                                                
1288 A. Peter Lupsha, ‘Transnational Organized Crime Versus the Nation State’, Transnational 
Organized Crime, vol. 2, no. 1 (1996), pp. 30-32; see also Naylor, ‘From Cold War’, pp. 46-47.  
1289 Max G. Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit 
Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica and Brazil 
(Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), p. 2. 
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Intermediation: mafia logic 
The default positioning strategy adopted by the Sicilian and American mafias in 
most of the episodes studied in Part Two was one of jurisdictional segmentation of 
the market for government.1290 Mafias – such as the Sicilian mafia, the American 
mafia, the Jewish gangs considered in Chapter 4, the Havana Mob considered in 
Chapter 7, or more recently groups in Russia and Kenya1291 – are clandestine 
governmental intermediaries, operating not just in the underworld, but at the 
interface between the upperworld and underworld. 1292  In this arrangement, a 
strategic actor exercises governmental power over a group or market operating 
beyond the state’s social, rather than physical, reach, intermediating between the 
two. As Eric Hobsbawm explained, mafia power rests on the creation of ‘a virtual 
parallel or subsidiary system of law and power to that of the official rulers’.1293  
Mafias broker corrupt exchanges, providing marginalised groups access to 
the goods and services controlled by higher political powers, to protection and to 
social mobility, while providing upperworld governmental actors access to assets in 
enclave populations and hidden markets: criminal finance, illicit labour, and 
votes.1294 As the Italian organized crime expert Pino Arlacchi put it, mafia power 
thus derives ‘from the privileged access they enjoy to the levers of State power’.1295 
As Anton Blok found, this can create a stable system in which the mafia ‘exercise 
jurisdiction … in conjunction with formal authority’.1296  
An actor’s power within a mafia thus depends on his position as an 
intermediary between the internal and the external, his control of internal violence 
and his influence over outsiders, including state actors. As we saw in Chapters 4 
and 5, Luciano’s power derived both from his effective use of force to see off 
internal rivals, and his influence over external rivals – whether Jewish gangsters or 
                                                
1290 On ‘jurisdictional sharing’ see Schelling, Choice and Consequence, p. 182.  
1291 Varese, The Russian Mafia; Wrong. 
1292 Hess, Mafia and Mafiosi, p. 29. On the related concept of ‘mediated states’ see generally Achim 
Wennmann, ‘Getting Armed Groups to the Table: Peace Processes, the Political Economy of 
Conflict and the Mediated State’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 6 (2009), pp. 1123-1138. 
1293 Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, pp. 5-6. Compare Hobsbawm, Bandits, p. 40. 
1294 Compare Daniel Bell, ‘Crime as an American Way of Life’, The Antioch Review, vol. 13, no. 2 
(Summer 1953), pp. 131-154; Ianni and Reuss-Ianni; and Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal 
Networks’, pp.78-80. 
1295 Arlacchi, Mafia Business, p. 40, cf. pp. 38-44, 69-75, 161-186.  
1296 Blok, The Mafia, pp. 94-96.  
  273 
the state. He could change the Mob’s culture to one based on a more collaborative, 
non-parochial outlook precisely because he was feared internally as the most 
ruthless and violent capo, having killed his two predecessors. Equally, once he was 
in power he could moderate his violence because he could offer mafiosi access to 
resources from outside their own ranks. He was in what Henner Hess called the 
‘optimal strategic position’ to be the ‘provider of, and channel for’ productive 
exchanges between these two strategic levels.1297  
The specific criminal governmentality promoted by mafias matches this 
secret intermediary role. Mafia governmentality is inherently clandestine, hidden 
inside and often drawing from prevailing mores and conventions. It is built on 
humans’ insatiable desire to have it both ways: their ‘desire to do so many things 
which they also desire to prohibit’.1298 Mafia strategic communications frequently 
straddle two quite distinct normative orders, balancing state-supporting political 
quietism with a claim to defend the values and security of marginalised 
populations.1299 The Sicilian mafia achieved this through emphasizing traditional 
values such as self-sufficiency, family, honour and, to some extent, Roman 
Catholicism. Luciano, in contrast, leading a mafia embedded in a modern American 
capitalist environment, oversaw the Mob’s adoption of a more entrepreneurial and 
materialistic governmentality. Both used omertà as the framework for influence and 
control, but the governmentality within each organization differed appreciably – at 
least until the 1950s, when the encounter with American power and culture during 
the AMG occupation, and direct Mob interactions with and influence over the 
Sicilian mafia, may have begun to change the Sicilian mafia’s external outlook and 
internal organization. 
Treating mafias as products of intermediary positioning strategy also 
provides potentially powerful insights into where mafias are likely to emerge, a 
major topic of current criminological research.1300 Part Two suggests that mafias are 
likely to emerge where two conditions hold: 1) major structural changes have 
created new or poorly governed markets, or weakened norms against participation 
                                                
1297 Hess, ‘Parastate’, p. 157. 
1298 Lippmann, ‘The Underworld’, p. 67. 
1299 Schulte-Bockholt.  
1300 See Morselli et al., ‘The mobility’ (2011) and ‘The mobility’ (2010); and Varese, Mafias on the 
move. 
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in illegal activity, creating an unmet demand for government; and 2) governmental 
capabilities are available at a corruption price that is lower than the pay-off from 
available criminal rents. Such conditions seem likely to hold consequent to a variety 
of politico-economic shocks: war, revolution, rapid mass immigration, the formal 
prohibition of a market, or the creation of new forms of property. The Sicilian mafia 
emerged in the context of the expansion of private property rights and Sicily’s 
sudden integration into the Italian political economy through political unification, 
without a concomitant extension of the state’s governmental capabilities.1301 The 
American mafia Families emerged in marginalized immigrant communities as a 
protection against the threat posed by the Black Hand to private property, and their 
development was accelerated by the advent of Prohibition. More recently, the 
Russian mafiya emerged with the introduction of the norm of private property in the 
context of post-Communist transition in the late 20th Century.1302  
This lens also helps us read the geography of mafia power. Mafias are likely 
to corrupt those institutions, and emerge at those levels of government, where 
governmental discretion could extend power into these hidden markets and 
marginalized populations, through defining norms (legislatures), enforcing them 
(police and courts) and allocating resources (expenditure decisions). If government 
institutions do not have these powers, then the pay-offs from corruption are unlikely 
to exceed the costs. Thus in the US, a federation that gives most of these powers in 
the first instance to cities and states, mafias emerged first at the municipal level, 
before extending their power to states; the interest in national politics was limited 
and late. In Italy, the mafia emerged first within specific latifundia (policed and run 
by gabellotti), then over time developed influence in Palermo, Rome and Brussels, 
as each of those became centres of legislative, judicial or spending power relevant 
to their operations. Likewise, we see contemporary mafias emerging at the local and 
state level in federations (such as Mexico and Somalia), and in capitals in more 
centralized polities (such as Kenya). In federal jurisdictions, in particular, this 
points to a potential state policy reponse: creating federal-level enforcement 
mechanisms to target local mafias. In Part Two we saw the Mob carefully avoiding 
federal crimes and jurisdiction, because of its limited reach into federal institutions.  
                                                
1301 Blok, ‘Reflections’, pp. 7-13.  
1302 Varese, The Russian Mafia; Handelmann. 
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Understanding mafia logic in these terms thus helps us to analyse where 
mafias emerge, the nature of their governmentality and, potentially, identify 
opportunities for effective state response. As hinted at in Table 1 above, these 
centre on addressing the opportunity structures that mafias exploit, by reducing the 
gap between the state and enclave markets or populations, through regulatory 
reform; and raising the costs of systematic corruption, including through 
introducing enforcement mechanisms from higher levels to provide oversight of 
local governance arrangements. In Chapter 10 we explore in more detail what such 
policy responses might look like. 
 
Autonomy: warlordism and gang rule 
Some of the episodes considered in Part Two also point to a very different criminal 
strategy for segmenting the market for government: not through jurisdictional 
sharing, but through territorial segmentation. The result is what we might call 
‘criminal autonomy’. 
Armed groups enjoying military control of territory have a short path to 
governmental power over both illicit and licit market exchanges within that territory. 
This can occur both where the state lacks effective territorial control – as we saw in 
post-conflict Sicily – or where a local organization such as a neighbourhood gang 
develops sufficient coercive and corruption capabilities to balance the state’s 
military or policing capabilities, and can begin to operate autonomously – as we 
saw with the local neighbourhood gangs of the Lower East Side, the gabellotti of 
post-Unification Sicily and, to a degree, the sugar barons of Cuba. Where the state 
goes along with the arrangement, we see a territorial segmentation of the market for 
government, with local actors emerging as de facto rulers. 
In a rural context, we often call such actors ‘warlords’, in part because they 
tend to emerge out of the ashes of war and the military structures of collapsing state, 
imperial and insurgent armies.1303 In recent decades, this pattern has emerged 
                                                
1303 Sasha Lezhnev, Crafting Peace: Strategies to Deal with Warlords in Collapsing States (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington, 2005); Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Respectable Warlords? The Politics Of State-Building 
in Post-Taleban Afghanistan’, Working Paper No. 33 (London: LSE Crisis States Programme, 
2003); Giustozzi, ‘Debate on Warlordism’, pp. 15-16.  
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particularly in Africa and Central Asia. 1304  Warlords emerge where ‘state 
institutions play little, if any, role in regulating political competition’.1305 Warlords 
take on basic governmental functions and authority themselves, setting norms, 
allocating resources, and resolving disputes.1306 Warlords’ governmental power 
usually straddles the grey area between the formal and illicit economies, and 
criminal activity has, historically, been a major source of warlords’ governmental 
power, from 1920s China to post-colonial Africa and Asia.1307 In fact, these 
criminal connections may help to explain why states turn a blind eye to warlords on 
their territory: it may enable the development of criminal rents from which the state 
can benefit through extortion (tribute), without the incursion of associated 
production costs, or the risk of threatened rivals banding together.1308 It can 
sometimes serve the interest of state powers to informally outsource the government 
of territories heavily dependent on organized crime, for example from illicit opium 
production (Afghanistan, Myanmar) or illicit mineral trafficking (DRC).  
The same strategic logic holds in urban contexts where particular 
neighbourhoods become plazas for illicit traffic, as has occurred with the posses in 
Kingston, Jamaica, and in some Brazilian favelas.1309 In this case, the groups 
exercising criminal autonomy tend to be self-starting protection groups, rather than 
remnants of shrinking state military institutions. In the case of The Bahamas studied 
in Chapter 8, we saw a variation on this type, with the state deliberately carving out 
an autonomous zone through the creation of a ‘baronial’ free-trade zone on Grand 
Bahama. In all of these situatons of autonomy, the local actor adopts a ‘neofeudal’ 
posture to the state, seeking neither to replace nor to secede from it, but rather to 
exploit their coercive capabilities, control over economic activity and state 
forebearance to exercise a high degree of local political autonomy, while offering 
                                                
1304 See Mark Duffield, ‘Post-modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-adjustment States and Private 
Protection’, Civil Wars, vol. 1, no. 1 (1998), pp. 65-102; Paul Jackson, ‘Warlords as Alternative 
Forms of Governance’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 14, no. 2 (2003), pp. 131-50; Kimberly 
Marten, ‘Warlordism in Comparative Perspective’, International Security, vol. 31, no. 3  (2006/07), 
pp. 41–73.  
1305 Reno, Warlord Politics, p. 8.  
1306 Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 10 et seq.  
1307 Anthony B. Chan, Arming the Chinese: Western Armaments Trade in warlord China, 1920-1928 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982); Strange, ‘Retreat’, pp. 116-117. 
1308 Antonio Giustozzi, The Art of Coercion. The Primitive Accumulation and Management of 
Coercive Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 14-15. 
1309 Kilcullen, pp. 89-102. 
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some level of fealty to the state.1310  
As with intermediation, the pursuit of criminal autonomy as an external 
positioning strategy seems to go hand in hand with a specific governmentality. 
Because, like mafias, they do not seek national power, warlords and gang leaders 
tend to advocate corrections of injustices within the existing normative order, rather 
than its revolutionary overthrow.1311 But warlord politics is usually framed in much 
more ‘local’ and place-specific terms than mafia culture; and warlord and gang rule 
is also much more overt. Warlords frequently present as community protectors 
resisting excessive state centralization; urban gang leaders often emphasize highly 
localized quality-of-life issues. Like mafias, warlords and local bosses may threaten 
formal secession, but that usually proves to be a temporary negotiating tactic 
designed to maximize local governmental power and balance between rival 
neighbouring states. In Myanmar, Khun Sa and other ethnic separatists relying on 
criminal markets (such as opium and jade trafficking) played this game for several 
decades, alternating between espousal of autonomy and advocacy of secession.1312  
The adoption of an autonomous posture in the market for government is also 
closely tied to internal organization. Depending upon coercive control of territory, 
warlords and gang rulers tend to adopt more centralized, hierarchical command 
structures than mafias and other criminal groups who are more dependent on 
clandestine operations, corruption and subversion. But their focus is military; as 
Giustozzi notes, warlords frequently develop a ‘neopatrimonialist attitude’ towards 
the populations they govern, with ‘institutionalisation weak or absent’.1313 The 
governmental system often involves undifferentiated political, military and 
economic authority in the person of the warlord or gang leader. Unless, that is, the 
extraction of rents incentivizes the development of a more complex and 
differentiated governmental apparatus.1314  
If rents can be extracted from non-labour intensive activity such as taxing 
transnational flows, the governmental apparatus is likely to be limited, as the 
                                                
1310 Duffield, ‘Post-modern Conflict’, p. 81. 
1311 Henriksen and Vinci, p. 93.  
1312 See Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Bangkok: White Lotus, 
1994). 
1313 Giustozzi, ‘Debate on Warlordism’, p. 14. 
1314 Jackson, ‘Warlords’. 
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warlord or gang leader can use his coercive capabilities to tax the trade, and 
piggyback on existing non-state authority structures to ensure local control.1315 This 
is the pattern in some parts of Afghanistan today.1316 It is also arguably the strategy 
adapted by Batista as Cuba’s strongman during the 1930s, taxing transnational 
flows while relying on the local ‘sugar barons’ for political support. But if larger 
rents can be derived from local production, there may be incentives for developing 
a more elaborate governmental apparatus and welfare system, in order to engage the 
local community in that production. This was arguably Batista’s strategy in the 
1950s, when he needed local labour to participate in the tourism economy he was 
promoting. It is arguably also the trajectory followed by Ismail Khan, a warlord in 
western Afghanistan.1317 
Cuba’s experience also provides insight into what happens when a stable 
territorial segmentation of the market for government loses its guarantor, as 
occurred when Batista left for Florida in 1944: gangsterismo. Political networks 
connecting the sugar barons into Batista’s Palace Gang began competing violently 
over market-share in the market for government. Politics became criminalized and 
paramilitarized. This may offer important lessons for countries where a weak 
capital today relies on local warlords and tribal militias for stability – Afghanistan, 
Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen – and, as discussed in Chapter 10, for contemporary 
peace operations’ exit strategies.  
Understanding the difference between mafias and warlords may also help us 
predict where each will emerge. Mafias, as we have seen, seem likely to emerge 
where there is a demand for government suddenly created and corruptible 
governmental capabilities are at hand. Warlords and gang rulers, by contrast, are 
likely to emerge where governmental capabilities are physically withdrawing or 
collapsing, and new governmental capabilities must be developed on the basis of a 
coercive foundation. As highlighted in Table 1 above, this points us to several 
possible remedial opportunities to address the emergence of criminal autonomy, 
such as the physical extension of governmental capabilities (whether to border areas 
                                                
1315 Ibid. 
1316 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, p. 129.  
1317 See Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Genesis of a “Prince”: the rise of Ismail Khan in western Afghanistan, 
1979-1992’, Crisis States Working Paper Series No. 2, Working Paper No. 4, September 2006 
(London: Crisis States Research Centre). 
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or through improved urban planning and design), and the localization of governance 
(subject to effective corruption monitoring). These matters are discussed further in 
Chapter 10. 
  
Merger: joint ventures 
Batista in 1950s Havana, Salvatore Lima in Palermo, and the Bay Street Boys in 
The Bahamas all partnered with criminal groups in a third form of accommodation 
in the market for government: merging capabilities. Where autonomy requires an 
informal territorial segmentation of the market for government, and intermediation 
requires a jurisdictional segmentation, in the joint venture strategy the capabilities 
of criminal and political organizations are vertically integrated to operate 
simultaneously across the upperworld and underworld.1318 Government becomes a 
co-production.  
If there were ‘mafia states’ on display in Part Two, these were they. In each 
of the joint venture episodes studied, criminal actors used political assets within 
their criminal enterprises, and political actors used criminal capabilities as 
instruments of political action and statecraft. 1319  They adopted a strategy of 
‘mutuality, where the political and economic systems become dependent upon and 
subject to many of the services the criminal organizations have to offer’, and crime 
is likewise organized – and not just protected – through political and state 
institutions.1320 Batista, Lima and the Bay Street Boys all used the state’s legislative 
capabilities, financing capabilities and security institutions to develop and grow 
criminal markets, and all in turn used the financial and coercive capabilities of 
criminal organizations for patronage-based governance and, in the latter cases, 
political campaigning. Access to criminal organizations’ clandestine force 
projection capabilities and international corruption networks meant access to realms 
beyond day-to-day politics.1321 And governance of political factions’ participation 
in organized crime ventures became a basis for domestic government.1322  
                                                
1318 Compare William Reno, ‘Illicit Commerce in Peripheral States’, in Friman, Crime, p. 68. 
1319 This is similar to Doug Farah’s concept of ‘criminalized states’. See Farah, ‘Transnational 
Organized Crime’, p. 6. 
1320 Stanley A. Pimentel, ‘Mexico’s Legacy of Corruption’, in Godson, Menace, pp. 175-197. 
1321 See Bayart et al.   
1322 Reno, Warlord Politics, pp. 8-10.  
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Understanding joint ventures in these terms also helps us to identify where 
they may emerge, and the developmental and geostrategic consequences. Post-
conflict and post-transition states with weak local rent-extraction opportunities in 
the licit economy seem particularly vulnerable to joint venture strategies between 
local political elites and foreign criminal groups. And once a joint venture 
arrangement is in place, it skews economic development. As we saw in Batista’s 
Havana, Lima’s Palermo and on Grand Bahama, the development of a broad 
productive base and effective taxation system is displaced as the basis of 
government by criminal patronage.1323 Democratic politics gives way to, or hides, 
‘court politics’, with rulers minimizing the provision of, or inclusive control over, 
public goods in order to maximize dependence on the ruler’s favour.1324  
Maintaining such a joint venture depends on the maintenance of a system of 
social repression, though that system can become internalized and normalized, as 
the Sicilian experience with omertà makes clear. As Batista learned the hard way, if 
a ruler’s grip on this system slips, the hollowing out of state institutions – 
particularly in the security sphere – can become counter-productive. The corrosive 
effects of corruption on the Cuban military opened the door to Castro’s revolution, 
just as corruption in the Malian military contributed to the success of the Touareg 
insurgency in 2011 (see further below), and corruption in the Iraqi military opened 
the door to the military successes of Daesh (a.k.a. ISIS or ISIL) more recently.1325  
This also points us to remedial opportunities for addressing joint ventures, 
centred around promoting the democratic accountability of the state’s governmental 
capabilities and institutions, such as armed forces, economic development 
organizations, and financial regulators. Promoting such accountability weakens the 
ability of political and military elites to form clandestine joint ventures with local 
and foreign organized crime actors. The episodes in Part Two suggest that 
campaign finance reform will be particularly important for limiting opportunities 
                                                
1323 William Reno, ‘Mafiya Troubles, Warlord Crises’, in Mark R. Beissinger and Crawford Young 
eds., Beyond State Crisis?: Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective 
(Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), p. 108; William Reno, ‘Clandestine 
Economies, Violence and States in Africa’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2 (2000), pp. 
436-437; and Bayart, et al.  
1324 Reno, ‘Clandestine Economies’, pp. 442-443; ‘Mafiya Troubles’, p. 108. 
1325 Patrick Cockburn, The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising (New York and 
London: OR Books, 2014), pp. 50-55; and see David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘Graft Hobbles Iraq’s Military 
in Fighting ISIS’, N.Y. Times, 24 November 2014.   
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for strategic corruption, a point further explored in Chapter 10.1326  
But as Jim Woolsey’s discussion of the hypothetical Russian trading 
executive recounted at the beginning of this dissertation suggests, joint ventures 
also raise particularly acute concerns at the inter-state level. They make it hard to 
figure out whether a state’s behaviour is guided towards classical political 
objectives and the long-term welfare of the state, or the short-term enrichment of 
state rulers. Will Reno warns of the criminal manipulation of ‘the façade of the … 
State’s globally recognized sovereignty for … commercial gain’.1327 As Moisés 
Naím has pointed out, this risks destabilizing systemic effects, corroding trust 
within international society and reciprocity as the basis for international order.1328 
The guarantees afforded by the international system to sovereign states – territorial 
integrity, a large degree of immunity from external coercion, and eternal life – start 
to lose credibility. First, they risk being seen to promote free-riding on the 
privileges of sovereignty, a concern heightened by allegations that states such as 
North Korea are deeply engaged in drug-trafficking and counterfeiting.1329 Second, 
sovereignty guarantees risk being seen as ineffective, if states can use criminal 
proxies to penetrate each other’s borders, economies and governmental apparatus. 
The danger is that the second dynamic becomes self-fulfilling: as trust 
corrodes within international society, states may increasingly look to strategies of 
subversion and to covert and ‘hybrid’ tactics to develop strategic advantage. For an 
idea of what this may look like, we can look to the Mob’s role in post-Revolution 
Cuba (Chapter 8), or to recent events in Ukraine. The head of Russia’s general staff 
Valery Gerasimov describes ‘hybrid conflict’ as a strategy involving ‘the broad use 
of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military 
measures’, as well as ‘concealed’ armed forces. 1330  This apparently includes 
organized crime. 1331  In Crimea, sometimes known as ‘Ukraine’s Sicily’, the 
Russian-backed premier is now an alleged former gangster nicknamed ‘the 
                                                
1326 Compare Jeff Fischer, Marcin Walecki and Jeffrey Carlson, eds., Political Finance in Post-
Conflict Societies (Washington D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2006). 
1327 Reno, ‘Clandestine Economies’, p. 435. 
1328 Naím, ‘Mafia States’, p. 101.  
1329 Chestnut. 
1330 Sam Jones, ‘Ukraine: Russia’s new art of war’, Financial Times, 28 August 2014.  
1331 On hybrid warfare’s relationship to organized crime, see especially Kilcullen, pp. 102-108.  
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Goblin’.1332 The Cuban cases studied in Part Two make clear the dangers in such an 
approach: the loss of command and control, the introduction of autonomous 




The turn to criminal proxies in inter-state rivalries suggests a fourth positioning 
strategy criminal groups can adopt in the market for government: strategic alliances, 
not with each other, but with states or other political organizations, against other 
rivals in the market. This moves us away from the question of how states and 
organized crime accommodate in the market for government, to an exploration of 
the dynamics of confrontation. In this section and the two that follow we consider 
three positioning strategies in the context of confrontation: strategic alliance; 
terrorism; and ‘blue ocean’ strategy, which is, in a sense a strategy of withdrawal. 
The essential features of each are captured in Table 2, below.  





Terrorism Blue Ocean 
Role of third party 
Common adversary of 
both state and criminal 
group 
 
Public – source of 
pressure on the state 
 
Potential new state 
host 
Underlying 






vulnerability Defection and betrayal 
Alienation and popular 
resistance  
 


















                                                
1332 Mark Galeotti, ‘Will “Goblin” Make Crimea a “Free Crime Zone”?’, Read Russia, 7 March 2014, 
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2015.  
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Phil Williams has explained that the formation of strategic alliances between 
criminal organizations follows the same logic guiding alliance formation between 
legitimate businesses: it represents an effort to create competitive advantage against 
their rivals by sharing risk, accessing new resources, customers and revenues, and 
creating new products, value and economies of scale.1333 How does this logic play 
out in alliances between criminal organizations, on the one hand, and states and 
other political organizations, on the other?  
The Underworld Project (Chapter 5) and CIA-Mob alliance against Castro 
(Chapter 8) make clear that states and criminal groups sometimes form military 
alliances to compete with other states. These cases are by no means unique: there is 
also evidence of long-term US government cooperation with the yakuza in occupied 
Japan,1334 with drug traffickers in Central America1335 and Asia.1336 Nor is it a 
purely American phenomenon: there is evidence of state officials from all five 
Permanent Members of the Security Council cooperating with organized criminal 
groups, though in some of these cases this cooperation was targeted not at foreign 
states, but at defeating rivals in the domestic market for government.1337 The Mob’s 
cooperation with the US Navy to combat union disruption to war efforts during 
World War Two (Chapter 5) offers another such example, as does the Italian state’s 
cooperation with the mafia to defeat Giuliano (Chapter 6), and Genovese’s possible 
collaboration with the Italian Fascist government to kill a labour activist in New 
York. And we can also imagine two rival mixed alliances, each incorporating at 
least one state or political organization and at least one criminal group, facing off. 
This study includes no clear examples of such competition at the inter-state level, 
but it does at the domestic level: the competition between the Marinelli-Mob and 
Hines-Schultz alliances discussed in Chapter 4, and the Cuban gangsterismo 
discussed in Chapter 7.  
                                                
1333 Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Organizations’, pp. 61-63.  
1334 David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2012).  
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1337 On Russia, see Chapter 1. On the UK, see Chapter 6. On France, see Schulte-Bockholt, pp. 64-
65. On China, see e.g. Shawn Shieh, ‘The Rise of Collective Corruption in China: the Xiamen 
smuggling case’, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 14, iss. 42 (2005), pp. 67-91. 
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Such political-criminal alliances differ from intermediation and criminal 
autonomy strategies because they do not involve a segmentation of the market 
between the allies, but rather collaboration in defeating a mutual rival. As the 
Underworld Project showed, however, such an alliance may depend upon tacit 
accommodation between the state and criminal group. Nor are alliances the same as 
joint ventures: the latter involve the integration of capabilities, while the former 
leaves them separate. As the Underworld Project and subsequent events in post-War 
Sicily showed, however, alliances may provide fertile ground for the partners to 
develop such joint ventures. But joint ventures can also be created by independent 
design, as the Cuba and Bahamas episodes show.  
Alliance with a political organization such as the state can however leave a 
criminal group vulnerable to defection by its ally. In Chapter 8 we saw how the 
protection afforded the Mob through its cooperation with the CIA against Castro 
ended when the US government reached an accommodation with Castro’s own 
protector, the USSR, as a result of the Missile Crisis. The Missile Crisis also made 
clear that, just as Williams has discussed in the context of alliances between 
criminal groups, success in political-criminal alliances requires strong coordination 
mechanisms. Otherwise the activities of subordinate or peripheral actors can derail 
the alliance.1338 Freelancing attacks by Mob actors following the Missile Crisis 
risked spoiling the fragile truce negotiated by the US and USSR. This highlights the 
risks of unintended or misunderstood strategic signalling, and the difficulty of inter-
state deterrence, once public institutions turn to private instrumentalities to promote 
the state’s strategic interests, as occurs through strategic alliances and joint ventures. 
Yet this appears to be the trend, particularly with the rise of ‘state capitalism’, 
explored briefly in Chapter 10.1339 An improved understanding of the strategic logic 
of political-criminal alliances may therefore be even more useful to states in the 
future than it was in the historical period on which this study has focused.  
 
 
                                                
1338 Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Organizations’, p. 63.  
1339 Glenny, pp. 71-96; Ian Bremmer, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between 
States and Corporations? (London: Portfolio, 2010). 
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Terrorism as criminal positioning strategy 
A fifth positioning pattern can emerge – often temporarily – when an organized 
criminal group responds to confrontation by a state with an indirect strategy 
intended to intimidate the state’s citizens into forcing a change in state policy.1340 
The logic of this approach is succinctly captured in the words of Salvatore ‘Toto’ 
Riina, the Sicilian mafia capo di tutti capi who ordered the assassination of 
politicians, judges and policemen, and the bombing of a church and the Uffizi 
Gallery, in the early 1990s: ‘Wage war on the state first, so as to mould the peace 
afterwards.’1341 This is terrorism as a criminal positioning strategy.  
 Where warlords and gang leaders confront the state directly in order to 
achieve a balance of military power and criminal autonomy, terrorism as a criminal 
strategy is the more obvious strategy of confrontation for clandestine criminal 
networks lacking standing military forces. The issues that generate acute 
confrontation between states and mafias – law enforcement policies, extradition, 
prohibition of certain commodities or services, prison conditions – tend to matter a 
great deal to those groups, but far less to the general public. Accordingly, if the 
criminal group can inflict significant costs on the public in a short time (and 
perhaps even attract sympathy to boot), the public may demand that the state sue for 
peace.  
This was the logic behind the American and Havana Mobs attacks on 
civilian installations, especially sugar mills and oil refineries, in Cuba, intended to 
cause economic pain and foment civil disorder (Chapter 8). This was the logic of 
the attacks mounted by Pablo Escobar in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s, which 
included the mid-air bombing of a civilian airliner, the assassination of several 
presidential candidates and an armed attack on the Supreme Court building, with a 
view to forcing the state to change its extradition policies. And it was likewise the 
logic of the Primeiro Comando da Capital, a powerful prison gang, which carried 
out three waves of attacks in Sao Paolo in 2012 designed to force changes in prison 
policies. Over 100 buses were firebombed, and banks, police stations, a metro 
station, and important bureaucratic offices were bombed or hit with grenades. Sao 
                                                
1340 On ‘indirect strategy’ see Liddell Hart, p. 339. 
1341 Dickie, Mafia Republic, p. 391. 
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Paolo ground to a halt.1342 
 The worldwide proliferation of kidnapping as a tactic of non-state armed 
groups also owes something to this strategic logic, and can highlight divergences 
within an armed group over whether the maximization of criminal rents or 
ideological violence is the ultimate goal. Kidnapping for ransom is a highly 
effective form of predatory capital accumulation. Al Qaeda-affiliated groups are 
thought to have received at least $125 million in ransom payments from European 
governments in recent years.1343 But kidnapping as a tactic also responds to a 
deeper strategic communications logic: it serves as a blunt instrument for armed 
groups to communicate with a large audience, attacking symbols of external 
oppression and claiming the mantle of community protector, while also encouraging 
the group or public associated with the targets to bring pressure to bear for a change 
of policy.1344 Armed groups from Colombia to Nigeria to Afghanistan to Syria have 
used kidnapping as a terror tactic in this way.1345 But as we see in the following 
chapter, in some cases – such as AQIM in the Sahel, and the Taliban – these 
strategic uses of terror tactics can come into direct conflict around the question of 
how to deal with hostages: as commodities to be sold, or as instruments for strategic 
communication through symbolic violence. 
Treating terrorism as a criminal positioning strategy also points to an 
important nuance in how we understand the relationship between terrorism and 
organized crime.1346 The strategic approach developed here suggests moving past 
treating ‘terrorist’ groups and ‘criminal’ groups as fixed identities, and instead 
looking at how armed factions strategically instrumentalise violence against 
civilians for a range of political, ideological and criminal purposes. This suggests 
that we recognize that a group’s overall organizational strategy is the product of 
numerous internal and external forces, potentially including competition between 
different strategies promoted by different factions within the same group. Complex 
                                                
1342 Bailey and Taylor.  
1343 Rukmini Callimachi, ‘Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror’, N.Y. Times, 29 July 
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strategic actors such as Hezbollah and Daesh (ISIS) cannot easily be pigeon-holed 
as ‘terrorist’, ‘insurgent’, ‘criminal’ or even ‘governmental’; they are complex 
organizations whose strategic goals and methods shift over time, in part as different 
internal factions prove more or less successful in strategically exploiting the 
opportunities and capabilities available to them.1347 Only by carefully parsing these 
groups’ use of terror tactics can we assess whether they are adopted in the pursuit of 
maximising control over criminal rents, or in pursuit of more ideological goals.  
Still, criminal groups turn to terrorism at their own peril. Terrorism 
significantly raises the profile of the group, which may reduce the chance of 
accommodation with the state. It can be difficult to calibrate terrorist violence to 
ensure that, rather than persuading the public to push for a change in state policy, it 
does not end up alienating the public and fostering popular resistance, as Giuliano’s 
May Day attack, the Mob’s attacks on Cuba, Escobar’s terrorism in Colombia, and 
Sicilian mafia terrorism in the early 1990s all seem to have done.1348 By making the 
coercive foundation of criminal power so brutally obvious, criminal groups that turn 
to terrorism risk undermining the notionally consensual basis of the corrupt 
exchanges that underpin their power over the long-term. Terrorism involves moving 
from the ‘throffer’ of corruption (see Chapter 2) to a direct threat, from a mix of 
deterrence and inducement to a compellent strategy. That is likely to be perceived, 
by the target, as a loss of power: they are suddenly transformed from notionally 
autonomous partners in crime to obvious subordinates to the criminal group’s will.  
Even if a population is alienated by a criminal group’s turn to terrorism, 
however, it may still succeed, if political actors and state agents feel the reputational 
or political costs of the campaign of terror are too high. That, indeed, was the 
outcome for the Primeiro Comando da Capital in Brazil, where terrorism won the 
relaxation of prison policies sought.1349 And current litigation is Italy is exploring 
whether, similarly, the result of Riina’s assault in the early 1990s was, 
notwithstanding public horror at mafia violence, a secret pact between the Italian 
                                                
1347 On Hezbollah, see Levitt. On Daesh, Cockburn.  
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security services, leading political figures, and the mafia leadership.1350 
 
Relocation and blue ocean strategy 
The final ideal-type positioning strategy also emerges in response to confrontation, 
but involves relocation. Scholars and analysts have long argued that pressure by one 
state on a criminal group can lead that group to withdraw and relocate elsewhere – 
the so-called ‘balloon effect’. But as Morselli and others have correctly pointed out, 
the journalistic representation of criminal relocation as ‘effortless’ ignores the 
constraints imposed by social, economic and regulatory context.1351 As Diego 
Gambetta has noted, the mafia ‘is a difficult industry to export. Not unlike mining, 
it is heavily dependent on the local environment.’1352 Foreign mafias, simply put, 
lack local knowledge and connections, because of the long-term relational nature of 
the corruption required to secure protection from the state.1353 Some of the episodes 
in Part Two bear this out. As Frederico Varese has indicated, foreign mafias usually 
face stiff competition from well-established local organizations with deeper social 
capital and access to trust networks, including state actors working illicitly.1354 In 
New York, Italian-origin mafias faced just such competition from Tammany Hall, 
Irish and Jewish gangsters.  
Yet Part Two also reveals several cases where criminal organizations did 
relocate, despite these barriers to entry into foreign markets. In the case of the 
Sicilian mafia’s transplantation to New York, and the Mob’s post-War reconnection 
with Sicily, this happened through migration or displacement of a kinship network 
with knowledge of mafia techniques, just as Morselli and others have identified in 
other cases.1355 Here, as Varese predicts, mafia migration resulted not from a 
‘rational decision to open a branch in order to conquer a territory in a faraway land’, 
but was ‘more likely the outcome of unintended consequences’.1356 But Part Two 
also includes at least two other cases where mafia relocation was precisely the 
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result of a ‘rational decision to open a branch … in a faraway land’: the Mob’s 
move to Havana in the 1930s and to The Bahamas in the 1950s. Its efforts to stand 
up governments-in-exile to install in Cuba in the early 1960s, and its attempt to 
force its way into Haiti, arguably represent two failed further attempts. Here are 
examples of precisely that ‘directed’ relocation for which Morselli and colleagues 
say there is no real evidence.1357    
As we saw in Chapter 8, this deliberate relocation was successful where it 
followed a criminal ‘blue ocean’ strategy. Rather than jostling with rivals for 
advantage in a crowded market, an ocean running red with the blood of competition, 
the Mob sailed off on its own into a ‘blue ocean’, finding a new, relatively 
uncontested market through vision and innovation.1358 This succeeded where they 
convinced local strongmen and governing elites to form joint ventures and 
transform the local market for government – Batista in Cuba, the Bay Street Boys 
(and then Pindling) in The Bahamas. They failed – in Haiti, and with Castro – 
where they could not form such a joint venture. In each case, the Mob was doing 
exactly what Kim and Mauborgne suggest ‘blue ocean’ strategy requires: not 
competing with other rivals on product differentiation or on cost, but reconstructing 
the value chain through novel combinations of existing capabilities.1359 In the 
process, they restructured the market for government.  
In Sicily, when the mafia took this approach through its sponsorship of 
separatism, it raised the prospect of a criminal group acting as midwife to the 
creation of a new sovereign state. Although this did not happen, it did lead to Sicily 
being granted significant governmental autonomy, changing the Italian 
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10. Innovation, disruption and implications 
 
In a society where the concept of citizenship is disappearing whilst the desire for a sense of 
belonging is growing stronger, where the ‘citizen’ with his rights and duties is giving way 
to the clan, the following, the clientele, in such a society as this, the Mafia looks 
increasingly like the model for the future. 
Marcelle Padovani1361 
 
The episodes considered in Part Two suggest that – though we may have forgotten 
or deliberately overlooked it – there has long been a variety of forms of competition, 
cooperation and collaboration between states and organized crime in the pursuit of 
governmental power. The positioning strategies identified in Chapter 9 suggest 
these may fall into certain ideal-type patterns. What can these patterns tell us about 
the strategic implications of organized crime today, and the apparent ‘convergence’ 
between statecraft, business and organized crime that former CIA Director Jim 
Woolsey warned of two decades ago? Are ‘mafia states’ the result of new trends, or 
an old phenomenon repackaged?  
In this final chapter, we consider two contemporary cases of protracted 
violence – Mexico and the Sahel – in which the strategic logic of organized crime 
has played an important role. These cases suggest that while criminal groups are 
still using the same positioning strategies that emerged in the historical episodes 
considered in Part Two, globalization may be intensifying the apparent 
‘convergence’ between politics and crime, by lowering barriers to entry into the 
market for government in ways that foster innovation by criminal groups with new 
forms of governmentality. The result is the emergence of new, hybrid forms of 
governmentality and, increasingly, the disruption of state sovereignty’s dominance 
as the model of government preferred by consumers around the world. Strategy, 
increasingly, needs to look beyond the state. The chapter and the dissertation close 
with brief reflections on how understanding the strategic logic of organized crime 
may strengthen not only strategic theory, but also practical efforts to combat 
organized crime, and the management of criminal spoilers in peace and transition 
processes – in other words, contemporary statecraft.  
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  291 
Innovation and disruption 
Mexico: from narcocartels to narcocults 
Drug-trafficking related violence in Mexico between 2006 and 2012 officially led to 
at least 60,000 deaths. 1362  The 71-year rule of the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) at the federal level in Mexico provided a framework for 
relatively peaceful competition between various governmental actors, including 
drug-trafficking mafias operating at the state and regional level in cooperation with 
corrupt local politicians and federal military actors.1363 Just as the 1944 removal of 
Cuba’s strongman, Batista, triggered the violent competition known as 
gangsterismo, similarly, the PRI’s loss of political power in Mexico at the turn of 
the century set the stage for increasingly violent competition between ‘cartels’ in 
the Mexican underworld. This violence was, however, also fuelled by the expiry of 
a US ban on the sale of assault weapons in 2004, lowering barriers to entry into the 
competition for even small criminal groups; and vacancies in hemispheric drug-
trafficking supply-chains resulting from stepped-up law enforcement in Colombia 
and the Caribbean.1364 The result was a rapid escalation of violence as cartels 
developed different positioning strategies, and different governmentalities, in 
response to local conditions in the market for government and the capabilities to 
hand.  
One of the first movers was the Sinaloa Cartel, amongst the wealthiest drug 
trafficking organizations in the world. A classic trafficking mafia, it had long 
intermediated corrupt exchanges between Mexican underworld and upperworld 
actors to move illicit narcotics to the US.1365 Like other mafias, it developed out of a 
kinship network – this one around a pioneering trafficker in Sinaloa state in the 
1960s, Pedro Avilés Pérez. His nephew, Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán emerged in 
the 1990s as Sinaloa’s leader. After 2009 El Chapo appeared in Forbes’ global 
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‘Rich List’, his net worth around $1 billion. 1366  Notwithstanding Guzmán’s 
notoriety, Sinaloa kept a generally low profile, claimed to eschew kidnapping and 
extortion, and may at times have worked with other cartels to minimize inter-cartel 
violence in an attempt avoid confrontation with the state, just as the American 
mafia Commission sought to in the 1930s.1367  
It may have been Sinaloa’s market revisionism after PRI’s fall, however, 
that triggered a dangerous arms race amongst the cartels, with the rival Gulf Cartel 
hiring members of the Mexican Army’s elite GAFE unit, joined by Guatemalan 
Kaibiles unit counterparts. The group, known as Los Zetas after their military call-
signs (‘Z-#’) soon broke away as independent and dangerously disciplined, well-
trained criminal unit.1368 The group’s martial culture quickly differentiated it from 
other cartels: rather than intermediating, the Zetas used ‘clear and hold’ tactics, 
asserting monopolistic extortion powers over criminal and licit markets alike within 
their territory.1369 They were moving towards a posture of criminal autonomy. The 
Zetas quickly expanded from drug trafficking into extortion, racketeering, 
kidnapping, human smuggling and oil theft. But because their rents were extracted 
through predation, rather than production, they had little need for popular support; 
to achieve control of territory they terrorized the population into submission, 
massacring 72 migrants near the town of San Fernando (Tamaulipas), dumping 49 
decapitated victims near Cadereyta (Nuevo León) and burning down a Monterrey 
casino.1370  
In the US debate has raged as to whether the Zetas’ military tactics justify 
their characterization as a ‘criminal insurgency’, or whether their reliance on terror 
tactics means they are better thought of in terms of ‘narcoterrorism’. This was not 
merely a semantic debate; it could also have major legal and bureaucratic 
implications. Both analytic approaches stumbled, however, on whether the Zetas 
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had political goals – as is expected of both insurgents and terrorists. In late 2011 a 
series of narcomantas in Nuevo Laredo seemed to suggest they did: ‘Let it be clear 
that we are in control here and although the federal government controls other 
cartels, they cannot take our plazas.’ But a new set, weeks later, signalled a more 
oligopolistic goal: 
We do not govern this country, nor do we have a regime; we are not 
terrorists or guerrillas. We concentrate on our work and the last thing we 
want is to have problems with any government, neither Mexico nor much 
less with the US.1371 
What was going on? The ‘positioning strategies’ framework offered in the 
previous chapter provides an answer. The Zetas was neither a mafia, an insurgency, 
nor a terrorist group: it was pursuing a strategy of criminal autonomy, using force to 
develop a monopoly on illicit governmental power within specific territories, with a 
view to extracting criminal rents, and with little interest in formal governmental 
responsibility. It was becoming more like a federation of warlords than a traditional 
mafia.  
The Zetas’ search for autonomy soon led it beyond Mexico’s borders.  In 
2007 the Zetas formed a strategic alliance with Guatemala’s Overdick mafia, sent 
500 paramilitary operatives over the border into Guatemala’s northern Petén 
province, and consolidated the alliance by assassinating the scion of an Overdick 
rival, the Leone family.1372 The Zetas thus acquired a strategic reserve space where 
it could operate relatively unmolested by the Mexican or Guatemalan state, or its 
Mexican criminal rivals. This was akin to a multinational corporation or a state 
outflanking a local rival by opening up a new foreign front with the aim of 
acquiring new resources or, if the local rival decided to compete on the foreign front, 
draining the rival’s resources. Indeed, Sinaloa soon took the bait, forming its own 
alliances with local Guatemalan criminal groups, internationalizing Mexico’s drug 
war.1373  
But the Zetas faced other strategic problems in Mexico. As its core ex-
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military expertise was eroded by confrontation with the state and rival cartels it was 
forced to recruit increasingly from local gangs and Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13), a 
transnational street gang formed in California and exported to Central America 
through US deportation policies in a manner similar to the transatlantic mafia 
migrations over the previous century.1374 The Zetas’ military training and culture 
was steadily diluted.  Increasingly its local outfits began forming links with local 
state actors and reverting to the interposition approach of mafia cosche. The Zetas’ 
governmental grip over its own units and, increasingly, over local populations, was 
weakening. By 2011 it was facing populist revolts in some communities, sometimes 
organized through online social media. By 2012-2013 the leadership structure was 
under sustained assault from the state. The organization became increasingly 
decentralized, and slowly began to fragment.1375  
The Zetas’ combination of criminal strategy and martial culture and 
organization was not the only such experiment in Mexico with hybrid 
governmentality. Two others emerged in the state of Michoacán, home to major 
marijuana production and the drug precursor importation hub of Lazaro Cardenas. 
The first was La Familia Michoacana, part narcocartel, part narcocult.1376 In 2004, 
Nazario Moreno González (a.k.a. ‘El Chayo’ – ‘the Rosary’ and ‘El Mas Loco’ – 
the ‘Craziest One’) spun off from a Michoacán criminal group La Empresa 
(literally, ‘the company’). His new group adopted the terrorizing paramilitary 
tactics of the Zetas, and like them expanded from drug trafficking into extortion, 
human smuggling and kidnapping. But Moreno González’s background was not in 
the military, like the Zetas’ founders; he was a zealously evangelizing Jehovah’s 
Witness. That religious sect’s traditions became the source from which La Familia 
spun its new organizational culture and governmentality.  
 La Familia recruited from the ranks of drug addicts, alcoholics, and juvenile 
delinquents, promising rehabilitation, empowerment and self-renewal. Members 
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were indoctrinated through compulsory bible study and the enforcement of codes 
requiring abstinence from alcohol, tobacco and drugs. This created a sense of in-
group identity and superiority to the morally destitute external population. Both its 
internal and public rhetoric characterized La Familia members as self-liberated 
agents of ‘divine justice’ in a Manichean struggle.1377 All of this served to create a 
cult-like governmentality amongst the membership, framed in terms of fictive 
kinship. Just like child soldiers being indoctrinated into armed groups, Familia 
recruits were forced to disown their old family in favour of their new familia, or 
risk violent recriminations against both themselves and their biological kin.1378 Out 
of loyalty to this new family and its god, Familia members committed acts of 
astonishing savagery. The announcement of their arrival on the scene came attached 
to 5 severed heads lobbed onto a nightclub dance floor. Later victims were 
cooked.1379  
In the absence of strong leftist political parties during this period, cartel 
propaganda including the hugely popular narcocorridos (narcoballads) 1380 
developed into a quasi-political discourse framed around notions of personal and 
collective redemption and resistance to injustice.1381 This ‘narcoculture’ served to 
normalize crime, providing the social foundation of what George Grayson has 
described, in the case of Michoacán, as ‘dual sovereignty’: 
parallel to the elected government stands a narco-administration that 
generates employment (in growing and processing drugs), keeps order 
(repressing rival cartels), performs civic function (repairing churches), and 
collects taxes (extorting businesspersons).1382 
This recalled the Italian Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission’s 
description, a decade earlier, of the accommodation between the state and the 
Sicilian mafia as a non-aggression pact between ‘two distinct sovereignties’.1383 By 
2009, however, Mexico’s federal state sovereignty was in direct confrontation with 
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La Familia’s criminal sovereignty. In 2009 the Federal government revealed close, 
corrupt ties between La Familia and an array of municipal, state and federal 
politicians and officials in Michoacán.1384 La Familia responded with attacks on 
federal military and police sites in 8 cities, leaving 19 federal personnel dead in two 
days. The state escalated its own response, and when in 2010 Moreno González 
appeared to have been killed the remaining Familia leaders formally dissolved the 
organization.  
One group, however, probably with Moreno González hidden amongst them 
(having faked his own death), set up their own spin-off organization: Caballeros 
Templarios, or Knights Templar. The original Knights Templar was a mediaeval 
military order during the Crusades (1129-1312 A.D.), charged with defending 
pilgrims in the Holy Land, known for its members’ piety, military prowess – and 
wealth. The Mexican Knights Templar combined the religious fervour of La 
Familia and the martial culture of the Zetas. They were governed by a written code 
of ethics positioning Knights as temporal intermediaries between the community 
and their unjust oppressors (the state and other criminal rivals), and spiritual 
intermediaries between the community and a divine upperworld. ‘The members of 
the Order must fight against materialism, injustice and tyranny in the world’, this 
code thundered, even as the Knights fought for controlling shares in local criminal 
markets. The code described their mission as an ‘ideological battle to defend the 
values of a society based on ethics’, and even instructed the Knights to be ‘noble’ 
and ‘chivalrous’. 1385  Beyond their own walls, the Knights broadcast similar 
messages through the mass media, aiming to position themselves as protectors of 
traditional Michoacán values and culture.1386  
Some have described the Knights as representing a new form of ‘spiritual 
insurgency’.1387 This suggests, misleadingly, that the Knights sought to overthrow 
the existing political system. That is not the case; like mediaeval knights, they were 
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happy to wield violence selectively and instrumentally, dressing their violence up as 
corrections of injustice within the system. Like mediaeval knights, mass violence 
was not directed at overthrow of the governmental system itself (feudalism then, the 
state now), but rather at rivals within the system, or those treated as enemies of the 
system. Spiritualism served as a framework for the Knights to develop a niche 
intermediary role in the market for government, as it does for local armed groups in 
other parts of Latin America.1388 In communities where the Knights held sway, 
shrines to ‘Saint Nazario’ (i.e. El Chayo) sprang up, supplicants praying to him as 
the ‘protector of the poorest’ and a ‘representative of God’ to intercede on their 
behalf with the ultimate upperworld power. 1389  Yet effective governmental 
intermediation also required more prosaic, temporal methods. The Knights are 
suspected of having donated millions of dollars to multiple political parties in 
Michoacán’s 2011 gubernatorial campaign; having provided thugs to intimidate 
campaign staff and damage campaign premises; having blocked highways to reduce 
votes in some districts; and having corrupted vote-counting and polling station 
officials.1390 This was more a spiritualized mafia than a spiritual insurgency. 
The shifting sands of the Sahel 
Just as changes in the global strategic environment provoked innovation in 
Mexico’s market for government, so they have stimulated governmental innovation 
in the Sahel over the last decade and intensified the convergence of crime and 
politics. 
The interdiction efforts in the Caribbean that contributed to the growth in 
Mexican drug violence also created a balloon effect in West Africa and the Sahel as, 
starting around 2002, Colombian and Venezuelan drug traffickers pioneered new 
trans-shipment routes to Europe. Huge sums of money suddenly became available 
to local state authorities, tribal leaders and militia leaders willing to accommodate 
these foreign traffickers, transforming the Sahelian market for government.1391 In 
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the littoral and urban centres, narco-dollars fuelled political corruption and planted 
the seeds of several joint ventures between state rulers and foreign trafficking 
organizations, the most spectacular in Guinea-Bissau. Recalling Aerovías Q in 
Cuba, Bissau-Guinean military leaders put airports, ports and naval vessels at 
foreign traffickers’ disposal, turning state assets into criminal resources, and using 
criminal rents as a basis for government patronage.1392 In ensuing years, cocaine 
trafficking seemed to become increasingly integral to formal politics along the West 
African coast from Mauritania to Benin, and to the more informal tribal politics of 
the Sahel.1393 Competition between rival political-criminal alliances sometimes 
played out through political assassinations (Guinea-Bissau), and sometimes through 
direct inter-cartel violence.  
As in Cuba, the boom in the illicit economy eroded state capacity and upset 
existing power structures, especially in northern Mali.1394 Northern Mali, sparsely 
populated and weakly governed by the state after several decades of Touareg 
militancy, and long a venue for informal cross-border trade and illicit smuggling, 
became a key location for drug, arms and hostage exchanges.1395 Between $40 
million and $65 million in ransoms appears to have been paid by European 
governments to actors in the region between 2008 and 2012, a huge windfall for 
non-state competitors in the market for government.1396 All of this ‘empowered a 
new criminal class who mediated the distribution of profits’ from these illicit 
markets.1397 Drug and ransom money was laundered through local ‘development’ 
and construction projects into local politicians and tribal leaders’ pockets. A 2010 
Malian state audit found $224 million in rural development funds had gone missing. 
Across local Arab and Touareg communities, traditionally ‘vassal’ clans used 
criminal revenue to revise political settlements, defeating traditional ‘noble’ clans. 
An affluent area of Gao, a north Mali city, became known as ‘Cocainebougou’, or 
                                                
1392 Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, The end of impunity? After the kingpins, what next for 
Guinea-Bissau?, ISS Policy Brief 44 (Pretoria: ISS, July 2013). 
1393 Lacher, ‘Organized Crime and Conflict’.  
1394 See especially GITOC, ‘Illicit Trafficking’; and Morten Bøås, ‘Castles in the sand: informal 
networks and power brokers in the northern Mali periphery’, in Mats Utas, ed., African Conflicts and 
Informal Power: Big Men and Networks (London: Zed, 2012), pp. 119-134. 
1395 See Serge Daniel, Les Mafias du Mali (Paris: Descartes, 2014). 
1396 Lacher, ‘Organized Crime and Conflict’, p. 9.  
1397 GITOC, ‘Illicit Trafficking’, p. 2.  
  299 
‘Cocaine-ville’.1398  
Even as Western donors hailed Mali as a democratic and development 
success story, some state officials were quietly accommodating their criminal rivals. 
Echoing the mafia’s sponsorship of Sicilian separatism half a century earlier, 
traffickers appear to have played an important role in convincing the state to back a 
policy of administrative decentralization adopted for northern Mali around 2006-
2007, ostensibly as a political resolution to long-standing conflict with Touareg 
separatists. Decentralization created many small, weak local councils over which 
traffickers could more easily develop power.1399 Organized crime became locally 
entrenched, manipulating the post-conflict settlement to its own benefit.1400  
When Muammar Gaddafi fell from power in Libya in 2011, thousands of 
Touareg soldiers serving in his armed forces returned to northern Mali with a 
considerable arsenal. This provided another external shock on the market for 
government in the Sahel, significantly lowering the costs of organizing coercion. 
Touareg Libya veterans and defectors from the Malian army quickly created several 
new separatist groups, most notably the Mouvement National de Libération de 
l’Azawad (MNLA),1401 which indicated that it would use ‘all means necessary’ to 
end Mali’s ‘illegal occupation’ of ‘Azawad’ – the Tamshek-language name for the 
western Sahel north of Timbuktu. 
The MNLA made rapid military advances. As in Cuba under Batista or the 
recent collapse of the Iraqi military in the face of Daesh (ISIS) onslaught, the 
Malian national military was revealed as a hollow shell, its morale and effectiveness 
fatally weakened as criminal patronage had replaced operational considerations in 
appointments, investment and planning.1402 As informal regulators of cross-border 
exchanges, military leaders had become influential brokers in drug-trafficking and 
hostage markets, and the military had become more a criminal patronage system 
than a fighting force.1403 Competition within the drug market had also fuelled 
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trafficking in arms from state arsenals, further weakening military readiness.1404  
 In the face of Touareg insurgent gains, in March 2012 a group of 
despondent mid-level military officers in Bamako led a coup d’état. By April 2012 
Touareg forces had taken control of most of Mali north of Mopti and declared the 
independence of a new secular state, Azawad.1405 At this point, however, tensions 
emerged between the MNLA and its Islamist allies in the Touareg insurgency. One 
of these was Ansar Dine (‘Defenders of the Faith’), formed by Iyad Ag Ghaly.  
Ag Ghaly was nicknamed ‘the Strategist’. He had been an important 
Touareg rebel leader in the late 1980s, a Malian diplomat in Saudi Arabia in the 
early 2000s, and then an influential broker in northern Mali’s hostage market. When 
he failed to win leadership of his Touareg tribe and the MNLA he adopted a new 
positioning strategy, drawing on his familial connections to the leading regional 
Islamist militant group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), to create a new 
Touareg Islamist organization – Ansar Dine.1406 Ag Ghaly was the cousin of the 
leader of AQIM, itself the successor to the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) and the 
Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) in Algeria, displaced 
from the Maghreb into the Sahara by Algerian military action in the 1990s. GSPC 
had looked to the Sahara as a staging area for strategic action in northern Algeria’s 
population centres. But over time its positioning strategy shifted from a 
transnational terrorist approach to something closer to criminal autonomy. GSPC’s 
Sahelian wing put down local roots as it forged commercial, political and marriage 
alliances with local Arab tribes and trafficking networks. The leader of this Sahelian 
wing, Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar, became known as ‘Mr Malboro’ for his role in 
trafficking cigarettes to the Maghreb. The group’s strategic communications 
increasingly emphasized issues not of Maghreb politics, but local Sahelian 
autonomy. 1407  But this shift in the Sahelian group’s strategic outlook led to 
significant inter-factional tensions within GSPC after 2004, particularly over 
whether hostages should be treated as sources of criminal rent (ransoms, Bel 
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Mokhtar’s view) or instruments for symbolic political messaging (the view of 
GSPC leadership in the Maghreb).1408 In 2007 the Arab leadership of GSPC 
reasserted the group’s terrorist identity, pledging allegiance to Usama bin Laden 
and turning GSPC into an official Al Qaeda franchise, Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM). But by declaring the focus of the organization to be the Maghreb, 
and with its leadership entirely Arab, that left space in the Sahelian market for a 
group with more localized branding and communications. The Mouvement pour 
l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) was spun off in mid-2011, 
announcing itself with videos featuring sub-Saharan Africans speaking in both 
English and Hausa. Through engagement with the Sahel’s illicit economy, it thrived 
‘as both a criminal enterprise and a jihadist organization’.1409 
MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Dine all supported MNLA during the Touareg 
insurgency of 2011-2012. But when MNLA declared Azawad’s independence as a 
secular nation-state, the divergence in the groups’ strategic goals became clear. 
AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine all sought the imposition of Islamist rule. But 
Ansar Dine sought to achieve this goal within the framework of Malian sovereignty, 
while the others sought to replace the Malian state, and other Sahelian states, with 
an Islamist governmental structure. By mid-2012 the three Islamist groups had 
pushed MNLA out of northern Mali’s urban centres, imposing a harsh interpretation 
of sharia law, and absorbing many MNLA gunmen into their own ranks.1410  
At this point, however, the Islamists’ own strategic differences emerged. 
While they all sought to create ‘a stable Islamic state’, the AQIM leadership in the 
Maghreb wrote to its lieutenants and to Ag Ghaly, ‘it is too early for that, God 
knows. Instead, it is necessary to be cautious in the matter and we must be more 
realistic’. AQIM’s leaders warned about the over-hasty imposition of Wahhabi 
interpretations of sharia and the destruction of local sufi shrines, which risked 
alienating the local population. They pushed for AQIM and Ansar Dine militants to 
take a more incremental approach, continuing to work as allies with the Touareg 
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separatists, to spread political risk and the costs of ‘administration of the region’ 
which, they assessed, ‘exceed our military and financial and structural capability for 
the time being.’1411 Apparently unpersuaded by their Maghreb-based colleagues, the 
Islamist militants in northern Mali remained hostile to the Touareg separatists. 
Governmental power in northern Mali was quickly territorially segmented amongst 
them: AQIM and Ansar Dine controlled Timbuktu, Ansar Dine controlled Kidal 
alone, and MUJAO controlled Gao. In Gao and Kidal, MUJAO and Ansar Dine 
forged close relations with Touareg traffickers, and separatism (which the 
traffickers had previously backed) seemed to lose political ground.1412 In Timbuktu, 
however, when Berabiche Arab traffickers formed a local militia called the Front 
National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (FNLA) and attempted to form an alliance 
with AQIM against the MNLA, AQIM rejected the proposal, and expelled the 
FNLA. It dissolved, only to re-emerge as the Mouvement Arab de l’Azawad 
(MAA).1413  
Despite this political instability, a French military intervention in early 2013 
managed to limit violence largely to northern Mali. That intervention, which gave 
way to a United Nations stabilization force, in turn caused a reshuffling of alliances, 
as strategic competition shifted from overt military hostilities to political 
negotiations, with many Touareg nobles who had allied with Ag Ghaly and Ansar 
Dine breaking away to form a succession of political groups, such as the hybrid 
Mouvement Islamique de l’Azawad and the Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad. 
The MNLA in turn renounced its declaration of independence. 
Militant and trafficking networks in northern Mali have thus generated a 
variety of separatist, Islamist and hybrid organizations over the last two decades. As 
Lacher concludes, ‘The lines between groups are often blurry, alliances are 
temporary, and networks overlap.’1414 ‘In the last year alone’, one Touareg subject 
interviewed for a 2014 study claimed, ‘there are people who have changed from 
Malian military, to separatist rebel, to jihadist, to French ally, all while being narco-
traffickers.’ 1415  Market and organizational structures changed in kaleidoscopic 
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fashion as governmental entrepreneurs innovated, attempting to match the coercive 
capabilities to hand with persuasive governmentalities, responding dynamically to 
changes in the strategic environment.1416  
Yet while there was organizational fluidity to the market for government, 
there was also a certain stability in the market for drug trans-shipment. A recent 
empirical study concluded that ‘the collapse of the Malian state and subsequent 
Islamist takeover … had a negligible impact on illicit trafficking in northern 
Mali’.1417 External shocks to the market for government might force rebranding and 
repositioning, but they did not disrupt the underlying logic of organized crime.1418  
The disruption of sovereignty  
In both Mexico and the Sahel, violent governmental entrepreneurs are innovating 
strategically, using the resources and capabilities at hand to respond to changing 
local conditions and opportunities. In the process, they are mixing and matching 
different sources of trust and governmentality well beyond statehood and 
citizenship: martial loyalty, kinship, clan- and tribe-membership, religion. The 
complexity of this innovation makes clear that there is no substitute for careful 
analysis of the capabilities and strategies of each organization, and even for the 
different strategic approaches of different factions within such organizations. Broad 
labels such as ‘mafia states’ and ‘criminal insurgency’ risk discouraging such 
nuanced analysis, without actually telling us much about a particular group’s 
strategic outlook or how it will ‘conduct its conduct’.  
Why is the dominance of sovereignty as a business model in the market for 
government being similarly disrupted in theatres so geographically and socially far 
apart? The episodes studied in Part Two and the Mexico and Sahel cases just 
considered point to two basic reasons, each with major theoretical and practical 
implications.  
First, all these cases suggest that rival governmental providers emerge where 
there is an unmet demand for government. As we saw in the preceding chapter, this 
is likely to be the case when populations are rapidly integrated into new markets, or 
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old governmental arrangements withdraw or collapse, or new, weak political or 
regulatory structures are suddenly introduced. But it may also occur where 
populations lose faith in existing governmental arrangements, and look for new 
governmental solutions, as we may be seeing in Mexico and the Sahel. The result in 
each case is the same: space in the market for non-state providers of government. 
That space may, if anything, grow in the years ahead, as states struggle with the 
structural and social transformations that will be wrought by unprecedented 
urbanization, youth bulges, resource scarcity and climate change-induced natural 
disasters. Trust and other forms of social capital may be scarce, particularly where 
societies have been damaged by shocks such as conflict or mass population 
movements. The space for alternative providers of government such as gangs, 
warlords and mafias may expand.1419  
 Second, as suggested in Chapter 9, alternative providers of government 
seem likely to emerge only where the costs of organization (whether through 
corruption of existing governmental capabilities, development of new ones, or 
integration of criminal and state capabilities) are lower than the resulting rents. The 
episodes in Part Two and the cases earlier in this chapter suggest that globalization 
has steadily transformed the geography that solves this equation by changing cost 
structures and reorganizing value chains. Today, even local armed groups have 
much easier, cheaper access to the strategic capabilities that are needed to organize 
crime and provide governmentality – coercion, corruption and communications – 
significantly lowering the barriers to entry into the market for government. 
Globalization has specifically lowered costs in three areas: transportation, finance 
and communications. 
The globalization of transportation gives groups controlling local resources, 
territory or officials the opportunity to tap into globalized value chains. In Cuba, the 
Bahamas and the Sahel, the result was access to new gambling and trafficking 
revenues that transformed local political economies. Cheaper transportation also 
means easier access to foreign weapons sources, lowering the cost of organizing 
coercion; Mexico and the Sahel show the disruptive results.  
                                                
1419 See Phil Williams, ‘Lawlessness and Disorder: An Emerging Paradigm for the 21st Century’, in 
Miklaucic and Brewer, pp. 15-36; and Nils Gilman, Doug Randall, Peter Schwartz, Impacts of 
Climate Change (San Francisco: Global Business Network, January 2007). 
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The globalization of finance simultaneously improves access to off-shore 
safe havens and investment opportunities once rents are captured, disembedding 
rents and rulers from local markets. As we saw in The Bahamas, criminal groups 
can become important brokers of laundering services for a range of political and 
governmental actors looking to move their profits into the global financial cloud. 
The same pattern has played out in Mexico.1420 The result is a weakening of the link 
between local economic activity and political power, as political and military actors’ 
interests become more closely aligned with foreign financiers and corporate 
interests, both licit and illicit, and less dependent on local communities and labour.  
Finally, the globalization of communications cheaply connects local groups 
to a highly dispersed and fragmented market of potential consumers of new forms 
of governmentality. This allows remote association. Clandestine organizations such 
as terrorist groups have traditionally recruited through pre-existing social networks, 
using the social capital and trust within those networks to develop a 
governmentality which can induce young men and women to abandon their families 
and move around the world to participate in a cause, or even to suicide for the 
perceived benefit of strangers.1421 But increasingly global social media offer non-
state actors the prospect of bypassing these intermediating social networks, just as 
the advent of film, radio and television allowed Dewey, Kefauver and other 
American politicians to by-pass the municipal political machines, forming a direct 
relationship with political consumers. Following this strategic logic, Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula, Daesh (ISIS) and Mexican drug cartels have all developed 
sophisticated social media capabilities, connecting directly with consumers of the 
governmentality they are offering, regardless of their location.1422  
These changes in market conditions are producing an intensification of the 
interaction and convergence between ‘crime’ and ‘politics’, as they make criminal 
positioning strategies more cost-effective and viable. That suggests that we can 
expect organized criminal groups to remain a factor in politics and conflict. But 
                                                
1420 Beith, op. cit.; and David Leigh, James Ball, Juliette Garside and David Pegg, ‘HSBC files: 
Swiss bank hid money for suspected criminals’, The Guardian, 13 February 2015.  
1421 See Scott Atran, Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2010); Pape, pp. 173-198. 
1422 On the cartels, see Katie Collins, ‘Guns, gore and girls: the rise of the cyber cartels’, Wired (UK), 
5 November 2014, at http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-11/05/cyber-cartels, accessed 14 
March 2015. 
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perhaps even more significantly, it suggests that we are seeing a disruption of 
sovereign statehood as the dominant business model for government. 
Entrepreneurial providers are experimenting with both external positioning strategy 
and internal organization to generate new governmental forms. They are drawing on 
a range of other sources to construct the methodologies, norms, and practical 
repertoires needed to govern the conduct of dispersed networks. Some adopt 
fraternity based models, organized around the social networks of tribes, clans and 
social cliques.1423 Some adopt faith based models, drawing on religious sources 
ranging from salafi neo-jihadism to the warped evangelism of La Familia.1424 And 
some adopt business-like franchise models, from the Sicilian mafia to the Central 
American maras, as well as outlaw motorcycle clubs. Speaking about the expansion 
of the Daesh (ISIS) brand to Libya, Algeria and Egypt, the Libyan Ambassador to 
the UAE recently warned: ‘The Islamists … have learned the franchising model 
from McDonald’s. They give you the methodology, standards and propaganda 
material.’1425 They provide, in other words, a common governmentality: it is up to 
local entrepreneurs to adapt it to local conditions. This they do, as we saw in the 
case of AQIM considered earlier in this chapter, through combination with local 
governmental forms. 
Still, the strength of the governmental bonds developed through such 
innovation remains to be seen. Social media allows organizations such as Daesh 
(ISIS) to lure teenagers thousands of miles to join their cause, and aids the spread of 
gangster and mafia culture. But the costs of monitoring and discipline are inevitably 
high in a virtual network, and it may prove difficult to maintain strategic discipline 
across such large distances, as Al Qaeda leaders have found in dealing with their 
various franchises. Strategic discipline may be easier to maintain in a co-located 
social group, or amongst state citizens. And hybridization and localization of 
governmental forms may not always produce effective results. On the contrary, as 
AQIM learned in the Sahel, it may lead to transnational political organizations 
losing control of their constituent parts as they become captured by local interests. 
                                                
1423 Compare Paoli, ‘Criminal Fraternities’; Janine R. Wedel, ‘Clans, Cliques and Captured States: 
Rethinking “Transition” in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union’, Journal of 
International Development, vol. 15. (2003), pp. 427-440.  
1424 Institute for Islamic Strategic Affairs, Neo-Jihadism: A New Form of Jihadism. Leading and 
Emerging Actors (London: IISA, 2015).  
1425 ‘What Libya’s Unraveling Means’, N.Y. Times, 14 February 2015.  
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Understanding what drives an individual embedded within multiple governmental 
networks – such as Woolsey’s putative Russian government official, or an Iyad Ag 
Ghaly or an El Chayo – may depend on understanding the relative strength of these 
different bonds, and how they interact.  
 
Implications 
War and strategy beyond the state 
The startling conclusion that emerges from the evidence in this book is that not only 
states, but also some organized criminal groups, make war. Despite its unorthodoxy, 
this can be seen not as radical departure, but a return to Clausewitzian roots. 
Clausewitz thought of war as the pursuit of politik by other means – that is, violence. 
But this politik was not solely state policy, but rather ‘the interests of the 
community’.1426 He contemplated war-making by a range of non-state communities, 
including the ‘semi-barbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords 
and trading cities of the Middle Ages’.1427 A Clausewitzian take on organized crime 
thus requires recognizing that some criminal groups form communities that may 
pursue politik – and not just simply greed – through the strategic use of violence. 
These groups may not be collocated in a particular territory, nor aspire to formal 
recognition or even political authority; but the cases studied in this book suggest 
their power within and over politics is no less real. 
Treating organized criminal groups as potential war-markers suggests a need 
to rethink our treatment of these groups in both strategic and international relations 
theory. Criminologists have recognized that criminal groups in illicit markets 
operate like states in the international system (i.e. strategically, under anarchy).1428 
But international relations theory treats the two realms as mutually exclusive, on the 
presumption that ‘the criminal does not threaten the effective control of the state; in 
fact it relies on the state for providing the hierarchical [Westphalian] system in 
                                                
1426 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 606-607. 
1427  Ibid., p. 586. See further Mark T. Clark, ‘Does Clausewitz Apply to Criminal-States and 
Gangs?’, Global Crime, vol. 7, nos 3-4 (August-September 2006), pp. 407-427.  
1428 Williams, ‘The Terrorism Debate’, p. 265.  
  308 
which to exist’.1429 This study seriously challenges that assumption. It shows 
criminal organizations wielding substantial power directly on the international level, 
invading states, seeking to effect regime change, transforming political economies 
and political settlements, even threatening to create new states. There is a need for 
international relations theorists to re-examine the influence of private criminal 
organizations as strategic players in the international system in their own right.1430  
Moreover, the study suggests a need to revisit the very notion of state 
‘sovereignty’. It suggests not just that sovereignty may be being ‘softened’,1431 but 
that it now coexists with a variety of other powerful allegiances and ‘social 
sovereignties’.1432 In this sense, the future of the market for government may in 
some ways resemble the pre-Westphalian period, with individual and group 
strategies shaped by multiple overlapping identities, obligations and incentive-
structures. Still, we should be cautious of proclaiming the Westphalian era dead, 
and the arrival of a ‘New Middle Ages’.1433 The effects of globalization are not to 
displace the state entirely, but to disrupt its existing business model, forcing it to 
compete, co-opt and collaborate with other providers of government, such as 
organized crime. The role of organized crime as a competitor for governmental 
power is not, as Part Two makes clear, entirely new; but globalization does, it 
appears, facilitate the use of criminal strategy by lowering some of the costs of 
entry into and survival in the market for government.  
  In the future, effective strategy may thus depend on understanding the 
incentives not only of states and their leaders and citizens, but also of complex 
transnational networks, some of them deliberately hiding their power from view.1434 
Competing with organized crime will be a central part of this task.  
 
                                                
1429 Anthony Vinci, ‘Anarchy, Failed States, and Armed Groups: Reconsidering Conventional 
Analysis’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 2, (2008), p. 304.   
1430 Compare Phil Williams, ‘The Nature of Drug-Trafficking Networks’, Current History, vol. 97, 
no. 618 (1998), pp. 154-159; Susan Strange, ‘States, Firms and Diplomacy’, International Affairs, 
vol. 68, no. 1 (January 1992), pp. 1-15. 
1431 Clunan and Trinkunas.  
1432 Robert Latham, ‘Social Sovereignty’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 17, no. 4 (2000), pp. 1-18.  
1433 Compare Rapley.  
1434 Compare Philip G. Cerny, ‘Neomedievalism, Civil War, and the New Security Dilemma: 
Globalisation as Durable Disorder’, Civil Wars, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 36-64. 
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Combating criminal governmentality 
If states are successfully to combat the convergence of organized crime and politics, 
they will need to heed the lessons from their own past experiences dealing with – 
and even collaborating with – organized crime. One crucially important practical 
insight that emerges from the episodes considered in this study is that the 
competition to govern is ultimately won and lost in the mind.  
In New York, Sicily, Cuba, The Bahamas, Mexico and the Sahel, the hidden 
power of organized crime derived from people’s choices to regulate their own 
conduct according to the secret rules and rulings of a private criminal system, rather 
than the public rule of law. And the less effective state government appeared, the 
more overt criminal governmentality became. Defeating organized crime means 
changing the calculus of these individual choices, so that people choose to be 
governed by the state, and not by criminal governmentality. 
 The case of Mali is instructive. One Touareg leader interviewed for a 2014 
study stated simply: 
We have become a mafia culture… Everyone wants to be a part of it. 
Every youth in our society now wants to be part of the black economy… It 
makes development impossible.1435 
 Expert observers such as Wolfram Lacher argue that political power in 
northern Mali grows out of ‘alliance with local criminal networks’, and that any 
effective ‘approach to the conflict must include strategies to break these 
alliances’.1436 Yet at the time of writing, the international community lacks a clear 
strategy for ‘breaking these alliances’, beyond strengthening law enforcement and 
interdiction capabilities. How can these alliances be defeated, when these criminal 
networks draw their own governmental power from the ‘mafia culture’ described 
above? As in occupied Sicily, foreign military actors dealing with traffickers in 
Mali have chosen to favour stabilization over transformation, eschewing efforts to 
confront or delegitimize mafia culture. ‘Our priority is counterterrorism’, one 
French diplomat told researchers. ‘When we stop a car, we are looking for weapons 
and explosives. Other than that, we let them go’, even if there are suspicions of 
                                                
1435 GITOC, ‘Illicit Trafficking’, p. 18. 
1436 Lacher, ‘Organized Crime and Conflict’, p. 19. 
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involvement in trafficking.1437 Unsurprisingly, there are signs of the re-emergence 
of systematic corruption in Mali’s politics, with several suspected drug traffickers 
elected to parliament.  
  The study also suggests, though, that where the state confronts organized 
crime solely through law enforcement and military means, short-term success rarely 
endures. Mori gaoled thousands, but the mafia returned to power. Dewey felled 
Luciano, only to be forced to release him ten years later. In the memorable phrase 
of mafia historian John Dickie, this is the common pattern of state strategy: ‘sleep-
walking into repression and then recoiling towards tolerance’.1438 Strategic criminal 
groups figure this out. Research shows that states’ all-too-predictable strategic 
reversals send a signal of competitive weakness that criminal adversaries learn to 
exploit. 1439 All they have to do is out-last state confrontation, and one form or 
another of accommodation is likely to return. 
 What would a more effective state approach look like? The lesson of Part 
Two seems to be that organized crime is weakened and its impacts on society 
greatly constrained when society rejects criminal governmentality – the ‘mafia 
culture’ described by the Touareg leader above. Criminal governmentality is 
organized crime’s ‘centre of gravity’, a term Clausewitz used to symbolize an 
actor’s ‘hub of power’, the central element of its forces or capabilities that keeps 
them all together, the source of its internal ‘political connectivity’.1440 A criminal 
group that is unable to maintain criminal governmentality is vulnerable to its 
members defecting, as Luciano, Giuliano and Batista all learned. A group that can 
extend its governmentality to new players can, in contrast, ride out even major 
political changes and state hostility, as the Sicilian mafia did after World War Two, 
and the Mob did in The Bahamas. This study suggests that more effective state 
policies for combating organized crime would need to focus much more on strategic 
communication and related methods to uncover, contain and delegitimize criminal 
                                                
1437 GITOC, ‘Illicit Trafficking’, p. 9.  
1438 Dickie, Mafia Republic, p. 127 
1439 See David M. Kennedy, Don’t Shoot: One Man, A Street Fellowship, and the End of Violence in 
Inner-City America (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011). 
1440 See Clausewitz, pp. 485-486, 595-596; and see Antulio J. Echevarria, ‘”Reining In” the Center 
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governmentality. Four avenues in particular stand out as potentially promising for 
research and policy development.  
 First, states would invest significantly more in effective anti-corruption 
mechanisms within government institutions. Randomized control trials indicate that 
the credible threat of sanction created by effective anti-corruption monitoring 
systems is the most effective way to deter organized corruption in developing 
countries.1441 Anti-corruption monitoring serves both as an effective preventive 
measure against criminal governmentality, and to expose actual corruption, which, 
once uncovered, can then be targeted for investigation, prosecution, or broader 
social delegitimization. 
Second, states would focus more on harnessing the power of broadcast (and 
today, social) media when delegitimizing criminal governmentality. Dewey’s radio 
addresses were crucial to Luciano’s fall. Cracks in the dam of omertà in the US 
began to appear with the televising of the hearings of the Kefauver Committee and 
later Valachi’s testimony. Criminal groups understand this vulnerability. The 
Sicilian mafia’s attacks on the press were designed to safeguard omertà, and today 
Mexican cartels have made independent journalists and social media activists a 
recurring target for attack.1442 Long-term investment in investigative journalism, the 
protection of journalists and free media may be crucial to resisting the hidden power 
of organized crime.1443 Yet this is, at present, almost entirely absent from state and 
intergovernmental frameworks to combat organized crime. On the contrary, the 
increasing insistence in some quarters on secrecy on the grounds of counter-
terrorism and ‘national security’ could hardly be better designed to create a more 
fertile environment for the development of ties between state intelligence 
institutions and criminal networks.  
Third, state and intergovernmental policies would also work through other, 
context-specific strategic communications channels to combat criminal 
governmentality. One source of potential models is North American anti-gang 
                                                
1441 See e.g. Ben Olken, ‘Monitoring corruption. Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia’, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 115, no. 2 (2007), pp. 200-249. 
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programming, which has found particular success through an epidemiological 
approach designed to disrupt the normalization of violence, 1444  and ‘focused 
deterrence’ efforts designed to ensure state agencies are better coordinated and thus 
send more consistent deterrence signals to specific criminal groups.1445 Such models 
will need to be adapted to other contexts, for example by working with local tribal 
leaders, religious authorities and civil society organizations to counter criminal 
narratives and promote an alternative, more positive vision of statehood and 
citizenship.  
Women seem to have a particularly important role to play here, by 
encouraging men to be governed not by violent, macho criminal culture but by 
more socialized, family-oriented values. Some counter-terrorism efforts encourage 
potential offenders to marry precisely because marriage seems negatively to 
correlate to participation in violent extremism; and there is evidence that women 
can be influential in anti-gang and community violence reduction initiatives for 
similar reasons, changing individuals’ perceptions of their strategic outlook from 
one of violence leading to glory or death, to one of long-term family development 
and social respectability.1446 
Fourth, in some cases, states may need to harness the organizational 
capabilities of groups involved in organized crime, in order to develop more 
effective delivery of governmental services under the state’s own patronage.1447 
Careful further research is needed to identify the conditions under which such 
collaboration with local groups involved in organized crime will lead to the state 
co-opting them, and when it will lead to the opposite – accommodation and 
corruption. In El Salvador, a recent attempt by the state, working with the Catholic 
Church, to co-opt the maras through a truce process may have backfired, enlarging 
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those groups’ political capital and strategic sophistication.1448 The maras recently 
publicly threatened to swing the next election against the ruling party if it did not 
re-open talks.1449 In contrast, in Haiti, the UN and NGOs found success working 
with local gangs to develop local rain harvesting, water distribution, sanitation, 
youth education, women’s health and recreational services. 1450 As Robert Muggah 
puts it, ‘[i]nstead of marginalizing gangs’ these programmes brought them ‘into an 
iterative process of negotiation, dialogue, and ultimately self-regulation.’1451 The 
process transformed these groups from being organized within a criminal system to 
being organized within the framework of civil society protected by the state. But the 
limited evidence and analysis relating to the incentive structures, amnesty 
conditions and reintegration programmes needed for such transformation 
programmes to be successful requires further expansion.1452 As Table 1 in Chapter 9 
suggests, in some cases folding the governmental capabilities of armed groups into 
the state system may also require extending state authority, whether in regulatory 
terms (for example by moving from prohibitionist to licensing regimes for 
criminalized goods and services), or in physical terms (for example through 
improved urban design, as has been effective in Medellín in recent years).  
Fifth, states might invest in improvements in the metric systems used to 
measure the risks posed by organized crime, and the impacts of different 
interventions on those risks. To date, because we have lacked a clear framework for 
analysing the strategic risks posed by organized crime, many efforts to develop such 
metric systems have substituted measurements of violence or criminal market 
activity for measurement of strategic risk. Similarly, they have substituted 
measurement of interventions’ outputs (numbers of police trained, number of 
criminals arrested) for measurement of outcomes (reduced risk). The shortcomings 
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of such approaches is increasingly recognized by some donors, such as USAID and 
the UK Home Office, both of whom are investing in efforts to measure the impacts 
of counter-organized crime interventions. But because these efforts lack a clear 
framework explaining how and when criminal activity will pose different types of 
risks to different actors (such as states, civilians, or legitimate business), many of 
these efforts seem driven more by ideology or hope than evidence. The framework 
offered in this dissertation may offer new ways to measure the risks posed by 
organized crime, and the effectiveness of interventions designed to combat it. This 
becomes particularly clear when we consider how we can better manage the 
impacts of criminal strategy on efforts to resolve conflict, build peace, and manage 
constitutional transitions. 
Managing criminal spoilers in peace and transition processes 
Many of the episodes studied in this dissertation lend support to the hypothesis that 
armed conflict is criminogenic: it facilitates the organization of crime. War often 
creates a gap in the market for government, by weakening the governmental 
capabilities of the state and loosening the ties of state governmentality that bind 
citizens to the state. At the same time, war lowers the costs of developing the 
strategic capabilities – coercion, corruption, communications, and command and 
control – needed to provide alternative government. In Italy and the Sahel, wars 
made the means of coercion more readily available (on the battlefields of Sicily, 
and in the outflows of arms from Libyan arsenals to northern Mali). It trained young 
men in violence, and lowered the cognitive barriers to the use of violence to resolve 
disputes. It lowered the price of corruption and forced populations into black 
markets as a survival and coping strategy. And wars also tend to harden in-
group/out-group identity, allowing violent entrepreneurs and organized criminals to 
cloak themselves in the mantle of community protection – as mafia-backed 
separatists did in Sicily, and trafficker-backed separatists have in northern Mali. 
This pattern has also played out in Bosnia and Iraq.1453  
War also seems, however, to weaken commitment to political solutions to 
conflict, even amongst organizations with strong political or ideological identities. 
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As we saw in Chapter 2, political insurgencies have a tendency to devolve into 
criminal organizations over time, as financial incentives displace political goals.1454 
This pattern may now be playing out in Afghanistan as, according to a UN 
investigation published in February 2015, some elements of the Taliban leadership 
are ‘increasingly acting more like “godfathers” than a “government in waiting”’.1455 
Taliban war-time involvement with illicit mining, the hostage market and opium 
trafficking has rewarded factions pursuing a criminal strategy, at the expense of 
those with more ideological goals.1456  
For these reasons, organized crime is often cited as a major potential ‘spoiler’ 
of peace processes. The ‘spoiler’ concept was elaborated by Stephen Stedman to 
describe actors who use violence to oppose, undermine or manipulate peace 
processes and post-conflict transitions.1457 In Part Two, we saw criminal groups 
doing just that: the Sicilian mafia stoked violence and ultimately separatist 
insurgency in an attempt turn the post-war transition to their own advantage (as, 
less successfully, did Salvatore Giuliano). We saw the American Mob both 
participating in armed conflict (during World War II) and seeking to instigate 
conflict (in Cuba and Haiti). But we also saw criminal groups actively avoiding 
conflict (the Mob in The Bahamas), or working to bring it to an end (the Sicilian 
mafia, once they had secured Sicilian autonomy). Some criminal actors also worked 
to end violent conflict between criminal groups: hence the creation of a peace-
mediation commission during the Castellammarese War, and the Mob 
Commission’s forestalling Schultz’s attack on Dewey to avoid a war with the New 
York authorities. Organized criminal groups may be opponents of peace, but they 
may also welcome peace, if they think they can turn it to their advantage, as 
traffickers in northern Mali appear to have in 2006-2007 (see above).  
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 As with all spoiler management, what this points to is a need to understand 
the worldview, interests, capabilities – and strategy – of specific actors. How does 
actual or potential access to criminal rents affect that worldview and those interests, 
those capabilities and that strategy? Answering that question requires moving 
beyond an assumption that organized criminal actors will necessarily seek to oppose 
or exploit peace or transition processes; they might, under certain conditions 
equally see the process as working in their favour. This leads to two further 
questions, which both require analysis in specific cases: 1) Under what conditions 
will the group in question act as an ally to, not a spoiler of, the peace process?, and 
2) What arrangements are needed to ensure that the short-term participation in 
peace processes of actors with criminal strategies does not lead to the longer-term 
undermining of that process or of democratic development?  
This dissertation has not set out to answer those questions. But it does offer 
some glimpses into what appear to be potentially promising research avenues for 
those who would attempt to answer them. In particular, it suggests a need to look 
more closely at how armed actors perceive the illicit political economy around them 
and their ability to extract criminal rents, and governmental power, from it. Careful 
value chain analysis and mapping of the illicit political economy may provide 
insights into a range of risks associated with different criminal positioning strategies.  
 First, it may provide insights into the dynamics of violence during conflict, 
including risks of harm to civilians. This might be directly applicable both to 
conflict assessment, mediation planning, and protection of civilians. Each criminal 
positioning strategy seems likely to be associated with a different calculus. As 
explored in Chapter 9 (see Table 1), mafias seem likely to emerge where the value 
of criminal rents is predicted to outstrip the costs of corrupting available 
governmental capabilities. For warlords and gangs, the equation is different: they 
seem more likely to emerge where the value of criminal rents is perceived as 
outstripping the costs of keeping the state at bay, and developing the limited new 
governmental capabilities required to extract the rents. And joint ventures are more 
likely to emerge where the costs of integrating capabilities (including developing 
new capabilities to exploit criminal rents) are seen as lower than the resulting rents. 
In each case, this requires a careful analysis of both the rents available from the 
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local political economy, and the costs of corrupting, integrating or developing 
governmental capabilities. 
In eastern DRC, for example, recent research found that whether an armed 
group chose to incur the costs associated with establishing autonomous rule over a 
village, or instead took on an intermediary brokering role (more like a mafia), 
depended on the village’s position in gold and coltan value chains. It was, in other 
words, a function of how the armed group perceived the rents that could be 
extracted from each strategic approach, reflecting Mancur Olson’s analysis that a 
bandit’s approach to government depends on their expectations of the length of 
their tenure and the rents that can be extracted during it.1458 This may have 
implications for being able to predict which locations are likely to be seen as 
valuable strategic assets for which criminal spoilers will violently complete. Risks 
of violence may be higher at bottlenecks in illicit transnational value-chains, or 
plazas, since they are always highly valuable assets. Indeed, Cockburn argues that 
military dynamics in the Syrian war are significantly shaped by just such 
competition for the choke-points in cross-border illicit flows.1459 Similarly, in 
Afghanistan, there is evidence of increasingly violent competition between the 
Taliban, the Haqqani network and warlords for control of specific resource 
extraction sites that are likely to become increasingly important sites of economic 
and strategic power as western forces draw down.1460  
Mapping illicit political economies in this way may also potentially offer 
insights into Protection of Civilians (‘PoC’) risks: other recent research suggests 
that the ability to extract rents from transnational flows, without local production, 
may increase the likelihood of attacks on civilians, because an armed group has less 
need of local social support.1461 Predicting risks for civilians also requires, however, 
understanding how a specific group is likely to react to state (or international) 
confrontation: whether, as explored in Chapter 9, it will seek to form a defensive 
                                                
1458 Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, ‘On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern 
Congo’, working paper, 3 December 2014, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358701, accessed 14 March 
2015. See Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy and Development’. 
1459 Cockburn, p. 78.  
1460 UN, ‘Monitoring Team Report’, paras. 23-30. 
1461 See Weinstein; and see Kyle Beardsley, Kristian Gleditsch and Nigel Lo, ‘Roving and Stationary 
Bandits in African Armed Conflicts’, conference paper, Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association, San Francisco, 2013. 
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strategic alliance, turn to terrorism, or seek to relocate. Recent work by Melissa 
Dell suggests that the risk of violence in Mexico goes up in areas adjacent to 
districts where criminal groups anticipate state confrontation, for example because a 
political party promising confrontation has just been elected to office.1462 As the 
costs of corrupting government change, so does the risk:return calculus, 
encouraging drug cartels to withdraw from the district in question and relocate to 
their neighbours’ turf, mounting a hostile takeover bid. But such cost structures 
cannot tell us everything: as the evidence in Part Two made clear, criminal actors’ 
strategic choices are also determinative. So conflict assessments will need to 
provide not only criminal rent maps, but also actor-level analysis of outlooks, goals, 
and strategic approaches. 
Second, mapping the illicit political economy (and conflict actors’ 
approaches to it) may improve our ability to chart a viable path out of conflict to 
peace, and our ability to protect transitional processes against exploitation by 
greedy criminal spoilers. The question for mediators and others managing political 
and economic transitions is how to develop what Stedman calls a strategy of 
‘inducement’ and de Waal calls the ‘buy-in scenario’.1463 A related danger, however, 
is that in ‘inducing’ groups with (hidden) criminal agendas into the peace process, 
we risk trading off short-term stability and peace for the longer-term subversion of 
the process or, even more disturbingly, subversion of democratic development. 
Instead of these armed groups’ governmental capabilities being folded into the state 
system, actors with hidden criminal strategies can emerge as mafias clandestinely 
brokering between the state and criminal markets, as appears to have happened in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan1464 and Myanmar.1465 Political cliques may use their power 
over transitional processes to capture criminal rents and even grow them through 
the use of state policy, legislative, financing and regulatory institutions, as we saw 
in post-War Palermo.1466 Encouragingly, the episodes studied here point to several 
                                                
1462 Melissa Dell, ‘Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War’, American Economic Review, 
forthcoming 2015, on file with the author.  
1463 De Waal, pp. 103, 106-108; Stedman. 
1464 Goodhand and Mansfield, ‘Drugs and (Dis)Order’, p. 26. 
1465 Zaw Oo and Win Min, ‘Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords’, Policy Studies No. 39 (Southeast 
Asia) (Washington D.C.: East-West Center, 2007), pp. 27-29. 
1466  Joel S. Hellman, ‘Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist 
Transitions’, World Politics, vol. 50, no. 2 (1998), pp. 203-234; Christine Cheng, ‘Private and public 
interests: Informal actors, informal influence, and economic order after war’, in Mats Berdal and 
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specific areas of risk in transition processes, offering starting points for developing 
practical approaches to reducing the risk of criminal spoiling.  
The first is in mediation planning and the design of post-conflict political 
settlements. These are arguably better thought of as ‘political-economy settlements’, 
since, where the rules set by the state are contested (as is the case in the underworld, 
and during armed conflict), competitions over wealth and governmental power are 
frequently linked. Planning mediation and peace processes, and post-conflict 
political settlements, without conducting a careful mapping of illicit political 
economies is thus inherently foolhardy: it is like trying to settle an argument 
between two sides, without knowing the core interests of the parties, which they 
will not name. It cannot be a surprise, therefore, that many mediations, peace 
processes, and demobilization and disarmament processes get sidetracked by hidden 
criminal agendas.1467 Improved mapping of illicit political economies will give 
mediators and other actors better insights into the stakes in play – and thus an 
improved chance of finding workable settlements.  
One related point that emerges from the preceding analysis is that different 
factions within an armed group may require different inducement strategies, and 
have different buy-in costs. Mediators and peace operations may need to provide 
different conflict-exit pathways for different factions, for example with specialized 
DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) programming tailored to 
address the factions of armed groups with specialist organized crime capabilities. 
As has been evident in Northern Ireland, and may now be emerging amongst the 
Taliban, those insurgent factions responsible for smuggling, weapons procurement 
and financing may be even more reluctant than their fellow insurgents to lay down 
arms, and may pose a particular threat to transitional processes. Tailored 
combinations of confrontation and legitimate accommodation (for example through 
judicially-regulated amnesty or suspended prosecution arrangements), and 
specialized reintegration strategies, may be necessary to incent these groups to re-
enter society and abandon not only conflict, but also organized crime. This has 
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immediate relevance in, for example, the peace processes in Myanmar and 
Colombia.  
A second specific area where we might strengthen our ability to manage 
criminal spoilers is in the conduct of post-conflict and transitional elections. 
Elections serve to restore the political legitimacy of the post-crisis state. But a rush 
to elections risks pushing politicians into the arms of actors with hidden criminal 
strategies, since they are often flush with cash and may also offer the organizational 
capabilities (including street coercion) needed for effective political campaigning. 
In turn, elections offer those groups a chance to leverage their capabilities to 
entrench themselves as post-transition mafias.1468  
So much was already clear in Sicily. Six weeks after the Allies landed, the 
Foreign Office sent Lord Rennell a questionnaire about the strategic outlook in 
southern Italy. One of the questions asked explicitly whether locals had the capacity 
‘to put democracy into practice’. Rennell replied, cannily, ‘beware of Mafia’.1469 
But the Allied Military Government (AMG) did nothing to act on this insight. 
Today’s post-conflict electoral assistance programming should not make the same 
mistakes, but instead ensure that appropriate campaign finance transparency, 
lustration and vetting mechanisms are in place to protect against elections being 
used to launder illicit economic power into ongoing political influence.  
The mistakes of Sicily point to another specific area where an improved 
understanding of criminal strategy might strengthen transitional processes. The 
AMG oversaw a devolution of power to the local level that helped the mafia back 
into power. Something similar occurred in northern Mali in 2006-2007. As we saw 
earlier, there is empirical evidence suggesting that the credible threat of oversight 
for corruption can deter systematic corruption. Yet the current ‘governance’ 
orthodoxy in post-conflict transitions is to localize governance, without localizing 
anti-corruption efforts. We should not be surprised if the results are similar to Sicily. 
But equally, the findings on corruption suggest a cost-effective solution: combining 
randomized anti-corruption oversight measures with allocation of resources to those 
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areas that an illicit political economy mapping suggests are most likely to be 
targeted for corruption.  
A fourth area that might benefit from improved illicit political economy 
mapping is law enforcement and accountability. Conducting law enforcement 
interventions without first mapping actors’ criminal strategies and the illicit 
political economy risks playing into those actors’ hands. Law enforcement efforts 
risk attacking groups that some local actors may see as legitimate sources of 
governmental services, fostering hostility to the state, as the UN has learned in Haiti 
and Kosovo. Rushed efforts to build local law enforcement risk unwittingly 
strengthening local criminal actors by passing materiel or skills on to them, by 
knocking out their rivals, or, worse, generating a violent chain reaction of criminal 
rivals seeking to exploit each other’s vulnerability.1470 And ill-timed interventions 
may even drive actors willing to cooperate with the state back into the arms of 
opposing forces, as appears to have happened in Afghanistan.1471  
Fifth, and closely related, improved analysis of illicit political economies 
should strengthen the effectiveness of targeted financial and travel sanctions. Well-
targeted sanctions can raise the costs and risks of crime. But they can also create a 
rally-around the flag effect: there is some evidence that sanctions have actually 
encouraged targets to draw closer to criminal networks, including in Bosnia, Iraq 
and Afghanistan.1472 Improved understanding of illicit political economies might 
provide greater insight into where leverage exists within these relationships, and 
how to ensure that targeted sanctions are achieving their deterrent and disruptive 
aims.  
Yet coercive responses – such as law enforcement and sanctions – 
ultimately serve to exclude potential spoilers from the transitional process, rather 
than transforming them into allies. The problem, as Ivan Briscoe trenchantly notes 
regarding sanctions targeted at Mali and Iraq, is that ‘selectively fighting crime 
merely so as to starve the armed radicals in the desert will do nothing to undermine 
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the systemic base that allows illicit activity to reproduce’.1473 To address the 
opportunity structures that criminal strategies exploit, mediators and those 
managing transitional processes may need to turn to other sources of leverage to 
induce participation, such as the ‘focused deterrence’ and epidemiological 
approaches discussed in the previous section. 
Finally, even if criminal spoilers are effectively managed in the short term, 
there is a real danger that this is achieved only by international actors inserting 
themselves in the place of the local state, as the guarantor of the local political 
settlement. There is a real danger of engendering dependence, lest the departure of 
the UN or international ‘strongman’ generates, as Batista’s departure from Cuba did, 
an explosion of criminal violence as rival factions seek to destroy each other and 
gain power. De Waal sees this as a recurring outcome in Africa, explaining that 
large external military interventions ‘become the monopsonistic purchaser of 
loyalty and the Leviathan that enforces’ internationally-negotiated peace 
agreements.1474 Kilcullen makes a similar point with respect the NATO presence in 
Afghanistan.1475 This raises difficult questions about how actors such as the UN can 
broker peace accords in such situations without creating an open-ended 
commitment to stay. Those questions require careful further reflection and study – 
not least, because in this tendency to become an informal political magnet standing 
behind, and potentially retarding, the development of effective state capabilities, 
international interventions risk producing structural outcomes that seem similar to 
those produced by strategic criminal groups. Only with a deeper understanding of 
how the market for government operates in a particular society can the international 
community hope to develop sound intervention strategies. 
 
Envoi: dealing with statehood’s brand problem 
The idea that states can protect peace processes from criminal spoilers – and 
perhaps even defeat organized crime by attacking criminal governmentality – rests 
on an assumption that consumers of government can tell the two products – 
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statehood and organized crime – apart. Perhaps the most troubling insight from this 
study is that this may be becoming more difficult. If a former Director of the CIA 
like Jim Woolsey cannot tell a state official from a crook, why should the average 
consumer of governmentality – the average citizen – be able to do so? 
 The problem is not just that organized crime groups have started to act like 
states. It is also that some states have started to act like organized crime. As we saw 
in Chapter 8, there is a similarity in methods between state subversion and criminal 
organizations’ covert actions. And as we saw in Cuba in Chapter 7 and The 
Bahamas in Chapter 8, as early as the 1950s and 1960s there were signs of 
convergence between some states’ economic strategies – harvesting rents from 
private transnational capital flows through wholesale deregulation of trade and 
especially financial markets – and the strategic logic of organized crime. If anything, 
this strategic convergence has arguably grown further since then, as the Washington 
Consensus has promoted a reduction of social service provision by the state and the 
liberalization of trade and financial markets. 1476  The result has been a dis-
embedding of market regimes from social community, and a winding back of the 
role of the state in providing public services.1477 And this, in turn, signals a growing 
unmet demand for government, creating space for alternative providers. 
The bottom-up growth of organized crime may be into this space; but it is 
also matched by other governmental actors moving up and out from the state level, 
into an elite, private global arena in which capital and power circulate hidden in 
plain sight, and free of the demands of accountable government. The Mob’s 
innovations in Havana and The Bahamas helped to connect the underworld, and 
their corrupt political partners, to a globalized financial system deliberately 
disconnected from the real economy, liberated from the shackles of income and 
corporations tax and the chains of the social contract.  
At the same time, ‘state capitalism’ has emerged as a combination of 
statecraft with corporate strategy, with global markets treated as a site for extending 
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the state’s geopolitical interests.1478 State capitalism can serve powerful public 
purposes, for example by finding productive investment opportunities for public 
savings; but it can also mask criminal joint venture, with elites instrumentalizing 
sovereignty to maximize private wealth creation. Casino resorts, such as in Cyprus 
and Macao, remain an important gateway between the two systems – state 
capitalism and disembedded global finance – with corrupt state capitalists first 
siphoning off national wealth and then moving it through casino-based money 
laundries into private off-shore bank accounts.1479 Grand corruption at the state 
level, and organized crime, begin to become hard to tell apart. 
The resulting appearance of convergence between organized crime and 
statecraft has deeply damaged some consumers’ faith in statehood as an effective 
model of government. Those doubts have been amplified by globalized financial 
shocks that have revealed individual and corporate players in this global elite as 
‘too big to fail’ and ‘too big to gaol’, highlighting states’ relative impotence to 
govern them, and the externalization of the costs of government onto the ‘99 per 
cent’.1480 In the developing world, populations watch as unprecedented economic 
growth leads not to prudent preparation for the transformations that climate change, 
urbanization and youth bulges will bring, but instead to growing inequality. And the 
geopolitical backdrop is important, too, to global public perceptions: one decade 
after calling for a rules-based ‘New World Order’, the global superpower flouts the 
global rules to invade Iraq without the support of the UN Security Council. Its allies 
around the world, many notional proponents of the global rule of law, quietly aid 
and abet its construction of a global gulag archipelago of terrorist interrogation 
black-sites.  
All of this feeds a growing popular perception that responsible statehood is a 
façade and that those who follow the rules do not get ahead.1481 The perception of a 
Russian businessman in the 1990s risks becoming globalized: 
The truth is, everything you see around you, all our success, is not thanks 
to our wonderful economic laws. It’s thanks to the fact that we do not obey 
them.1482 
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Globalized social media promotes a culture of affluence that seems 
increasingly out of reach, if you play by the rules.1483 Organized crime offers a 
powerful alternative, and a way to fulfil dreams of consumption promoted by 
globalization, but unmet by states.1484 The result is what President Yeltsin described 
(at the beginning of Chapter 1) as becoming a ‘mafiya power’, and what the 
Touareg leader described as succumbing to ‘mafia culture’. Customer loyalty to 
statehood as the preferred model of government is waning.   
 For states to defeat criminal governmentality, therefore, they must not only 
change perceptions of organized crime, but also arrest the slide in the perception of 
statehood – and consumers’ growing inability to tell the two apart. They must 
address statehood’s brand problem. The system of global governance built for the 
inter-state era must be turned towards re-embedding the globalized economy – and 
the globalized market for government – in a socially responsible framework.1485  
This means strengthening the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’,1486 
and moving away from the ‘negative sovereignty’ model towards a 
conditionalization of sovereignty through specification of positive norms of 
expected state conduct.1487 It means being more forthright in using the Security 
Council and the Human Rights Council to name and shame those states complicit in 
organized crime, and to unmask joint ventures. The willingness of the Security 
Council in December 2014 to take up the question of the human rights situation in 
North Korea, intimately bound up with slavery, forced labor, trafficking and other 
organized criminal activities, is a positive sign, and builds on other positive steps 
such as the international prosecution of Charles Taylor for the crimes associated 
with the joint venture he oversaw in Liberia. The Security Council has also found 
innovative means, in recent years, to mandate corporate due diligence to remove 
conflict minerals from specific supply chains. 
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The United Nations is, however, more a trade association for states than an 
independent market regulator. Like other trade associations, its ability to act as a 
referee is limited by its membership, especially their control of its finances and 
enforcement capabilities – and their willingness to hold each other to account. 
Ultimately, if states wish to promote responsible statehood as the preferred model 
of government it is up to them to hold each other accountable for their performance, 
and to promote statehood as a more effective, credible and rewarding system of 
government than the others now in the market. If states – and society more broadly 
– do not hold each other responsible, the attractiveness of other forms of 
governmentality will continue to grow. And with it, the hidden power of organized 
crime.  
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Abbreviations 
AFHQ   Allied Forces Headquarters 
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(Italy) 
AQIM   Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
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Church Committee U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th 
Congress, 1975-1976 
CFRB Comando Forze Repressione Banditismo, Command Force 
for the Repression of Banditry 
CIA U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
Daesh al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham, a.k.a. the Islamic 
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DC Democrazia Cristiana, Christian Democrats, Italian political 
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DCI   US Director of Central Intelligence 
DEA   US federal Drug Enforcement Administration 
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ISIS See ‘Daesh’. 
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McClellan Committee  U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities 
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